



DERVISHES.

[Frontispiece of Vol. II.]

TURKISTAN

NOTES OF A JOURNEY IN RUSSIAN TURKISTAN,
KHOKAND, BUKHARA, AND KULDJA

BY

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WITH THREE MAPS AND NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

NEW YORK:
SCRIBNER, ARMSTRONG & CO.

1877.

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JOHN F. TROW & SON,
PRINTERS AND BOOKBINDERS,
205-213 *East 12th St.*,
NEW YORK.

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TURKISTAN.

CHAPTER IX.

KHOKAND.

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In one of the letters I had received from the head-quarters of the Khivan Expedition, I was told that it would perhaps be inadvisable to go to Khokand while Mirza Hakim, the Envoy of that country resident at Tashkent, and the Russian Diplomatic Official were away, as possibly I might not be well received in their absence. This advice, taken in connection with current rumours, made me still more anxious to visit the country; and as I saw no chance of the speedy return of these gentlemen from the Khivan Expedition—for Khiva had not then been captured—I resolved to go as soon as I could find a favourable opportunity.

Such an opportunity offered itself in the proposed visit to that Khanate of Mr. F——, a retired Russian officer, living at Hodjent, who wished to buy timber for use in the bridge he was constructing over the Syr Darya. Accordingly, we met at Hodjent, and started off at five o'clock in the evening of June 19 in a *tarantas*, our horses having being sent on with our *jigits* and servants to the village of Kastakoz, as we were

desirous of postponing till the last minute what we knew would be a wearisome horseback journey over a hot and dusty road.

Passing the little village of Ispisar, we soon reached Kastakoz, about eleven miles from Hodjent, where we had supper, and passed the night on the terrace in a large courtyard of a native merchant.

We had in our party Abdullah, a young Tartar, the interpreter of Mr. F——, and my own interpreter Andrei, an active, trustworthy, and courageous young Russian, who had been in this part of the country since he was twelve years old, and spoke Turki and Kirghiz perfectly, and who, being dressed in semi-Tartar costume, was usually taken for a Mussulman. There were besides a rich Hodjent merchant, Haba Bai, acting as Mr. F——'s agent, and three *jigits*. We each had a cart for luggage, since in travelling in these countries one must take beds and mattresses, as well as baths, and other necessary articles.

We left Kastakoz at 5.45 next morning on horseback, and after travelling over a stony plain, destitute of water and verdure, we stopped for a short time to rest at the village of Karatch-Kum, 'the robber sands,' just across the Khokandian boundary. There are about a hundred families only living in this village, but as it was market-day, the bazaar was full. We drank tea and ate melons in a little court of the Yuzbashi, or centurion, while he sent a messenger to Makhram, four miles on, to announce our arrival, and we soon after started ourselves for that village, seventeen miles in all from Kastakoz.

Makhram is a large square fort, with high crenelated mud walls, standing on the steep bank of the Syr Darya, the other three sides being protected by a deep moat, then dry. To reach the little bazaar, opposite the sole entrance, which is on the eastern side, we had to make the circuit of the moat, keeping close to it to avoid the irrigating canals and cultivated land. Though we had letters to the Khan, and had thus a right to official hospitality, we preferred to stop for our nooning at a tea-house, in the almost deserted bazaar, the only bazaar day there being Saturday.

The sun was intensely hot, and I was glad to scramble down the steep bank of the river at the end of the street, and take a bath in the muddy water. We improvised an awning,

but a crowd of inquisitive spectators followed our every movement. Presently the adjutant of the Bek came to us, accompanied by two men with long wands, to learn who we were, and whither we were going. Having been informed that we were going to Khokand to see the Khan, they departed, and soon after returned with a *dostar-khan*, the merit of which was a tray of fresh ripe apricots. We then sent a small present to the Bek, excused ourselves on account of fatigue for omitting to visit him, and soon received in return a cheap silk gown.

Makhram, as the frontier fortress of Khokand, is a place of some importance, and has a constant garrison of 500 men. Some of these soldiers came to look at us: among them one with a blue coat and red trowsers, another with a green coat over a long white native shirt, and a small boy, a fifer, in a blue jacket covered with brass buttons put on over his native gown. Little did I then expect that these resting-places of ours were in two years' time to be the scenes of battles, in a war too begun, not by the Russians, but by the Khokandians.

At four o'clock we started off for Kandbadam¹—celebrated of old for its almonds, which give it its name—making the eighteen miles by seven o'clock. The latter portion of the road was very pretty, shut in by gardens without end. Passing at length between high clay walls, shaded by numerous trees, and flecked with golden spots from the setting sun, we came to a tea-house in the bazaar, by the side of an ill-smelling pond. I was too tired to eat, and amused myself by tossing apricots and almonds to the crowd of boys who flocked from all parts of the bazaar to gaze on the foreigners. This was almost my first experience of horseback travelling; and as I had had but very little practice in Tashkent, and had scarcely been on a horse for two years before, I ached all over, and rubbed myself well with whisky, lest the next day I should be too stiff to move. It was a new thing for me to live thus in public, as I was compelled to do during nearly my whole

¹ Even Ye-lü Tch'u-ts'ai, when travelling with Tchinghiz Khan, speaks of this: 'Around the city of Ba-lan (the Chinese equivalent of the Persian *badam*, almond) there are everywhere *ba-lan* gardens; hence the name. The blossoms of the *ba-lan* tree resemble those of the apricot, only they are a little paler. The leaves are like the leaves of the peach tree, but a little narrower and smaller. The blossoms appear in winter, the fruits ripen in summer.'

journey; but our beds being spread in the open verandah, I soon fell asleep, disturbed somewhat by the noisome odour of the pond. I woke up the next morning feeling much better than I had anticipated, and we started at five o'clock, just as people were beginning to appear in the bazaar.

The town is one of considerable size, and contains several mosques, one of which is handsomely built of burned brick. The view on leaving the town was at first very fine, with snowy mountains visible on the right, and other ranges appearing on the left; but we soon came to a large stony plain, about ten miles across, covered with shifting sands, which are constantly encroaching on the cultivated fields bordering the river. In the middle of this waste is a small village, called Patar, built of clay houses, without trees or the slightest sign of verdure, and seemingly deserted.

Coming again into a cultivated country, and passing through the pretty village of Yaka Tut (one mulberry tree), at nine o'clock we reached the village of Bish-aryk (five canals): stopping at a tea shop, we rested during the heat of the day, but tried in vain to sleep. The bazaar here was built by Khudayar Khan and has regular narrow streets crossing each other at right angles, but the market-day being Monday there was then no animation. As we had a long ride before us, and wished to get to Khokand before the gates were shut for the night, we were compelled to leave at two o'clock, in spite of the heat. Fortunately we found some shade from the trees by the roadside, and came once in a while to a village where we could quench our tormenting thirst with a bowl of green tea or a juicy fruit.

At last we crossed a bridge over a large deep canal, traversed a dyke through fields of rice, the young shoots of which were then of a tender green, and gradually entered a more thickly settled country, with enclosures on each side, and now and then houses and shops, meeting at every step people coming from the town. We soon saw in front of us, beyond the gardens, a long clay wall, seeming fully two miles in length, and in the middle, at the end of our road, a semicircular outwork of even height with buttressed and crenelated wall. Passing round this breastwork to the angle of the wall, we entered the gate of Khokand.

Inside, the view did not much change. There were the same fields and scattered houses, and it was not for some time after passing cemeteries and gardens that we came on a broad inhabited street. Trotting along as fast as I could, for I had dropped much behind the main party, we followed the street which led to the centre of the town, and passing the large Medressé Khan, we turned to the right over a well-built brick bridge, and were almost at once in the bazaar. We fortunately reached the Zekat Sarai just before its doors closed for the night, and were received with kind hospitality by Mr. S——, a Russian merchant, agent of the firm of Pupyshef, the most important trading house in Central Asia. Although his rooms were small, the verandah was large, so that we had space enough.

The Zekat Sarai, a large two-storey building surrounding a square court in which our host had six or eight rooms and storehouses, is properly the custom house of the city, being the place where the official business of the *Zekat* or customs is carried on, and where goods are stored until they have paid the customs' duties. The chief customs' officer, the Mekhter, usually spends the day there, from seven in the morning until five o'clock in the afternoon, seated with his attendants and officials in the verandah opposite to us, where he transacts all the business, and all day long we were able to see goods weighed and measured, and notes and records of various accounts jotted down by the chief scribe on long rolls of narrow paper.

The next day, on finding that we had arrived, the Mekhter sent for us, and accordingly about nine o'clock we presented ourselves. When he saw us coming he put on a flowered chintz robe, and rearranged the folds of his turban, so as to be quite ready for us. He was an old man of about sixty, with a grey beard and sharp twinkling eyes, kind in manner, but not very remarkable for intelligence, and, from all I hear, of more sharpness than probity; at all events, he is very carefully watched by two subordinates, thus having a double sort of inspection over him. He received us very cordially, shook hands, asked us to sit down, ordered some bread, cucumbers, apricots, melons, and tea to be brought in, and asked us why we came.

Mr. F—— gave him an official letter from Tashkent, and stated his business in general terms. I told him that I had

brought a letter to the Khan from General Kolpakofsky, the acting Governor-General, and that as I understood the Khan was not in Khokand, but had gone to Namangan, I desired to go there, to deliver it in person, and added that my object in coming to Khokand was to travel through the country and learn something of its people.

He thought I had better give him the letter, which I refused to do, on the ground that I ought to deliver it personally to the Khan. He then told us we must stop there two days until he could have an answer from the Khan, as he had already sent to inform him of our arrival. He objected to sending us on immediately, from fear lest the Khan might be angry with him, professing to have no powers for such an emergency.

Mr. F—— spoke of the bridge which he was building at Hodjent, and laughingly said, that if they had bridges to build in Khokand he would always be ready to construct them; upon which the old man brightened up, and said they had excellent workmen for such purposes, and were perfectly capable of doing their own work. He then enumerated certain articles which were excellently made in Khokand, referred especially to rifles, which he said were as well manufactured there as they were at any place abroad, and showed us one or two trays of ordinary Russian manufacture, which he at first tried to pass off as being of Khokandian fabrication, but afterwards admitted to be of foreign work, insisting at the same time that the native productions were much superior in point of durability and taste.

As soon as we returned to our own verandah, the Mekhter sent a writer to take down accurately our names and our business, and to know from whom were our letters to the Khan, and subsequently sent again to inspect the letters themselves, although without breaking the seals, in order that he might assure himself of their existence.

I had heard in Tashkent that the diplomatic affairs with the Khanate of Khokand, except in cases of letters addressed personally by the Governor-General to the Khan, were always conducted through the Mekhter, and as Mr. F—— had been instructed to carry on his business through him, we naturally regarded him as something in the nature of a Minister of

Foreign Affairs; but to our great surprise we found he was a person of very inferior rank, being simply the overseer of the Customs, and that he had not the right of free entry into the Khan's presence, and could do nothing in our matter without consulting the Atalyk and the council which had been left there in the Khan's absence. The Mekhter, Mullah Mir-Kamil, had the rank of Merakhor, the seventh in the official hierarchy.¹

The word 'Mekhter' itself means 'steward.' Although he had charge of the customs' duties, he was not in any way a Finance Minister, as he had no part in the collection of the *haradj* or *tanap* duties, or of the other receipts, such as rents, &c., and merely paid the money he received directly over to the Khan. Besides this, as I have said, two persons watched him and controlled him to keep him from cheating.

About six o'clock that evening a messenger came to us from the Mekhter, bringing a box of sugar-candy, a pound of coarse tea, and a *tilla* in silver (9s.), as something towards our travelling expenses. We were of course, according to the custom of these countries, the guests of the Khan, but the Mekhter was evidently desirous of letting his master off as cheaply as he could, and did not even offer us a place in which to live, taking it for granted, as he said afterwards, that we preferred to stay at the caravanserai. As I had made up my mind to follow in all things the customs of the country, and had been particularly told that I must both give and receive presents, I accepted what was sent. The messenger told us that the Mekhter was very desirous of seeing us at his house, and thought it very strange that we had not been there. To this

¹ The higher official ranks in Khokand are as follows:—

1. *Atalyk*, the highest military officer. There is only one,—Ata Bek, who is also one of the five *Naiibs* or lieutenants.
2. *Kush Begi* (fowler), the corresponding civil grade, at present unfilled.
3. *Parmanatchi*, general (from Tadjik *parman*, Pers. *ferman*, firman, order).
4. *Datkhal*, colonel.
5. *Pansat Bashi*, commander of five hundred.
6. *Taksaba* (vessel filler), captain.
7. *Merakhor*, equerry.
8. *Karaul Begi*, guard commander. *Yuz Bashi*, centurion.
9. *Mirza Bashi*, chief scribe.

The former high office of *Ming Bashi*, or commander of a thousand, has been abolished.

we replied that the Mekhter had never invited us to his house, and that as he had preferred, contrary to all propriety, to receive us at his place of business, we did not desire to intrude upon him at his residence. We said further, that if he really wished it, we should be glad to visit him, and asked when we should go. The messenger replied that the Mekhter was then busy, but would be glad to receive us at seven o'clock the next morning.

We rose at an early hour, and were on the point of starting, when another messenger came from the Mekhter asking us to hasten, as his master had been waiting for us a long time: it was then only half past six o'clock. We immediately jumped on our horses, and rode quite through the town to the Mekhter's residence. We were shown through two spacious courts surrounded by broad verandahs and were introduced into a large room where the Mekhter was seated with other officials. Shaking hands with us without rising he requested us to go into the next room, where he would immediately join us. This was a large hall, the walls of which were covered with arabesques and with rude paintings of bouquets and of flowers growing in pots, while the beams of the wooden ceiling were carved and decorated, the intervals between them being filled with small round pieces of willow wood, painted with red and gold arabesques, on an ultramarine blue ground. The floor was well covered with rugs and cushions, and the general effect was pretty. The Mekhter with his attendants soon came in, and after the usual greetings and commonplaces, sent us a *dostar-khan*, and excused himself for a short time. Several of his officials remained, and immediately asked us in a tone of reproach why we had come thus early, as we had disturbed the Mekhter's sleep by this unexpected visit. We explained the summons which we had twice received, whereupon the officials denied that any messenger had been sent, or that any person had authority to make such statements. Of course this was a lie, and a very gratuitous one, for no one would have dared to bring us such a message from the Mekhter, without being authorised to do so.

We then sent out to the Mekhter the presents we had brought for him, I giving a piece of satin for a gown, and Mr. F—— a silver cup, pieces of cloth and other articles, amounting in all to a large sum, for the Mekhter's influence was deemed very essential to the success of the timber contract. In return

a cheap silk gown was put on our shoulders and we retired, not however before we had asked the Mekhter if it would be possible for us to see the Atalyk. He told us that he thought the Atalyk would be disposed to see us, and that he would endeavour to make arrangements to that effect.

It was not until the last day of our stay, however, that we received a message from the Mekhter, that the Atalyk would see us. In the meantime we had made the Atalyk's acquaintance by ourselves, and had been most hospitably received by him; for on my return home I thought it best to send my interpreter to the Atalyk, with apologies for not having come to him at once, and with a request for an interview. The visit was fixed for the next morning. At seven the next morning we rode out to the *urda* or fortress, situated in the north-east part of the city, on low ground, and after going through a guard-room under the vaulted entrance, and then to the left through a group of soldiers, we were shown into a plain reception room with whitened walls, and with a European grate in the fireplace. It was apparently used for a storeroom as well, for robes and other articles made up into parcels were lying on the shelves. Arm chairs and stools covered with red cloth were placed for us, and the Atalyk Ata Bek presently entered, a small thin old man, with a white beard, and a very gentle pleasant face. He had been commandant at Pishpek, and had surrendered that fort to Colonel Zimmermann, and subsequently (at his own request, I believe, to escape the wrath of the Khan) he had lived for three years as a prisoner of war at Vierny and at Omsk. After the Khan, he is now the most important man in Khokand, and as he knows and respects the Russians, he gives his master much sensible advice, and restrains him from rash and headlong acts.¹ It is a strange proof of how little the Russians know of their neighbours, that in Tashkent the Atalyk was supposed to be living in disgrace, and I was therefore astonished to find him the Regent of the city. I apologised as well as I could for not having brought him a letter from General Kolpakofsky, who knew him well, and who had sent a verbal message to him in case I should meet him. Ata Bek seemed very intelligent

¹ This chapter was written in 1873, and all statements must be considered as referring to that time. On the revolution in Khokand in 1875 Ata-Bek followed his master in his flight to Tashkent.

and well informed, made many inquiries about America, showing that he had some elementary knowledge of geography, and we had for some time a pleasant conversation. He told us we should be obliged to wait for the pleasure of the Khan to be known before we could continue our journey, asked us if the Mekhter were doing everything for us that we wished, and was seemingly astonished to learn that he had not offered us a house in which to live. During the *dostar-khan*, the Atalyk excused himself, and on coming back sent a man to show us the fortress.

This is a new citadel or *urda*,¹ which has been built within the last twenty years; the old one, which occupied a much better position, having been abandoned. It might be of some use for the protection of the person of the Khan, in case of an *émeute* in the city, but would certainly not stand against an invading army. It is a large rectangular construction, with high clay walls, containing several small courts and numerous buildings. At the further extremity, beyond the large court, is the new palace, much larger and more magnificent than any other in Central Asia,—a fine building of two or three stories high, with towers at the corners and two in the centre, the whole front faced with glazed tiles, white, blue, and green, and a large inscription—‘Built by Seid Mohammed Khudayar Khan, in the year 1287’—running along the cornices. I was not allowed to enter the palace owing to the absence of the Khan, and to the presence there of many of his wives, and could only see the façade for a few moments from the end of the courts.

Among the various buildings through which we passed was the Mint, but the workmen were manufacturing, not money, but silver ornaments for bridles and harness, and we were informed that the mint-master was also court jeweller, and did any little jobs in silver or gold work that were required by the Khan. In another room was a cannon foundry; several guns were already cast and were being finally finished. The largest piece, which was then occupying the chief attention, was a twelve-pounder breech-loading gun, the mechanism of the breech being constructed after a Russian pattern improved by native work-

¹ The word *urda* is chiefly used in the countries on the right bank of the *Syr Darya*, for what, in Bukhara, is called *ark*, meaning citadel or *kremlin*.

men. The most singular thing was that the gun was not rifled, and was far larger at the mouth than at the breech. Other guns, some of them rifled, were lying on the floor, and near them the large spherical balls used there, for the new artillery system had not been thoroughly learned. Another room of the armoury was devoted to the manufacturing of Berdan rifles. It seems that two rifles had been bought or stolen from Russian soldiers and taken to Khokand, where they served as patterns, and for the preceding four months the whole force of the armoury had been working at these rifles, and had succeeded in nearly finishing four of them. The imitation was tolerably good, and the mechanism, although rough and loose in the joints, worked fairly, but the barrel was not rifled, and I should think that there would be considerable difficulty in manufacturing the cartridges. These rifles were handed to me for inspection, on which I expressed my great pleasure at finding the men able to do such remarkably good work, and promised to inform the inventor of the adoption of his system by the Khokand government. The workmen here do not receive any regular wages, but are usually given their food and from time to time a cotton gown. In some cases the labour is compulsory, and without any remuneration whatever. In the smithy men were engaged in boring musket barrels on a most primitive plan. The borer was fastened to the centre of a large mill-stone, which was kept in rapid movement by two men; the musket barrel, fastened to a block of wood and kept in its groove by means of wedges, was pushed against the borer by a crowbar in the hands of a lad. It was with some little nervousness that I visited this armoury, for in the next room to the smithy—with the sparks liable to come in at any time through the half-open door—men were engaged in manufacturing and filling rockets, the powder lying loosely on the table. The rockets seemed very fair.

Returning again to the reception room, we bid the Atalyk good-bye and received the usual robes of honour.

Khokand is a modern town, not more than a hundred years old, and therefore has wider streets, and is more spacious than most Asiatic towns. It is nearly square in form, and contains I am told 500 mosques, which, with the average of thirty houses to each parish, would give a population of 75,000,—as it seems

to me a fair estimate, although many more inhabitants could be accommodated within the walls of the town.

From the roof of the caravanserai we may see the whole city spread out before us, and not only the city but the Khanate as well. Immediately around us are the broad flat clay roofs of the bazaar, most of the streets even being covered, so as to allow an easy promenade from one end to the other. Near by, to the left, is a group of mosques and *medressés* built of reddish grey brick, with high melon-shaped domes, the cornices covered with blue and white tiles, forming texts from the Koran. In front is the brick bridge of Kish-kupriuk, with its bold arch over the little stream which divides the city, while above it stands out the large *medressé* Khan. To the left are the beautiful façade and portal of the Khan's palace, glittering in all the brightness of its fresh tiles, blue, yellow, and green, for it has but lately been built. Everywhere around are clay roofs, half hidden in luxuriant verdure, and surrounding all the brilliant green of the gardens and orchards. Owing to the flatness of the ground, the town has not the picturesqueness of Tashkent, but this defect is more than made up by the superb mountain view. To the west and south-west are the low hills near Hodjent, to the north the high Tchatkal mountains, while on the east and south rises the magnificent snow-covered range of the Alai, the very boundaries of the Khanate. We see that we are in the midst of the small but charming valley of Fergana, and were we but a few feet higher we could see its life-stream, the Syr Darya.

In my rides through the town I managed to see most of it, and nearly all that was interesting, although riding was particularly uncomfortable on account of the heat, for we were obliged to be at home by seven o'clock in the evening when the bazaar was closed, and thus of course lost the pleasantest time of the day. Besides that, I was constantly insulted and abused, although I was not attacked, and the necessity of being constantly on my guard destroyed to some extent the pleasure of sight-seeing.

In a large square open place at the edge of the bazaar, where fruit is sold all day long, are two large *medressés*, well built of burnt brick picked out at times with blue tiles, and surmounted by domes and small blue turrets. One is called

Ali, and was built by Mussulman Kul. The other which is not yet finished was begun by Sultan Murad Bek, the brother of the Khan, in fulfilment of some vow. Near the bridge, of which I have already spoken, is the spacious *medressé* Khan, built by Madali Khan, containing rooms for 200 Mullahs. It was, however, never completed according to the original design. In the eastern part of the city is the *medressé* Mir, built by Narbuta Bii about eighty years ago, and close by is a large cemetery, with a primary school connected with its mosque, where I stopped on one occasion and spent a pleasant half-hour chatting with the Mullahs, who, although they saw that I was a stranger, were very kind and polite. I had come there to see the monument erected for the wife of Madali Khan, on which were written the celebrated and frequently quoted verses :

Makshar kuni kuram diram ul sarvi kommati
Har anda khar kurumasa kil kur kiyumati.

I hope to see at the Resurrection
 Her of lovely slender form ;
 If I do not see her then,
 Go look after the judgment.

I found, however, that this monument had been destroyed by the Amir Mozaffar Eddin, when he occupied Khokand, on the ground that it was improper thus to honour a woman.

One of the greatest curiosities in Khokand is the paper manufactory, situated just outside of the Minyatchu-vorak. Most, if not all, of the paper used in Central Asia is manufactured either here or at the little village of Tcharku, also in Khokand. The rags are alternately pounded and macerated until they are reduced to a thick pulp, which is then collected into a round ball. Portions of this are then placed in a tub of water and well mixed together. The paper-maker takes an oblong sieve made of thin grass stretched over a wooden frame, and puts into it a certain quantity of the pulp, shaking and inclining it until it is equally distributed over the surface. After allowing it to stand a few moments he turns it out on a board. In this way one man can make about 300 leaves per day, which are placed one on the other with layers of felt between, and submitted to a heavy pressure to squeeze out the moisture. In the morning they are taken out and hung for drying on a wall exposed to the south. The sizing and polishing is done in the

bazaar by a different set of workmen. The size usually employed is a kind of dextrine found nearly pure in the roots of the *Shirash*, a plant of the lily family, and the polishing is made by rubbing it with a smooth and heavy stone. By this process the value of the paper is nearly doubled (from fifteen to twenty or thirty kopeks a sheet).

Imperfect paper is, however, never thrown away, for at the time of sizing holes or fissures are patched up with thin strips, and the surface is made so even that defects can only be discovered by holding the sheet up to the light. This paper, which is usually grey, although sometimes coloured pink and blue, is very firm and tough, and excellent for the gummy ink with which the natives write. For the purposes of Europeans it is of little use, and the Russians have to import all the paper that they require.

The chief bazaar at Khokand is by far the best built that I saw in Central Asia,—very regular, with all the streets crossing one another at right angles, and with many of the shops built of burned brick. The streets are wide, and the whole is covered by a roof supported on timbers high up above the houses, so that the bazaar itself is shaded, while yet plenty of fresh air comes in at the sides. Since a fire about two years ago a portion of the bazaar has been reconstructed in even a better way. There are two bazaar days in the week, Thursday and Sunday. The trade seems to be very large.

The bazaars in Khokand,—as in most other cities of the Khanate,—belong to the Khan himself, who a few years ago took possession of them, and receives the rents himself. Some he bought, paying but a small proportion of their real value, while others he simply seized, telling the owners that they had enjoyed them long enough, and that now he intended to have some profit out of them. The revenues from these are by no means small; for instance, the Cocoon Sarai brings in 1,800 *tillas* (810*l.*) although it is used only for the six or seven weeks when cocoons are in the market; and the rooms of the Zekat Sarai, where I stayed, are rented out for 200 *tillas* (90*l.*) a year. This of course will be of great advantage to the Russians whenever they take possession of Khokand, as the revenues of the bazaars will at once become government property, while in most towns captured by the

Russians, as in Tashkent and Hodjent, the revenues belong to private persons, or are secured by *vaqf* to some religious or charitable purpose.

As I lived in the middle of the bazaar, I had frequent opportunities of lounging in it and of seeing the various trades that were carried on there; but there was nothing new or different from that in Tashkent, nor were the goods sold better in quality, with the exception perhaps of riding-whips, of which an excellent quality is made at Khokand and sold very cheaply.

I was greatly struck with the prevalence of goitre, and it seemed to me as if every third merchant was afflicted with this disagreeable malady. Whether it has anything to do with the use of snow water, I cannot say, but in fact the streams flowing through the city are formed by the melting of glaciers, although at distances of many miles. This was the only town in which I noticed this disease, but I am told that it is also very prevalent in Kashgar and Yarkand.

The structure of the bazaar renders it necessary to take extra precautions against fire and robbers, and the bazaar is closed every night at seven o'clock and patrolled by a guard of soldiers. The parade of this guard was always an amusing spectacle. The different bodies of troops were marched up to take their positions at certain places, and the two fire-engines were brought out; one of Russian work, and the other a clumsy native imitation.

There are about 12,000 troops in Khokand, all under very lax discipline. In the companies I saw hardly two men were dressed alike, or armed in the same way. Some had sticks, some rifles or flint-lock muskets, or more generally match-locks, while some had nothing but the native club, the round brass head of which was fastened on by a joint. The officers, besides their belts and swords, had wands of command. Some soldiers were in native dress, some wore a mixture of native and Russian, but the regular uniform seemed to be a loose jacket and trowsers, the colour being apparently at the option of the wearer, and the number and arrangement of the buttons being also left to his taste. The buttons were all European, and there were few more acceptable presents to the Khan than an assortment of buttons. Many were plain, but most of them were old Russian military buttons, with not a few French,

German, and even English, which had probably come up from India. The words of command showed that some of the instructors had been trained in India, and others in Russia. Three particularly struck me: ' *slushai na karaul*' (the Russian for 'attention'), 'carry arms,' and '*ardja* (order) arms.'

When robbers are caught, they are severely punished; for the first offence losing one hand, and for renewed or aggravated offences being liable to summary execution. When a criminal is to be put to death,—and executions are very frequent there,—he is taken through the streets of the bazaar, the executioner following behind him, while the crowd hoot and pelt him with stones. Suddenly, without a word of warning, when the executioner thinks the spectacle has lasted long enough, he seizes him by the head, thrusts the knife into his throat and cuts it, and the body sinks to the ground, where it is left for some hours before it is carried away and the blood is covered with sand.

I just missed an execution of this kind, for three persons had thus suffered only a day or two before my arrival, and shortly after I had finally left Khokand, the various rebels caught in the recent insurrection were put to death, when the bazaar literally streamed with blood, which even trickled into the *Sarai* where I had stayed. More than five hundred persons were then executed.

Besides throat-cutting, hanging is not an infrequent punishment, especially in the smaller towns, and criminals are sometimes buried alive, or, what is still more frightful, are impaled. In impaling, the victim is sometimes tied to a cart, with his legs fastened to the shafts, while the stake is fastened to another cart, and then thrust into him with great violence, after which it is stuck into the ground. At other times, the man is more gently placed on the top of a pointed stake, which has already been erected, and it is then the duty of each passer-by to give his legs a pull. In this way the prisoner may live in agony for a day or two.

This closing of the bazaar at such an early hour was one of my greatest trials, as it confined us to the close and sometimes ill-smelling court of the *Sarai* during the coolest and pleasantest time of the day; and we were even prevented from leaving the *Zekat Sarai* and going round the corner to the *Khan Sarai*, where the other Russian merchants were living. We

could, it is true, go for a little while on the roof, but as soon as the guards were in full force we were not allowed to remain there.

The Russians then in Khokand were chiefly agents and clerks of the two houses of Pupyshof, and of the firms of Bykofsky and Kolesnikof.

The chief business consists in importing cloths and printed calicoes from Russia, and in purchasing with them silk and cotton, the staple articles of export. It is very often the case that merchants are obliged to sell prints in Khokand and Bukhara at the prices quoted in Moscow, or even less, thus losing all the expenses of transport, in the hopes of recovering themselves by buying silk and cotton at low prices, and by selling them at a great advance, and also by quickly turning over the money embarked in such a way as to save some months of interest by repaying the manufacturers of the prints before the time of credit expires, and then obtaining another consignment, or by having the use of the money in the meantime.

Commercial treaties, it is true, exist now with all the Central Asiatic States, but the rulers know little what they mean, and care less; and the position of the Russian traders is at all times disagreeable, if not dangerous. It is for instance stated in the treaty with Khokand that no exports from that country shall pay more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., or a 40th part, as a *zekat*, or duty,—it having formerly been the custom to charge Christians double what was paid by Mussulmans,—and that no other taxes or trade should be imposed. In spite of this, however, the merchants in Khokand were obliged to pay in addition an export duty of half a *tilla* (4s. 6d.) per camel load of cotton of 576 lbs., amounting to nearly 3 per cent. more, and at one time the Mekhter even insisted on a smaller camel load paying the same sum. This, however, he was forced to change. The merchants naturally sent a petition to the government at Tashkent with regard to the unlawful cotton duty, and General Kaufmann sent a letter of remonstrance to the Khan, who in reply made no reference whatever to the stipulations of the treaty, but said: ‘Four or five years ago, when, by order of my brother the Governor-General Colonel Schaufuss came as our guest, he gave me a petition from His Excellency with regard to cotton, and I, out of respect and a desire to please my brother the Governor-General, accepted his petition, and

reduced the duty from 60 *tengas* to half a *tilla*, and from that time a duty of half a *tilla* from each camel load has become habitual with respect to both Russian and Mussulman merchants. Between the Russian and the Mussulman merchants there is no difference. With reference to the former, by my orders the Mekhter, Mullah Mir-Kamil, shows them in every case attention and magnanimity. I do not know what would happen if I were to put an end to the custom which has existed so many years between us and the Russians, since in every state there are many regulations of such a kind. You, as an educated man, ought to know better than anyone else the customs and regulations of every country.' Although this amusingly evasive answer,—which considered the commercial treaty as a petition which he had deigned to grant,—had been returned to the Russians the preceding year, they had taken no steps at the time of my visit to bring about a better state of things.

In order to avoid insult, and even injury, the Russian traders, when in the streets, were accustomed to wear the native dress. They were not allowed to live in any part of the town they chose, but were restricted to the Sarais of the bazaars, and were unable to mix freely with the natives. The native merchants were forbidden by the Khan to invite the Russians to their houses; and on one occasion, when a Russian merchant invited several native customers to dinner, the act was viewed with extreme displeasure by the Khokand authorities. I cannot help thinking that a different state of things would exist were these foreign traders either English or Americans. They certainly would not be willing to live cooped up in small uncomfortable apartments deprived of all the comforts of life, to say nothing of luxuries, such as postal communications. The native governments have strenuously objected to the establishment of postal routes within their territories, and unless a letter from Tashkent be brought by a special messenger, it must be sent by some native, who may for days forget it, or who simply in passing throws it in at the door, usually in a mutilated state, as it has generally been opened by the frontier or the city authorities. It was difficult for me to believe, until I saw it with my own eyes, and it is difficult for Russians to believe that the Russian Government, which claims to be in Central Asia for the advantage of trade, and which gave out that Khokand was a

vassal state, accorded so little protection to its merchants, and has such meagre information, even in Tashkent, about the state of the country. It was natural to think that the Russians maintained in Khokand an accredited commercial agent, about whom the merchants would naturally group themselves. Such an agent would be protected either by a guard of Cossacks, or by the influence of the Home Government, and he would gradually produce a compliance by the native government with every demand of the Russian authorities. But nothing similar to the English Residents in the native Indian states existed here. The Russians had no agent either secret or otherwise in Khokand; the diplomatic relations are kept up by the Khokandian envoy, Mirza Hakim, resident at Tashkent, a man who enjoyed but to a limited extent the confidence of his sovereign, and who was universally looked down upon and suspected by his countrymen, and by the Russian diplomatic *employé*, also residing in Tashkent. This agent once in two or three years made a short trip to Khokand, where as the official guest of the Government, he was surrounded with spies, occupied with *dostar-khans*, and the exchange of presents, and was unable to ascertain the real state of the country, and according to persistent, if not well founded, rumours was in the pay of the Khan.¹ The merchants complained that in general they were treated with discourtesy, and that their representations and statements were disbelieved, if they conflicted with the official theories which guide the politics of Tashkent.

At the Zekat Sarai we had one frequent guest whose conversation furnished us with unfailling amusement and instruction. This was a Russian refugee, whose history had been most singular. Mina Yevgrafef Gretchenko (commonly called Yevgraf) was a Cossack from Novotcherkask, and had served in the Caucasus as well as in the Imperial Guard, but for some reason or other had been sent to serve at Omsk in Siberia. According to his story he

¹ At Tashkent and Samarkand there was in this connection much talk of wagon-loads of presents, of large sums of money, and of the payment of losses at cards. Captain Terentief, in his 'Russia and England in Central Asia' (St. Petersburg, 1875), p. 332, says: 'The Khan of Khokand, among other things, gave Mr. Struve the rank of *taksaba*—field-marshal of the armies of Khokand—and bestowed upon him a velvet uniform with gold epaulets set with pearls and precious stones. They say also that the *taksaba* receives the revenues of a grant of land.' Full details of all these things were told to me in Khokand.

had a slight difficulty with a comrade over cards, in which he threw a bottle at him, and left him either dead or severely injured. He therefore thought it best to decamp, and having plenty of friends who furnished him with facilities to do so, he was provided with a number of false passports and various changes of dress, and gradually worked his way to Arkhangel, arriving there the very day the last steamer for England had gone. Finding himself under suspicion at that place, he returned down the Ural, and came to Petropavlovsk after many narrow escapes. The first day at Petropavlovsk he met an acquaintance from Omsk, and fearing recognition, and having no alternative, went over the steppe to Turkistan and offered to enter into the Khokandian service. Indeed there was nothing else to be done; and in addition the poor man was forced to become a Mussulman, taking the name of Suleiman Knl. This was more than twenty years ago. He married, at first, the daughter of a Russian prisoner, and it is said that love for her had something to do with his original flight to the country. He has served in various branches of the service, has been in nearly all the fights against the Russians, and is now a *Yuz-bashi*, or centurion, in the artillery. On the death of his first wife he married a native, and lives entirely in the native way. He is, however, but a skin-deep Mussulman, and has remained a thorough Russian patriot, and would be delighted to return, if even for a day, to Russian dominions. He could do so by calling himself a Tartar, but he has friends living in Russia, and does not like to go back to them in that way. He wishes to return as a Russian and a Christian, with his past wiped out. He still speaks and reads Russian with fluency, in spite of his long exile, and is as shrewd and observing a man as one cares to meet, thoroughly acquainted with all that is going on in the country, and might be of great service to the Russians, if they knew how to use him.¹

On Wednesday, June 25, the Mekhter finally sent word that the answer of the Khan had come, and that we could now go on and join him at Namangan.

¹ In 1875 Yevgraf saved the lives of Colonel Skobelev and Mr. Weinberg, during their forced retreat at the time of the revolution which dethroned Khudayar Khan, and accompanied them to Hodjent. He has since been pardoned by the Emperor.

We were delighted with this intelligence, crossed over to the other side of the court to bid the Mekhter good-bye, and started off as soon as possible, accompanied by three officials sent by him, and an additional guard of a few soldiers until we were well out of the town.

Starting at two o'clock, at about half-past three we reached Buvandy, a small village twelve miles from the city. The road was very pretty, through fields and plantations with many trees, and occasionally canals of clear water, the high mountains being visible both on the north and south. Now and then some fierce-looking man, with matchlock slung across his back and heavy sword jangling against his stirrups, passed us bearing messages from the Khan, or joined us to go in company, so that when we left this village, where we waited for some hours, we had a considerable company.

We rode on for five hours at a good steady pace, although, as there was no moon, it soon became quite dark, through the barren steppe and the sandy desert, which seems to surround the city of Khokand on all sides, and at last arrived at a wretched village of four or five huts. Here, in spite of cheerlessness and misery, we were glad to spread our blankets on the ground by the side of a pond,—for although we were the Khan's guests, no other place was offered to us,—and slept until morning, being too tired even for tea.

After a sound sleep, we were awakened early, and in an hour we succeeded in getting off, when we changed our destination, for we were told that the Khan had already left Namangan, and was at Balyktchi, on the Syr Darya. After two hours' hard riding, still over the steppe, with the mountains visible to the right and left, we reached the village of Gur-tepé, nine miles. Here we were put up in a small court intersected by a narrow ditch of water, without a tree, and with no shade save under one verandah, where we were greatly annoyed by gnats, and with no shelter but an old hut with a muddy floor. We, however, ate apricots, took tea and *shurpa*, a sort of rich mutton-broth, and dragged through the day until two o'clock, when, being too tired to ride, I set out in a cart. The road was again through the steppe and sand, and finally over a barren plateau, lying at some little distance from the Syr Darya.

Between the villages of Hama Bulak and Ming Bulak, we

had a lovely view to the north. In the far background was a high mountain range; below this were lines of hills, and in the middle distance the fertile valley of the Syr Darya full of trees and villages, while rice fields and reeds filled up the foreground. In the distance, on the other side of the river, was seen Namangan, one of the most important towns in the Khanate; and to the south the snowy Alai range was always in full view.

This was about five miles from Balyktchi. On approaching that town, the road follows the river bank, and we had an excellent view of the meeting of the muddy and turbulent Naryn with the placid and clear Syr Darya. The Naryn is, however, the main stream, and imparts its muddy character to the river for the rest of the course. The road turned away many times from the river between the clay walls of the numerous gardens, and again came back to it, and followed its edge till it seemed to me as if I never should reach Balyktchi; for I was fatigued, it was now getting dark, my horse constantly stumbled, and all except my interpreter and one *jigit*, were far in advance. At last we turned up the hill, wound our way through the bazaar, and went to the *urda*, where we were assigned to a common court, and were told that the Khan was not here, but had gone further on, to Utch Kurgan.

Our journey was in many respects greatly lacking in incident. Often, it is true, we had fine scenery to look at, but no one seemed to care for it, or to share my feelings for landscape. The officials who were taking care of us treated us in a very offhand way, and provided nothing for our entertainment, and consequently we were obliged to rely upon ourselves for all our amusement. By far the most diverting of the party was Ata Bai, the *jigit* of the interpreter Abdullah, an old man who had lived in Khokand the greater part of his life, and was addicted to the use of *kukhnar*, a narcotic drink made of poppy-heads bruised in water. He prepared and drank this in a most unblushing way, although constantly admitting it to be a weakness and a sin. His fits of the dumps, when he could not have his usual modicum, made him as amusing as did the undue exhilaration which was caused by the drink. He always had some jest, and succeeded almost alone in keeping up our spirits.

Leaving Balyktchi early the next morning, after a twenty miles' ride we reached Haikovar, a small village. We crossed the Syr Darya on a low crazy wooden bridge, the road following the river for a little distance, and then striking north. The whole country in this triangle between the Naryn and Syr Darya is beautifully cultivated, and full of villages, the canals being brought from the river Naryn, although the immediate valley of the Naryn is a stony and barren one. There was constantly a beautiful mountain view to the north. This part of Khokand, including Namangan and Andijan further to the east, is by far the most fertile part of the Khanate. The city of Khokand is situated in the midst of a stony waste, and only the immediate vicinity of the town can be cultivated, the water used there coming from a small stream which flows the Alai mountains.

Sweltering in the heat, we were obliged to wait at Haikovar the whole day; for although it was only four miles to Utch Kurgan, etiquette required us again to send to the Khan to say that we had arrived thus far, and to ask if we could go further. An answer finally arrived saying that a house had been prepared for us, that new carpets had been spread down, but that we had better travel when it was cooler, and that the Khan would receive us in the morning.

At about five o'clock we set out over a horribly dusty road through the bare steppe, and in an hour reached the bank of the Naryn. The river is here very muddy and rapid, and roars over the rocks like a cataract. Passing for some distance along the bank, and meeting at every step with soldiers and *jigits* who were taking horses down to the river to be watered, we passed through the little bazaar, now crowded with people,—for the Khan had brought a large suite with him,—and were conducted to a small garden, where the air was very oppressive,—by no means the place which had been promised to us. To add to our discomfort, a great dust storm arose, and for five minutes we could scarcely breathe, being obliged to bury our faces in the pillows. The Mirza who was with us told us that for that night we must content ourselves with tea, as it was too late for him to procure us anything to eat. I had long before felt like rebelling at our treatment, and had restrained myself for fear lest I might injure Mr. F——'s business; but

throughout the whole journey I had strongly objected to our not being allowed to have our own way, and to being compelled to follow implicitly the orders of the Mirza. The insolent manner in which he gave us this last information made me thoroughly angry: and I told him that he had informed us all along that we were the guests of the Khan; that as such I demanded better treatment, and that I should insist upon having some supper that night; that it was still early, seven o'clock, and that as I had seen the bazaar was yet open. The Mirza, impressed with my tone, began to apologise, said that we should have something in about three hours, and soon brought me in a dish of *kavap*, which I and my interpreter ate alone, the others having gone to sleep.

We had been told that we were to be presented to the Khan at the early *salaam*, and we consequently had to rise about four o'clock. Mr. F—— put on a black frock coat, with all his decorations; but I, conjecturing that the Khan would not know the difference between full and ordinary dress in an infidel, and having no uniform, wore my usual grey tweed suit, refusing a proffered native gown. After riding for half-a-mile along the river bank, we came to a double line of ridiculous soldiers, sitting cross-legged in the road, in the most absurd uniforms, some with match-locks, and some with flint muskets, which most of them held at 'present.' After riding a certain distance, we had to dismount, and immediately our arms were seized by various officials,—generals, as it turned out afterwards,—in long dark coats, and high fur caps, gold belts, and swords, and three epaulettes, one on each shoulder, and one in the middle of the back. We soon came in front of a large garden, where at a distance of a hundred paces or more, there was a green Bukharan tent, under which three men with white turbans were sitting. Which was the Khan, I was unable to discern. For some reason my movements were not as much restricted as those of the others, and while my companions were forcibly made to bow very low, I had a chance to look. The attendants shouted out something in a loud voice, of which I could only make out *Khudayar Khan Kylsun*. We were summoned to deliver up our letters and presents, and were then immediately brought back, even more quickly than we came. This astonished me greatly, for I knew something of the order of ceremonies at these courts, and had supposed that this was merely



SEID MOHAMMED KHUDAYAR, KHAN OF KHOKAND.

the preliminary salutation previous to advancing to the tent and being personally presented to the Khan. Haba Bai, who was a native of the country, although long settled in Hodjent, and whose conscience perhaps smote him for something, was seized with fear and trembling, thinking that he was being led off to immediate execution, and even Abdullah thought that we were going to prison. We were, however, after being led on foot through the whole line of soldiers, only taken to a house close by on the bank, occupied temporarily by the Bek of Balyktchi, who spends his summers at Utch Kurgan.

This was the first time the Khan had been here during the ten years of office of this Bek, whose house he was then occupying. The Khan every summer makes a tour of the provinces, nominally for amusement and inspection, but really to obtain largesums of money in the shape of presents from the various Beks.

Rahmet Ullah Bek of Balyktchi was formerly a slave, but the Khan fell in love with his sister, who was a great beauty, and on his marriage to her freed him and made him Bek. This sister had died, but had left a son, Urman Bek, then a boy of twelve or thirteen years, who had recently been appointed Bek of Namangan, and is the pet of his father, the Khan. Rahmet Ullah was a fine looking man of about thirty-five, and of very gentlemanly manners.¹

On reaching the house, we were ushered into the reception room, where we sat on stools, while the Bek, in full uniform,—three epaulettes and all,—accompanied by his brother, a handsome young fellow in the service of the Khan, and by his little son Namet Illah, told us that the Khan had ordered him to give us hospitality, and that this, his temporary house, was at our disposal. He then said that he would send for our luggage, and that we were to remain there during our stay. As the house was very pleasantly situated near the river, and had a large garden with plenty of shade, we were delighted with the change. The Bek asked us what we wanted, and told us that everything depended on the Khan's pleasure; that no one dared speak to him first on any subject, and that we therefore must wait. We told him that we thought the Khan had not treated us properly in not receiving us personally when we

¹ A few weeks after my visit Rahmet Ullah was killed by the Kiptchak and Kirghiz insurgents, by having a sharp stake driven through his head.

were the bearers of letters from the chief authorities at Tashkent, but he repeated that everything there was at the Khan's own pleasure, and that he, much less anyone else, did not dare to criticise him, or speak to him. After conversation of a slight nature, he left us with a tray of tea and melons, and afterwards sent each of us a silk gown. When we were lounging about the garden, the Bek got hold of the interpreter Abdullah, with whom he had a long private conversation, trying to see if we had not some more secret business than that which we alleged. In the afternoon we sent the Bek some presents; I giving him, among other things, a small compass set in gold. He then came in to see us, and talked a long time in a very amiable way, had a long conversation with Mr. F—— about his business, asked a few questions about America, and then, turning to the subject of the Russians, asked whether it was true that the troops at Hodjent were being reinforced, and showed a fair knowledge of the position of affairs there and of the character of the new commander, as compared with that of the old, as well as of the complaints made against the administration; he boasted greatly of the excellent army of the Khan, which was capable of repelling any invasion, and then referred to the 3,000 Kiptchaks whom he had in his own service, evidently desiring to make the impression upon us that the Khan was only waiting for an excuse to annihilate the Russian power in Asia.

Toward night we bathed in the river, and had our beds spread on the terrace in the garden, where we had our tea and *pilaf*. We were lying there, half undressed, when a great uproar was raised near by, and we found that one of the men of the house had been stung by a scorpion. I made a slight incision, and applied some ammonia which eased the pain, and in the course of an hour or so he entirely recovered. The next day I tried the same remedy on another man, but without effect, perhaps because he had been stung in the callous part of the foot. Soon after this—although it was now very late—the Bek came to us again and had a long talk. He told Mr. F—— that his business would probably get on well, and that he would tell the Khan himself all that we desired; but he was unable to tell me whether I would be allowed to pursue my journey or not, as the Khan had said nothing about it,

although he thought that it would be possible. He said that, according to custom, he had been obliged to show to the Khan the presents we had given him, and that *Hazret*¹ had been so much pleased with the small compass that he had retained it in his own possession, and then the Bek hinted strongly that he would like another. Compasses are much liked by Mussulmans as they are used to show the *Kibleh*, or the direction of the *Kaaba* at Mecca.

Life in UtcH-kurgan was rather dull. The near vicinity of the Khan, the crowds of soldiers, Kiptchaks, and all sorts of people who filled the streets, united with the intense heat, rendered it disagreeable to be out. And then there was the fact that there was very little to see except the people. We had to rise early, for after the sun was up there was no chance of sleeping in the open air, and we had nothing to do all day but to lie on our backs and talk with the various inmates of the house, or wander round the garden and watch their occupations. It was a very good opportunity for studying native life in a rich noble's house, for the number of retainers was great. In one corner three or four cooks were occupied all day long in killing and cutting up sheep, in washing rice and boiling it into *pilaf*; for Rahmet Ullah Bek maintained a guard of 200 soldiers, whom he had to feed from his kitchen. Then there were the horses to be groomed; and one old man and two boys devoted themselves exclusively to the care of three falcons, which had to be fed, exercised, and played with, in expectation of another chase. The chief steward of the Bek was also his tailor, and I watched him cut two whole pieces of calico into shirts and trousers. There was an old secretary who had very little to do, except to give a reading lesson to Namet Illah, the Bek's little son, who had also three or four other men engaged in looking after him. When all of these people were not occupied with their own duties they were either talking to us, examining the things which we had brought with us—and for them nearly everything was curious—or looking at the operations of the cooks, and gloating in anticipation over their supper. Amusement there was none, all games being strictly forbidden. Such things as dancing, jugglery, and comic performances are, I am told, prohibited

¹ 'Sanctity,' or 'Majesty,' used in speaking to or of high dignitaries or saints.

in the Khanate,—the licentious Khan, having seen the error of his ways, and having put on, for his people at least, a semblance of virtue. Of praying there was very little; occasionally in the afternoon, or at sunset, some few more piously disposed individuals would spread out a rug and make their supplications to Allah; but prayer did not seem the pastime or excitement which it is in the large towns. One poor old man,



THE SIN-EATER.

however, I noticed, who seemed constantly engaged in prayer. On calling attention to him I was told that he was an *iskatchi*, a person who gets his living by taking on himself the sins of the dead, and thenceforth devoting his life to prayer for their souls. He corresponds to the 'sin-eater' of the Welsh border.

With the exception of the book used by the secretary in giving his daily lesson to the small boy, not another one was to be seen, nor did there seem to be any attempt at story-telling even. It was a very lazy and listless, though perfectly decorous life.

We had a whole sheep given to us once a day for the sustenance of our party, but were obliged to kill and cook it ourselves, and as one of the *arba* drivers was speedily found to be the most skilful cook, on him fell the burden of the kitchen.

During the few days I passed in this garden I learned many proprieties as well as many superstitions of Mussulman life. For instance, I was shown how to eat a melon. According to the Koran, when an animal is killed for food, its throat must be cut in order that the blood may all run out. By transfer of ideas the melon is treated in the same way. First, its throat is cut, that is, a small incision is made in the end farthest from the stem; then its head is cut off by slicing off a small piece; after that it is cut up lengthways, and with one or two dexterous turns of the knife the flesh is removed from the rind and cut into small thin slices, which are pushed out alternately by the knife. When a man drinks water, he should first take one swallow slowly, while repeating to himself the name of *Allah*, and then take two swallows, after which he can gulp down as much as he pleases. When a person hiccoughs it is common to say, 'You stole something from me.' This is supposed to bring good luck. If you sneeze when I speak to you, it shows that I am right. If a person sneeze three times it is very unlucky. Yawning is a most sinful and dangerous practice, and arises from an evil place in your heart, *hazzi shaitan*, which is getting ready for the reception of an evil spirit. Mohammed never yawned, for when he was only four years old he was one day seized in the desert by the angel Gabriel, who pounced upon him like a bird and cut out the evil place from his heart. If, therefore, you yawn, you should always put up the hand with the palm outwards, so as to ward off the evil spirits that will at once come to you. Among the more puritanical folk laughter is also bad; and it is said that Hanify, one of the famous Mussulman doctors, lost half of Asia for Islam by laughing. Whistling also is bad. If a husband whistle, something

will happen to his wife; and if children whistle, their father or mother will die. Whistling, too, is supposed to bring wind, and the Kirghiz frequently whistle for that purpose.¹ A buzzing in one's ears shows that a man is dead, and a prayer is always repeated. There is a beautiful legend connected with this. In heaven there is a tree, on each leaf of which is written the name of some soul, and what men call a buzzing in their ears is the rustling of one of these leaves as it falls from the tree. If the noise in your ears be a ringing as of bells, then it is a Christian soul whose leaf has fallen, and who is to die; and so for each faith the noise is different. There also exist many similar superstitions with regard to the twitchings of different parts of the body, called *tentakmak*. There is a little bird named *karlagatch*, the forked tail of which is always trembling. This tail, if you keep it about you, will always ward off ill luck. It is, therefore, a very common part of a woman's head-dress. There is another belief, too, about the *karlagatch*. If, when you first see this bird in the spring, you dig a deep hole in the ground under the big toe of your right foot, you will find a coal. With this coal in your hand go and stand in front of a mosque, bearing also a slim rod. You then watch everyone who passes, and at last there will be a girl wearing a large hat. You touch her with the rod, and make her stop and go into the mosque with you, and you can then obtain her hat, which will make you invisible, and allow you to wander unseen wherever you please.

Among the Kirghiz the magpie (*aka*) is a very ominous bird, and they carefully watch its comings and goings. If a Kirghiz hear one of these cry, he goes out to look. If the magpie be on the east, it means guests; if on the west, a journey; if on the north, bad luck; if on the south, some remarkable event. With regard to the crow, there are similar superstitions, and among others it is said that the *karga*, or ordinary crow, and the *kok-karga*, or green crow of the steppes, never met until the Russians came. Before that the black crow flew away before the green one came; now both birds are seen together. Either the stumbling or the snorting of a horse while on a journey is considered a sign of good luck. In

¹ Russian sailors also object to whistling on the water, as it is believed to call up evil spirits, and produce danger or a storm.

Bukhara, if, in crossing a stream, a horse stumble and let the rider get wet, it is thought to be the greatest good luck. To meet a woman unmounted, or with nothing in her hands, is to have bad luck; but if you meet anyone on horseback, especially a young man, with something in his hands, you will have good luck. If a hare run across a man's path while he is on a journey, it foreshows ill-luck, and he usually goes back.

It is, however, the sheep, which constitutes his chief wealth, that furnishes the Kirghiz with the best material for forecasting the future. The shin-bone of a sheep is always placed above the door of a *kibitka* to keep out robbers, and men sometimes take one as a charm on a journey. In order to prove to me the efficacy of this charm, one of the *jigits* told me the story of a Kirghiz, who, when he was going on a long journey, was besought by his wife to carry with him a small bag which she gave him, and which he was always to keep fastened to the saddle of his horse, and never to untie. After he had accomplished the fortieth day of his journey, his horse being weary, his eye happened to rest upon this bundle, and he began to wonder what he had been carrying so long; on cutting it open, he saw forty bones, which, thinking them to be a useless burden, he threw away. That very night he was attacked by robbers who had been watching him for forty days, and lost his horse and everything that he had.

The most common method of divining the course of future events, is to place on the coals the shoulder-blade of a sheep, which has been carefully cleaned of the flesh. This is gradually calcined, and the cracks, the colour, and the small particles which fall away from it, denote good or bad luck or the various accidents which may happen on an expedition. When a Kirghiz is about to start on a plundering expedition, or indeed on any task which requires luck as well as skill, he always first tries this process, and sometimes will stop in the middle of his way, light a fire, and consult this oracle. Another kind of divination is very common,—*kumalak*, by means of dried sheep dung. The Kirghiz selects forty-one balls of dung, and divides them roughly into three heaps. He then takes four at a time from each heap, until only four or less remain in each. The remainder he also divides into three heaps, and again takes from each by fours. Three more heaps are thus made, so that

at last there are three rows of three piles in each. What is left he divides by three, and sees whether the remainder be one, two, or three. The varying numbers and positions of the balls of dung can be explained by an experienced soothsayer to the intense satisfaction or to the disappointment of the one who consults him. In the towns, stones or small knuckle-bones are substituted for sheep dung, although at such a profanation the Kirghiz would look askance. Persons even carry them always about with them in a bag, so as to be never at a loss for means wherewith to divine the future. This process is in some respects similar to the divination by cards practised by gypsies, and by almost every woman, young or old, in Russia. Among the more settled population, especially among the upper classes, fate is usually consulted by more refined methods, practised by individuals who devote themselves to that as a profession, and in all the large towns there are regular astrologers. A *falbin* foretells the future by opening the Koran at hazard, and endeavouring to explain the first verse that meets his eye in regard to the event about which the question is asked. Another book in use is the *Jalal-eddin-rumi* of Masnavi. This method is in every way analogous to the *Sortes Virgilianæ*, or to the Bible lots practised among some Christian sects. Great regard is paid to dreams, and their explanation is always a matter of anxiety. There is, for instance, the process called *istakhari*, praying for a fateful dream. The usual method is to consult a holy man, or saint, and ask for the decision of heaven as to the course about which you wish to be informed. The saint, on retiring for the night, makes certain fixed prayers which are considered necessary, and has a dream appropriate to the occasion, which he explains on the following day. The test of a dream is nearly always resorted to in cases where a person wishes to join a religious community. Such a person presents himself to the *pir*, or leader, and asks to be a member. He that night recites the *istakhari* prayers, and in the morning relates to the *pir* his dream, in accordance with the character of which he will be received into the community, or rejected.

One evening, towards sunset, I started out with Andrei to walk a little by the river side, and look at the crowd. We saw a calvacade pass us with two of the Khan's sons, stupid-looking youths of sixteen and eighteen years, one of them

carrying a falcon on his wrist. We walked along towards the Khan's garden, where soldiers and *jigits* were standing, one or two of whom rushed up and shook hands with us, and greeted us politely, but we were soon told that it was forbidden to pass there, and were ordered to go back. We had no sooner turned back, than another official came to us, and told us, that if we liked, we could go on and look at the bridge over the Naryn. This is a large rough wooden bridge, standing on wooden coffer piers filled up with stone, extending and coming to a point up-stream in the usual way, to keep off floating ice from the bridge. It was built about forty years ago. As we came back the Khan was coming from prayers, and we were obliged to wait for a few moments, while the band struck up some Khokandian anthem. The music was very droll, the band being composed of four drums, three or four horns, and as many clarionets. We heard here an amusing complaint of a soldier to the *aksakal*, on account of his being abused and called names by some comrade. As we passed the pavilion in which the Khan was sitting, and made the usual salaam, we had a good view of him. On arriving home, the official who had accompanied us back expressed his surprise that we should have been allowed to go out alone, and we were immediately overwhelmed with reproaches at having dared such a rash proceeding; consequently, when three of us went to bathe that evening, only across the road, we had a body-guard armed with matchlocks and sabres, first of three, and afterwards of eight men, who sat on the rocks and watched us, so that I could not help remembering stories of prisoners among Neapolitan brigands, and wondering who would pay our ransom.

Late at night, although we were already going to bed, the Bek, whom we had not seen all day, came and told us that my journey would be decided upon the next day, at the same time as F——'s business. After a long talk he went away with Abdullah the interpreter, and they had an interview with an old white-bearded fellow, Mullah Turdali, the Regent of Namangan, who is one of the Khan's most intimate counsellors, and usually accompanies him on his journeys. The Mullah seemed unable to see any reason why the Khan should do anything for me, as the friendly relations of Khokand existed only with Russia, and not with America, but st'ill was willing to consider the subject. After

some time the Bek came back, and told us that we should each have papers given to us the next day, permitting us to travel wherever we chose, and that every opportunity would be given to F—— to purchase the timber he wished. He asked again about America; and I took occasion to impress upon him its power and its relations with Russia, and hinted that we could even make an impression on Central Asia in connection with Russia, if it were necessary to do so. In a case like this, where I felt that the future of my journey was at stake, a certain amount of humbug seemed not only admissible, but absolutely necessary. After praising once more the Khokandian forces and his 3,000 Kiptchaks, he left off war-talk, and went away. In half an hour the Bek again returned, bringing with him an India-rubber bottle and an India-rubber air-cushion of mine, and wished to know what they were, and how they were to be used. I had left these articles fastened up in my bag, so that it was evident that he and his friend the Mullah had been thoroughly investigating our luggage. He was anxious to obtain some more presents for the Khan, who, he said, was always very eager to get curiosities and things that came from Europe, and began to talk a great deal about inventions. We were able to tell him about many curious things, at which he opened widely his eyes, and evidently thought we were romancing. Although F—— said that he was building the bridge for the government, the Bek told him that he still made some profit out of it himself, and refused to consider him a government agent, evidently taking him for an ordinary merchant, and consequently declining to allow him to have an interview with the Khan. He seemed very well informed; for Mr. F—— was building the bridge as a private speculation, although under a privilege given by the government. From what I had already seen, I thought that if positions were reversed, the Russian authorities would have been more ignorant. He promised again to give me a paper which would be addressed to all Beks and other officials, allowing me to travel wherever I pleased, and offered me also a *jigit* to accompany me; but said that when I came back from my journey, I must then come again to the Khan, wherever he might be, and have an interview with him, when he would be glad to talk to me, as he desired to see me, and wished to give me a letter to take to Tashkent, to General

Kolpakofsky, in return for his politeness. I evaded making any promise, and simply replied that for my part I should certainly be glad to have a personal interview with the Khan. Considering that the Bek had lost his compass, I felt bound to give him, in addition to the previous presents, the India-rubber bottle which seemed to interest him; and F——, whose affairs were evidently not going on in the best way possible, went back with him to the room to meet again the old Mullah, and sent a silver watch to the Khan, and, I think, made some personal arrangements with the Bek about the purchase of the timber, for it was found necessary to interest him pecuniarily in the affair. In one of these conversations the Bek said that he had some very pleasant news to communicate to us,—that the Russians had taken Khiva. ‘This,’ he said, ‘is not news which I have found in the street, or picked up at the bazaar, but it came to the Khan by a special messenger.’

On Monday morning the Bek sent for us early, and we found the old Mullah waiting for us. He gave us each a cheap silk gown on the part of the Khan, and told us that we must come and make a salaam in return for these presents, when we would receive our passports, and could then depart on our way in peace. Haba Bai received only a common calico gown, such as the *jigits* got, and was exceedingly disappointed at being thus lowered from the rank which he had claimed as a wealthy merchant, and at being put below our interpreter, especially when he had given a small telescope to the Bek. After some *kavap*, which we had to beg from the Bek’s cook, as our supply of mutton was stopped that morning on account of our anticipated departure, we went to the Khan in our new gowns and received our bits of paper with the Khan’s seal, and, holding them as we were bidden between the first and second fingers of the right hand, made a low bow. We were this time much nearer to the Khan, and saw that he was a stout, pleasant-looking man of about forty-five, with a brown beard. He even raised his hand in salutation.¹

¹ My passport, which was in Persian, read as follows: ‘To all Hakims, all Commandants of Forts, all Beks, all Amlakdars, and all Serdars: By this order be it known that one Russian American envoy with his people travels in our country for amusement, *tomasha*, and pleasant pastime, therefore to this Russian, in every Vilayet and Kishlak where he may go, let nothing be done against the hospitality which is due to our guest, or against his wish, and let the hospitality be shown

Luckily, on account of the heat, I wore only the gown when I went to bow to the Khan, for when I came to pack up before starting I narrowly escaped being stung by an enormous scorpion which I found on the collar of my coat. The Bek came to bid us good-bye, and gave F—— and myself each another silk gown, and as road-money ten rubles in silver, as well as a smaller amount to the interpreter Abdullah. Under the circumstances there was nothing to do but to take the money, much as it went against the grain. F—— started off immediately on his road to Namangan, but I was detained for some hours waiting for the *jigit* promised to me. Finally, about three o'clock I set off with Andrei and my own *jigit*, and the Bek's *jigit* overtook us when we got up the hill and were leaving the town. For miles we went in a south-easterly direction through a barren steppe, then through a well-watered and cultivated country skirting low hills to the east, and came at last at eight o'clock to the large village of Paita, twenty-four miles from Utch-Kurgan. In some of the smaller villages we met half-a-dozen horsemen who were passing over the road, directing all the inhabitants to clear it and to make it ready, as the Khan was expected within two days. Whenever they came near a person or house they shouted out at the top of their voices: 'His Majesty Khudayar Khan is coming. See to it that the roads be smooth, and that there be no mud nor uncleanness.' All along the road large bodies of peasants were at work filling up the holes and making it level and good. I could not help recalling what in the Gospel of Matthew is told of John the Baptist: 'The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, and make his paths straight.'

In order to try the effects of my new passport, I had sent it before me by the *jigit*, who received the paper reverently and pressed it to his lips and to his eyes, and had asked for a lodging in a garden with good water, provender for the horses, and supper for myself.

I was met at the edge of the town by a messenger, and conducted to a garden belonging to the Serdar of the town, where a terrace had been covered with rugs for me. One of the tea-boys from the bazaar was there, and served me tea and which is due to him, looking at him (considering his position), and let masquerades not be made of him, and let improper words not be spoken to him.'

melons, and I had a supper of *shurpa* and *pilaf*, and every attention was given to me. Even here, however, there were scorpions, and having killed one while I was taking my tea, I was glad to have my iron bedstead put up. I had taken a cold at Utch Kurgan from bathing, and found it that night much worse, and it continued to trouble me for weeks till I broke it up with quinine.

While my men were packing up the next morning I had time to make a survey of the garden, which was large and really very fine. It was surrounded on all sides by a high clay wall, was well irrigated, and besides containing many fruit trees, was planted with pomegranates, quinces, grapes, cotton, china-asters, and other flowers. Although the gardens in this country are the usual places of abode in summer, the inhabitants rarely, if ever, have any houses in them, preferring to sleep in the open air on a raised platform which can be covered with rugs. Sometimes a tent, or *kibitka*, is put up, and there are always a few stones or low clay mounds where fires are built and the pots are placed for cooking.

I talked a long time with the Serdar, and gave him a silk gown such as I had received from the Khan, at which he was much pleased—probably never having had one so good before—and immediately put it on, receiving the compliments and congratulations of the bystanders. It is curious that in Central Asia a man rarely thanks for presents until he is congratulated on receiving them, and even then he thanks you only for your congratulations. Except in cases like this, when presents are a payment—and a very dear payment too—for hospitality received, the practice of giving presents, so prevalent in Central Asia, is a great nuisance. A present cannot be refused without offence, and if accepted, a present of like or of even greater value must be speedily returned. Indeed, if a man offer you a bunch of grapes he will say: '*Sillau kiryak*,' a present is necessary. In Tashkent the natives will even tell a Russian the exact amount they expect to receive from him, and no sale can be effected or service rendered without an immediate demand for a *sillau*. It is accepted with an impassive face as a mere matter of course.

The Serdar accompanied us through the town, which was filling up with country people of all kinds, Uzbeks, Kiptchaks,

and Kirghiz, it being bazaar day, Tuesday. We went through continual gardens and occasional villages as far as the Syr Darya, more than four miles, where my host left me, after having seen me safely across the three broad streams on a cart. I had to sit on a high seat, as the water covered the floor of the cart. For four miles more we went through gardens, losing our way once through wrong advice, but soon finding it again, and arrived at Andijan about noon.

The large Khan Canal which runs through the town was overflowed, so that in getting to the palace of the Bek to find out where we were to put up, and in returning thence to the bazaar, we were obliged to make a circuit of two-thirds of the town; the remark of Baber about the nine streams of water flowing through Andijan seemed to me literally true.¹

I was given a house and a court at the bazaar, the same that had been occupied by Fedtchenko on his journey of exploration, as inscriptions on the walls testified. While convenient on many accounts, it was extremely unpleasant from the very noisome odour which came to us with every breath of air,—the real Central Asian bazaar smell. Toward evening I took a walk through the bazaar, which is very large and fine, as Andijan is the most important town after the capital, and is besides an

¹ 'Of the districts on the south of the river, one is Andijan, which has a central position, and is the capital of Fergana. It abounds in grain and fruits, its grapes and melons are excellent and plentiful. In the melon season it is not customary to sell them at the beds; every one can eat them without pay. There are no better Nashpatis (pears) produced than those of Andijan. In all Maverannahr, after the fortresses of Samarkand and Kesh, no town is equal in size to Andijan. It has three gates. The citadel is situated on the south of the city. The water-courses of the mills by which the water enters the city, are nine; and it is remarkable that of all the water that enters the city, none flows out of it. Around the fortress, on the edge of the stone-faced moat, is a broad highway covered with pebbles. All round the fort are the suburbs, which are only separated from the moat by this highway that runs along its banks.

'The district abounds in birds and beasts of game. Its pheasants are so fat that the report goes that four persons may dine on the broth of one of them, and not be able to finish it. The inhabitants of the country are all Turks, and there is none in the town or market who does not understand the Turki tongue. The common speech of the people of this country is the same as the correct language of composition, so that the works of Mir Ali Shir, surnamed Navai, though he was bred and flourished at Heri (Herat) are written in this dialect. The inhabitants are remarkable for their beauty. Hodja Yusuf, so famous for his science in music, was a native of Andijan. The air is unwholesome, and in the autumn agues are prevalent.'

old place. I saw several *medressés* and a number of fine caravanserais constructed of burnt brick inlaid with tiles, better than anything which I had seen at Khokand or Tashkent. An escort of soldiers and officials accompanied me, and although they somewhat hindered my free passage they were useful in driving off the crowd which surrounded me at every step. On coming home I sent Andrei to the Bek, to ask at what time I could call on him. On reaching the palace his elbows were seized, and he was dragged before the Bek with all the usual etiquette, when the Bek told him that he would receive me the next morning, if I greatly desired it, but he wished to know why I was in such a hurry, as it was customary to stay in a place a day or two before asking an audience of him. The Bek was Nasr'Eddin, the eldest son of the Khan, and heir to the throne, and therefore commonly called Khan Zada (the Khan's Son).¹

When at the early hour appointed we arrived at the palace, which is a new building, constructed with all the out-houses and stables in the Russian style from Russian designs, we found the Bek still asleep, and we were obliged to wait for some time in the hot courtyard, where we were surrounded by inquisitive people. At last I protested and said that unless I were shown to a room within the palace, where I could wait until the Bek was ready to receive me, I should return home. I was then invited into a room filled with servitors and people of the Bek, who were eating nuts and raisins and drinking tea, with whom I had rather an amusing time. Two of them, I found, were Tartars, who understood Russian; for the Bek had surrounded himself by Tartar servants.

At last, we were sent for and were brought into the great inside court-yard by an official who told us what to do. We saw the Bek sitting at a window at the right, in a building facing us. We bowed and then went up close to him on the verandah where we were obliged to stand during the interview, while he remained seated within the building. There was, however, none of the ceremony used with the Khan. The Bek held out his hand to me, which I took; and then he asked us to stand closer to the window and talk with him. I found him a

¹ Nasr'eddin took part in the rebellion against his father in 1875, and was made Khan, but he was soon driven from the throne.

pleasant, full-faced man of about twenty-five, looking as if he had a good disposition, and were a good liver. He had been in Tashkent, where he had stayed for nearly a month, and had acquired, to a certain extent, Russian ways; at least, as far as dissipation is concerned, for, besides champagne, he was in the habit of drinking a great deal of *vodka*. He told me, that now I had come here, we must always be good friends, and that he perfectly understood the reasons of my coming, for no two cities in the world were alike; that he himself had gone to Tashkent to see something new, and had made many friends there. He then asked me when I was going away. I told him that I desired to go that day and asked him for a *jigit*, at which he said I should stay longer, as he had remained twenty days in Tashkent and therefore I ought to remain the same time here. I said my time was very short and that I had already been two weeks in the country; to which he replied that Andijan was a very different place from Tashkent and that I ought to stay and see everything that was curious; and that I might go where I pleased. I therefore, agreed to stay until the next morning and then presented him with a silver horn for tobacco, at which his eyes brightened up, and, with a smile, he said in Russian, '*Na pamiat*' (in remembrance). After a few compliments I bowed, and, in accordance with the prevailing etiquette, asked him if I could be allowed to go; to this he graciously assented, and I was taken to a little room on the other side of the court, where the Bek's steward offered me a cup of tea and a *dostar-Khan*, far worse than I had ever received from any petty village official. I had barely put the cup to my lips, when the steward brought me a second-hand gown of scarlet silk shot with gold, gave a common one to Andrei and told me that I could now go, a permission of which I was not slow to avail myself, first going back into the court and bowing to the Bek.

Here, as elsewhere, I have related these personal and apparently petty details, because they afford an index to the spirit and disposition of the Khokandian authorities in their dealings with Russians. Although travelling as a private person, I had come provided with a strong letter of recommendation from the Russian authorities, who had supposed that a wish of theirs, expressed to the Khan, was equivalent to a command, and that either would be submissively obeyed. When,

on my return to Tashkent, I recounted the incidents of my journey, great astonishment was manifested and some persons went so far as to say that I had greatly exaggerated them.

The most amusing part of my visit to the Khan Zada was the return, when, in accordance with the etiquette to which even the Russian Envoy had submitted, I was obliged to wear my gown. I had more than a mile to ride to the bazaar, and, seeing me thus attired and accompanied by several officials sent by the Bek, the people all stood up and bowed to me as I passed. One of the men sent by the Bek was instructed to tell me, that his master would have been very glad to receive me quietly in the evening as a friend, but that he was afraid of his father, who was coming within a day or two and who disliked the Russians and did not wish his subjects to have much intercourse with them. He would be glad, however, to do for me everything that was possible; and said, that if I had no *vodka* with me and desired some, he would be very glad to send me a supply. Whether he thought that he was doing me a favour in offering me some of his favourite drink, or that it was a necessity to all Europeans, I do not know; probably, the latter, judging from what he had seen in Tashkent.

I told the messenger that I should like to visit the fortress; but in spite of the permission I had personally received from the Bek, he said it would be impossible for me to do so, unless he returned to the Bek and obtained his order. He went back, but did not come to me again until late in the day. Meanwhile, two gypsy women (*Liuli*) came in to look at us: they sang songs for me, presented flowers, and tried their best to get some money from me, all of which afforded us great amusement. Gypsies—who are not uncommon in these countries—look very much like the Kirghiz, but are easily distinguished from them, being much handsomer and having more regular features.

When the messenger at last returned with the required permission, we went to the new fortress, Yangy Urda, which contains the former palace of the Bek,—a wretched, clay building,—and some new constructions, evidently from Russian designs. The guard was placed under arms near a number of old brass cannon, some evidently of Chinese manufacture, and probably captured in Kashgar. Considering the vicinity and the sometime sway of the Chinese, it is remarkable that traces of

Chinese influence have not been found in this and other cities. The soldiers were as ridiculous in appearance as any I had previously seen, and the officer in command wore Russian epaulettes, bearing the cipher of the Emperor Paul I. On the way home we stopped at the armoury, where rude muskets were being made. The machinery is turned by water, and is in every respect much better than that in the armoury at Khokand. I saw there, to my great surprise, some plans of buildings, apparently copied from French architectural books, bearing French inscriptions, such as '*plain*' and '*élévation*.' I supposed at the time that some French designs had been obtained and copied by the architect, but I subsequently learned that there was an English or French Jew in command of the factory, who was then absent, to my great regret, for he could probably have given me much interesting information:

Andijan, now a town of 20,000 inhabitants, the chief place of the Khanate after Khokand, and one of the oldest, made a very pleasant impression upon me;¹ whether it was the picturesque streets and the many gardens, the palace of the Bek, so much like a country house, the rapid swollen canal, the bright and lively appearance of the people, or the greater variety in food, I do not know; possibly all these together, and the last not least. I had, unfortunately, brought with me to Khokand no cooking utensils, having been told I would everywhere find something to eat. That was quite true; but we became very tired of nothing but mutton cooked in the greasy tasteless ways which are common here; and it was difficult to obtain any variety. At the same time it was too hot, and I was usually too fatigued at night to be able to show my servants any new or better methods of cooking. Here, at

¹ Mir Izzet ullah, in 1812, says that Andijan was then abandoned. Nazarof two years later, thus describes it: 'Andijan is on the borders of the territory of Kashgar; this town is surrounded by villages; its suburbs abound in all kinds of fruit; the inhabitants are agriculturists, they raise silkworms, and manufacture cotton cloth. They trade with the Black Kirghiz across the mountains, who are their neighbours, and who furnish them with animals. The only fortification of this town is the house of the Governor; it is surrounded by a wall pierced by four doors; a garrison of 10,000 men defends it; every soldier lives with his wife and his horse: the horse occupies the first chamber; the wife has only the second which is less comfortable. A part of the produce of taxes levied on merchandise is employed by the Government in maintaining the garrison. The houses are of mud; the streets are tortuous and narrow.'

Andijan, however, I was able to procure eggs, which were really fresh, some chickens, which I had split and broiled on a spit over the coals, and some fresh fish, which was a great delicacy, as it was the first I had eaten for months.

The next morning, Thursday, an official came to say that the Khan Zada had gone towards Utch-Kurgan to meet his father, and that, consequently, I could get off without saying a formal good-bye. He presented me, at the same, time with ten *tillas* in silver to pay my travelling expenses.

The road led south-east over the hills, whence I got a lovely view of the Andijan valley, then through a small valley containing a village called Kashgar, then came more hills, then a rather pretty valley, with cultivated fields and trees in the foreground, and bare sharp hills beyond, and still further off the distant mountains with yet a little snow left on their tops. Coming down to this valley, and leaving the little river, we halted, after fifteen miles riding, at the village called Hodjavat, where on Saturdays there is a large bazaar. In an open field, just on the edge of the town, stood the village gallows, two very tall slim poles, firmly planted in the ground, and united by a small cross-bar at the top, to which the criminal is hung. No body, however, was dangling there at this time. The plain here was well cultivated, but after crossing the river, we skirted along some rugged limestone and feldspar rocks.

The heat was intense, and we were glad enough, about five o'clock, after a ride of thirty miles in all from Andijan, to arrive at Ush. Here I was given a comfortable house, with a large clean court, near the 'Throne of Solomon.' This celebrated rock, *Takht-i-Suleiman*, is a bare high ridge of rugged stone, standing out of the midst of the plain, on the edge of the town, in a way not uncommon in Khokand. An old tradition represents it to be the place where the great Solomon once established his throne, to look over that part of the world. By a mixture of traditions, Solomon is also said to have been killed here; though, probably, this Solomon was some local saint or hero who has become confounded with the Jewish King. A square, solid, ornamental *mazar*, or tomb, surmounting the very summit of the rock, is supposed to cover his body, and near by are shown various round holes, such as are occasionally

made in ravines by the action of loose stones and water, where the numerous black dogs, which he brought with him, are supposed to have drunk his blood and eaten his body. This rock has been a sort of stumbling block to geographers, owing to the exaggerated accounts of it which have come down to us. Mir Izzet-ullah said that the Takht-i-Suleiman was 'a mountain near Ush, on which is still shown the tomb of Asef Barkhi, the vizier of Solomon; its dimensions are very great.' Nazarof, a Russian, who was there in 1814, said: 'On the right hand, on a cliff of these mountains, we saw two old buildings, under which there is a great cave. The guide told us that these buildings are called the Throne of Solomon, and that the Asiatics of these parts, every year, come to worship at this place, believing that on this spot the spirits made reverence to Solomon. These buildings are inhabited by no one.' In fact, the buildings are small, and utterly insignificant, and can hardly be more than a hundred years old, if as much. Baber makes no reference to Solomon's Throne in his description of Ush, although I am inclined to believe that the hill he calls Bara-koh is the same, as there is no other hill in the immediate neighbourhood.¹ Beneath the rock there is a large garden,

¹ Baber says: 'Another district is Ush, which is situated to the south-east of Andijan, but more to the east, and distant from Andijan four farsangs by the road. The air of Ush is excellent. It is abundantly supplied with running water, and is extremely pleasant in spring. The excellencies of Ush are celebrated even in the sacred traditions. On the south-east of the fort is a mountain of a beautiful figure, named Bara-koh, on the top of which Sultan Mahmud Khan built a small summer-house, beneath which, on the shoulder of the hill, in the year 902 (1496-7) I built a larger palace and colonnade. Although the former is in the more elevated situation, yet that built by me is the more pleasant of the two: the whole town and suburbs are seen stretched out below. The river of Andijan, after passing through the suburbs of Ush, flows on towards Andijan. On both of its banks there are gardens, all of which overlook the river. Its violets are particularly elegant. It abounds in streams of running water. In the spring its tulips and roses blow in great profusion. On the skirt of this same hill of Bara-koh, between the hill and the town, there is a mosque, called the Mosque of Juza; and from the hill there comes a great and wide stream of water. Beneath the outer court of the mosque there is a meadow of clover, sheltered and pleasant, where every traveller and passenger loves to rest. It is a standing joke among the common people at Ush to let out the water from the stream upon all such as fall asleep there. On this hill, about the latter end of the reign of Omer-Sheikh Mirza, there was discovered a species of stone finely waved red and white, of which they make the handles of knives, the clasps of belts, and other things of that sort, and it is a very beautiful stone. In all Fergana, for healthiness and beauty of situation, there is no place that equals Ush.'

containing two or three small mosques, the residence of a fraternity of recluses and their Ishan, to whom the pilgrim is expected to give a gratuity. After climbing the narrow and very steep path which leads to the top, I came to a large stone and brick platform, built out in front of the tomb, from which I had a magnificent view on every side of the whole valley, the river, the town, the roads leading in all directions with the villages along them, the narrow defile in the low hills through which the river passes, and the splendid panorama of the Alai mountains, in which I was shown the various passes leading to the south. The mountains on the Kashgar boundary were also dimly visible. I was told that Kashgar was 35 *tash*, over 200 miles from there, or a five days ride. Ush is a large town standing on both banks of the river, which is spanned by a bridge. On the other side is the fortress, an insignificant building, and on this side was the large bazaar, which, as it was a bazaar day, was filled with people, although I saw nothing peculiar or remarkable there.

On coming back to the house, I found that my landlord had sent for a man who knew Russian in order to learn what I and my interpreter talked about; but the *jigit* had proved faithful to me, and had said that he should not allow such a proceeding, as, in such a case, I would at once send a messenger to the Bek with complaints.

Ush, being a town of the Bekship of Marghilan, is managed by a Serkar.

From Ush I was very desirous of proceeding to Uzgent and Tarak Davan, the pass leading to Kashgar, and even had some idea of going to that place if I found the way practicable, only hesitating because I had not previously thought of it and had no letter of introduction with me. I also wished to go into the Alai mountains to see some of the glaciers, and, striking through the southern passes, to go if possible into Karategin. I had heard much talk of the danger of any attempt to penetrate into Karategin; but, as near as I could make out, these were reports started by the Khokandian authorities to deter travellers; and judging from the inhabitants of Karategin that I had seen (many of these men—swarthy, thick-set, good-natured fellows—are employed at Khokand in the Zekat Sarai¹), I did not think

¹ These men used to collect in a circle in the Sarai court every evening, and

there would be any other difficulty than the natural obstacles of the mountain passes, and, possibly, the scarcity, for a day or two, of food. Besides the fact that Karategin is an entirely unexplored country, I had had my curiosity especially aroused by hearing at Khokand that in the mountain passes there exist inscriptions cut in the rocks in some European language. But my designs, however, were at once frustrated by the action of the Khokandian authorities. On sending to the Serkar he told me that it would be impossible for me to go into the Alai mountains, as the Kirghiz living there had risen in rebellion against the Khan; that the tax collectors who had been sent there had been robbed, stripped almost naked, and beaten back; and that subsequently one of the men had been killed. That as for Kashgar it was utterly impossible without the special permission of the Khan, as the road there was often dangerous; but that if I were willing to give him a written paper that I went of my own free will, and that whatever happened to me the Russian Government would not hold them responsible for my safety, he would consider the matter and, perhaps, allow me to go. As I knew very well that should I give such a paper, which would of course have no weight, they would themselves either rob or kill me, I refused. Permission was also denied to go to Uzgent, which I much regretted on account of the ancient ruins—supposed by some to be of Greek origin—that are said to exist there. Finally, the Serkar said that I would be allowed to go to Naukat, which was close by, and where there was no danger. I had asked for this, because I thought that if I could get to Naukat it would be comparatively easy for me to go on along the foot of the mountains, even without permission. I entirely disbelieved the story about the disturbances among the Kirghiz, knowing that it was a thing which had been said to Fedtchenko and other travellers, and that it was the usual mode of deterring them. I knew also enough about the Kirghiz to believe that I would be even safer with them than with the people of Khokand. The Serkar, however, refused to allow me to start that day, but promised that I could go early in the morning, and that the *jigit* who had accompanied me from Andijan should go on with me. Late at night, the after prayers and supper, one of them would recount tale after tale, and legend after legend, until his comrades were asleep.

jigit came to me and said that he had heard that there was to be a military expedition against the Kirghiz, and that, as he was in the army, he wished to go to Andijan and join it; on which I said he might do so if the Serkar would allow him and would send another *jigit* in his place.

The next morning I rose at five o'clock so as to make an early start, but my *jigit* had gone off without permission, and I had to wait for him, till at last I sent Andrei to the Serkar for another; but he found my own, who had been ordered to go on with me. The Serkar sent to me a man who spoke a little Russian, wished me a prosperous journey, and gave me a blue cloth robe in return for the presents I had sent him the previous day. I never saw the Serkar at all, as he always pretended to be too busy to receive me. It was arranged that I should pay him a visit of adieu, but, as it was evident he wished to escape it, I thought it an unnecessary ceremony.

When we at last got off, the *jigit*, instead of taking the road on the left of the Takht-i-Suleiman, which I believed to be the direct road to Naukat, as I had had it pointed out to me when I was looking at the view from the top of the rock, turned to the right, and went through the bazaar. I insisted that this was not the way; but he assured me that it was the only good road, and that it immediately turned to the left on the other side of the rock. He said that there was another road, but it was practicable for horses only and not for carts. At last we turned to the left, and after a while came to a good beaten road leading straight to the town, which we should have taken at first. I showed this to the *jigit*, who then explained that he had desired to show us the bazaar. We soon found by inquiry of those whom we met that even this was not the direct road, but was the road to Aravan; that the direct road to Naukat was perfectly practicable for carts, although ascending a short steep hill of no extreme difficulty. As we were told that the road we were then travelling was only thirteen miles longer, we, wrongly as it turned out, concluded it better to go on than to return. We skirted along some trap rocks, and finally came into a pretty valley about eighteen miles from Ush, where, across a small stream, is the little town of Aravan. We had sent both the *jigits* on to the village with the Khan's letter, for I would not trust this man alone, and we were therefore met

by a considerable deputation, including several soldiers, and shown to a house where we could rest. I then sent for the head man of the village, and learned from him that Aravan—which was marked on no map—was on the direct road to Marghilan, and that we were nearly forty miles from Naukat, for which we had originally started, and that there was no cart road either to the mountains or to Naukat. This was disagreeable news, but it seemed easy to procure one or two more horses and to pack our baggage on them, which I resolved to do. I then complained of the *jigit* who had deceived me, and demanded that he should be sent back to Ush for punishment. He begged for mercy, and confessed that he had purposely misled us, but that he had done so by order of the Serkar, and that, consequently, it was not his fault. The chief of the village told me that his son had gone to the Khan, at Andijan, to consult about the Kirghiz rising, and would be back that day, and that when he came, if he thought it would be right for me to go to Naukat, I should be provided with an escort; but, that otherwise, I must go on to Marghilan. When this officer came, he of course considered it inadvisable to do as I wished, and said that there really was a war, and that the Khan Zada himself was going on the expedition. I at first had some thought of going back to Ush, and insisting on going at once to Naukat, but as from private information I gathered there really seemed then to be some appearance of war, and as I had but little doubt that my request would be refused, I concluded to make *bonne mine au mauvais jeu*, and to go straight on to Marghilan and thence back to Khokand. When I sent for the Serkar, to ask for a *jigit*, he said that we might go to Marghilan on condition that we made no attempt to go to the mountains, as this would be impossible. He then asked me for a pair of spectacles. With regard to our complaints as to the *jigit* and to my treatment at Ush, he mildly said, ‘How are you going to act when you have to do with fools? We find it very hard.’ In spite of the refusal of my requests, both the Serkar and his father were so civil and kind, that I could find no fault with them personally.

We set off at five o'clock from Aravan, and, after travelling nine miles over a pretty road through a cultivated country with low trap hills on each side, we arrived at Ming-Tepé, where we passed the night. Starting at eight o'clock the next

morning and riding fifteen miles, we arrived at noon at the bazaar town of Kua-Kishlak where we had a good large house with a courtyard, evidently belonging to some rich man, for it was better built and cleaner than any I had seen in the country. The rooms, which were prettily decorated, were very cool, so that it was a good resting place. We found the town occupied by soldiery, and on the road we constantly met soldiers armed with matchlocks, in groups of from three to a dozen, some on foot and some on horseback; many of them were clad in heavy coats of mail. We were told an expedition was going against the Kirghiz from Marghilan under the command of the Bek of Marghilan, Sultan Murad, the younger brother of the Khan, who had been at Kua that day, but had left, just before our arrival, for Andijan, in order to consult with the Khan. Starting about three o'clock under a broiling sun and constantly meeting soldiers on the road, we reached Marghilan—twenty miles further—in the early evening, just before the closing of the gates.

At about eight miles from Marghilan, we passed the village of Yaka-Tut; and from that place to the city, the country was a continuous garden. Just outside the gate we were insulted by some natives, and the *jigits* came near getting us into a fight.

Marghilan, which contains about 30,000 inhabitants, is surrounded by a high wall, and in almost every street are pretty little *mazars*, or chapels, built in the Persian style with bulbous domes, mosaic fronts, and much alabaster fret-work. These give to the town a bright and cheerful air. The streets of the bazaar are chiefly covered over as at Khokand, and the bazaar is full of fearful smells.¹

We were shown to a house with a neat courtyard and small

¹ Marghilan was by the old writers called Marghinan. I again quote from Baber an interesting description:

'Another [district] is Marghinan, which lies on the west of Andijan, at the distance of seven farsangs, and is a fine district. It is noted for its pomegranates and apricots. There is one species of pomegranate named *dana-kalian* (or great seed), which, in its flavour, unites the sweet with a sweet acid, and may even be deemed to excel the pomegranate of Semnan. They have a way of taking out the stones of the *zerd-alu* (or apricot) and of putting in almonds in their place, after which the fruit is dried. When so prepared, it is termed Seikhani, and is very pleasant. The game and venison are here also excellent. The white deer is found in its vicinity. All the inhabitants are Sarts; the race are great boxers, noisy and turbulent; so that they are famous all over Maverannahr for their blustering

flower garden, which in its palmy days had been very pretty. The rooms were of good size and tastefully decorated with doors and windows in lattice work of arabesque patterns. On one side of the court was a jutting balcony, and on the other, a large verandah. The Kurbashi in temporary charge of the town refused, however, to do anything more for us, and told us that if we wished for food, we could get it for ourselves in the bazaar, and this we had to do, as the master of the house refused to furnish us with cooking utensils or dishes, or even bowls for tea. Although I was very tired, I was unable to sleep on account of the predatory incursions of various dogs and cats looking for the remains of our supper. I had intended to stay the whole of the next day, but having soon exhausted the sights, and disliking the inhospitable treatment I received, as

and fondness for boxing, and most of the celebrated bullies of Samarkand and Bukhara are from Marghinan.'

Mir Izzet-ullah says: 'Here is the tomb of Sekander Jul-Karnain (Alexander the Great). Silk and woollen shawls are very common there, but are inferior to those of Kashmir. The walls of Marghinan are of clay, and in a very bad state. There is in the town a lofty minaret built of burned brick.' This minaret I did not see; it has probably fallen down.

Nazarof speaks of Marghilan as being entirely unfortified, and says: 'The houses of the city are built of clay without windows. The streets are narrow. There are many great monuments and porticos, some of which are in good preservation. In the middle of the city there is a large building like an open temple, inside of which is a red silk banner. The Khokandians consider it very sacred, and have a tradition that it belonged to the Padshah Iskender (Alexander the Great), who, on his return from India, died in the desert, and was buried in this place; although Plutarch, Arrian, Quintus Curtius, and other commentators agree that he died and was buried in Babylon, in the year 323 B.C. When a new governor is appointed to Marghilan, the clergy take this banner and accompany it with singing through the whole city to the governor with their congratulations. He, as a mark of gratitude, ties to the banner, as a present to the clergy, a piece of rich cloth of gold and various stuffs, and gives them money, bread, and apples. The bazaar is built of several rows of shops, and on two days of the week is crowded from morning till evening. The Government looks strictly after the weights and measures. In this town they manufacture various kinds of goods, among others Persian cloth of gold, velvet, and various Asiatic stuffs, which they send to Bukhara and Kashgar. From this latter place they receive tea, porcelain, ingots of silver, dyes, and all the best Chinese wares. The inhabitants lead a comfortable and tranquil life. The women are pretty, tall, and very coquettish. They fell in love with the Russian Cossacks, and when they noticed that there were no Asiatics near, they removed the veils from their faces, talked with them, and always praised the Russian law which forbade polygamy. They also pleased the Cossacks. At the sight of a woman, a Cossack always arranged his cartridge-box, and curling his long moustaches, or clanking his sabre, tried to give himself a martial air.'

well as the smells of the bazaar during the heat of the day, I thought it better to go on twelve miles to a little village, called Duvana.

When we sent for a *jigit*, the Kurbashi, in spite of the Khan's letter, refused to give me one; but after much difficulty we succeeded in hiring the *jigit* we had brought from Aravan to go on with us to Khokand. When we were all ready to start the Kurbashi's tardy hospitality at last came in the shape of a *dostar-khan* with some apricots. The first six miles the road was pleasant, through gardens and fields; but after that we entered upon a perfectly barren steppe, which extends for over twenty miles and has no water. The village of Duvana we found to be a wretched place, consisting of a few sheds, and thoroughly worthy of the Duvanas or Dervishes who are said to inhabit it. Not a tree was near, and there was no water except that brought from the vicinity of Marghilan, but, fortunately, there was a cool wind blowing and we passed the day pleasantly, leaving there about five o'clock for Khokand.

About sunset we were caught on the steppe by a furious dust-wind, coming from the west, which almost prevented our breathing.¹ I took refuge in an *arba*, and let down the felt in front, as we were obliged to face the storm, when suddenly, without the least warning, a violent cold rain came on. Although I wrapped myself up, as best I could, in native blankets, I was entirely wet through. The storm soon passed over, and we arrived, at a little after eight o'clock, at the large village of Kara-tepé, where we were unable to find any resting place. The Aksakal was utterly indifferent to us, and said it was none of his business to wait on us, advising us to seize on one of the shops in the bazaar, and turn the people out; and we were compelled to act on his advice and take possession of the gallery of one of the shops. It was not,

¹ This desert, which surrounds Khokand on three sides, is the same called by Baber, the Ha-Dervish. 'Between Kandbadam and Hodjend there is a desert, named Ha-Dervish, where a sharp wind prevails, and constantly blows from the desert in the direction of Marghinan, which lies to the east of the desert, or in the direction of Hodjend, which lies to the west, and this wind is excessively keen. It is said, that certain dervishes having encountered the wind in this desert, and being separated, were unable to find each other again, and perished, calling out, "Ha, Dervish! Ha, Dervish!" and that hence the desert is denominated Ha-Dervish unto this day.'

however, so comfortable as might be wished, being infested by scorpions. As I was thoroughly wet through, I was obliged to change my clothes: the act outraged Mohammedan propriety and brought down upon me the curses and abuse of all the neighbours. After this, they refused us permission to purchase *pilaf*, or even hot water for our tea. We had a long dispute and finally had to send again to the Aksakal, and get him out of bed—it was then quite late—when he compelled the people of the nearest shop to furnish us with what we wanted.

The weather having become brighter, and the moon being out, we started at half past twelve, and after travelling slowly the whole night, on account of the muddy roads, we reached Khokand at half past five in the morning. It was already very hot, and the streets were frightfully filthy and muddy, it having rained there, as we were informed, for three days in succession, a most unusual occurrence.

On going again to my friends at the Zekat Sarai, I found that F—— and his party had already arrived, having been to Namangan, and having made a short trip into the mountains, where he had, as he supposed, accomplished his business successfully. I surmised, however, from my experience, that the agreement between him and the Khokand authorities would not be carried out in the way he expected; and it afterwards proved that the timber furnished was by no means of the quality which had been shown him, by which he was put to great embarrassment and loss.

F—— was then leaving, but, as my horses were tired, I was obliged to wait until the following day.

That day, Wednesday, July 9th, the Mekhter sent his secretary to me, saying he would like to see me, and I was asked various questions about what I had done, and what had occurred, and a fear was expressed that I was angry and dissatisfied. I related in general terms what had happened, and said that I had not at once presented myself to the Mekhter, because I was feeling unwell, but that I should come to him presently and take leave. When I went to see him, he was unwilling to allow me to depart, and said that I had promised, on my return, to go back to the Khan, who was now at Andijan, and wished to see me personally, in order to talk with me about various subjects, and to give me a letter for General Kolpakofsky. I

told him that I had never promised to return to the Khan, as he had said; and that after the insults which I had received on the road, I should certainly not do so, as I had no wish to expose myself to them again; that if the Khan were desirous of seeing me, he should have received me as he ought to have done when I went to Utch-Kurgan on his order, expressly to see him; that in not giving me a personal audience, he had treated me with great impoliteness, and had paid but slight regard to the letter of introduction which I had brought him from the Russian authorities. I then told him in detail of all that had happened on the road. The Mekhter made excuses for my being misled and deceived, and tried again to persuade me to go to the Khan, saying, among other things, that General Kolpakofsky would be sure to ask me what he looked like, and that I could not tell him unless I had seen him; to which I said, that I had done my best to see him, and it was not my fault that I had not. He then asked me, at all events, to wait in Khokand for some days until he sent to the Khan to know if I could be allowed to depart; that if I wished to go to Andijan, a *jigit* would be at my disposal to take me at once, but that he would not give me one to go to Tashkent. I refused all these propositions, and after a long dispute, I told him I expected to start that afternoon for Tashkent, where I had reasons for being as soon as possible, and where I should relate all that had happened; and if there were any leave-taking necessary for the Khan, I would write a letter from Tashkent, bidding him farewell; and further, that if he prevented my departure, he must take the responsibility upon his own head. He was extremely angry at this, and finally said that he had asked me enough, and that if I chose to be impolite, he would have nothing more to do with me.¹

It was reported in Khokand that it was perfectly true that there had been some slight disturbance with the Kirghiz, but that the affair had entirely terminated. The Mekhter professed to have information that forty of the leading insurgents

¹ A year after, the *Mekhter* was accused of stealing from the customs' receipts, and was sentenced by the Khan to be suspended to a wicker bridge and trampled on, as a sort of ordeal. Luckily for him he escaped alive, and was thus supposed to have proved his innocence. Subsequently, he was poisoned by order of the Khan. See APPENDIX I. at the end of Vol. I.

had been captured, and were shortly to be brought to Khokand for execution ; and Yévraf, the Russian refugee, tried to persuade me to stay, by telling me that not only should I thus have a chance of seeing a wholesale execution, but that the discontent in the city was so strong against the Khan and government, that it was possible there would be a general insurrection, which would terminate in the plunder of the houses in the neighbourhood, and possibly of the bazaar. Having, however, made up my mind to depart, I left that afternoon with only my own interpreter, the *jigit*, and the cart-driver, and arrived towards morning at Bish-aryk. We stopped there in a caravan-serai, and the next afternoon I arrived at Makhram. I thought that I would once more try my passport, so as to see whether the Mekhter had sent any orders against letting me pass, and I was relieved on finding myself hospitably received by the Bek, although I did not see him. I was provided with a large garden and plenty of fruit, and was furnished with supper. A large number of the inhabitants came in to see me, and as I had made up my mind to start about midnight, everybody lay down to sleep on the terrace, while waiting until I was ready to start. Riding all night, I reached Hodjent at about ten o'clock the next morning, after an absence of nearly a month.

My journey had been in many respects disagreeable, but not altogether profitless. I had acquired a knowledge of what native rule was, and I had learned the extent and the character of the influence exerted by Russia on its neighbours.

The Khanate of Khokand is an almond-shaped valley, in extreme length, from Makhram to Uzgent, about 160 miles, and in extreme width about 65 miles, surrounded on all sides by mountains and mountain plateaus, which narrow down to small hills at the narrow end near Hodjent, where there is the only road into the Khanate practicable for wheeled vehicles. It was early known as Davan (Chinese *Ta-wan*) from its mountains and passes, and was celebrated among the ancients as the fertile valley of Fergana, owing its fertility in part to the river Syr Darya, which, joined by the Naryn, flows through its whole length, leaving about two-thirds of the country to the south. The Syr Darya, in its lower course, is useless for

irrigating purposes, being enclosed between high banks; and the country is watered only by small streams which come down from the mountains, but which are exhausted before they reach the river. From the upper portion of the Syr Darya numerous canals have been diverted for purposes of fertilisation; two of them,—the Khan canal, and the Mussulman Kul canal,—in recent times. The mountains to the south consist of a vast plateau rising into peaks of 19,000, and even 25,000 feet, and containing many glaciers, known usually as the Alai and Kitchi Alai ranges, although called the Southern Khokand mountains by Fedtchenko, the only person who has ever explored them.¹ Through this mountain range are several passes, leading into Karategin and Kashgar, all accessible with difficulty. The Kendyr Tau range, which separates Khokand on the north from the Russian possessions, is by no means so high, and has one or two good roads, especially one going to Tashkent, across the western extremity, and another from Namangan to Aulié-ata. Nearly the whole of the valley is fertile, with the exception of the sandy waste which surrounds the city of Khokand. Although it is proper to speak of Khokand as being one large valley, it is, in reality, a series of small oblong valleys separated by low narrow ranges, usually of trap, which, on the southern side of the river, seem

¹ The late Mr. Fedtchenko, who carried on explorations in Central Asia for several years under the auspices of the Imperial Society of Lovers of Natural History, was in Khokand in all about two months and a half during June, July, and August, 1871, and beside his wife, was accompanied by an assistant, a fowler, and an interpreter. After having obtained the Khan's permission for his journey, he went from the city of Khokand to Ispara (the old Asfara), and thence south through Varukh to Jiptyk, a pass 12,500 feet high, where he discovered and explored the Stehurofsky glacier, not far from the glacier of the Zarafshan. Returning to Varukh he proceeded eastward to Sokh, on the road to Karategin, and then to Shahimardan, whence he went southward nearly to the Kara-kujuk pass, although he was prevented from penetrating into Karategin by the official who accompanied him. He succeeded, however, in crossing the Alai chain at Isfairam, a pass 12,000 feet high, and went as far as the village of Kurgan, on the river Kyzyl-su, in the basin of the Amu Darya. Turning back, he proceeded through the mountain ranges to Ush, went thence to Gultcha, Uzgent, and Andijan, and returned by the way of Namangan and Tuz. A memoir on the chief incidents and discoveries of his journey appeared in the 'Proceedings of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society,' in 1872, vol. viii. No. 1. Since his unfortunate death, a complete account of his travels in Khokand has been edited by his wife, the first part of which was published in St. Petersburg in 1875; the second part has not yet appeared. Six parts of the scientific descriptions of the collections of Natural History made by him, have also been published.

always to run from east to west. Thus Marghilan is in its own little valley, Ush is in another, and the villages between them seem each to lie in a separate valley between rocky ridges.

The climate is more equable than in the districts of Russian Turkistan, being warmer in winter, when but little snow falls, and that late. On summer days the difference in heat between Khokand and Tashkent is hardly perceptible, but the nights are always cool and comfortable, and I found none when it was uncomfortable to sleep under heavy blankets.

The mountains of the Khanate abound in minerals; coal formations have been seen cropping out near Isfara, and in some of the northern mountains, while naphtha and petroleum wells have been found in many places, especially on the north-eastern frontier, near Ketmen-tepé. It is said that copper, lead and iron, as well as inferior turquoises, are also to be found.

Owing to the fertility of the soil and the excellence of the climate the agriculture of the Khanate is in a most flourishing condition. Wheat, millet and barley are largely cultivated, the last of poor quality and used only for the food of horses. Rice grows in great abundance everywhere, as also lucerne; but the two chief products of the Khanate are cotton and silk, which are also the main articles of export. In point of agricultural wealth, Khokand will, I think, not be found inferior even to the valley of the Zarafshan, and it will be possible to give a greater development to its resources by extending the irrigation system, and bringing additional land under cultivation.

The population of the Khanate is probably less than a million, and is sharply divided into two classes, the settled and the nomad. The settled class inhabits only the open valley, and, with the exception of Namangan, and a few towns to the north of the Syr Darya, occupies but a narrow zone between that river and the foot-bills, in which most of the towns are situated. The settled population are chiefly Uzbeks; but in Khokand and the region of the west there is a considerable number of Tadjiks, and, as in all of the large towns of Central Asia, there are among them numbers of Hebrews and Hindoos, and occasionally a few Afghans. The nomads, whose hostility to, and rivalry with the settled popula-

tion has been the cause of all the intestine troubles of Khokand, are either Kara-Kirghiz or Kiptchaks; in all they would not number more than 300,000. The Kiptchaks, a warlike tribe of Uzbeks, live to the north of the Naryn, and in the neighbourhood of Andijan.¹ The Kara-Kirghiz or Buruts, of whom I shall speak more especially afterwards, inhabit not only the mountains to the north of the Syr Darya, but also, and more especially, those to the south, cultivating the land along the foot-hills, and in the summer, driving their flocks for pasture into the higher plateaus and mountain valleys.

Khokand is governed arbitrarily by the Khan, although the various towns and provinces are intrusted to Beks who have almost absolute power, with the exception of that of life and death; decisions in these cases being made only by the Khan. They collect most of the taxes and disburse them themselves, being responsible for the administration of the government, and the support of their shares of the army. There are, however, certain taxes which are the right of the Khan, and with which the Beks have nothing to do; and besides this, although they are not obliged to account to him for any money they get, they are expected to give him presents once or twice a year. The exactions of the Khan were one of the causes of the discontent of the population, which broke out into so many rebellions, one of which has at last been successful. The following extracts from a letter written in 1874 by a native will show how reasonable the complaints were.

‘To keep the roads in repair, to build houses for the Khan, to cultivate his gardens and to clean out the canals, men are seized in all parts of the country and forced to work. These get no pay, not even their food; and besides this, when half a village is forced to work, the other half is compelled to pay a tax of two *tengas* (11*d.*) a day for each man during his work. Anyone who runs away or who refuses to pay is whipped. Sometimes people have been whipped to death, and others have been buried alive in the place of work. This same forced

¹ The Kiptchaks are believed to be ancient Comanians, the Polovtsi of the Russian chronicles, and the name Desht-i-Kiptchak was given to the whole Kirghiz steppe. It is curious that Abdurrahman-Avtobatcha, the leader of the recent rebellion (1875) in Khokand, in one of his proclamations, uses this appellation, which had hardly been heard since the Middle Ages.

labour existed under previous Khans, but with less cruelty, and the workmen at least received their daily food. Formerly, the inhabitants had the right of collecting without pay grass, reeds and brushwood; now, everyone is obliged to deliver to the Khan the half of what he collects, and these articles are then sold by the *Serkar* at fixed prices. Besides this, every cart load of reeds or brushwood must pay at the entrance of the town half a *tenga* ($2\frac{3}{4}d.$), and at the bazaar a *tenga* ($5\frac{1}{2}d.$) more. Leeches were formerly free, but now the Khan makes people pay for them four *tcheka* ($\frac{1}{2}d.$) a piece to the official who lives near the pond where they are. When cattle are sold, besides the ordinary *zekat* there must be paid to the Khan one *tenga* each on horned beasts, half a *tenga* on sheep, two *tengas* on camels, and one *tenga* on horses or asses. All imported merchandise, besides the *zekat* of one fortieth part, or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., pays in addition 5 per cent. of the price to the Khan; this is called *aminiana*. Silk and cotton, when exported, pay 10 *tengas* per camel-load. In sales on the bazaar, men's and women's clothing, beds and silk stuffs and other valuable objects pay half a *tenga* a piece; things of less value, from one eighth to one quarter of a *tenga*. Soldiers of the Khan are set every night to guard the shops, and for this each shop must pay from two to ten *tengas* every four months. On grain sold at the bazaar four *tchekas* ($\frac{1}{2}d.$), a *tcharik* (180 lbs.) must be paid. Vegetables and melons and fruit pay from one to three *tengas* a load. This tax is called *tek-jai*, or right of selling at the bazaar, and is in addition to the *haratj* and *tanap* (*land tax*). Milk, sour cream, &c. must pay a farthing a cup. Of every pair of ducks or wild geese sold at the bazaar, the Khan takes one. On domestic fowls a farthing each is paid; and a *tcheka* ($\frac{1}{2}$ farthing) for every ten eggs. From time immemorial the tribe of Liuli has got its living by amusing the people, and leading monkeys, bears and goats through the streets and villages. This means of earning their livelihood has now been taken from them by the Khan, who has made it a source of revenue for himself. Khudayar has set his agents over them, and has increased the number of animals. On every bazaar day, in the large towns three times a week, his showmen go through the bazaar with monkeys, bears, wolves, hogs, goats and foxes; every shop must pay four

tchekas. The buffoons of the Khan also go through the bazaars, and all that they get goes to pay his kitchen expenses. When an Imam is appointed to a mosque, he must pay the Khan ten *tengas*; and a Sufi must pay five *tengas*, or neither of them will be permitted to perform his functions. If the Khan learns that there is a family feast, or a circumcision, or a wedding he sends his musicians there. The master of the house must give each of them a gown, and besides, from two to five *tillas* (18s. to 45s.) for the Khan. Every spring, outside of Khokand, there is a popular festival, called *Dervishkhana*; and then every guild must felicitate the Khan and make him a gift of money, according to its means, from 100 to 1,000 *tillas* (45l. to 450l.). If this were not done the leaders would be beaten and tortured. If the Khan desires a piece of ground, or a garden, belonging to a private person, he forces him to sell it, only paying him the price at which it was originally bought, and taking no account of the present value of the land or of the improvements made on it. Every person wishing to leave the Khanate presents a petition and obtains a pass, for which he pays two *tengas*. This pass is then presented to the Makhram, who receives one *tenga*, and at every station on the road an additional tax must be paid. The receipt of the taxes on grass, brushwood, and leeches, as well as on pasturage, which is $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ per month, for every head of cattle, is entrusted to Sydyk Kuitchi, who pays to the Khan annually 20,000 *tillas* (9,000l.). The *haradj*, or harvest tax, gives yearly 300,000 *tchariks* (a million bushels) of grain which are sold by the Khan. In each district there is a special officer for this. The district of Sharikana gives 9,000 *tchariks*, Balikytkhi 100,000, Sokh 14,000, Nerkent 12,000, &c. The *tanap*, or tax on gardens and orchards, produces 60,000 *tillas* (18,000l.). The *Serkar* receives the tolls on the Syr Darya, between Balyktychi and Tchil-Makhram, the taxes on provision sales in the bazaar, on the registration of marriages, which comes to half a *tilla* (4s. 6d.), the tax on inheritance, one fortieth part, and the tax on making salt; and he pays annually to the Khan 20,000 *tillas* (9,000l.). The *zekat* on the country people and the nomad tribes, entrusted to Tchertchi-Bashi, gives 11,000 *tillas* (4,850l.). The Mekhter who collects the *zekat* from the merchants, pays over 35,000 *tillas* (15,750l.). The caravan-

serais and shops built by the Khan, which number over a thousand, are farmed out to a man named Issaie, and bring into the treasury 30,000 *tillas* (13,500*l.*). The cotton tax and the brokers' tax bring in 10,000 *tillas* (4,500*l.*). The oil-presses, grain markets, silk markets, hay markets, and milk markets, bring 5,000 *tillas* (2,250*l.*). The exactions from marriages and ecclesiastical nominations bring in also 5,000 *tillas*.¹

After this, it is not to be wondered that Khudayar Khan was able to leave Khokand with a fortune estimated at a million of pounds sterling; and is in a position to give, as he has done, magnificent balls at Orenburg, his present place of abode.

Not with regard to taxes alone, but in every other respect, the Khan was a frightful tyrant. Under him neither virtue nor life was safe. As a young man he was only a debauchee, but when he overthrew Mussulman Kul, his chief minister, in 1853, he became a murderer, and by the wholesale butchery of 20,000 Kiptchaks, though he himself had Kiptchak blood in his veins, he excited the hatred of his subjects. One cause of the dislike of the Khokandians for the Russians was because by their means—at least it was so believed—Khudayar was kept on the throne.¹

¹ For a sketch of the career of Khudayar Khan, and of the recent history of Khokand, see APPENDIX I. at the end of Vol. I.

CHAPTER X.

BUKHARA.

From Samarkand to Shahrisabs—A mountain pass—Kitab—My reception by the Bek—Hospitality and amusements—Shaar—The old Bek—The Bazaar—Recent history of Shahrisabs—Tchiraktchi—Karshi—Its appearance and its trade—The Amir's son—The Karshi steppe—The Amir's Camp—Interview with His Majesty—Bukhara—The city—The Bazaar—Commercial importance—My acquaintances—Public sales of slaves—Purchase of a slave—Consequent difficulties—Outwitting the authorities—Unsuccessful effort to go to Tchardjui—The shrine of Bohoueddin—Attempted assassination—Kermineh—The Amir's favourite son—Ziaueddin—Katta Kurgan.

My journey in Bukhara was in every respect a great contrast to that in Khokand. The country was not so beautiful, but it showed the impress of an older and a more perfect civilisation. The inhabitants were more amiable and had more refined manners; but they were also less simple and more *rusé*. My reception was all I could desire. I was not looked upon as a foreign spy and treated with indifference, if not contumely; on the contrary, externally at least, I was regarded as an honoured guest, and was feasted and amused. The Bukhariots certainly know what hospitality is, and showed me the best of it. With all that, I do not believe that their real feelings to the Russians are very different from those of the Khokandians; but they took a different expression. In Khokand, they were shown by rudeness and impoliteness; in Bukhara recourse was had to all the finesse of diplomacy.

On Monday July 28, armed with letters from General Abramof to the Beks of Kitab and Shaar and to the Amir, I set out from Samarkand on my journey to Bukhara. As the road over the mountains was impassable for wheeled carriages, I had the day before sent my luggage, on a two-wheeled Buk-

haran cart, by the longer round-about road through Djam. I had with me Andrei, my interpreter, and a Kirghiz *jigit* named Konus-Bai, whom I had brought from Tashkent, while another *jigit*, a Persian, long, lean, and lazy, accompanied the luggage. I was also accompanied by Abdurrahim, the Kurbashi or Police-master of Kitab, who had been in Samarkand on some errand from the Bek to General Abramof. The first sixteen miles, as far as the village of Kara-tepé, I succeeded in accomplishing in a carriage, although the road, especially as we approached the mountains, was very bad indeed. Here the village authorities had prepared a kibitka in the garden of a mosque, and we soon had green tea and pilaf. Kara-tepé is a small village, or *kishlak* (winter habitation), as it is called here, situated among the foot-hills of the Samarkand range, and was formerly a frontier fortress erected against incursions from the side of Shahrisabs. It now contains, perhaps, a thousand inhabitants, and is devoid of all importance.

Passing the night here, and starting early the next morning, we followed for several miles the windings of the small clear stream of the Katta-sai, until at last it disappeared, and we then took a zig-zag course up the bare mountain. It was only toward the top that our road became very steep and difficult, on account of the large stones. This northern side of the mountain is not entirely bare, but covered with a short, sparse grass, upon which numerous flocks of sheep and goats were browsing. By the much brighter green of the grass it was easy to mark where the snow had recently melted; for it lies here till the end of June and middle of July. When we reached the top of the pass of Takhta Karatchi—about 5,200 feet above the sea, a broad flat platform of rock hemmed in on one side by great rough blocks,—we let our horses rest while we enjoyed the beautiful view before us of the valley of Shahrisabs, and of the serrated outlines of the snowy Hissar range beyond. Kitab, Shaar, and even Yakobak and Tchiraktchi, with their surrounding villages, were plainly seen; although they looked like forests rather than cities from the numbers of gardens and orchards. Indeed, Shahrisabs means the ‘green city.’ The southern slope of the mountains is far steeper than the northern, and is of bare gneiss and granite rock. The zig-zag path was full of sharp and jagged bits of rock, so that I found it far easier to descend on foot and have my

horse led by a *jigit*. Indeed, but one of the party had a sufficiently strong head to make the whole descent on horseback. What made it more disagreeable was that a violent wind took up the fine particles of the disintegrated rock and enveloped us in clouds of dust.

In about four hours from leaving Kara-tepé we had crossed the main ridge, and found ourselves on a dusty but tolerable road among the hills, already on Bukharan soil, where we were met by an escort of some twenty men sent by the Bek of Kitab. The chief men of the party placed their hands on their breasts, then took mine, said '*aman*' (the term of welcome for one not a Mussulman), and immediately entered into a long series of inquiries about my health and my journey. Messengers were then sent on in advance, and we rode at a leisurely pace eight miles further to the little village of Kainar, which we reached about noon. Here the *serkar*, in a scarlet robe embroidered down the back with white, attended by his suite of *jigits*, showed me into a kubitka which had been put up for me in a court-yard. I had barely time to bathe my face and hands after my dusty ride when a procession entered with a *dostar-khan*, consisting of nuts, sugar-plums, sweets, loaves of sugar, grapes, and melons, which was speedily followed by green tea, soup, boiled meat, and pilaf.

Kainar¹ is a true *kishlak*, or winter habitation; for, in summer the whole population lives in the fields, and the village is deserted. With the exception of the officials, no one was there but a few idlers, who had strolled in from the country to have a look at the *Frenghi*. After an hour's rest I started out again, and before long descended into the valley and reached Urus-kishlak, or Russian-village, a name coming down from very distant times with a tradition that some Russians had lived there—whether fugitives or suppliant princes at the court of the Mongol conquerors, no one now knows. Here I found waiting for me a new escort, consisting of the sons of the Bek of Kitab, arrayed in the whitest of turbans and the most gorgeous of robes, red shot with gold, and mounted on beautiful, richly caparisoned horses. Again there were bows and hand-shakings, and mutual inquiries after our respective healths and the well-

¹ The name Kainar means 'boiling,' and is given to the village on account of some bubbling springs.

being of our immediate relatives. From here onwards the country was green and inviting, but the wind and the dust-clouds still followed us. Soon we forded the clear river of the Kashka Darya, which gives life and fertility to all this valley as far as Karshi, and had before us on a little rise of ground the crenelated and battlemented mud wall (*tchim*¹) surrounding the twin cities of Kitab and Shaar, which together constitute Shahrisabs. Within the gate were gardens and orchards, and it was some little time before we reached the true city wall.

Kitab differs in no respect from other Central Asiatic towns: there are the same irregular, straggling streets, the same clay houses, the same ditches of water, the same people. As I passed through the streets, and especially through the bazaar, everyone rose to greet me with signs, not only of respect, but of pleasure. As I was leaving the bazaar the guard was called out for me, but, unfortunately for the effect, not quite quickly enough, so that I caught the men in the greatest disorder, running to and fro, hastily adjusting equipments, and trying, with but indifferent results, to stand in a straight line. They wore scarlet coats, black trousers, and black fur caps. Buttons were scattered over the breast in one or several lines, as the wearer's fancy dictated, and on one soldier I noticed buttons which bore the arms and numbers of English, French, German, and Russian regiments. The words of command were a mixture of English, Russian, and Turki, and the trumpeter blew his calls in a creditable manner.

Passing a large *medressé*, with its trees and its pond, I was taken to a house near by, the residence of my guide, the Kur-bashi Abdurrahim. Here carpets had been spread for me on the balcony, where I could recline on silken mattresses and cushions, and enjoy at my ease the really picturesque sight. A little below me was a platform, also covered with Turkoman carpets, where the sons of the Bek and a few other honoured individuals took their places, sheltered from the sun by large particoloured awnings. Still lower was a square pond, bordered with trees, around which sat groups of people; then came the large lower court where the horses stood, which was soon filled by a curious crowd, including many Hindoos; and beyond all, rose

¹ *Tchim* is literally turf or sod. See 'Note on Tchimkent,' vol i. p. 75.

mud walls and flat roofs, interspersed with trees. When I had got rid of my heavy riding-boots and my huge Kirghiz leather trousers, servants brought me a *dostur-khan* of more than twenty dishes. By the rules of Bukharan etiquette this was *my* entertainment, and no one else could partake of it unless I invited them. Accordingly, after first breaking and tasting a small bit of bread, I loaded a brazen platter with the choicest grapes and apricots, and another with bread and sweets, and sent them with my compliments to the sons of the Bek. When I was beginning to get cool and comfortable the Kur-bashi asked me if I would permit them to show me a dance. As I was perfectly willing to be amused I at once consented, and in a few minutes a dozen boys of different sizes came trooping in, and, after a low obeisance, squatted on the carpet facing me. The musicians tuned up, and the dancing began, and continued without intermission for about two hours, when I graciously—for I had already fallen into the habits of a prince—gave my consent that the entertainment should cease. Had I not done so, I believe the dance-mad natives would have kept it up till the next morning.

Toward evening I was informed that the Bek was ready for my formal visit, and I accordingly mounted my horse and set out for the *ark*, or citadel. This is a huge artificial mound, surrounded by high clay walls, and containing two large courts and several houses. In accordance with Bukharan etiquette, I was asked to dismount at the bottom of the steep incline leading up to the citadel. Various officials stood at the top, and the sides as well as the neighbouring streets were lined by soldiers, who gave me a military salute as I passed, with a great fanfare of trumpets, while a large crowd pressed on after me. At the entrance of the first court I was met by the Bek, Abul-Gaffar. He immediately shook hands with me warmly, and asked after my health and that of General Abramof, and then conducted me into his reception-room, a fine large hall, with a gaily ornamented ceiling, and walls stuccoed in arabesque patterns. Abul-Gaffar Bek was a fine-looking man of about fifty-five, with a half-grey beard, and was evidently a person of considerable intelligence. His father was then a very old man, high in standing at Bukhara, and one of the chief councillors of the Amir. The red-covered stools upon which we sat were

the same that I had at the house of the Kurbashi, for I saw them being carried in procession after me. The Bek—who was simply dressed in a dark green silk gown—in a very cordial manner inquired about my visit, and why I came, telling me that I did right to go to Bukhara by that route, and thus see their beautiful country. He, as well as the other dignitaries I had met, had his ideas of America; but they were very indistinct, for he seemed to think it a place about as large as Bukhara, where people chiefly devoted themselves to the culture of cotton. After repeated compliments and inquiries about my health, he insisted that I should stay at least a day longer, although I had promised the Bek of Shaar, who had sent a special messenger to me, that I would visit him the next day. On leaving, he presented me with a gown of crimson and gold stuff, of the kind worn in Russia by the priests, and of course imported from that country. My interpreter and *jigit* each received a silk gown. At the door I found, waiting for me, an apparently very fine horse, with a gold-plated bridle, and embroidered harness. Politeness obliged me to mount and ride him away, although I was nervous at the thought of going down such a steep incline on a strange horse. On taking off the saddle and trappings so that one could see him, I found him to be an *argamak* to be sure, but very unsound, and worth, perhaps, about three pounds sterling.

After dinner, the dancing boys were once more introduced, but as I did not care to see them dance again, they merely sat and talked with my host. I allowed my entertainers to send for two or three *maskarabashes*, or native comedians, who amused us until late in the night with their comic representations of low life and of animals, constantly calling forth peals of laughter from the spectators.

The night was cool and I slept till late in the morning. After breakfast I sent Andrei to the Bek with my presents, a piece of green satin for a gown, a box of fancy biscuits and a box of sweets. The Bek kept him some time in conversation, and asked if I were not a relative of the Emperor, for, although he knew that I was an American, he still seemed to think that I was also a Russian. Shortly after he sent a messenger to request me to write to General Abramof and tell him how well I had been received, saying that he would

forward the letter. At the same time, he asked for a pair of spectacles, saying that he was getting to be an old man, and that his eyes were weak,—a request with which I was happily able to comply. I walked out to the bazaar, but it was utterly empty as it was not a market day, and with a temperature of 96 degrees Fahr., in the shade, I was very glad to get back to the house, where I found another messenger from the Bek of Shaar, saying that as he had made all his preparations to receive me he would be offended if I did not come that day. Many persons came to talk with me, and one of them inquired about Jura Bek, who was the ruler of the place until the city was captured by the Russians and given up to the Bukharans. I afterwards found that a rumour had been spread that a friend of Jura Bek had come, and that his popularity was the cause of the anxiety of the people to see me.

After sending to the Bek to make my excuses for leaving, and bidding farewell to the people who had charge of me, and giving of course the necessary presents, I started for Shaar, which was about six miles to the south-west. The Kurbashi and the Mirshab accompanied me as far as the last mosque between Kitab and Shaar. Passing between highly cultivated gardens and fields edged round with trees I was met at the boundary line by the nephew of the Bek of Shaar, with a large suite,—all dressed in their robes of state—who went through the usual compliments and inquiries. There were two runners in front, for the custom there was for great dignitaries always to have men running before their horses. I whipped up in order to try to pass them—everybody following my example—but none of us succeeded in overtaking them. As we approached the city the crowd became very great, several persons came up and shook hands, many bowed very low, especially the Jews, who said in Russian ‘*Zdravstvui?*’ or ‘How do you do?’ and the Hindoos, who were very obsequious. Near the fortress the crowd was very great, and could with difficulty be kept in order by the police who pushed them constantly back. Notice had been given of my coming, and the whole city was there to see me, and no doubt I amused the people as much as they did me. At the Bek’s express desire, I was taken immediately to his palace. At the gate of the citadel, which stands on no elevation, and the earthen walls of which are fast crumbling down,

a guard of honour hailed me with a blast of trumpets, and passing them and within the gates through several crooked streets I came to a large open place, where three or four hundred soldiers were drawn up in a hollow square to receive me. There was another grand flourish of drums and trumpets and I was astonished by a salute of cannon. Here I was presented to two *Yuzbashis*, (centurions), wearing gowns made of Cashmere shawls, with highly wrought silver belts. Dismounting from my horse I walked on with them past the ruins of the *Ak-Sarai*, the splendid palace constructed by Timur, of which there now remain only the two immense piers of the front arch, solidly built of large bricks, and faced with blue and white porcelain tiles inlaid in arabesques and in large Persian and Arabic inscriptions.

In the interior court of the palace I was met and heartily greeted by the Bek, Abdul-Karim Divan-Begi,—an infirm old man with trembling hands. We sat down on a large carpet spread on the raised platform at one side of the court, I at one side and the Bek with the two *Yuzbashis* on my left, the interpreter being at the corner between us. I gave the Bek my letter from General Abramof, and he called a Mirza to read it for him. He was exceedingly talkative, seemed anxious to know all about me, and asked me if I were going to meet General Kaufmann? where I was going next? how far it was to St. Petersburg? how much farther to America? and many similar questions. Among other things, he asked if it were true that the Russians had given back Khiva to the Khan. ‘Now,’ he said, ‘that the Russians have taken Khiva, they have taken all the cities possible. I suppose none is left for them to take but England. Have you heard anything about it?’ I gravely replied that, although I thought the Russians had no immediate intention of capturing that large city, yet that, with Allah, all things were possible. I was somewhat amused by this question, but I was afterwards told, that although Abdul-Karim was a former tutor of the Amir, he was at that time very ill-disposed towards him, and meant to ask me, in the concealed parabolical way often used in these countries, if the Russians were intending to attack Bukhara. In the meantime, a *dostar-khan* of more than thirty dishes was brought in, and excellent green tea was served. Besides

pilaf cooked in the different ways in vogue there—some of them new to me—and various meats, there was an excellent green soup, made of grape leaves. When I had eaten as much as politeness required the dishes were taken away and sent to the house assigned to me, where I found them spread out on my arrival. I cannot say that I was sorry, for the cooking at Shaar was by far the best that I had found in Central Asia. This time I was given two robes, one of them being of cloth of gold. As it was against etiquette for me to mount my horse within the palace, and the Bek was too feeble to come out of it, a large white horse intended for me, covered with an immense embroidered cloth, was brought in and shown to me as a present from the Bek, and I was congratulated by his officials. When I had reached the proper distance, I mounted my new horse which could scarcely be induced to move through the soldiers and the dense crowd that constantly hindered our passage through the town.

I was taken to the house of Seid Merekhor, the chief executive officer of the Bek, the balconies and platforms of which were covered with Bukhariot embroidered tents and awnings. The platform devoted to me was covered with handsome rugs and was very pleasantly situated. On one side was a rapid stream, muddy to be sure, but the only water that could be had; on the other, a garden full of mint balm, balsams, portulaca and other old-fashioned flowers, such as I have often seen in old, half neglected country gardens of the West. When I had finished the dinner which I had begun at the palace, I had inflicted on me another dance by ten boys, of whom several had performed the night before at Kitab. As the nephews of the Bek came to spend the evening with me I had to allow the ballet to continue till a late hour.

The continual firing of the soldiers, who were exercising at the fortress, woke me up at day-light. The tea was bad and the water still worse, for the river, which I had found perfectly clear at Kitab, had not improved by irrigating the fields along the way. I wanted to visit the bazaar and found myself obliged to ask special permission of the Bek, for there seemed to be an impression that something would happen to me if I went out alone. I accordingly sent Andrei, with the usual presents, to get the required permit. He did not return for

nearly two hours, being kept by the Bek, who gave him breakfast and made use of the time to ask all possible questions about me and the object of my visit. Here as everywhere else my interpreter, who was dressed like a Tartar, was taken for a Mussulman, and the Bek exhorted him to serve his master well, even though he were an unbeliever, and presented him with a large turban suited to the requirements of a learned Mullah.

Attended by several officials on horseback, and by one runner to clear the way, I set out for the bazaar. It was fortunately bazaar-day (here Thursday), and the whole town, but especially the bazaar, was densely crowded. With the exception of one round building, with passages radiating from the centre, where fine cotton and silk goods and small articles were sold, the bazaar resembled in all respects those which I had previously seen, each trade, keeping to its own locality. I could find no English goods except a few thin muslins for turbans, but I saw many Russian prints and calico and other cotton goods, although most of the fabrics on sale were of native manufacture. The only things special to the place were skull-caps, embroidered in silk in the same cross-stitch used by our ladies. The horse-bazaar was situated some little distance beyond the gate to the south. The crowd was very respectful and the Jews were all extremely polite, for they understand that the only relief from the restrictions under which they now labour can be obtained by Russian intervention. The garden of one of the mosques served as a tea garden and was crowded with merchants and other natives seated on the ground in all varieties of costume and drinking tea served to them by boys. We went in and had a place made for us between two small streams of water, and at once a large ring of curious spectators formed around us. The *mirshab* who had charge of me introduced some jugglers, one of whom played tricks with a tame snake, while others ate fire, swallowed knives, turned somersaults, and performed other gymnastic feats with large knives strapped to their elbows and knees. This curious scene amused me for nearly an hour, and the rest of the day, which was fearfully hot, I spent at home, listening to two men playing on the *dutara*, accompanied by a tambourine, and singing Uzbek and Persian songs. I had some conversation with Seid Merekhor,

and with his retainers; but it is difficult talking to Moham-medans, with whom you have nothing in common, and who are watching you with suspicion because you are a foreigner and a Christian. Some of them were much interested to know in what way we punished criminals, and I found that in Shahrisabs, from motives of humanity, they usually cut a man's throat before hanging him. The gallows stands in the sheep-market behind the chief *medressé*.

There are said to be in Shaar ninety mosques and three *medressés*, which would indicate a population of about 20,000. Kitab, which is somewhat smaller, has about 15,000 inhabitants. Shaar and Kitab being surrounded by one wall, were anciently known by the name of Kesh, but now, when taken together, are called Shaar-i-Sabz,¹ or the 'Green City,' a name given to it even before Baber's time, on account of the gardens. Timur, who was born at Kesh, at first intended to make it his capital, but gave up the idea on account of the superior attractions of Samarkand. With the exception of the *Ak-Sarai*, already spoken of, there are no remnants of Timur's constructions. The palace is a large house, covered with plaster in the ordinary style, although apparently one or two hundred years old,

¹ This should more properly be written *Shahr-i-sabz*, or even *Shehr-i-sebz*. It is often pronounced *Shehr-sebyz*. The word *Kitab* means 'book,' and Shaar is explained as the same as *shahr*, 'city'; but why these names were ever applied would be difficult to tell. More probably, *Kitab* is a compound of *ab*, 'water.' Baber thus describes the city:—'Another province is Kesh, to the South of Samarkand, at the distance of nine farsangs. Between the cities of Kesh and Samarkand lies a hill called Amak Dayan, from which all the stones brought to the city are quarried. In the spring, the plains, the town of Kesh, the walls and terraces of the houses, are all green and cheerful, whence it is named *Shehr-i-Selz* (the Green City). At Kesh was the place of Timur Bek's nativity; he made incredible exertions to extend and render it his capital. He built a number of magnificent edifices, and, among others, a lofty Tak, or arched hall, for holding his court. On the right and left of this great Tak he constructed two smaller Taks (or arched halls), for the convenience of the Beks who attended the court, and for the benefit of those who came to wait the result of their applications, smaller Taks and saloons were constructed on all sides of the great hall of audience. There is not in the world any Tak or arch that can be compared with the large one, which is said to exceed even the Tak-e-Kesra. In Kesh there is a college and mausoleum, in which are the tombs of Jehangir Mirza, and of several of his family. As, however, Kesh was found not to possess the same requisites for becoming a great city as Samarkand, Timur Bek at last fixed on Samarkand as his capital.'

judging from the carved wooden pillars. None of the mosques seem to be older.

The inhabitants made a more pleasing impression upon me than those of the other Bukharan cities, partly perhaps on account of the warmth of their reception. It is evident, however, that the conditions of life there are different from those which prevail in the rest of the Khanate. Slavery has never been allowed there; Shahrisabs, like Magian, Farab, and other small Bekships, was until recently nearly always semi-independent, bearing something of a feudal relation to the Amir of Bukhara. The whole of Central Asia has probably never been under one homogeneous rule. Tchingiz Khan divided his conquest among his children as appanages, and this system was afterwards kept up. We see by the 'Memoirs of Baber' that in his time the appanage system was in full force, and we know that it existed in Bukhara until comparatively recent times. The effect of the appanage system was to give each province a desire for independence, which in many cases was to a certain extent realised.

Such was the case with Shahrisabs, and the efforts of the present dynasty of Bukhara have always been to unite the country, and abolish the semi-independence of the outlying parts. With Shahrisabs this was very difficult, for this fertile valley was separated from Bukhara by a desert, and from Samarkand by a mountain range, the passes of which were easily defensible. In the middle of the last century, after an obstinate struggle, Rahim Bii, the Regent of Bukhara, succeeded in getting possession of Shahrisabs, and held it for five years, but after his death the country again rebelled, and fell under the rule of one of the chief families of the *Kairosaly*, one of the Uzbek tribes of the neighbourhood. In the early part of the present century, Daniar Atalyk, one of the most remarkable of the rulers of Shahrisabs, governed the country for twenty-five years, from 1811 to 1836, with the title of Veli-n-niem. Both Mir Haidar and his son Nasrullah, endeavoured to conquer the country, but met with such opposition from Daniar, that they were obliged to withdraw. Daniar was succeeded by his two sons, Hodja Kul, who reigned in Shaar from 1836 to 1846, and Baba Datkha, to whose share Kitab fell. Dissension broke out between the brothers, and Nasrullah

profited by them to make a new invasion, but before his army had arrived, Hodja Kul had driven out his younger brother from Kitab, and then repulsed the Bukharans. Angry at this, Nasrullah sent his cavalry twice a year to devastate the meadows of Shabrisabs, and each time a truce was made which lasted till the following foray. On the death of Hodja Kul, in 1846, Kitab passed to his brother Iskender, and Shaar to his son Ashur-Kuli Bek, who was very speedily driven away. Iskender took the title of Veli-n-niem, which he retained until 1856, when, after ten years of constant warfare, Nasrullah succeeded in capturing Shaar, having first blockaded and reduced it by famine. Iskender fortified himself in Kitab, but soon surrendered himself to the Amir on advantageous conditions. He was sent with his family to Bukhara, and received the revenues of Kara Kul for his support. The Amir Nasrullah obtained in this way too the sister of Iskender, Aim Keninghez, who was a remarkable beauty, but who had just before been married. The husband was sent to Tchardjui, and the chief families of Shahrissabs were colonised in Tchardjui, Karshi, and other places. Nasrullah died four years later, in 1860, and just before his death ordered Iskender and all his family, including his own wife, Iskender's sister, to be killed, partly perhaps out of vengeance, and partly out of jealousy.¹

Scarcely had Nasrullah died, when Shahrissabs revolted against his son Mozaffar Eddin, and elected two members of the clan of Keninghez, Jura as Bek of Shaar, and Hakim as Bek of Kitab.² The Amir attacked Shahrissabs, but was obliged to raise the siege, and conclude peace in consequence of an invasion by Malla Khan of Khokand, who had taken Ura-tepé, and was attacking Jizakh. The Beks acknowledged the precedence of the Amir, sent him yearly presents, and assisted him with their troops in case of need, but did not allow him to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. These friendly relations were broken, in 1866, by the disorders consequent on the defeat of the Bukharans by the Russians at Irdjar. Some of the nomadic Uzbeks devoted themselves to wholesale pillage. The Amir was shut up in Samarkand, afraid to show

¹ I have given an account of the execution of Iskender and his sister in vol. i. pp. 75-79.

² See vol. i. p. 85.

himself in Bukhara, where a strong party had been formed in the interests of his nephew Seid Khan. At last the Amir's party gained the ascendancy, and Seid Khan and the defeated leaders of the rebellion, took refuge at Shahrisabs. Some of them were induced to return on promises of forgiveness, which were at once violated. Jura Bek, therefore, refused to give up Seid Khan to the Amir, and successfully resisted all attacks. Finally the Amir thought it best to conclude peace, by which he paid to each of the Beks 10,000 *tengas*, and in addition gave to Jura Bek the honorary title of *Datkha*. Of the relations of the Beks of Shahrisabs to the Russians and of their attack on the citadel of Samarkand, I have previously spoken, vol. i. p. 241 ff.

The final blow to the independence of Shahrisabs was given by the Russians. In the summer of 1870, during the absence of General Abramof on the Iskender Kul Expedition, a band of marauders attacked Prince Urusof, who was engaged in the collection of taxes, and killed several of the Cossacks forming his escort. Prince Urusof insisted that this attack had been conducted by a certain Aidar Hodja, apparently well known in the region, and in the service of Jura Bek. A message was therefore sent to Shahrisabs demanding his instant delivery. To this Jura Bek replied that he was not bound, either by any law or by his conscience, to deliver up an innocent man; that neither Aidar Hodja, nor any other inhabitant of Shahrisabs, had taken part in the attack; and that moreover, Aidar Hodja himself had been at the time in another place. He at the same time wrote that he believed a certain Dervish, coming from Kunduz, had taken part in the attack, and sent to the Russians a Cossack rifle which had been taken from him. The Russians still insisted that the leader was Aidar Hodja, and again demanded his surrender. To this letter no answer was received. General Kaufmann therefore decided to make an end of Shahrisabs, and despatched an expedition thither, under the command of General Abramof. Kitab, after a vigorous defence, during which the Russian loss was heavy, especially at the passage of the river, was taken by storm on August 26, and Shaar immediately surrendered. The Beks fled to Khokand, and Shahrisabs was immediately given up by General Abramof to the Amir of Bukhara, as a proof that the Russians desired no further conquests.

The last evening of my stay my host gave another entertainment of dancing and jugglery, his chief secretary supporting a variety of comic parts.

The next morning, at five o'clock, I went to take leave of the Bek, who received me in a very simple and almost fatherly way. He spoke of his old age and of his sons; talked much about God and God's will in allowing me to come to see him; hoped that I had enjoyed myself and sent, as usual, various messages to the Russian officials. His goodness and simplicity, if not sincerity, made a strong impression on me, and I recall his kind, old face with much pleasure. On leaving Shahrisabs, Seid-Merekhor and his officials accompanied me beyond the gate to the little village of Sharmitan. At the next small village, about six miles from Shaar, I was invited to stop for tea in the Amir's garden. The day was not too warm as there was a cool and pleasant breeze. The road lay through the valley of the Kashka, but the mountains to the south were almost invisible through the haze. About four miles from Tchiraktchi we were met by the retainers of the Bek, who had previously sent a message to me at Shaar to offer me his hospitality, and we went off at a gallop to the town, which is very small and insignificant and almost in ruins. The chief bazaar was just opposite the gate. This place was formerly a dependency of Shahrisabs, but is now governed by a Bek appointed directly by the Amir. Salim Bek, whom I found ruling there, a son of the Bek of Kitab, and a young man of about thirty-five, lived in a mean, low house well situated on the high bank of the river. He was very uncommunicative and seemed greatly under the influence of the Reis, who was constantly with him (but who, I learn, was soon after removed for misdemeanours), and the usual ceremonial meal, which I took with them, passed in silence. I was then presented with a horse and a gold embroidered gown, and was conducted to a kubitka, which had been placed for me near two large ponds of clear water, and at a short distance from the river, in the valley underneath the palace, the Bek excusing himself from making any better provision for me on the ground that he had but just entered upon the government. I had barely got established there when a messenger arrived from Karabak, sent by the Serkar, the aid of the Bek of Karshi, desiring me to come on as soon as possible. I sent word

to the Bek that I would come at once, as it would be pleasanter to travel in the evening; but Salim Bek was very desirous that I should remain overnight, since he had had dancing boys brought up from Shaar, there being none in Tchiraktchi. As it was evident that he expected to amuse himself in entertaining me, I yielded to his request. My supposition was correct, for in the evening the Bek and the Reis both arrived, and could hardly wait to finish their tea and melons before they asked if it were not time for the dances to begin. Lamps were lighted and set around a raised platform, and apparently the whole population of the town came down to see the show, until I was forced to tell the Bek that I was very tired as a hint for him to retire and let me put an end to the festivity. At sunrise the next morning I had a delightful view,—a green valley with villages and fields on the other side of the river, and to the north the mountains of Shahrisabs in two high ridges gradually sloping off to the plain.

It was a pleasant ride of a dozen miles to Karabak, the road running through the steppe and through cultivated fields constantly intersected by ditches, with the river on the right, now near and now far off. The Hissar range was barely visible through the heated air. At intervals I passed country people and encampments of nomadic Uzbeks, and near Karabak I was met by the Serkar of the place with his suite. A Bukharan tent and awning were prepared in a court near a pond, and breakfast had been made ready for me. At noon I left Karabak, which is a very insignificant village, and made ten miles more to Sham, where I was lodged in a kubitka beside a dried-up pond in the garden of a mosque. Starting from here about half-past two in the morning, I jogged along quietly, stopping only for a cup of tea and a five minutes' nap under a shed at the large village of Kanavat, six miles from Karshi. Three miles from town I met the assistant of the Bek with his suite, when we all alighted and embraced one another, each, however, taking particular pains not to derogate from his dignity by alighting too soon. I had soon learned whether to dismount first or last, or whether to watch the motions of the dignitary who met me, and so manage it that we should put our feet on the ground at one and the same moment.

Karshi, which I reached about nine o'clock, is surrounded

like nearly all other towns of Central Asia, by extensive gardens. This seems strange here, as the river is dried up long before it reaches Karshi, although in former times it probably flowed quite to the Amu Darya. The irrigation is carried on in summer solely by means of wells, from which the water is drawn, sometimes by hand, and sometimes by rude machines,—wheels bearing earthenware jars. There were many wells along the road as we drew near to Karshi, and men were constantly employed in drawing the water and emptying it into troughs for the use of travellers and their horses. The principal street, into which we immediately entered, was originally paved with huge blocks of stone, once probably very well laid, but now dangerous for an unpractised rider, and I preferred the narrow unpaved strip at the edge. The houses were all of clay, and were frequently two stories high. As I drew near to the citadel I was met by the oldest assistant of the Bek, Mirza Iraddin Divan-Begi, a handsome Uzbek, who conducted me to his house in the large square citadel, where he gave me a comfortable room, furnished with two beds, a few chairs, and a table of reasonable height. Usually in these native houses, even where special preparations had been made, the seats were a foot higher than the tables. I was then informed that my proper host, the Bek Nureddin-Khan, the second son of the Amir and heir to the throne, a boy of about eighteen, had gone to Khuzar, a distance of about thirty-five miles. After dinner I was asked to go into the garden, situated at the foot of the hill on which the house stood, where carpets were placed for me in the shade, on the edge of a dry deep pond, there being no running water here except in winter. The Divan-Begi came down to see me, and I had a long talk with him, as well as with several other officials who dropped in, and who, apparently with great willingness, gave me what information they could about the road to Kerki and Hissar and about the country beyond.¹ The evening closed with the usual entertainment.

¹ Since then, in the summer of 1875, a Russian exploring party, although unfortunately intended rather for the pursuit of decorations than of information, and including no scientific man except an astronomer, visited Hissar and penetrated as far as Kulab. Nothing but a very brief account has yet been published, a translation of which appeared in the 'Geographical Magazine' for November, 1875,

In the morning, I was informed that the Bek had just then returned, but as I had heard no salutes and was unable to find that anyone had gone to meet him, I began to think that his absence was feigned. I was asked if I desired to see him, and replied that I should certainly be very happy to pay my respects to him, although I had nothing special to say to him. The Divan-Begi went to him with this information and returned saying that I should have an interview at one o'clock. At the appointed hour, I sent to the Divan-Begi to say that I was ready to pay my visit, and he went to the Bek to see if he were ready to receive me, but soon returned with many excuses on the Bek's part, that as I had not yet been presented to his father, the Amir, whose guest I was, and as he was only a boy and stood in awe of his father, he did not dare to receive me, but that if I insisted upon it, he would, perhaps, be able to meet me in a casual manner, and hoped that I would not be offended. I replied that my request to see him was dictated merely by politeness and of a desire to conform to Bukharan usages, and that while I would be very glad to make the acquaintance of the heir to the throne, I certainly did not wish to insist upon it. The messenger returned again, saying that the Bek was glad that I was not offended, and would be very well pleased if I would stay longer. He sent me, as a present, five handsome gowns, and a white horse with bridle and trappings, set with cornelians and turquoise. This really was a good horse, and the best I received during my stay in the country, but he nearly broke my neck, by running away with me the first time I tried him. I sent the Bek some presents in return, and excused my hasty departure. From that time until early evening, when I left, I did nothing but receive his treasurer, secretary, and various other officials, who came to make my acquaintance. On my return to Samarkand, I learned that this refusal to see me was owing to wounded pride, caused by the fact that I had not brought a letter of introduction from General Abramof, while I had had letters for the other Beks. It was the result of an oversight on my part, as I refused a letter thinking I should not go to Karshi, but expecting to find a more direct road from Shahrissabs to Bukhara.

except a list of 67 elevations (some of them truly astonishing) and of 14 astronomical determinations in the 'Turkistan Gazette,' No. 49, 1875.

During the morning, I rode about the city, which is a large straggling place, although as it was not a bazaar day it seemed nearly deserted. Not far from the citadel were three *medressés*, Ali, containing accommodation for 130 students—Abdullah Khan, with room for 80, and Biki, intended for 100 students. Turning from the square, I came to a *sardoba*, a curious large cistern, covered by an arched building, close by which was a domed bath, the best, if not the only one in the place. The bazaar was chiefly under cover, with paved streets. But few goods were to be seen.

On market days, however, a large business is done in this bazaar. The fields about Karshi are full of poppies, planted for the seed and the capsules, and of tobacco, that of Karshi being considered the best in Central Asia. Mulberry trees grow everywhere, although but little silk is produced. Karshi is a great centre of the grain trade, being one of the chief places for supplying the Bukharan market, grain being brought here from all points in the fertile valley of the Kashka Darya, and even from further off in the neighbourhood of Hissar, and transported to Bukhara. Near Karshi too are the mines of that peculiar, excellent, rose-coloured rock-salt, which is largely sold throughout the whole of Central Asia. It is obtained in the mountains about ten miles to the south of Karshi. Although Karshi lies on the direct road of the trade between India, Afghanistan and Bukhara, it derives no advantage from it, all merchandise being taken directly to Bukhara without being opened; some articles, such as tea, being afterwards sent back to Karshi. For this reason tea and Indian wares are dearer there than at Bukhara. Karshi is also the chief market for Turkoman goods, and especially for their excellent carpets; although most of them seem to be sent on to Bukhara where they can be sold at a greater profit, and at this season of the year I was unable to find any there. There, too, is one of the chief markets for slaves. I asked to see the slave market and was shown the *sarai*, but saw no slaves, though I was told that the next day (Tuesday), being bazaar day, some would probably be brought in for sale. Near the bazaar is another *medressé* called the Medressé Sarai. After passing through the western gate of the city I went round the town through the gardens to a large mosque, on the south side, which is especially used during the month of Ramazan and

at the festival of Kurban, when its large gardens are filled with people, who combine their prayers with dancing and other amusements. The inside was very plain, consisting of nine stone vaults. The front of the mosque was very handsome and well proportioned, and was covered, as was also the cupola, with blue and white tiles arranged so as to form texts from the Koran; but wherever hands could reach, even on the cupola, the coloured glaze had been designedly and wantonly scratched off, or the bricks knocked out. From the top I had a fine view of the town and of all its surroundings. This mosque was built about three hundred years ago, by Biki, a simple Uzbek, who was made a Bii and governor of Karshi by Abdullah Khan, because, when that monarch had once lost his way during a hunt, this Biki had met him, put him in the right track, and shown him the greatest civility without knowing his rank. This was the same Biki who constructed the *medressé* bearing his name.

Soon after leaving the town, on the road to Bukhara, we crossed the then dry bed of the river on a bridge of nine brick arches, built by Abdullah Khan. The arches have all fallen in but the brick piers remain, and a wooden bridge has been constructed upon them. I was told that in the spring, the water rises so high as to float away the roadway of the bridge, which is replaced when the water has fallen. After riding about eighteen miles in four hours through a well cultivated country, I arrived at Karsan, a very large village, and, through the stupidity of the messenger who had been sent ahead, had to wait sometime in the dark streets of the bazaar, so that it was nearly midnight before I could find the place prepared for me. I was at last admitted to the garden of a mosque, where I had supper, and, for the first time, found it almost too cool to sleep in the open air.

It is difficult to exaggerate the unpleasantness of the journey from Karshi to Bukhara. During the whole distance, after leaving Karsan, there is absolutely nothing but sand and a few ruined stations over wells of bad water, which date, as everything is said to date here, from the time of Abdullah Khan. The heat was intense, and a strong wind constantly drove the fine sand into our eyes and nostrils, and made riding very uncomfortable. Frequently the road was so drifted over with sand as

to be entirely lost, although there was usually visible in the distance the dome of some cistern, or some natural object, by which to mark the way. Fortunately for me, tents had been erected at most of the stations, and other preparations had been made to receive me, with plenty of fresh water, fruits, and eatables; but for this I should have found the journey very difficult. It was necessary to ride as much as possible early in the morning, and then, resting at some station during the heat of the day, to travel again in the evening. As I had with me the *arba* for my luggage I could, when too tired, lie down in that, spread a piece of felt to keep the sun and wind out, and get a little sleep. The stations are still the same as those given in the list of Khanikof.

On the morning of the second day, I arrived at the large station of Karaul, the Caravanserai of which is in tolerably good repair; it consists of a number of vaulted rooms, surmounted by low domes, around a square court. I found here a large guard;—I had had an escort for the two last stations on account of the supposed danger from the Turkomans, who, it is said, at times make raids on the caravans going to Bukhara. Preparations were being made here to receive the Amir, who was on his way to Karshi and Shahrisabs. We had been told along the road that he had already left Bukhara for the gardens, and that he was expected here in five or six days' time, but about noon a man came to say that the Amir was some eighteen miles from the station of Karaul, and that if I wished to see him I must either go at once or wait there until the morning. I sent back word that when it got a little cooler toward evening, I would come to the Amir's camp, but that had I known he was coming I would have waited for him in Karshi. A couple of hours after, the man returned with an answer, saying that his message was not believed.

When I finally summoned up courage to brave the heat, I found that the advance guard of the Amir had just arrived, and for fully five miles I passed large bodies of troops straggling on at intervals, I should think about 8,000 men in all. It was a most curious army,—men in every kind of uniform, some on foot, some on horses, camels, or donkeys, often several on one animal, and as they were on the march, of course keeping no order. Most of the men were armed with matchlocks, but a few had flint and

percussion muskets, and many pikes and swords. There were several cannon, the smaller pieces being dismounted and carried on camels, and there were three large heavy guns, drawn by horses and camels. The troop of young nobles, part of the special body-guard of the Amir, displayed more order, and were much more richly dressed. They had with them a band, composed of a large number of drums, trumpets, and clarionets, and displayed many banners, one of them, I remember, being a red tea-pot on a white ground. There were many Afghans among the soldiers, recognisable at once not only by their features but by their long black hair. One of them began to threaten and revile us, and it was with difficulty that the officials with us prevented a conflict. At last, after passing over some low rocky hills, and marching through deep sand, we saw before us some pools of brackish water looking like silver in the sunset, and near by the guard of the Amir regularly drawn up near a mud enclosure, where he kept those of his harem who were selected to travel with him.

After passing the artillery, I was shown to a small green tent at a little distance from the rest of the camp, and tea, fruit and pilaf were immediately brought to me. The *Mirza-bashi*, or Secretary of the Amir, and Mohammed Sherif *Taksaba*,¹ a son of the Kush-Begi or Grand Vizier, came to see me. After answering the *Taksaba*'s numerous inquiries, I told him I had a letter to the Amir from General Abramof, but that it was in my *arba*, which had not yet arrived, and that I would send it to him as soon as it came. He said 'No,'—I had better deliver it myself to the Amir, who would receive me for that purpose. Being very tired, I soon went to sleep, although my rest was broken at intervals by the noise and singing of the soldiers.

I was awakened at four o'clock by the *Mirza-bashi* with the statement that the Amir was desirous of starting at once for Karshi, and that he wished to see me before going, so that I must dress and go to him immediately. After making myself ready, I was told to wait until I was sent for. I waited in vain until 9 o'clock with increasing ill-humour, when I sent for the *Taksaba*, to ask the reason of this delay. He came to me im-

¹ *Taksaba* is a rank nearly equivalent to colonel. Mohammed Sherif, besides being in attendance on the Amir in case of the reception of foreigners, was the chief *Zekatchi*, or customs collector.



MOZAFFAR-EDDIN, AMIR OF BUKHARA.

mediately and said that the Amir was taking a nap, and that the delay was entirely my fault; that the Amir had been very anxious to see me the night before, but had not done so because I had not my letter of introduction with me; and that he, the Taksaba, had come to me early in the morning, but had feared to wake me; and that the Amir was waiting here a whole day, merely to suit my convenience. I replied that, I was only waiting for the Amir, and gave him my letter of introduction, which he carried off, saying that he thought that the Amir would receive me after he had breakfasted and finished his morning business; meanwhile, I was requested not to leave my tent. At last about noon, we were told that the Amir was awake, and was bathing, and in about half an hour, I was sent for.

As the distance was very short, we walked; but as there was no other shelter from the sun, I raised my umbrella, which seemed to displease the Taksaba, who considered it, perhaps, an infringement of the Amir's prerogatives. However, in spite of all his remonstrances, I kept it up until I reached the door of the Amir's tent, for I was convinced that the more I asserted my dignity and stood up for my rights, the better I should get on. I think that I was right. As I drew near, the masters of ceremonies with their long wands, uttered the usual loud cry, '*Khudai Hazreti Amirni Mozaffar Mansul Kylsun*'—'God make his majesty the Amir Mozaffar powerful and victorious.' On such occasions it is usual for the masters of ceremonies to drag along the person who is to be presented to the Amir, but my presentation being somewhat informal, they contented themselves with merely touching my arm. The officials remained outside, and I and my interpreter entered alone.

The Amir was kneeling on a broad low bedstead, raised a few inches from the floor, and covered with silken cushions, there being no other furniture in the tent except a few rugs and cushions. As I entered he turned, and smilingly held out his hand, took mine, and said, '*General Aman?*' 'Is the General well?' I replied, '*Aman,*' 'he is well.' He then gave his hand to the interpreter, and motioned to us to sit down facing him at the end of the tent on the right of the entrance.

Supposing it to be etiquette that he should speak first, I kept silence, and had leisure to observe him. He was a tall, stout man, with sallow complexion, and small, dark, uneasy eyes,

which he kept turning in all directions. His flesh looked very flabby and unhealthy, and his hands trembled constantly throughout the interview, as I have been told, from a too frequent use of aphrodisiacs. His beard is very dark, but rather thin. He wore a plain grey silk gown and a white turban. After waiting in vain for him to speak, and finding the silence growing awkward, I said,

‘I have come with a letter from General Abramof.’

‘Yes, I received it,’ he replied.

‘I have been in Kitab, Shaar, and Karshi, where I was very well received, and passed the time very pleasantly.

‘I am glad you were pleased. I am glad you came.’

‘I wish now to go to Bukhara, Kara-kul, and Tchardjui, and then back to Samarkand.’

‘You must consider this country as your own, and travel where you wish. Go to Bukhara, Kara-kul, and Tchardjui, and be our guest, and pass the time pleasantly. The Taksaba will make all arrangements for you.’

I thanked him for this permission, and waited a moment longer. He began to look uneasily towards the door, the Taksaba appeared, and the Amir said, ‘Now go;’ upon which we immediately took our leave. On the way home I told the Taksaba that the Amir had given me permission to go to Tchardjui, and he said that he had himself heard it. I was particular in saying this to him, because I knew that no Russian had been allowed to go there, and I had been astonished at having so readily obtained permission.

In connection with this interview, I may say that, after I had returned to Samarkand, a report came from Bukhara that the Amir was very much dissatisfied with me, alleging as the reason that I had squeezed his hand too hard on being presented to him.

Mozaffar-Eddin, although without the sternness and strength of character of his father Nasrullah, inherited his cruel and capricious disposition. His subjects detest him, and more than that, believe him to be gifted with the evil eye; so that, on meeting him, or coming into his presence, they always secretly make the sign which avails as a countercharm. In these annual journeys to Karshi and Shahrissabs, he is always accompanied by his army, not so much to protect himself from

actual violence, as to assure himself of its fidelity, and to prevent a discontented son, or a rebellious Bek, from winning its favour while he is away, and shutting him out of the capital. He likes also to wreak his vengeance on the inhabitants of Shahrisabs by subjecting them to the inconveniences caused by the presence of a large body of troops, and to the exactions of the soldiery.

I had packed up, and made preparations for starting off, when the presents from the Amir arrived, consisting of four gowns and a richly caparisoned horse. The Taksaba told me that the Amir had a garden at Kakan, six miles from Bukhara, and another twelve miles off, and asked in which I preferred to live. I was prepared for this question, for I had been told that an effort would probably be made to prevent me from living in the town, where I could too easily learn all that went on. As I was anxious to see as much as I could, and did not wish a long ride every day, I told him that I should prefer living in the city itself, at which I think he was not very well pleased; but after reflecting a moment, he said that he himself had a house there, and would be very glad if I would live in it, and that he would send a man to prepare it for me. This camp was about ten miles from the city wall, and after riding two or three miles, we came to gardens and fields which surrounded the city. The walls and enclosures seemed to be better, but the trees were smaller and not so thickly planted as in the suburbs of Tashkent and Samarkand.

As we approached the city, the number of people we met constantly increased; peasants, merchants, and mullahs, on foot, on horses, and on asses. It was bazaar day, and everyone was coming away loaded with purchases. We passed village after village, and indeed the whole road, from the numbers of small booths and shops, seemed to be one long bazaar. At last we saw on the left the blue dome of the mosque Namazga standing out from its green garden, and before us rose the high clay walls of the city. The gate Sallia-Khani was comparatively modern in appearance, and surmounted by two large towers of burnt bricks. We rode on through narrow streets paved with hard clay mixed with small stones—almost as good at this season as a Macadamised road—along the canal, and through the bazaar, where a dense crowd collected about me in astonishment

and almost prevented my passage. We passed many *mosques* and *medressés*, and rode through the Righistan with its markets, the *ark* or citadel looming up to my right, and through more narrow streets, almost to the city wall near the Uglan gate, where I found the house intended for me. After going through a narrow passage, there was a large court to the left intended for horses, and then we passed into another, two sides of which were occupied by the house; on the third were sheds, which were usually filled with horses. Two large rooms were given to me on the upper floor, with a large balcony, and I was provided with chairs and a table, although the table was so low that I was compelled to turn the chairs on one side, in order to restore anything like proportion. At the end of my balcony was a large store room containing clothes, silk mattresses and pillows, bread, muskets, and other weapons, harness and saddle cloths, and jars of various sweets. The ground floor was occupied by the Mirzas and men of the house, and was also used as the kitchen. The house did not belong to the Taksaba, as he had informed me, but to a different man, who subsequently made my acquaintance, and it has been of late the residence of many Russians who have visited Bukhara.

During the week that I spent at Bukhara, my days all passed in very much the same way. In the early morning I either made or received visits, then rode through the town and visited the mosques and medressés, or lounged about the bazaar. In the evening an entertainment of some kind, usually dancing, was provided for me, and nearly always some acquaintances were present. Already in Khokand I had got very tired of native food, —pilaf, and greasy, fried or stewed, mutton, —and had taken measures to have a slight change; but with only mutton, although the most excellent I have ever eaten, and old tough chickens to choose from, my *menu* could not be very varied, especially as there was no butter, nor any variety of vegetables or seasoning. I taught my servants how to prepare stewed kidneys, mutton chops, eggs in various ways, and liver with tallow—the nearest obtainable substitute for bacon—and I managed at all events to eat with considerable relish. By tallow I do not mean candles, but the fat of the *kurdiuk*, or rumps of the so-called big-tailed sheep, which is by far the most delicate portion of the animal. The early

melons were now all gone, but those of midsummer were coming in, usually much larger, and of much firmer flesh, and equally good. Peaches of two kinds were plentiful, as were grapes of all varieties, although not equalling those of the Crimea or of Western Europe. The Husseini and Sahibi grapes were especially good; the celebrated Bukhariot plums which were coming in season struck me as being hard and acid; but the purple figs, which I tasted for the first time, were delicious. Flowers also seemed very plentiful, for a fresh bouquet was brought to me two or three times a day, and the natives, who are very fond of flowers, had little sprigs of mint, or other plants, stuck in their caps over their ears.

I had always been warned against the water of Bukhara, which is very apt to give one the *reshka*, a disagreeable worm, that makes its appearance through the flesh a year afterwards; but I was told that fresh water had just arrived at Bukhara, the dyke at Samarkand having been repaired, and that as I could also have well water, there would be no danger. I gave orders, however, to have the water always boiled before giving it to me, although I suspect my commands were not in all cases carried out. I looked uneasily the next summer for the appearance of the unpleasant creature in one of my legs, but fortunately escaped an attack. The water from the ponds must certainly be very unhealthy.

Besides my own servants, there were several attached to the house, and three or four secretaries, under whose special charge I was, and who had orders to accompany me wherever I went. Generally speaking, they were very polite, and did not seem to object to my seeing any part of the city, or anything which I wished.

The walls of the Bukharan houses always shut out one's neighbours, but the flat roofs afford a good opportunity for looking into another court, if one desires to take advantage of it; and as there had been a great deal of curiosity to see me, and especially to witness the dances and other entertainments which were provided for me, the surrounding roofs and walls were always covered with a crowd of women and children; and many a time I found the black horse-hair veil which usually concealed their faces uplifted, and had a chance of seeing the beauty, or rather the lack of it, of the Bukharan women.

I myself usually slept in a room, on a camp bedstead which I had brought with me, but my interpreter lay on the balcony outside. One evening we were annoyed by some stones or clods of earth being thrown, and my interpreter's bed was struck with one of them ; after this, we had the roof patrolled, to keep off intruders. I was not sure, however, whether this missile was intended as an act of hostility or as a friendly signal.

One evening, I was taken to a garden of the Amir, just outside the Uglan gate, where it was proposed to show me a ram-fight. The garden, though a very large one, and occasionally used by the Amir during the summer season, was not in a flourishing condition, owing to the lack of water, the trees being all small, and the vines unhealthy looking. Ram-fighting is a favourite amusement among the Uzbeks, but of late years it has somewhat fallen into disuse, and bets are readily made and taken, in spite of the strict injunctions of the Mussulman law against that practice. On this occasion the fight was unsuccessful. Four large and excellent rams were introduced, and went at one another with great delight, but after one or two butts, three of them retired, and could not be brought up again to the mark ; they were willing to engage with each other, but the moment the largest, the victor, appeared, they immediately turned tail and fled.

I am not surprised at the high idea Asiatics entertain of Bukhara—it is officially called *al sherif*, the noble, although probably from religious reasons—for in spite of all its discomforts, it made upon me a very strong and a very pleasant impression. You cannot walk the street without seeing at once that it is really a capital ; the persons at leisure, well dressed, and riding well groomed and richly caparisoned horses, the crowd of idlers who beset the market place, even the very narrowness of the streets and height of the houses, the numerous bazaars, and the great amount of trade which is constantly going on there, every day seeming like a bazaar day, show you that this is a metropolis. For a Central Asiatic, and especially for one coming from the steppes, even the mild amusements allowed in Bukhara are not despicable. There are plenty of mosques in which to pray, and praying seems to be done as much for pastime as anything else. There are plenty of shops at which to gossip, and excellent baths, and even, from all that I could learn, establish-

ments of a worse character. In general the cities of Central Asia are all alike, the same crooked streets, the same high clay walls, the very colour of which at last offends your eyes, the same windowless houses, with flat roofs everywhere; but Bukhara seems to have more individuality than the others; the houses are more commonly of two stories, and frequently have balconies with lattices or carved railings. There seem to be very few gardens, and trees even are very rare, except about the ponds of the mosques and along one or two of the canals, thus giving the city a very different look from Tashkent or Khokand. In my morning rides I was able to see almost every part of the town, and to inspect all the buildings that were interesting, either historically or architecturally. The mirzas who went with me used to be somewhat astonished at my being able to find the way, or even to tell them in which direction I should go in order to reach a certain gate or mosque; and once or twice the Kush-Begi sent to know how I knew of the existence of certain localities; they were not aware that I had with me the excellent plan of Khanikof,¹ if indeed they could understand its existence.

At a short distance from my house, at the north-west side of the town, was the Righistan or public place, which is immediately in front of the *ark* or citadel, and is surrounded by fine large mosques and medressés. On the west side of it, which is raised above the rest,—a locality greatly frequented by loungers—there is a large pond surrounded by trees, about which are placed barbers' shops, tea houses, and refreshment booths of various kinds. The rest of the square seems to be a general market for bakers and butchers, dealers in skins, and small wares of various kinds. It is the real centre of the city, and from sunrise until evening prayer, is filled by a great throng. To the right of the citadel, close under its lofty walls, lie many pieces of cannon, of which some few seem to be good, although the most of them are utterly worthless. Some

¹ Inserted in his 'Description of the Khanate of Bukhara.' The name Bukhara is derived from the Sanskrit *Vihara*, a Reunion of Wise Men, a Monastery, and, like several other names in Central Asia, is a relic of Buddhist influence. In earlier times, and even in the sixth century, as we find in Chinese authors, the place was called *Numi*, or *Numijket*. In APPENDIX II., at the end of Vol. I., will be found an article of Professor Grigorief on the 'History of Bukhara.'

had been captured in Khokand, and as they bear dragons and other similar devices, had, probably, been previously taken from the Chinese in Kashgar. The *ark* itself is a large square mound, evidently artificial, for the ends of the beams on which it is constructed are occasionally visible through the clay walls. It is surrounded by a high crenelated wall, two lofty round-topped towers guard the entrance, and high above is a clock with Arabic numerals, made some years ago by Giovanni Orlandi, an Italian enslaved in Bukhara.¹ From the entrance

¹ Modesto Gavazzi, who, with Count Litta and another Italian, visited Bukhara in 1863-4 for the purpose of buying silkworm's eggs, and was imprisoned there by the Amir for thirteen months, gives an interesting account of Orlandi in his little book, 'Alcune Notizie raccolte in un viaggio a Bucara,' Milan, 1865. Some of the facts in this statement, especially those about the Russian merchant, I have had recounted to me by Russians cognizant of the circumstances.

His (i.e. Karatacf's) predecessor as clockmaker and artificer of the Amir was Giovanni Orlandi of Parma, about whom we collected some information from an old Negai, whom we knew in the last days of our stay in Bukhara, and who under Nasrullah had been the companion of this poor man in prison. Orlandi was the last European victim of Bukharan despotism, and what we have heard of him from persons who knew him is enough to render his memory venerated as a man of intelligence, of firmness of mind, and of nobility of character. Twelve or fifteen years back there lived at Orenburg a certain Z——, a Russian by birth, who maintained an extended commerce with the Kirghiz Steppe and with the Khanates of Central Asia, and was reputed, not without reason, to be the richest merchant of that city, because, with a certain elasticity of conscience which was peculiar to him, he knew how to get profit from every kind of business, and to find secret and safe sources of gain. One of these was the sale to the Kirghiz of men whom he inveigled, under pretext of colonisation, to an estate of his situated on the borders of this steppe, which was from time to time invaded by bands of Kirghiz robbers, who carried off all the people stationed there and sold them as slaves in Bukhara. The infamous traffic was at last found out, Z—— was tried and condemned for life to Siberia; but as in Russia gold is omnipotent, and he could dispose of much of it, it was found that he had died, although in reality he had in the meantime changed his name to avoid the punishment. Orlandi had been sent to this estate as a superintendent, and together with his companions had been carried as a slave to Bukhara and sold to the Amir. As Orlandi was a Christian and a *Frenghi*, the Amir repeatedly tried to convert him to Islamism, and angry at his obstinate refusal threw him into prison, and later condemned him to death. Orlandi would not even then change his mind, but knowing that Nasrullah was a great lover of mechanical works, promised to construct for him a machine for measuring time, and thus obtained his pardon. Orlandi then made the clock which is on the tower over the palace gate, the only one which exists in all Bukhara. Nasrullah was so satisfied with it that he appointed Orlandi his artificer, and gave him at the same time his liberty. Orlandi then lived an endurable life with the fruit of his labours, and as independently as he could under a government as capricious as that of Bukhara. During this time he made a telescope for the Amir, who unfor-

there is a steep incline to the top, where are the palace of the Amir, his treasury, the house of the Kush-Begi, a mosque, the *ab-khaneh* or water reservoir, which serves also as a prison for state offenders, and the *kana-khaneh*, that noted place of punishment into which men used to be thrown to be slowly devoured alive by sheep-ticks and other vermin. I had heard that this dungeon had been abolished; but people in Bukhara assured me of its existence, and said that some criminals had been confined there not long before; the story however that in the absence of prisoners the ticks are fed by raw meat to keep up their diet, is probably untrue. At the right of the entrance, under the archway, is a raised platform, where at certain hours the Kush-Begi is obliged to sit, in order to learn the business of all who enter the fortress; during the absence of the Amir, when the Kush-Begi remains above, another officer is detailed for this duty.¹ In this passage many curious objects are hung on the walls, such as an immense whip seven feet long, which is said to have belonged to the hero Rustam; a snake-like staff of some saint; various battle-axes and halberds; hammers of command (*ai-balta*); a curious root brought by a Mecca pilgrim, &c. In a word, this is the Amir's museum.

Passing to the right round the *ark* and down through the narrow high-walled street, we came to a mosque, called Masjid Baliand, a Jumma mosque that is intended for the holding of the *Jumma* or Friday public service. Properly speaking such

fortunately one day let it fall from the top of a minaret near Bohoneddin. On re-entering the city he sent immediately for Orlandi to repair it; but Orlandi that day had been on a drinking bout in company with an Armenian or Hebrew who was allowed to drink wine, and came to the Amir a little intoxicated. The Amir therefore condemned him a second time to death, but repenting shut him up again in prison, enjoining him to embrace Islam if he wished his life to be spared. A Cossack, then a slave in Bukhara, was ordered to persuade Orlandi to be converted, which, according to him, was the only means of saving his life. He said that a mere appearance of submission would satisfy the Amir, who wished an act of submission rather than a formal renunciation of his religion, but Orlandi was so firmly opposed to it, saying that he preferred death to shame, that the Amir resolved on a hard trial. He had the executioner cut the skin of his throat, warning him that if on the morrow he should still be obstinate, he would have him killed. The threat did not move him, and the next day he was beheaded. This happened in 1851.

¹ 'Sitting in the gate of the king' is a very ancient custom in the East, as may be seen from many passages in the story of Esther, and especially from Daniel ii. 48, 49.

a mosque should be large enough to contain the whole population of the city, and this one will hold at least ten thousand people within sound of the preacher's voice. It is one of the largest and most solid constructions of Bukhara. The interior consists of a large open court, surrounded by a sort of wide vaulted cloister of brick, two, and sometimes three aisles in width. The walls, especially of the sides and back, where the ground is lower, are all built of brick, supported by immense buttresses. The front, which is in bad repair, has a great arched portal covered with porcelain tiles set in arabesques, and the roof is surmounted by tiled domes. Opposite to this mosque, is a very tall round tower, called the *manari kalian* or great minaret. The surface is covered with pretty and curious designs in inlaid bricks, and on the top is now a huge stork's nest. It is sometimes used as a place of punishment, outrageous criminals being thrown from the top and dashed to pieces on the ground below. The last person thus punished was the noted robber Baban, who had taken refuge in Samarkand, and had been sent back by General Abramof in 1871. On the other side of the small square is the medressé Miri-Horab, a very large and fine building, containing one hundred and ten students' rooms which open on the corridors and galleries that surround the court. The vaulting of the corridors is very well done, and is inlaid in patterns with tiles and coloured bricks, and in various niches are canopies of alabaster work, similar in design to those seen in the Alhambra.

After passing through the bazaar, we came to a number of large mosques and medressés, the two largest of which are the Medressé Kukoltash, and the Medressé Divan-Begi, and opposite this latter is a large paved place with mosques on each side, surrounding a square pond known as the *Liabehaus Divan-Begi*. This pond, which is shaded by rows of mulberry trees, is the constant resort of the idlers and loungers of Bukhara, and is surrounded by markets, houses, and the booths of cooks and barbers. As it is so large that, according to Mohammedan ideas, the water is always pure, one may see people drinking, bathing, or performing their ablutions at any hour of the day.¹ Near by

¹ The Mussulman doctrine is that a pond of water is pure for religious purposes, no matter what its real condition may be, if it be 10 *attchins* long by 10 *attchins* broad (23 × 23 feet), and if it contain three fingers of water, so that in taking the water in the hollow of the hand the bottom cannot be seen

is a medressé, called *Irnazar-Eltchi*, of no very imposing appearance, founded by the Empress Catherine II. of Russia, who gave the sum of 40,000 rubles to build a college in Bukhara for Tartars and other Russian Mussulmans. Irnazar-Eltchi was a Bukharan envoy sent to the Empress, and the local story is that this money was given to him by Catherine after a *liaison* which she had with him. On the western side of the city, near the Talipan gate, is a large medressé called Kosh Medressé Abdullah Khan, supposed to have been founded by that sovereign, which consists of two large buildings on opposite sides of the street constructed in the usual style, with two stories and corridors about a central court. Continuing down the same street, close by the gate Sheikh-Jelal are the medressés Jubar and Hodja-Jelal, a large basin called the Haus-Van, and the cemetery Jubar. Such cemeteries are not infrequent within the walls of the town. None of the mosques and medressés in Bukhara are as old as the great and splendid ruins in Samarkand, unless perhaps the mosque Baliand, which, it is said, was built by Timur on the ruins of another, and repaired by Abdullah Khan; the style of architecture is, however, the same; there are the same ornamental tiled fronts and blue domes, although the buildings are much lower, and minarets and towers are rare.

There are many bath houses, the Bukhariots being very fond of the luxury of a hot-air bath. The best of these is situated in the bazaar, to which I was taken one night about nine o'clock, when the bazaar was already deserted, except by the watchmen, and the streets were dimly lighted by lamps slung across them on ropes at intervals. The bath itself is nearly the same as the Turkish bath, and certainly is not so good as that which one finds in civilised countries. You enter a large room surrounded by raised platforms covered with rugs, where you undress, and then, wrapping a large cloth about you, you go into the next room where the temperature is already very warm, and where are a succession of square or octagonal vaults, with niches in the sides for bathers. After remaining there some time to accustom yourself to the temperature, you are taken into the hottest room of all, where, after having water thrown over you to make you perspire, you lie on your face and are rubbed and kneaded by the bath attendant, who cracks all your joints and

leaves you in a very weak and helpless state. After this you are taken back to the room you left and placed in one of the niches, thoroughly washed with soap and water, and again kneaded. You are then wrapped up in your cloth, and go into the front room, where, reclining on a cushion, you take green tea and fruit and gradually dress. There is no regular payment, but you are expected to give whatever you please. This process of kneading is much liked by the Bukhariots, even without a bath, and often at night they have attendants to knead them until they go to sleep.

The most important of the many bazaars in Bukhara are the open bazaar on the Righistan and the bazaar of Tchar-su, which occupies the centre of the town, extending nearly from the *Ark* to beyond the medressé Divan-Begi. The bazaar of Tchar-su is interesting and peculiar; it has not the grandiose appearance of the bazaar at Khokand, but it in every way shows that it is an old haunt of trade. Not only are the sides of all the streets filled with shops and caravanserais for the storage of goods, but there are large numbers of *timis*, brick or wooden buildings with passages radiating from the centre, where goods of special kinds are sold. The *timi* of Abdullah Khan, for instance, is appropriated to the trade in silk, velvet, and cloth goods, while others are filled with cotton goods, shoes, caps, turbans, and knives.

Bukhara is evidently the trading centre of all this region of Asia, and one sees here productions from all parts of the world. Besides the Russian cottons and calicoes, I saw many English, and even French and German goods. The English goods are known chiefly by the name of *Kabuli*, on account of being imported through Afghanistan, and are sold at a slight advance only on Russian goods. As far as I noticed the English goods were chiefly manufactured by Greek firms, such as Ralli and Co., Petrococchino and Co., Schillizzi and Co., and by some Calcutta houses. Among miscellaneous articles, I found American revolvers, at a price somewhat cheaper than in Tashkent. Strangely enough Russian sugar is cheaper in Bukhara than in Tashkent, and has often been re-imported to that place from Bukhara. There was at this time only one Russian merchant in Bukhara, Shmelef, the agent of the firm Bykoff Brothers, who occupies two small rooms in the Aim Sarai, and who deals not only in

cotton goods, but particularly in small and fancy articles. He told me that most of the Russian trade was in the hands of Tartars, but that the openings for it are very great, although unfortunately neglected. A person of small means would even have an advantage over a large trader, if he lived in Bukhara, dealt in such European articles as there was a demand for, and attended to his business himself. Such a small trader could sell all his goods immediately, collect his debts at once, and turn over his capital at least three times a year, making each time a profit of fifty per cent. In Bukhara itself, for a resident trader, there is little difficulty in collecting debts, but the traders in Orenburg, Troitsk, and Petropavlovsk, who sell largely on credit to merchants coming from Bukhara, lose much money by bad debts. Unfortunately the Russian law does not allow foreign trade to be carried on by any one except a merchant of the first guild, and the guild tax to be paid is so large as to be a burden upon a person of small means. The Russian merchants, although they adopt to a certain extent the native dress, are not subject to the same restrictions as in Khokand; in other respects the commercial treaty is no better carried out, merchants being obliged to pay in addition to the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. duty on exports, a further illegal duty on cotton, amounting to at least 3 per cent.²

¹ One other Russian clerk lived in Hazhduin, looking after the cotton cloth manufactured for the Russian troops.

² In 1872 Mr. Petrofsky, the agent of the Minister of Finance, went to Bukhara for the purpose of studying its commercial relations. I quote a few extracts from his account published in the 'European Messenger,' March 1873:

'Bukhara is the chief point of Central Asiatic trade, and is very important to us, because the state and direction of this trade must govern our further movements in Central Asia. Being an important depôt of Russian and Anglo-Indian wares, Bukhara carries on an immense and active trade with all the remaining Mussulman countries, receiving from them their local productions and supplying them in return with wares from her depôts. The conditions of the Anglo-Indian trade with Bukhara we unfortunately know very little about, but we know well enough the commercial enterprise and energy of our rivals and our own Russian carelessness and disposition to let matters take their course. Who can guarantee that with our carelessness with regard to the Bukharan market, all the trade with Central Asia will not pass into the hands of the English or the Afghans; and there are signs of it already. In that case we should of course have nothing left to do in Central Asia. My previous ideas with regard to the bazaar of Bukhara, I must admit, were far weaker than the reality. One has only to look at this bazaar, at least five times greater than that of Tashkent, with its immense cara-

Some of the larger shops I came to know well ; such were those of the armourers, where, in addition to chain-armour,

vanserais and *timis* of baked brick (24 of the former and 6 of the latter) filled to overflowing with all sorts of goods from distant India and from still more distant Moscow, with its merchants from the Peshawuri to the Kazan Tartar, to see that the Tashkent market can bear no comparison with this. From India and Afghanistan there are brought the thousand objects of the so-called Attar trade (dye stuffs and drugs), and about sixteen kinds of green tea, quantities of various cotton goods, shawls, cloth of gold, opium, earthenware, metallic manufactures and printed books. Six large caravanserais serve as store houses for Indian goods exclusively. Persia supplies Bukhara with some dye stuffs, the so-called *Mashad* muslin, silver, pepper, arms, and large numbers of written and printed books. From Khiva there are brought fur, robes, linseed oil, mutton-tallow, wheat, rice, apples, sheep, poppy heads, copperas, and Russian goods, such as sugar, sugar-candy, iron kettles, &c. Herat sends dried fruits, furs, sheep and slaves, and Merv Turkoman horses and arms. Finally, the Bukharan bazaar is the market for all sorts of local productions. In return she sends to these countries either her own, or the productions of the neighbouring regions ; to Afghanistan gold, silk, camel's hair, goat's hair, madder, silk and half-silk stuffs, Russian cloth, velvet and satin, fur, robes, horses, asses and even cats and nightingales ; to Khiva tea, tobacco, opium, silk, madder, drugs and dyed stuffs, silk and cotton goods ; to Persia, gold, lambskins, silk stuffs and Russian cloth and velvet. Even the bare enumeration of countries and goods is enough to confirm my opinion of the commercial importance of the Bukharan market, the yearly transactions of which are estimated at not less than forty million of rubles (5,500,000*l.*).

‘Without studying the commerce of Bukhara we shall never put Central Asiatic trade on a profitable footing for us, and will even perhaps finally lose it, and it will then be too late for us to repair our mistake. At present I think we can say that trade in Russian wares has here the first place, and the dependence of Bukhara on the Nizhni Novgorod fair is felt at every step. Bukhara is literally filled from top to bottom with Russian cotton goods, and there seems to me to be at least six times as much of them as of English goods.’

‘The prices of all Russian goods in Bukhara are considerably less than at Tashkent. During my visit there the difference in price of sugar, for example, was five rubles a pud (in Bukhara eleven, and in Tashkent sixteen); they say that the difference is even greater.’

‘All the trade in Russian goods at Bukhara is carried on either by the natives or by Tartars.’

Mr. Petrofsky goes on to speak of the disadvantage to Russian trade of this condition of things. He is of opinion that it would be better for the Russians themselves to take their goods to Bukhara than to sell them at Moscow, Orenburg and Troitsk to Bukharan merchants, whose credit cannot be guaranteed and who frequently do not pay their debts.

‘The tea trade in Bukhara has passed entirely out of our hands. Immense caravans (of even 5,000 camels) of green tea yearly come to Bukhara from Afghanistan, and their loads are distributed through Bukharan possessions, Turkoman Steppes, go to Khiva, and penetrate even to Khokand and Russian Turkistan. There is literally no black tea to be found. The stores of green tea in Bukhara are immense. It is impossible for Russian teas to compete with them,

matchlocks, and Khorasan blades, I found good American revolvers no dearer than at Samarkand, of the jewellers and the silk merchants, the booksellers and the dealers in Turkoman and Persian rugs and carpets. After exhausting the shops I accepted the suggestion of one of the Mirzas to have things brought to my house, and every afternoon, therefore, I had visits from dealers in silks, books, coins, and gems. Coins were held at a high valuation, from some mistaken idea of their worth. Among those which I procured were some good specimens of Demetrius, Euthydemus, and other rulers of the Græco-Bactrian dynasty, as well as of the rude contemporary imitations struck in the neighbouring countries; pieces of the Golden Horde, of Timur, and of Afghan and Persian monarchs. One remarkable and unique silver coin (now in the Asiatic Museum at St. Petersburg), originally struck by one of the Timurides, bore one mint mark of Baber at Samarkand in 903, and another of the date of 904, stamped by Sultan Ali Mirza, who expelled Baber from the city after his seven months' occupation of it. I obtained also a few gems with Pehlevi and Cufic inscriptions, and one with a finely cut female head of Greek workmanship.

It seemed to me that books were unwillingly sold to an 'infidel,' and I was sure that many I wanted were concealed from me. Nevertheless, I obtained some relating to the history of Bukhara which are more or less rare in Europe; and one—'Lives of the Bukharan Saints'—which was apparently unknown. I was told that in the Treasury of the Amir there are many books, written in languages unknown to the learned men of Bukhara, which for that reason lie neglected. These books are said to have come down from very ancient times. It immediately occurred to me that they might be a remnant of the famous library said to have been carried off from Brussa by Timur, the fate of which has so long excited the curiosity of scholars. It is long since Bukhara was sacked, so that it is

both on account of their comparative dearness and because the market is already occupied. It only remains for us now to keep this tea out of our dominions, giving up all hope of crowding it out of Bukhara. What I have said above refers only to green tea. As for brick tea, viz. apple tea (*alma ichai*), I make an exception. The energy of our merchants will, perhaps, succeed in crowding this tea out of Bukhara by means of the better quality which we receive from Kiakhta.'

possible that unknown literary treasures may exist there, and the story of Timur's library ought not yet to be regarded as wholly mythical—the fantasy of some Armenian monk. My imagination was haunted with visions of lost classics, but unfortunately, in the absence of the Amir at Karshi, it was impossible to get a sight of the books. By a little strategy these volumes might, perhaps, be obtained, but many precautions should be observed; lest, with the usual suspicion of Asiatics, the Bukharan authorities imagine that the books are valuable, and conceal or destroy them.

In general I travelled in European dress, once or twice only putting on a turban and robe to visit the bazaar, but finding no special advantage in so doing, as from my not speaking the language I was immediately known to be a foreigner. One annoyance was that I was constantly surrounded by a crowd, which hindered my movements, although it was frequently driven back by the attendant Mirzas. I was usually treated with civility, but I occasionally met with insult and abuse, and there certainly was not the same respect and politeness paid to me as at Shahrisabs and Karshi; in fact in all the towns, that had been occupied, even for a day, by the Russian troops, the behaviour of the inhabitants was much more respectful.

What greatly pleased me at Bukhara was being able to talk comfortably with all sorts of people. I often stopped in a shop at the bazaar for twenty minutes or half-an-hour; in the *sarai* of my Russian friend, I met Bukharans, Persians, and other Asiatics, who were always willing to talk on almost any subject. I liked much going into a Hindoo *sarai*, thinking that possibly I might find some one who spoke English, but my efforts in that direction were vain, although the Hindoos were all glad to see me, and to talk with me. In my bargainings at home I had occasion to see the display of great varieties of character. Then too, I had visits from various personages, official and other, and I somehow managed to hear all that was going on that was worth knowing. Since I found out that my talk was repeated from one to another,—occasionally something I had said in the morning, came back to me at night from the fourth or fifth person,—and as everything I said or did was immediately reported to the Kush-Begi and often with variations, I

took a special pleasure in letting out all I had heard, and in showing as much knowledge as I could about Bukharan affairs. I had been, to some extent, informed in Tashkent, about the principal personages I should be likely to meet, and I have no doubt that I often surprised them by some of my revelations. As I knew of course that no end of lies were being told to me, I sometimes invented a little myself in order to get at the truth, and professed myself interested in a great many subjects, which I had no care for, in order to obtain geographical and political information. One of the Mirzas with me could, I was told, speak Russian; but he took great pains to conceal that accomplishment from me, his self-composure not deserting him even when I suddenly addressed him in that language.

Among the persons with whom I was brought in contact the Kush-Begi, Mohammedi Bii, was of course the most prominent. The day after my arrival, I paid him a formal visit, in the citadel. He was an old man of about sixty-five, still hale and hearty, with a full grey beard and a very kindly eye and face. He was a Persian by birth, and in his youth had been a slave, having become free by marrying one of the cast-off wives of the Amir. Although I had occasion to have several disputes with him, and had no doubt that he was a cunning old rascal, his *bonhomme* was such that it was impossible to be angry with him, and we parted the best of friends. He was exceedingly talkative, and ready not only to ask but to answer questions, and on both my visits he kept me more than an hour. His son, the Taksaba, Mohammed Sherif, was of a far different character. Though personally a handsome man, with his black beard and finely cut features, he had a face which at once made me suspicious and on my guard; his restless eyes never looked at me directly, and in his talk he was always evading the point. With all that, he was, as everybody told me, even his official friends, very stupid; at all events, he was not bright enough to be consistent in his lying for ten minutes at a time. My friend, the Russian merchant Shmelef, was of a very different stamp, simple and frank, with long, frousy hair and grizzly beard. Disliking all the natives and thinking them utter rascals, he had yet been so long in Bukhara, that he told me he felt ill at ease when he went back to Russia, and he lived much as the natives themselves do. His assis-

tant, an intelligent, handsome Tartar, named Muruk, was one of the best specimens of a civilised Mussulman of the mercantile class that I have met. A strong believer in his own religion, he was tolerant of that of others, and was willing even to admit the ridiculous side of some parts of his own belief. He had seen something of the world, and was an exceedingly good man to show one the under side of Bukharan life.

There was another Tartar there, Karataef (called in Bukhara Usta-Ali), who had become bankrupt in Russia, and had run away, twenty years before. Here he entered the service of a merchant; but when he wanted to return to Russia, he was forcibly retained by the Amir, and when he attempted to escape, was caught and brought back. He is a clockmaker by trade, but his chief employment now is that of confidential secretary to the Amir. Knowing Russia as well as he does, he has been able to give the Amir much good counsel and has prevented many difficulties. It was he who saved the lives and alleviated the captivity of the Russian Envoys sent by General Tcherniaief in 1865. He is, however, heartily tired of this uncivilised country, and of the *rôle* which he is playing there, and has expressed a desire to apply to the authorities at Tashkent to have his offences condoned, and to be allowed to return to Russia.

By the Bukharan politicians I was looked upon as a spy; and no one was willing to believe the truth of my statements as to who I actually was; but the authorities made every inquiry of all my servants, and even tried to bribe my interpreter to tell them the exact truth. I have no doubt that my conduct, in some respects, helped on this belief, for I had two disputes with the authorities which, as they show the methods of Bukhariot diplomacy, I will recount with some detail.

In visiting Bukhara I was especially anxious to learn something about the slave trade, and if possible to see for myself what was going on. The Russian authorities had expressed their desire that the slave trade should cease, and had been of course informed by the Bukharians that it had long since come to an end. Nearly all the Russian officials who had been in Bukhara had been deceived in this respect, and an official report had been made to General Kaufmann that the slave trade no longer existed there. Merchants, however, told me

that they had frequently seen public sales of slaves in the bazaar, and my interpreter said that, on two visits to Bukhara during the preceding year, he had seen the slave market filled with Persians who were dying of cholera and hunger, for, in the panic caused by the epidemic, they had not been fed; and the Agent of the Ministry of Finance had been able, in the spring of 1872, to see slaves publicly exposed for sale. He had made a report of this, but the matter had been passed over without notice by the Russian authorities. I knew very well that if I said to the Taksaba, or to any of the Mirzas with me, that I was going to the slave market, measures would be taken to shut it up, and I should be assured that nothing of the kind existed there. I therefore said to the Tartar Muruk, one day when I was at tea in the Aim-sarai, that I should like to see the slave market, and he offered to take me at once, as it was in the immediate vicinity. We started out, without telling where we were going, and although the Mirzas followed after, they were not in time to prevent us. Entering into a large *sarai*, we went upstairs into a gallery, and found several rooms, some of which were locked, and a number of slaves—two little girls of about four years old, two or three boys of different ages, and a number of old men—all Persians. There were no women, either young or old, such being bought up immediately on arrival. The slaves were shown to me by an old Turkoman, who acted as broker, and who told me that the market was rather dull just then, but that a large caravan would probably arrive in the course of a few days. Without the slightest idea of purchasing, but out of curiosity to see how a sale was conducted, I asked the price of one of the boys, a lively looking lad of fifteen, who had been stolen only five months before from near Astrabad. I was immediately asked to take a seat on a mat, and the room soon filled with people, all of whom seemed to take much more interest in the sale than did the boy himself, who did not understand what was being said, the conversation being in Turki. The first price asked was more than 1,000 *tengas* (30*l.*), which I gradually reduced to 850 *tengas* (25*l.*); the seller constantly dilating on the good points of the boy, what an excellent *jigit* he would make, and so on, the bystanders joining in on one side or the other. Meanwhile, I asked one of the men how he dared sell a Mohammedan

as a slave, when he, as a Mullah, knew that it was strictly prohibited by the Shariat. To this he indignantly replied, 'He is not a Mussulman, he is only a Persian, a Kaffir. All Persians are Kaffirs and unbelievers.'

It seems that some Mullah, in order to legalise the sale, had declared that the Persian Shiites were not heretics, as they are regarded by the Turks and other Mussulmans, but were absolutely infidels.

I thought that 850 *tengas* was too much to pay for the lad, especially as I had no desire to buy him; at the same time, the wistful looks of the boy, who seemed very anxious to be bought, smote my conscience a little, and I asked for the refusal of him at that price, which was given. We then looked about in the other rooms to find some more slaves, but were unsuccessful. On my return to the Aim-sarai, I thought the matter over, and finally concluded to purchase the boy, take him with me to Russia, and, if an opportunity offered, send him back to his friends at Astrabad. I, therefore, sent one of the Mirzas after the boy, saying that I had concluded to take him. He returned bringing him, and with him came another broker, a swarthy, thick-set fellow, from Kara-kul, a well-known slave dealer. But now a difference arose; the broker said that some one else had agreed to pay 900 *tengas* (27*l.*), and to give in addition two gowns, and besides this, that the real owner was not there, and that the other broker had no right to sell him to me. Finally, after a long argument I persuaded the broker to give me the boy, to take a portion of the price as hand-money, and to refer the dispute to the Taksaba, who, as chief overseer of the bazaar, had the settlement of all such matters. As I afterwards found to my cost, it was very stupid in me not to retain possession of the boy, for I sent him by the Mirza, together with the broker, to the Taksaba.

When the Mirza came to me on reaching home, he informed me that the Taksaba had decided in my favour, and that the price which I had agreed to give was the correct one, that the boy was a nice fellow, and well worth the money, and that he had given orders that he should be delivered to me at six o'clock.

At six o'clock the boy did not come, so I sent the Mirza after him. He stayed away a long time, and at last came

back with a long story, saying that the master of the boy had gone away, he believed out of town, for some circumcision feast, but that it would be all right in the morning.

In the morning the boy did not make his appearance, but an official did, sent by the Taksaba to ask after my health and to know if there was anything he could do for me. After a long conversation with him on various matters, during which I took occasion to compliment the Taksaba and the Kush-Begi, knowing very well that it would be repeated to them and might render them more obliging, I asked about the boy and insisted upon having him. The Mirza professed to know nothing about the affair, but said that the Taksaba wished him to tell me that he would himself call and see me in the afternoon. As the afternoon, however, passed without his visit, I asked the Mirza if he were not coming; he immediately sent a messenger to him, who returned with the answer that he regretted very much his inability to come, but that he was very ill, the *reshtha* having suddenly declared itself upon one of his legs. As I knew that he had been riding about the bazaar all day, and had seen him myself in excellent health in the street that morning, although he did not notice me, I thought it rather strange that such a lingering and gradual illness, should have become at once so violent, and sent the Mirza back to say that I regretted extremely to hear that he was ill, but hoped that his malady would soon pass, and that, as I was unable to see him upon the subject of the slave boy whom I had bought, and who had not, in compliance with his orders, been delivered to me, I should be obliged to at once go to his father, the Kush-Begi, and demand an explanation.

I had barely finished my dinner, when the Taksaba appeared, accompanied by a venerable white-bearded man, who, as I found out, understood Russian perfectly, and had come to listen to what I said to my interpreter. The Taksaba limped very much as he came up the stairs, and pretended to be in great agony. After much general conversation, I broached the subject of the boy. 'Yes,' he said, 'they brought the boy to me, and told me about it; he is a very nice boy, but unfortunately he has run away!'

I expressed my surprise at this, for the boy knew that he was going to be freed, and wished me to buy him.

He said he trusted I did not doubt his word.

‘Certainly not,’ I replied; ‘still, it seems to be very strange.’

In reply to this remark, he said that people had frightened the boy, by telling him that General Kaufmann had freed all the slaves in Khiva, and that they were, probably, all going to be freed in Bukhara, and that on account of this story he had run away.

This was so amusing that I burst out into a laugh, which seemed to discompose him. He said that he knew General Abramof, and General Kaufmann, but that me he did not know; he had only received a letter about me, and he did not think that General Kaufmann would at all approve of my buying a slave here.

Whereupon I said that I also knew these gentlemen, that his acquaintance with Russian generals was nothing to me, nor did it matter to him who I was, that I had been at the bazaar, and had seen merchandise publicly exposed for sale, and had bought it; and that all I wished to know of him as overseer of the bazaar was whether he allowed his merchants to refuse to fulfil their agreements.

He then said that the boy’s master had become frightened at a foreigner having bought him, and had taken him back to Tchardjui; at which I said that this seemed very strange, because sellers are always glad of a good bargain, and he himself had said that what I had offered was a fair price, especially in the dull season.

After some more talk of this kind, the Taksaba said that the slave trade was about to stop, and that he was sorry I did this without asking his permission.

I told him that I had not come there to interfere with their commerce, and that I did not know why I, as well as any one else, had not the right to purchase articles openly exposed for sale at the bazaar, without asking the permission of any one. He again said that the slave trade had stopped, that these were only some few ‘remnants’ that were being sold—evidently in fear lest I should be able to prove by means of the boy the actual existence of the trade.

I told him that I did not doubt his words, although, at the same time, it appeared very strange to me in this case, that when a caravan of sixty slaves had arrived at Bukhara the

night before, at nine o'clock, he himself had given order that it should remain outside the Kara-kul gate, in order that I should not see it.

The Taksaba was so much confused at my knowing this so soon, that he was only able to stammer, and say that if they found the boy, they would be very glad to send him to me, and that, of course, I should pay nothing for him, for they would make me a present of him; that if I had only told him before about it, he would have given me ten slaves, or if I had even sent the boy to him, he would have arranged the matter, but that as he knew nothing about it until that evening, he of course had been unable to take any steps in the matter.

I was rather astonished at this denial of what he had previously said, and called on the Mirzas who were present, to corroborate my words; but they, as was very natural, although it rather surprised me at the time, denied they had spoken to him on the subject, or that I had sent them, or that they had even seen the boy. When I afterwards privately demanded an explanation of the Mirzas, they admitted that they had lied, but said, 'You know he is our master, and of course we must say what he wishes.'

At the moment I was very angry, though I endeavoured to keep within moderation, and the Taksaba remarked that it was evident I did not believe him, when he said that he had nothing to do with it, and had given no orders to hide the boy, and added, in a regretful tone, that he had come to be merry with me, and ease his pain, but that he felt insulted by my words.

I told him I regretted this very much, that it was exceedingly disagreeable for me to speak to him about business, but that I thought that the boy could be found, as I knew very well that a man so high in position as he must know all that passed in Bukhara, that it was very difficult for slaves to escape, as the penalty by law was death, and that I expected he would send me the boy by eight o'clock in the morning, for, if I did not receive him, I might be obliged to take steps which might be disagreeable to him.

He at last turned the conversation, by asking if I had any curious European things to show him. I was sorry to tell him, that, as I had left St. Petersburg very hurriedly, I had brought almost nothing with me, but finally produced my air-

cushion, which I showed to him, and asked him to accept, as it would be good for his leg, he having just described to me the symptoms of his illness; and with that we parted.

The next morning the Taksaba, as usual, sent a man to talk with me, and find out all that I was doing; and I afterwards went to the bazaar by a round-about way, and sent Andrei in native dress to the slave market. He found there one boy and the two little girls, and his visit was, apparently, unsuspected. I then sent him to the Taksaba, to stir him up on the subject. He offered Andrei a piece of silk as a present, and 150 *tengas* in money, and told him to persuade me not to be so hard on them, and to endeavour to put me in better humour. As regards the boy, he beat about the bush. I was informed in another way, that he was waiting for an answer from the Amir, to whom he had written on the subject, to know if the boy should be delivered to me. I told Andrei that he should make no difficulty about accepting all the bribes that were offered to him, as it might allay suspicion, but only on condition that he should tell me all that occurred.

The next day the Taksaba himself came to me, with his Russian interpreter; we had another talk about the boy, in which he utterly denied having seen him, or having made the statements which he had made to me two days before. This was said in such a way as to make me very angry, and I immediately rose and told him that I could not permit him to lie to my face, that I saw there was no use talking to him any further, and that I desired no further intercourse with him.

At this he was taken very much aback, and, as I afterwards heard, said that I evidently did not understand the Bukharan mode of doing things. It is, I believe, considered impolite to remember what a man has said five minutes before, if it be contradicted by anything he says five minutes after.

That same day, after sending off the Mirzas for something else, I went to the slave market myself, but found that one of the Mirzas had been too quick for me, and was there before me; the whole place was shut up, not a slave was visible, and the Turkoman trader, with whom I had made my first bargain, denied ever having seen me, or ever having had the boy whom I described; but after some pressure, he confessed that the

master of the boy had taken him away by order of the authorities.

I was convinced by my first conversation with the Taksaba, that it would be impossible for me to obtain the boy back, but resolving not to be outwitted by him, I made up my mind to purchase another, if it were possible to do so. I knew very well, and indeed I had been so informed, that the authorities were very fearful that I should show the boy in Samarkand and Tashkent, as visible proof to the Russians, not only of their falsehoods, but of the present existence of the slave trade. I, therefore, sent out Pulat, my *arbakesh*, or cart-driver, whom



PULAT THE ARBAKESH.

I had taken at Samarkand, who knew the city, his family living there, and who seemed to me a very straightforward, faithful man, to find out if a slave could anywhere be purchased. After remaining away all day, he came back in the evening, and said that he had found a boy about seven or eight years old, who could be had for 700 *tengas* (21*l.*) and a good gown. I immediately gave him the money, and directed him to purchase the boy and buy him some clothes, for in Bukhara, unless a special bargain be made for the clothes, the slaves are delivered to you in a state of nature; in buying a horse one does not have the saddle and bridle thrown in. The boy whom I thus purchased, turned

out to be very small and feeble, although intelligent, a Persian, from near Meimana, who had been stolen from his parents, as he was playing on the steppe with other boys, by the Salor Turkomans, some three years before. His recollections of his parents were very slight, and as he did not seem to know his real name, I took the liberty, which in these countries is always allowed on the purchase of a slave, and named him Hussein. The *arbakesh* passed him off as his brother, and although I think people in the house suspected the truth, yet no one made any remark.

Having thus succeeded in outwitting the Bukharan authorities, I resolved to make one last trial with the Kush-Begi for the recovery of my first purchase, and at the last interview I had with him, we talked on the subject for a long time. But he so completely absolved himself from all blame, so smiled and regretted, that there was nothing to be done with him. I attacked his philanthropy, and quoted the sentence from the Shariat, that 'to free a slave is a work pleasing to God,' and asked to be allowed to complete the good work. He agreed with me in all I said, and promised, if the lad could only be found, to free him, and *give* him to me, but that he could not think of his guest paying money. Although the Kush-Begi and the Taksaba offered me so many slaves as presents, they were very careful not to give me any.

I of course carefully concealed my new purchase till the time of my departure. When the Taksaba came to bid me 'good-bye,' I told him that although I wished to part with him on good terms, I was perfectly aware of all that had been done with reference to the boy; that I had regretted very much that he had retained him, as I had given him my word that I would buy him and free him, and disliked to be false to it; that I understood he feared I would show the boy in Samarkand as a proof of the existence of the slave trade, but that he need not be anxious about that, as I had bought another for that express purpose; and I then produced the little Hussein, at which the Taksaba was in such rage and confusion as to be almost speechless.

When I reached the shrine of Bohoueddin, about six miles from Bukhara, the former master of Hussein met me, and said that the government had already discovered that it was he who

had sold the boy, and that he was anxious to receive him back, being willing to repay the price, for he feared that, if he left him in my hands, he would probably have his head cut off.

I told him I did not wish for my money, and certainly could not give up the boy; and that if he had his head cut off, I should have no regrets, but should feel that he had been served perfectly right. On this he went off; but as we were about starting, he returned, and tried to take the boy by force; my *jigits* soon put him to flight, and I was able to bring the boy safely to Samarkand and St. Petersburg.¹

This purchase was the subject of a great deal of comment in Samarkand and Tashkent, some few declaring that it was impossible that I could have bought the boy, when the government had official evidence that the slave trade did not exist; but most people were very much delighted that so decisive a proof of its being carried on could be given, although they expressed a doubt as to whether General Kaufmann—then absent in Khiva—would be very well pleased, as he had just then gained great fame by abolishing slavery in Khiva, while he had allowed it for years to exist within 200 miles of the capital of Russian Asia. I was afterwards pleased to learn that on the return of the army, General Kaufmann concluded a treaty with the Amir, by which the slave trade is for ever abolished in Bukhara.

At my interview with the Amir, I had asked for permission to visit Tchardjui, having a desire to see the Amu Darya, and especially to know what was going on there, for Tchardjui is a place of exile for Bukharan political offenders, and it is said that the treasure of the Amir is kept there so as to be ready for any emergency.

On my first visit to the Kush-Begi, I told him that the Amir had given me permission to go, to which he had said 'Yes I know all about it, my son has told me.' Several times subsequently, in conversation with the Taksaba, I spoke of going to Tchardjui, as soon as I should have finished my visit in

¹ The boy Hussein, who displayed remarkable cleverness and intelligence, remained with me for two years at St. Petersburg, going to school, where he learned to read and write Russian and a little of German. He was afterwards apprenticed to the Court clockmaker, a worthy Tartar of the Mussulman faith.

Bukhara, and even promised to stay a day or two longer on my return. My proposition was always received with assent, and no objection of any sort was made. When I felt I had seen sufficient of Bukhara and was ready to go on, I told the Taksaba, on one of his morning visits, that I proposed, that evening, to start for Kara-kul and Tchardjui. He immediately began to dissuade me, and said that the road was very bad; that for two days I would be without water; and that, further, it was impossible for a cart to travel on that road. I told him that I knew all about the road, and had calculated all these difficulties, and did not intend to let them stop me. He then said that the road was dangerous; that the Turkomans were besetting this route; and that I might get into some danger. I laughed at the idea of a road being dangerous so close to the capital; but he assured me that it was really so, and begged me not to go. He asked me if I had not heard of Sadyk, the celebrated robber chief, who, with his band, was then on this road. I told him that I thought he was mistaken, for that I knew very well that after the capture of Khiva, Sadyk with his Turkomans had gone far on the other side of the Amu. He then said the ferry over the Amu was dangerous, and that although I might be safe on land, he would not be willing to guarantee the risk of my crossing the river on the unsafe boats. He then returned to the Turkomans, and said that the road was so dangerous, that the Bek of Tchardjui, the son of the Amir, had sent word, only the day before, that no one should be allowed to go there. I still persisted in my intention, and he then desired two weeks time, to write to General Kaufmann, and see whether he wished me to go, and asked why General Abramof had not mentioned it in his letter. On my refusing to wait, he said that it would be necessary to ask permission of the Amir. I told him that I had already done so, to which he himself could bear witness. This he admitted, but said that I ought to have the consent in writing, as a verbal order amounted to nothing; that this was their usage; that I could not go without an escort, and that he must get permission from the Amir to give me one; that if I would wait, they would ask the Amir for his consent, and would make other arrangements for a safe and pleasant journey, and would even give me a carriage as far as Kara-kul. He spoke of Russians who had desired to go to Kara-kul, but who had

been deterred on hearing the danger of the road. I told him that I knew very well that Mr. Struve had been frightened by reports of fevers (an idea, which he at once seized, and told me, that the fever was raging frightfully there), while Mr. Petrofsky insisted to the last on going, and was only prevented by the positive refusal of the Kush-Begi. I finally told him that I intended to start that afternoon or the next morning, and that if he took measures to prevent me, I should at once return to Samarkand and tell of the difficulties placed in my way.

That evening Karataef came to me on the part of the Kush-Begi, and endeavoured to dissuade me from going, using very much the same arguments. The next morning I went to see the Kush-Begi, and told him of my intention to start at once for Tchardjui. He argued with me for half an hour on this subject, telling me, among other things, that it was a great pity I did not mention this subject to him at first, for then he would have had time to obtain the Amir's consent; that he refused to recognise the verbal consent of the Amir as valid; and that although he was ruling in his place, he could do nothing without a written order.

I told him that his son had been witness to the interview, at which he seemed astonished, saying that his son had never mentioned the fact to him, and sent for him to hear what he had to say. Of course the Taksaba did not appear, and although I reminded the Kush-Begi that he himself had said at my first interview that he already knew of this from his son, he seemed unable to bring the matter to his recollection. He said that if I had only arranged this matter at first, before I had been there so long, and had only gone at once, the case would have been other; that I could even have started apparently for Khiva, and turned down to Tchardjui—thus admitting that the road was passable—and referred to the fact that Milutin, a young Russian officer (son of the Minister of War), had gone two-thirds of the same way, a few weeks before, in perfect safety. 'But now,' he said, 'you have been so long in Bukhara, that everybody knows you are here, and is talking about you; so if you go to Tchardjui people will say that Bukhara is good for nothing now-a-days, because foreigners are going everywhere, whereas you might easily have deceived them by going at first.'

Finding it impossible to dissuade me, the Kush-Begi finally

said that I could not go without an escort. I asked if the decision were final? He said it was. I then said that I should be very glad to accept an escort; on which he seemed to think that there might be danger to me from the very escort, and desired me to give him a written paper that if I should be killed, or anything should happen to me, the Russian Government would not hold the Amir responsible. I told him that on the contrary I would give no such paper, as I had been especially requested not to do so; but that further, if a finger were raised against me, or I were injured in any way, the Bukharan Government would be held responsible.

This seemed to frighten him a little, and he insisted the more on the necessity of an escort. I asked him if I could have the escort to-day. 'No.'—'To-morrow?'—'No.'—'When?'—He was not sure I could have it at all, but he should be obliged to write to the Amir, and in the course of five days would probably receive an answer, saying whether I could have an escort or not.

I then said, 'You do not permit me to go to Tchardjui to-morrow?'

'No.'

'Very well,' I replied; 'in that case I shall start at once for Samarkand.'

At this the face of the Kush-Begi became radiant; he was delighted to think he was not going to have the responsibility of my journey to Tchardjui; and, in fact, the announcement that I was to leave Bukhara immediately seemed to fill him with great pleasure, and with a feeling of relief. I think I must have worried him a great deal over these various matters. He was then as cordial as possible, hoped that we should always be good friends, and said that he would do everything to make my return journey pleasant, and would instruct everybody on the road to treat me well.

On my return to Samarkand, I had a copy given to me of a letter he then wrote to General Abramof, speaking of my visit in pleasant terms, and saying that I had expressed a desire to go to Tchardjui, that the Bukharan Government had been anxious to facilitate me in every possible way, but that on hearing that the road was dangerous, I had of my own accord declined to go.

True to my determination, I left Bukhara the next day (August 13). The Taksaba and Karataef came to bid me good-bye, bringing me some tea and three pieces of silk. We had rather a stormy scene, but finally parted on good terms.

Leaving Bukhara by the Mazar gate, I rode through gardens and fields along a dusty road to Baha-Uddin, the shrine of a celebrated saint, at a distance of six miles from Bukhara. We found an immense bazaar going on there, and the streets were thronged with a crowd of people of every class and condition, beggars and pilgrims preponderating. As I passed through the crowd, a respectably dressed Mullah walked close to my side; he had a large stone in his hand, and was muttering to himself, 'Just let me hit him, and he will drop dead at once, and there will be one Kaffir the less.' Fortunately Andrei noticed this, and immediately rode at him, when he dropped the stone and retreated some distance, and then picked up another and threw it at Andrei. At this Andrei and the *jigits* ran after him and drove him across the ditch into a large open field, where they beat him soundly with their whips, and left him half dead. He protested against this treatment, saying that he was a Mullah, and that they had no right to beat him. I did not at first understand that the man actually proposed to kill me, supposing he was merely reviling me, as people occasionally did; but when I found that there was a struggle, I fired my pistol into the air, in order to show the crowd that I was armed, and passed on without further trouble. Had this man been wise enough to keep his own counsel, he could easily have disposed of me.

We were soon brought to a small house, near the shrine of the great saint of Central Asia, Hazret Baha-Uddin, or Hazret Nakshband, who, it is said, died in 1303. The tomb of the saint is in a small enclosure about twelve paces square, raised about six feet above the ground, with a small temple-like mausoleum at the top, covered with old bushes and grass, and with the usual rams' horns and rags with which all sacred places are decorated, having in every way an uncared-for look. At one side is the inscription, and let into the wall near it a black stone, called *Sianghi Murad*, which all pious pilgrims rub with their hands, and touch with their face and beard, an operation which leaves evident traces on the stone, and which is

supposed to cure and to prevent all maladies of the head. I, being a Kaffir, was exempted from this ceremony, but my attendants all performed it. Two or three monks near by received money for this privilege, as did others for pointing out another small inscription. The Ishan had also to be paid. This tomb stands in one corner of a square court, enclosed on two sides by mosques filled with graves, said to be of the descendants and pupils of the saint. Here are also the tombs of the great Abdullah Khan, and of Daniar Atalyk. The mosque on the south of the shrine is said to have been built by Hakim Kush-Begi. A large portico at the side contains a great number of dingy chandeliers, brass and bronze, some of which with the silver plating nearly rubbed off are evidently of Russian workmanship. From this mosque there is a long narrow passage to the street, with another mosque at the right side, full of pilgrims and beggars, who almost despoil one of whatever money he may have with him. Still, one should not be ungenerous, for a visit to this shrine, which ranks next to Mecca in sanctity, would be sure to alleviate the future punishment even of a Kaffir pilgrim.

Starting from this place about half-past three o'clock, we arrived at six at the village of Kuyuk Mazar, about twelve miles further, where we had refreshment, and where we were advised to pass the night, but we concluded to go on twelve miles more to Varganzi. Here we were placed in a caravanserai, and a large verandah was given up to my use. The whole road from Bukhara to Varganzi, and especially in the vicinity of that place, led through well cultivated gardens and fields, this being one of the best parts of the Khanate. Shortly after my arrival, there came a message from the Kush-Begi to inquire about my health, and to say that the man who attacked me had been arrested and brought to Bukhara, and that they were desirous of cutting his throat, but had been obliged to send to the Amir to know if they could do so. I sent back word that when the man should be punished, I hoped that he would be punished publicly, so that all the people might know that they could not molest or insult a foreigner, and requested the Kush-Begi immediately to write to General Abramof at Samarkand, informing him what had been done with this man. The last day that I spent in Tashkent, a merchant, an acquaintance of

mine, arrived from Bukhara, and told me the various rumours he had heard about me among the people; very exaggerated stories about my actions, and especially the belief that I was a minister in disguise from St. Petersburg, to find out the actual condition of affairs at Bukhara, and that, as I had been dissatisfied at the action of the government, the Russians would shortly invade and conquer the country. I asked him about the man who had attacked me, and he said that he was still in prison, and had not yet been punished, and that the popular belief was that I had sent a letter to the Amir, requesting him to be detained for the present, as I desired to behead him with my own hands! This is the last I heard of him.

Starting from Varganzi at half-past six o'clock in the morning, passing several *Mazars*, or tombs, by the way, and taking tea at a village called Bustan, on the edge of a narrow canal, on the shady side of a small shop, we reached Malik, about twenty-four miles further, at about noon. I went the whole way in my *arba*, as we passed through a desert steppe, and it was very windy and dusty. There were rumours here of Turkomans and robbers, and we always had an escort of two or three horsemen. At Malik, which was formerly a town of some note, there are the ruins of a very large castle (or caravanserai), with arched windows, the whole building being somewhat in the Gothic style, with minarets at the corners; the drawing of Lehmann gives, to one who has seen it, a very fair idea of the building. We rested here for a few hours in a very small hot room, and while we were taking our tea, the son of the Divan Begi of Kermineh came to meet me. Near Kermineh, which was twelve miles further, we were met by an escort, and I was asked if I wished to go through the bazaar into the town, or by a round-about road. I of course preferred the bazaar, and was then told that the people there were very bad, and might perhaps insult me or throw stones at me; upon which I said that if they dared to do so in the presence of their rulers, they should be taught better. They then agreed to take me directly through the town, but we went by a round-about way which led through a small part of the bazaar to the house of the Divan Begi, where I was given very comfortable apartments, and a platform on the edge of a large square pond of fresh water, shaded by some

great elms. After a little repose, I walked to the house of the Bek, which was near by. In the fortress square there was a long line of soldiers, who saluted me with a fau-far made of trumpets as I passed, and a crowd of richly dressed people stood on the slope which led to the small fort containing the palace. The Bek, a small, but intelligent-looking boy of thirteen, Seid Abdullah, a son of the Amir, who was sitting by the window when we were shown in, rose and gave me his hand, and asked after the health of the Emperor and that of the Governor General. We then took seats, and the Bek, who was dressed in a dark red silk robe and white turban, immense for his years, remained silent, leaving the Divan Begi to speak in his name, and only as we were leaving the room, and had already made our last salaam, he suddenly cried out to remember him to the Emperor and to the Governor General when I saw them. This Bek is the favourite son of the Amir, who frequently calls him to Bukhara, and apparently intends him as his successor. He maintains a little court, with all a boy's love for finery and display. Everyone here is obliged to dress richly, with girdles if not gowns of Cashmere material, and daggers in heavy gold sheaths carved and set with precious stones. As we were going out, the *Namaz* was cried, and everyone rushed off as fast as possible to get to prayers in the mosque opposite the palace, before the Bek himself should go in. The scene was very amusing. Robes were brought to me, which were much handsomer than I had received at any other place; one of my seven robes was of Cashmere stuff, worth about thirty pounds. Among the presents I had brought for this Bek were some toys from Tashkent, including a small trumpet and a velocipedit going by clockwork, with which he was very much amused, although he immediately put them out of order.

Kermineh is a small town with four mosques and one medressé, and contains nothing of interest except one mosque, which is comparatively ancient, standing on the edge of a pond. In the house of the Divan Begi I did not lack for entertainment. My host had formerly been a merchant, had resided at Orenburg, and had even been to the Fair of Nizhni Novgorod; he was a shrewd, observant man, who had outgrown many prejudices, and whose conversation was agreeable and instructive.

His enlightenment seemed to extend to his household, for even his son, a bright little boy of five, had no objection to being petted by the strangers, and amused us greatly by his babble.

The next afternoon we went to Ziaueddin, twenty-four miles, stopping for refreshment at Tash-kupriuk, or Stone Bridge. At Ziaueddin I was lodged in a part of the palace of the Bek, who was himself out of town, and did not return until the next morning. It was his duty to see that the dykes of Samarkand, which turn the water into Bukhara, were always kept in good order, which necessitated his going there two or three times a year, and as he had been much with Russians, he was far more civilised and agreeable than any of the other Beks whom I met. Ziaueddin seems to consist only of the Bek's palace, and of a square outside on which a bazaar is held, each trader being accommodated with a small clay conical mound, of exactly the shape of the hill of the white ant.

The next day I went on as far as Shirin-hatun, where I passed the night in a large garden, having stopped only for an hour at Mir, where lodgings had been prepared for me; and the next day (August 17), about ten o'clock, I arrived at Katta Kurgan.

The last days of a journey seem to one always more fatiguing than the previous ones, and the whole distance from Kermineh to Katta Kurgan was very wearisome. The road lies at the edge of a beautiful country, the celebrated district of Miankal, with the low mountains or hills to the south always visible, but is itself on the high ground which is not watered or cultivated, and as the soil is of clay the dust was more than a foot deep and like an impalpable powder. I was, therefore, all the more pleased to go to a place where I could find at least some civilisation in the residences of the District Commandant and in the post station, not to speak of my travelling carriage, which was a very agreeable change after so much horseback travelling. Though I had had some discomforts, and a great many disputes with the authorities and other disagreeable incidents, I look back to my journey in Bukhara with extreme pleasure. Not only was the country itself interesting, but the government, no matter how suspicious and jealous, as far as hospitality went, did everything in its power to render me comfortable. Still, it seemed like getting to another world to

arrive at Katta Kurgan, eat civilised food, enjoy rational conversation on ordinary topics, and, more than all, to meet, after such a long absence from female society, as the wife of one of the officers, a well-known French actress from the Théâtre Berg at St. Petersburg. I found also at Katta Kurgan a very good friend of mine, whom General Abramof had kindly sent to meet me at the frontier, and after a pleasant evening spent at the Commandant's, we got into our travelling carriage and by morning were safely back in Samarkand.

Throughout the whole of my journey I had endeavoured to maintain my independence, had refused to allow myself to be bullied or imposed upon, and had insisted that no one should consider me his inferior, being sufficiently acquainted with the native character to know that the more respect I demanded, the more I should receive. I had the satisfaction of enjoying myself while travelling, even, or perhaps I may say especially, in my disputes with the Taksaba, and of returning in safety.

When, two months later, a Russian colonel passed through Bukhara on his way home from Khiva and asked the officials what had been going on, he received the reply: 'An American was here for ten days, and kept the Bukharan people completely under his control.'

CHAPTER XI.


ISSYK KUL AND SEMIRETECH.

Aulié-ata—Old ruins—Prester John—Spiders and Tarantulas—Cockroaches—Tokmak—The Buam Pass—Lake Issyk Kul—Submerged cities—The Tian Shan—No volcanos—The road to Kashgar—The Muzart Pass—The Kara Kirghiz—Their legends—A court of Biis—Bad interpreters—Attempt to navigate the Tchu Signal defeat of the Khokandians at Uzun-agatch—The White Tsar—Vierny—Chinese merchants—A Polish refugee—General Kolpakofsky—Semiretech—Russian and Cossack colonisation—Navigation of the Ili—Kopal—Lake Balkash—Through Siberia.

I HAD been warmly invited to go to Khiva after the capture of that city, and I might easily have done so from Bukhara before, and perhaps even after, my dispute with the Kush-Begi about Tchardjui. I could have proceeded by road to the little fort of Ustyk on the Amu-Darya, and could then have descended that river in a boat almost to the very walls of Khiva, a journey at the utmost of about four or five days from Bukhara; but the coming back would have been a very different matter. It would have been very difficult to ascend the river against the current, and riding up along the river bank or through the desert of Khalata where the Russian army was so nearly lost, was more than I cared for after my experience in the waste of Karshi. I could, indeed, have gone on from Khiva by steamer to Kazala, but this would have brought me out in a place far from my base of operations, for I had left my carriage in Samarkand, and most of my luggage and the few curiosities I had picked up in Tashkent. Having seen Khokand and Bukhara, I felt that my curiosity for that region of Central Asia was entirely satisfied, for I knew that the Khivan oasis did not differ in any great respect from the countries which I had already seen. Then, too, ugly rumours were rife about the condition of the Russian army, a campaign against the Turkomans had been begun, and there

were widely credited and apparently well-authenticated reports,—which fortunately proved untrue—of the massacre of Russian garrisons and of the defeat of separate detachments. When, therefore, I returned from Bukhara, I was desirous of pressing on as fast as possible towards Issyk Kul and Kuldja, but I was delayed for a few days waiting for authentic intelligence about the movements of Mac Gahan, who, I was erroneously told, was on his way to Tashkent. It was not, therefore, until the evening of September 9, that I finally started from Tashkent, after having been accompanied by some kind friends to a little country house called Izbushka, on the edge of the town, where many ‘God-speeds’ were wished me amid the sparkle of champagne. A moonlit drive brought me the next morning to Tchimkent, and after staying a few hours to look again at the town and to call on the Prefect, I started off through the mountains eastward. An unlucky hill did some damage to my carriage, and I was forced to pass the night at Mashad, a little valley between some hills. The mountains here are not high, and I reached Aulié-Ata without difficulty at sunset the next evening, passing on my way the double peak of Kazikurtata, about 7,000 feet high, one of the many Asiatic mountains on which Noah’s Ark finally rested after the flood, and where some pieces of it are still to be seen by believing eyes.

Aulié-Ata, which is situated on the rapid river Talas, probably near the site of the well-known ancient city Taraz or Talas, is now but an insignificant country town, important only as the chief place of the district, and as a market for the Kirghiz, who live in large numbers among the neighbouring mountains. It was taken by storm by General (then Colonel) Tchernaiief, on June 16, 1864, with a loss of only five wounded on the part of the Russians, and of over 300 killed on the part of the Khokandian defenders—the first step of the memorable campaign of 1864, which has resulted in the Russian conquest of nearly the whole of Central Asia. Since that time the place has greatly increased in population and in business, but it is still a straggling, shabby looking village with almost no trees, set down on the bare steppe. At one time there was an idea of making this the administrative centre of the province, and when General Kaufmann went to Turkistan, in 1867, he was undecided whether to place his capital at Tashkent or at Aulié-Ata.



KIRGHIZ HUTS NEAR AULIE-ATA.

There is a road through the mountains from Aulié-Ata to Namangan, which is of some commercial importance, especially for the trade in cattle and sheep. In 1869, above 300,000 head of sheep, worth more than 700,000 rubles, passed on this road from the steppes to Namangan. The whole distance is 165 miles, and the usual time consumed is eight days. The two passes are not high, although on account of the snow they cannot be crossed by horses or camels during two months of the winter.

Aulié-Ata owes its name to the tomb of a patron saint of the Kirghiz—Aulié-Ata, holy father, said to have been a certain Kara Khan and a descendant of the Sheikh Akhmed Yasavi, who is buried at Turkistan. The tomb itself, which is an ordinary brick building, is in a woeful state of dilapidation, and is by no means as interesting as the similar monument erected over the grave of Assa-bibi, some female relation of Kara Khan, which can be seen on the road-side ten miles west of the town. Ten miles below Aulié-Ata on the Talas, amidst the sands of the Muyun-kum, are the ruins of what was apparently a city, called by the natives Tiume-Kent.¹

Tradition says that a maiden once lived here who was beloved by the prince of the Divs, giant spirits who dwelt in the neighbouring mountains. In order to prepare a fit residence for her, this Div began to build a city, and for that purpose threw down immense stones from the mountain of Mak-bal. The city was never finished, but its remains are still visible, called by the natives Akhyr-tash (Akhyr-tepé), or Tash-kurgan. The legend may be absurd, but the ruins, which are about thirty miles east of Aulié-Ata, are very curious. They consist of an immense unfinished building, 600 feet by 450, of reddish sandstone, the lower layers of the front being built of large stones seven feet long by four broad. Mr. Lerch, who investigated this ruin, thinks that it was intended for a Buddhist monastery. The scattered stones are supposed by the natives to have been mangers, or feeding-troughs, for an encampment, and hence the name Akhyr-tash, stone-manger. The Chinese traveller, Tch'ang Tch'un, who passed here in 1221, says: 'We travelled westward along the hills and after seven

¹ These ruins, which have never been investigated, may perhaps prove to be those of the city *Tulas*.

or eight days' journey the mountains suddenly turned to the south. We saw a city built of red stone, and there are the traces of an ancient military encampment. To the west we saw great grave mounds placed like the stars in the Great Bear.' These mounds also still exist, and from a short distance they indeed appear to be seven disposed like the seven stars of the Great Bear. In reality, however, there are sixteen mounds of different sizes, the largest being from 200 to 250 paces in circumference. They are called by the Kirghiz, *Jitte-tepé*, or the seven mounds. On one of them Mr. Lerch found a stone bearing a Mantchu inscription, relative to a victory of the Chinese over the Jungars, in 1758.


Indeed, all this region is to the geographer classic ground. Here began the *Min-bulak*, or 'thousand springs' of *Hiouen Thsang*; here too was the realm of *Prester John*, that semi-mythical, Christian pope-king so celebrated in mediæval histories; ¹ here was the country of the *Karakidans*, and a little to the north lay their capital *Bala Sagun*; and here was the great highway between the East and the West along which passed so many travellers from *Zemarchus* and *Hiouen Thsang* to *Rubriquis* and *Tch'ang Tch'un*.²

¹ *Prester John* now seems to be thoroughly identified with *Yeliu Tashi*, the founder of the realm of *Karakitai*, who, after his conquest of Eastern and Western Turkistan, became known by the title of the *Gur-Khan*, and had his capital at *Bala Sagun*. A full account of the legend of *Prester John* and of the modifications which it underwent, will be found in the interesting book of *Dr. Augustus Oppert*, '*Der Presbyter Johannes in Sage und Geschichte*.' See also *Yule's 'Cathay'*, pp. 173-182, and his second edition of '*Marco Polo*,' vol. i. pp. 229-233, and vol. ii. pp. 539-543. Professor *Braun*, of *Odessa*, in his article on the '*Migrations of Prester John*,' (*Odessa*, 1870) propounds with some force a theory that he was *Prince John Orbelian of Georgia*.

² For a slight sketch of the routes taken by the great mediæval travellers, see APPENDIX III., at the end of Vol. I.

Bala Sagun, for reasons which I in part stated in the '*Geographical Magazine*,' December, 1874, p. 389, and January, 1875, p. 25, seems plainly to have been in the valley of the *Tchu*, although not necessarily on the very banks of that river. In the present state of our knowledge it would be impossible to identify it with any particular place. *It-kitchu*, the place proposed by *Mr. Howorth* ('*Geog. Mag.*' July, 1875, p. 216), is a Turkish, but not Kirghiz, name meaning '*Dog-ford*,' given probably on account of the shallowness of the *Tchu* at that place.

I cannot find that there is the slightest reason of any kind for confounding *Bala Sagun*, which is probably of Persian origin, with the Mongol word *Balghasun*, city, and am at a loss to imagine how the idea arose, and why it is so persistent.



ON THE ROAD TO AULI-ATA.

The kind Prefect of Aulié-Ata wished me to wait a few days, and to accompany him twenty miles into the mountains to a great Kirghiz festival. Gladly would I have availed myself of this invitation to see something more of the Kirghiz, who now, after my experience of the Sarts, seemed patterns of simplicity, manliness and virtue; but I thought that there were better things in store for me. North of the mountains I seemed to breathe a different air. I had left the fanaticism and the narrow life of the sedentary populations of Central Asia behind me, and was again on the Steppe in a most healthful and delightful region. All along my right was the beautiful Alexandrofsky range, with many of its summits then white with snow. At almost every step I crossed rivulets trickling down from the hills, showing well the truth of the old name, 'the thousand sources.' The road was good, the horses were fresh, and I drove the whole distance from Aulié-Ata to Ak-su, 150 miles, in 24 hours, including all stoppages. At Merke there is a small military post, but there is nothing there of interest, and I cared not to stop longer than for dinner, on account of the *kara-kurt* spiders which infest this region, about the venomous qualities of which I had often heard.

The spider called *kara kurt*, or black worm, by the Kirghiz, (the scientific name is, I believe, *Latrodectes lugubris*), is not larger than the finger-nail, but it has the power of jumping several feet, and is by far the most venomous of all such vermin native to this country. It is said that its poison will kill a man, although I have never known of authenticated instances; but I was told that the Kirghiz who live on the small streams coming down from the Alexandrofsky range, especially in the neighbourhood of Merke, annually lose many animals through the bite of this spider. It lives in the grass, and there is a belief that it is unable to walk over a woollen substance, for which reason the Kirghiz, as well as the Cossacks and the soldiers, always spread down large pieces of felt, on which to sit. More terrible in appearance, although less deadly, are the tarantulas and phalanges. The tarantula (*Lycosa singoriensis*) is black, with a body of the size of a pigeon's egg, covered with dark brown or black hair. The phalange (*Solpuga araneoides* and *S. intrepida*) is of a yellowish or reddish brown, also with long hair, and when walking seems as large as one's two fists. They

frequent the steppes, and live in the sand, but are rarely found in gardens or villages.

A Mantchu officer, in an account of his travels in Eastern Turkistan, in 1777, gives a curious and nearly correct description of the phalange.

He says, 'The *pa-tcha chung* (the insect with eight legs) is found everywhere in the countries of the *sin kiang* (the new frontier—Turkistan). It resembles the spider, and is of a roundish form, and of a dirty yellow colour. It has eight not very long legs, and a reddish brown mouth. The mouth is formed by four branches. When the insect bites iron, it can be heard. The body of it is yellowish green, the skin is transparent like that of the silk-worm. It is found in damp places, near canals, and also in the houses. The larger ones are of the size of a hen's egg; the smaller ones are as big as a walnut. They run to a light as moths to a candle. When a violent wind blows they quit their holes, and, aided by the wind, enter the houses. They run very quickly, and when angry, rise on their eight legs and attack men. If one should happen to creep upon a man's body, he must not touch it, but wait until it goes away of its own accord, when there will be no danger. But as soon as one interferes with the insect, he is bitten immediately. The poison enters the body, causes great pain, and penetrates to the heart, and to the marrow of the bones. When in such a case immediate help cannot be obtained, the man's body will mortify and death will ensue. When he has been only slightly bitten, if he catch the insect and bruise it, there will be no danger. But when it has succeeded in spitting a white web on the wound, death will be inevitable. Sometimes the sap expressed from the plant *si-ts'as* (a kind of madder plant, *rubia*) and applied to the wound is useful, but generally out of a hundred men bitten by the *pa-tcha chung* only one or two escape. The Mohammedans say that the only means of cure is calling in an *Akhun* to read from the holy book, but I have often heard that the Mohammedans bitten by this insect, when they turn for help to the *Akhuns*, often die before the reading is finished.'¹ With its four jaws the phalange makes four little holes, but the bite is much less deadly than is stated by the

¹ 'Description of Jungaria and Eastern Turkistan,' by the Monk Hyacinth; p. 218. St. Petersburg, 1829.

Chinese author. Mr. Fedtchenko held the opinion that there was no poison whatever in the phalange, as its teeth have no openings through which poison can run, and as he found in it no poison bag. Mrs. Fedtchenko was bitten by a large one with no consequences except a slight pain, although, as she was bitten through her clothing, the instance was not decisive. The Cossacks and the soldiers, who are very frequently bitten, say that at first the pain is no greater than the sting of a gnat, and that it is even difficult to find the place of the bite; but that after some time the pain spreads through the whole body, and is attended with fever and great exhaustion.

It is curious that Ritter, in an interesting digression, while citing the description of the Chinese traveller whom I have quoted above, from some preconceived idea concludes that the insect spoken of was not a phalange, but a cockroach (*Blatta*), and endeavours to show that the black-beetle, or cockroach, came into Europe through Siberia from Central Asia. But strangely enough the true black-beetle is not found in Turkistan, and the one now to be seen in the Russian houses is of a different species. In Eastern Siberia, too, it does not exist, the river Ob forming a sharp boundary line, on the west of which even at the very first station, cockroaches are abundant, while on the other side there are none at all. The Russians have various superstitions connected with this disagreeable beetle, and consider that its presence in the house brings good luck. They therefore have frequently endeavoured to naturalise them in Eastern Siberia, but always without success, and the peasants with a tone of sadness say, 'They cross the Ob and die.' Ritter also says that Turkistan was the birth-place of the bed-bug,¹ but, as I have said before (vol. i. p. 149), bed-bugs were never known there until introduced by the Russians. On this Fedtchenko remarks that it was formerly very much the fashion to point to Turkistan as the native country of many of our cultivated and domestic plants and animals, through ignorance of that region, but that the result of his travels was to show that Turkistan received nearly all its animal and vegetable population from the neighbouring countries, by the migration of forms which were, of course, to some degree changed by the new conditions

¹ 'Die Erdkunde von Asien,' vol. v. pp. 453-461.

which they found there, and by the consequent struggle for existence.¹

After leaving Ak-su we seldom met any Sarts, but on the contrary numbers of genuine Russian peasants, for here begin the Russian colonies.

Opposite Pishpek are the highest peaks of the Alexandrofsky range, 15,000 and 16,000 feet high. As we approached Tokmak, near the banks of the Tchu, the country became marshy and the road was through meadows covered with tall grass and reeds. Both Pishpek and Tokmak were small Khokandian forts which were taken by the Russians, under Colonel Zimmerman, in 1860. The old town of Tokmak, about fifteen miles above the present place, of which now only almost undistinguishable ruins exist, was formerly the capital of a principality and gave to the Mongols the name for all the country to the west—the realm of Kiptchak.² Tokmak is now the chief town of a district, and has a Russian population of about 800. The town was built here to be near the junction of the road to Issyk Kul and the Naryn with that going north over the Kastek Pass to Vierny, but as in order to avoid the Kastek Pass, the Vierny road has now been taken very much to the west, joining the other road at Pishpek, it is proposed, on account of the unhealthiness of the site, arising from the fevers caused by the surrounding marshes, to abandon it and to change the seat of the administration to Pishpek.

Leaving my carriage and luggage at Tokmak, I took a light post-cart for an excursion to Lake Issyk Kul. Beyond Tokmak our way lay again through the reedy lowlands until we came to the ford over the Tchu, a few miles above the town. Here we found a small picket, and one of the Cossacks piloted us across, for the current is so rapid and deceitful that it would be difficult to cross without a guide. We went on twenty miles to Kara Bulak, on the Little Kebin, at the mouth of the Kastek Pass, and then turned south-east till we recrossed the Tchu,

¹ Fedtchenko:—'Travels in Khokand,' p. 42.

² In the 'History of East Mongolia' by Sanang Setzen we find (as for example, under the years 1196-1452) frequent references to the wars between the Mongol Khan and the Sultan of Tokmak, by whom we must understand the Shah of Khârezm.

over a fine bridge, just below the place where it receives the Great Kebin. Here the banks of the Tchu, as well as of the Kebin, are rocky and precipitous, and the river, confined within a narrow space, rushes swiftly by, forming picturesque rapids and cataracts. The view from the bridge, as well as that from the bank above it, is very fine. We soon entered the mouth of the Great Buam Pass, separating the Alexandrofsky range from the two parallel chains of the Trans-Ili Ala-tau. The road crossed and recrossed the torrent, now passing on a cornice through a narrow defile, and again coming out on an open valley, where the stream grew wider and shallower, and where were sometimes small green meadows and clumps of willow and *hippophae*. The scenery was certainly very grand, but owed its beauty entirely to the immense masses of bare rock, and to the contrasts in colour observable, some being of a rich reddish purple sandstone conglomerate, and others of black trap with occasional patches of yellow, grey and brown. I missed much the trees and verdure which give the charm to the Rocky Mountain cañons, the only defiles with which I can compare this pass. The view on descending the pass was much finer, the point of view and the consequent scenic effect changing at every step. The precipitous walls of rock rose so high on either hand that we were unable to see the snowy summits of the more distant mountains, and darkness overtook us when we had reached the station of Kok-Moinak, at about the middle of the pass, where we, therefore, spent the night. A drive of fifteen miles the next morning through similar scenery brought us to the head of the pass at the station of Kutemaldy. In one or two places we should have found it difficult to get by another vehicle, but in general the road was excellent, and I could not help thinking of the great changes which had taken place here since the visit of Mr. Semenof, in 1856. The old road, *Koi-yul*, or sheep-path, at times traversed by Kirghiz horsemen, we saw winding up and down the sides of the cliffs, sometimes fifty or sixty feet above our heads.¹

¹ In the dialect of the Kara-Kirghiz, as also in the Altai, a pathway over precipitous crags bordering a river is called *bom*, or with some pronunciations *buam*; hence the name of this pass. *Kutemaldy* corresponds to the *Pisse-vache* of the Alps.

At Kutemaldy we were already in the open country, partly meadow, partly sedge-land, and partly gravelly plains which in general slope gradually down to the Issyk Kul, although a slight rise of ground prevented our seeing the lake. After changing horses, I went on one station further to Turu-aigyr, on the lake shore. To one born and bred on the banks of a great lake there could be nothing more beautiful than this expanse of water, especially after months passed on dry and barren steppes. The day was bright and warm, the lake was of the deepest, richest blue that I have ever seen on water, contrasting and harmonising with the mountains of a warm reddish and purplish brown, which surrounded it on all sides. Above these was a range of snow-covered mountains—the Terek-tau—while the sky was of a light transparent blue. On every side the view was magnificent, for even behind me the crests of the Kungei Ala-tau were now covered with snow, and in some of the valleys I saw what seemed to me to be glaciers, although they were more probably large snow-drifts. I remained here all day trying to get my fill of the view, if it were possible, thinking that at sunset it would be still lovelier, but alas! no sooner had the sun disappeared than the summits of the mountains became cold and dark, and only on the lower hills were there quick-changing shades of crimson and purple. With the descent of the sun, too, it became very cold, and I was glad to drive at a quick pace back to Kutemaldy, congratulating myself on being so lucky as to have had a fine day, and on having had the good sense not to go farther where the lake might have been too wide to see easily across it.


During the day I rode through the sedge and the clumps of bushes down to the water, for Turu-aigyr was fully two miles from the edge of the lake. It was curious how still and deserted the lake seemed, for not a boat was visible. I had wanted to go out in the fishing-boat which belonged to the Russian station-master, but we found one of the oars broken, and it seemed pleasanter to lie on the sand and look at the mountains, or to wander along the shore and pick up with wonderment the human bones which were to be seen at every step. For a distance of several miles here, as well as at a place at the eastern end of the lake, the shore is thickly strewn with skulls and bones, sometimes in a very perfect state. The

Kirghiz relate that on this spot, in ancient times, a great battle was fought, and that these are the remains of the slain. Others say that here stood a city, the inhabitants of which were so wicked that there was a second flood, which drowned them all and formed the lake. This legend is also recounted in a form somewhat recalling the old story of Midas. Over an unbelieving people who lived in this valley, there once ruled a childless Khan, who had long prayed to heaven to grant him an heir. At last his prayers were answered; but through some fright or fault of his wife, the long deferred son, to whom was given the name of Jany Bek, had the ears of an ass. He succeeded in concealing these marks of his origin until the death of his father. When he himself ascended the throne he had recourse to severe measures, for every barber who shaved his head was immediately put to death. At last lots had to be cast as to who should shave the Khan and then die. Once the dreaded task fell to an adroit young fellow, who succeeded in so pleasing Jany Bek, that after swearing secrecy and fidelity he was allowed to live, was retained as the Khan's constant barber, and was subsequently made his prime minister. Years passed, and once at a hunt his falcon outstripped that of the Khan, and in thoughtless exultation he cried out: 'My falcon is better than the falcon of ass-eared Jany Bek Khan.' He thought too late of what he was saying, and to escape death fled to the mountains, sometimes returning at night to the city. On one of these visits, whilst at the well in the public square, out of sorrow for the renewed cruelties of the Khan, he prayed God to send punishment on him, and on his corrupted people who endured such a yoke. His prayer was heard in heaven, and water began to flow out of the well in such abundance that it submerged the city, and formed Lake Issyk Kul.

As it is known that in former times cities existed on the lake shore, this theory has gained much credence, but the skulls which I picked up seemed to me to belong to Kirghiz, and all the bones were, I thought, of recent origin, only so much discoloured, as might be expected after lying a few years in the water. I understand that in the mountains near here, on the banks of a stream, there are Kirghiz cemeteries, and I think it probable that with the melting of the snows in

spring some of the graves are washed away, and the bones carried into the lake, where they are thrown up again by the waves, especially after storms. But besides bones, other objects are found in the lake, especially large tiles and bricks. The rooms in the station house were paved with such square and diamond-shaped tiles, some plain red, others covered with a blue glaze, which had been obtained partly from the lake and partly from ruins ploughed up by the peasants. At a place on the northern side of the lake called Koroi-saroi, and in two places at the eastern end, remains of submerged cities are still to be seen a few feet under water. Many objects have been found here, some thrown up by the waves and others fished out of the water, chiefly broken pottery and pieces of metallic vessels, a number of which are preserved in the collections of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society. In 1847 two ornamented copper kettles were found on the south shore of the lake, and were given by the Kirghiz to the Khan of Khokand. Among other things, I have seen a small lamp which bears an inscription in an entirely unknown alphabet, although one letter is said by Mr. Lerch to bear a strong resemblance to a letter of the Manichæan. Old Chinese maps place the city of Tchi-gu on the shore of Issyk Kul, and on the Catalan map, of 1375, there is marked on the southern shore a Nestorian monastery containing the bones of St. Matthew. These ruins have never been carefully investigated, but in 1869 General Kolpakofsky examined some of them, and says that between the mouths of the streams 2nd and 3rd Koi-su at seven feet from the shore, and at a depth of three feet, there are visible traces of brick walls which go parallel to each other at a distance of a few feet until the depth of the lake prevents their being seen. He also saw a large stone on which was carved the representation of a human face, and which he succeeded in getting out of the water.¹ Subsequent observers, who had succeeded in rigging out a boat, assured me that especially near the river Tub, on a clear day, they could see the remains of buildings. Stone statues of men and women of the same character as those found in the steppes of south Russia are of not infrequent occurrence at the eastern end of the

¹ Memoirs of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, 1870, p. 101.



TARANTCHI CART.

Issyk Kul, and north of the mountains in the neighbourhood of Vierny.¹

The fact that ruins are visible under the water would seem to show either a subsidence of the soil, or that the lake is higher than it once was. At the same time near Turu-aigyr the lake shore is divided into terraces, and these, I believe, are always to be seen except where precipitous rocks come close to the water, showing that the lake has been at different periods higher than its present level. The lake receives forty or more small streams, and as it has now no outlet the water is brackish, but not sufficiently so to be unpleasant to drink in small quantities. It contains abundance of fish. Issyk Kul, the name by which it is known among the Kirghiz, means a warm lake, and was given to it either on account of the numerous warm springs that exist on the southern shore, or from the fact that it does not freeze in the winter except with a thin crust along the edges. It was called by the Chinese *Zhe-hai*, which has the same meaning, and it has also sometimes received the names of *Yan-hai* in Chinese, and *Tuz-gul* in Kirghiz, meaning salt-lake, while by the Kalmuks it is called *Temurtu-Nor*, or the iron lake, it is said on account of the ferruginous black sand found on its shores, which the Kirghiz smelt into iron, and use.

The northern shore of the lake is called the Kungei, or sunny-side, while the southern shore is called the Terskei, or dark and cold side, names which have been also applied to the two mountain ranges closest to the lake.

¹ These statues are spoken of by a Chinese traveller Sui-Sun who was in that region in the early part of this century. He says: 'Into the north-eastern end of Lake Issyk Kul there flows the river Kou-ken-bag. To the east of this river, along the shore of the lake, there are ruins of a city, and a stone statue lies in the grass. The statue represents a man girt with a sword, who holds his right hand on his sword, and places his left hand against his forehead. The stone is much spoiled by time, and it is therefore difficult to find out when it was made.' He, however, adds that he did not see these statues himself, although he looked carefully for them. He quotes what was said about them by the Chinese General De-Jo, who had seen them in 1805, but who, on account of his age and weak memory, could not remember the exact place. 'The Chinese,' he says, 'think that these statues were either tombstones of the burnt sovereigns, or statues representing ranks in the official hierarchy such as in the time of the Tan dynasty it was customary to place on the 'ombs of sovereigns.' Mem. Imp. Russ. Geog. Soc. 1870, p. 103.

Between the Issyk Kul and the Tchu there is a very small stream, the Kutemaldy, running out of a marsh near the Tchu and usually flowing into the lake, although frequently the water is almost stationary. At the spring floods it is said that even a good portion of the water of the Tchu runs into the lake. The lower portion of the Kutemaldy is almost like a canal, and the natives insist that it is entirely artificial, and was constructed by the Kalmuks a century ago for irrigating purposes, or in order to draw off the waters of the lake, and thus reclaim the land occupied by it.¹

The recent explorations of Russian officers have taught us that the Tian Shan is not the simple mountain chain that it was formerly supposed to be, but that it constitutes a great Alpine region extending far to the south of Lake Issyk Kul, and forming with the Pamir and the Himalayas the mountain centre of the whole Asiatic continent.

The axis of this Tian Shan Alpine region is apparently from north-east to south-west, the elevation rising gradually to the south and east, and sinking on the side of Kashgar much more rapidly. Lake Issyk Kul is 5,300 feet above the sea's level, while Lake Son Kul is 9,430 feet, and the Tchatyr Kul 11,210 feet. The main ranges run from north-east to south-west, but are cut by other smaller ones in a north-westerly and south-easterly direction. The centre, although not actually the highest part of the whole region, is the plateau or range of Ak-shiiraik, in a recess of which is the great Petrof Glacier, the true source of the river Naryn. There are many peaks between 14,000 and 20,000 feet high, and south-east of the eastern extremity of Issyk Kul is the lofty mountain of Khan-

¹ Referring to what I said in vol. i. p. 54, I find that, according to Ritter, an old Japanese map of the fifteenth century, constructed on materials gathered by Buddhist missionaries in the beginning of the seventh century, makes the Issyk Kul run into the Tchu and the Tchu empty into the sea of Aral. Considering how errors are always liable to creep into maps of a little known country, and how until a very few years ago, the Issyk Kul was supposed to be the source of the Tchu, we cannot perhaps attach much importance to this map, but Ritter is decidedly of opinion that when lake Issyk Kul was formerly at a higher level it debouched into the Tchu, and that the Tchu, instead of stopping in the marshes near the Saumal Kul actually communicated with the Syr Darya near its mouth. An itinerary quoted by him says the same thing.



A BACHTA AND HIS ADMIRERS.

Tengri, the altitude of which, although not accurately measured, is estimated at over 24,000 feet.¹ Both Humboldt and Ritter, on the basis of notes contained in the Chinese annals, believed that the Tian Shan was of volcanic formation, and that active volcanoes had existed there in recent times. Four particular localities were pointed out; the mountain Pe-shan, north of the city Ku-tche, the neighbourhood of Urumtsi, a mountain near Turfan and the island Aral-tepé in Lake Ala Kul. Even as far back as 1840 Schrenk showed that on the Aral-tepé and near the Ala Kul, there were no volcanic formations at all, and recent Russian explorations in the Tian Shan have come to the same result. Severtzof is of opinion that the fire in the mountains to which the Chinese historians refer, may have been caused by the ignition of the seams of coal, or of the carburetted-hydrogen gas filling the cavities of the seams.

Captain Sosnofsky during his passage up the Black Irtysh, made some particular inquiries regarding the volcanic region north-west of Urumtsi, and was told that there was a place in that neighbourhood called Jin, from which steam constantly arose, and that near this crevice there had existed from ancient times three pits, where persons afflicted with rheumatism or skin diseases were in the habit of bathing. The temperature was very high. Captain Sosnofsky came to the conclusion that there was no reason for supposing this locality to be volcanic.

The most important road through the Tian Shan is that extending from Tokmak and the Buam Pass to Kashgar, by the way of Fort Naryn, a small fortification erected on the upper Naryn, in 1868, by Colonel Kraiefsky, in order to establish the authority of Russia over the mountains. In consequence of an anticipated war with Kashgar, orders were given in the

¹ Much interesting information about the interior of the Tian Shan may be found in the account of Mr. Semenov, a translation of which was published in the Journal of the 'Royal Geographical Society' for 1869 p. 311, and in that of Baron Osten Sacken, *id.* 1870, p. 250; but for more exact geographical information it is necessary to turn to the 'Travels in Turkistan and the Tian Shan' by the naturalist N. Severtzof, St. Petersburg 1873, a portion of which was translated in the Journal of the R. G. S., 1870, p. 343, and a German translation of the whole of which was published as Appendices xlii and xliii to Petermann's 'Mittheilungen,' 1875 (the maps here are much fuller and better than in the Russian edition), and to the 'Materials for the Geography of the Tian Shan' by Baron Kaulbars, published in the fifth volume of the 'Geographical Memoirs of the Imp. Russ. Geog. Soc., St. Petersburg,' 1875

spring of 1872 to construct as far as this fort a road passable for artillery and carts. A detachment of soldiers was sent out, and in less than five months, under great difficulties, the road with its bridges was completed to the Naryn—a distance of ninety-six miles. The road leaves the Buam Pass at the station of Kok-moinak, then crosses the Tchu, then the pass of Kuakky, which separates that river from the Kotchkur, and then by the Juvan Aryk Pass, through easier ground. During the march of the detachment the river was crossed by means of a bridge of *arbas*, high two-wheeled carts, a method not uncommon in Central Asia, and by which in a war against Kliiva the whole of the Bukharan army is said to have been transported across the Amu Darya. The wheels of these carts offer but little obstruction to the current, and even on such a river as the Tchu the bridge could be placed in position in half-an-hour, and drawn out again in ten minutes after the troops had crossed. The distance from the Naryn to Kashgar is about 175 miles, and although the road is not yet passable for carts, it is by no means a difficult one. On commiserating the station-master at Kok Moinak on the unpleasantness which he must experience in being shut up there during the whole of the winter, he told me that neither in the Buam Pass nor on the shores of the Issyk Kul is there very much snow in winter, that the road is never closed, and even that carts, and not sledges, are used throughout the winter. He said, too, that for two stations only on the road to the Naryn was the travelling sometimes rendered difficult during the winter by the snow.

To the east of Lake Issyk Kul, close under the peak of Khan-Tengri, there is another pass, the Ice or Muzart Pass, which is of great importance as being the shortest means of communication from Kuldja and the valley of the Ili to Ak-su and Kashgar.

In the old Chinese times the road over the Muzart was kept in a tolerable state of repair, and pickets were stationed at intervals to keep it open, and to hew steps in the ice.

The accounts of Chinese travellers¹ speak of the terrors and difficulties of this pass, and the explorations of Russian officers show that these were not exaggerated. The pass was first visited in 1867 by Mr. Poltaratzky, but he succeeded in

¹ One of these, that of Hiouen Tshang A.D. 629. I quote in APPENDIX III., at the end of Vol. I. Another is given in Father Hyacinth's 'Jungaria,' p. 221.

reaching the first summit only, although he thought that he had attained its top. It was next explored by Colonel Tchaikofsky, in 1870, as well as by Baron Kaulbars, but neither could get further, and even that point, which Kaulbars estimates at 11,000 feet above the sea, was attained with very great difficulty. In 1871, however, Captain Shepelef went the whole length of the south Muzart Glacier to the neighbourhood of the Kashgarian picket on the southern side of the Tian Shan. Much of the road lies over the moraines of glaciers, and even over the glaciers themselves, which are so full of fissures that temporary bridges have to be made for the passage of caravans. In one place at the mouth of a defile, the slope was so great and the fissures were so numerous, that the glacier presented to Baron Kaulbars the aspect of a cataract of ice. A Russian post is stationed at the north entrance of the defile, and a Kashgarian picket on the southern side of the Tian Shan near the pass itself.

Colonel Tchaikofsky told me that at the northern end of this pass there is a large stone erected, on which a human face is roughly drawn, and in addition to which is a long inscription in characters which he supposed to be Thibetan. In the defile itself he found a Chinese block-house, in perfect order. In this neighbourhood there is excellent hunting for the *marali*, or mountain deer, especially in the spring when they have shed their horns. These deer are then shot by the Kirghiz for the purpose of getting the gelatinous masses which have not yet developed into new horns, and which the Chinese buy at enormous prices, for this substance is considered an aphrodisiac and forms part of the marriage portion of every well-to-do Mongolian and Chinese bride. The exact manner of using it is not known. When fresh the horns are soft and gelatinous, so that if properly cooked they might be palatable and even efficacious; but after they have rotted and been pulverised it is difficult to imagine anything more repulsive.

The neighbourhood of the Issyk Kul, and in general the valleys of the Tian Shan, as well as the Alai mountains and the Pamir to the south of Khokand, are inhabited by the true Kirghiz, called by the Chinese and the Kalmuks *Burut*, and by the Russians *Kara-Kirghiz* (Black Kirghiz) or *Dikokamenny* Wild Mountain) *Kirghiz*, to distinguish them from the Kazaks,

who have erroneously and accidentally obtained among the Russians the appellation of Kirghiz.¹ There are some reasons for supposing this race to have been originally of the same extraction as the Finns, and many persons consider them a mixed race of Turks and Mongols;² but at all events they must at a very early period have become Turkicised, for even the Chinese historians of the seventh century, to whom they were known under the name of the *Khagas*, show by the words they cite that they then spoke a Turkic language. They are there described as being fair-skinned and light-haired, and although now most of them are dark and black-haired, yet individuals of the original type are not unfrequently met with among them. As the *Khagas*, they seem to have possessed a higher civilisation than most of the Asiatic tribes, to have inhabited a wide extent of country, and to have been in intimate relations with the Chinese, the Arabs, and Eastern Turkistan.³

In the 10th century the might of the *Khagas* began to decline, the *Uigurs* and other nations threw off their supremacy, and they for a while disappeared from history, only to return to it again in the second half of the thirteenth century under their present name of Kirghiz, in Chinese *Ki-li-ki-tsi*. The movements among the nomad tribes between the tenth and thirteenth centuries seem to have cut the Kirghiz in two, so that while the greater portion of them lived in their present habitats in the Tian Shan and the Pamir, another division of them remained on the upper waters of the Yenissei, where, even as late as the eighteenth century, they gave much trouble to the Russian colonists. During the eighteenth century they disappeared, partly cut off by the attacks of the *Kalmuks* and of other hostile tribes, and partly absorbed by them, while only

¹ See also vol. i. p. 30. *Kara-Kirghiz* is an appellation which is thought to be borrowed from the Kirghiz-Kaisaks, given, as they say, to denote their low origin, and supposed want of nobility, but, according to Mr. Radloff, because for a long time they refused to embrace Mahommedanism, unbelievers being called by Mussulmans *Kara-Kaffir*, 'black infidels.' Kirghiz is the only name they themselves use.

² Klaproth and Abel Rémusat class them among the people of Germanic race.

³ An exceedingly interesting account of the *Khagas* from Chinese sources is to be found in the 'Collection of Information about the Peoples anciently inhabiting Central Asia' by the Monk Hyacinth; vol. i. pp. 442-451. St. Petersburg, 1851.

a small remnant was able to join the rest of their race—too small to leave any impression of this exodus on their traditions or legends.

At the end of the last century these Kara-Kirghiz were subject to the Chinese, who on several occasions gave them protection against the attacks of the petty Beks of the provinces of Khokand and Tashkent. Subsequently they came under the dominion of Khokand, but in the troubles at the death of Madali Khan, in 1842, they made themselves practically independent. Owing to the disputes and wars between the different tribes, especially those of Bogu and Sary-bagysh, those inhabiting the Issyk Kul region asked one after another to be taken under Russian protection. A few of them, however, owe allegiance to the ruler of Kashgar. Those living in the Alai and the Pamir in part recognise a nominal allegiance to the Khan of Khokand. They are divided into two great divisions; *On*, right, and *Sol*, left. To the first belong the tribes of Bogu, Sary-bagysh, Sult (Solty), Sayak, Tchon-bagysh, Tcherik, and Bassyz, who live throughout the Tian Shan on the river systems of the Tekes, the Issyk Kul, the Naryn and the Tehu. The left division includes the tribes of Saru, Munduz, Kontche (Kutchu), and Ktai, and is distributed through the Alai and the Pamir. As only two tribes are thoroughly known, but vague estimates can be formed of their numbers; but it is thought that the Kara-Kirghiz within the Russian dominions number about 200,000, and that there are, perhaps, 150,000 more in Eastern Turkistan and Khokand.


The manners, the customs, and even the dress of the Kara-Kirghiz are, in most respects, similar to those of the Kirghiz Kaisaks, and in general there must be a similarity among all nomadic tribes under similar conditions in northern Asia. In religion they, like the Kirghiz Kaisaks, are nominally Mohammedans, although few of them have ever heard of the existence of Mohammed, and still fewer know any of the prayers or practice any of the observances of that creed. They retain traces of their old Shamanism. According to Bardashev¹ the rite of fire-worship is celebrated on Thursday nights; 'grease is thrown over the flames, around which nine lamps are placed. Prayers are also read, if there be any one present able to read

¹ Quoted by Veniukof.

them, during which the worshippers remain prostrate.' Their Shamans wear long hair, and caps and sleeves of swan's down. They are even fonder of music and poetry than are the Kirghiz Kaisaks, and one of their favourite recreations is to listen to singers of epic ballads, one of whom is to be found in every encampment, and with every expedition. They possess an epic poem, the *Manas*, part of which has been written down by Valikhanof and by Radloff. It is, Valikhanof says, an encyclopædical collection of all the Kirghiz mythological tales and traditions grouped round one person, the giant *Manas*, being a sort of *Iliad* of the Steppe.

There is a legend deriving the name of the Kirghiz, which they themselves pronounce *K^yrg^hz*, from forty maidens, *kyrk kyz*; and the story goes that the daughter of a certain Khan, on returning one day from a long excursion with her forty handmaidens, found her tents pillaged, and but one thing left alive in them—a red dog, whom the Kirghiz consider the father of their race, while the name itself is borne in remembrance of their mothers. Some tribes are silent about the red dog, and say that the forty maidens were impregnated by the foam of Lake Issyk Kul, but the legend in one or the other of these forms exists with many variations, not only among the Kara-Kirghiz themselves, but also among the surrounding tribes, and even as far back as the time of the Mongols a Chinese writer repeats the story.¹ The claim of descent from animals is not uncommon among the Asiatic tribes, and is widely spread among those of America, and such legends have frequently been looked upon as significant of a very ancient origin for the people who possess them. There exist also traditions of a similar nature with regard to the origin of the various tribes, who all try to connect themselves with the hero Togai. The tribes of Sult, Sary-bagysh and Bogu claim to be descended from Togai by his lawful wives, while the Sayaks were merely the offspring of one of his concubines, for which reason these last are looked upon with contempt by the other tribes, and were formerly frequently reduced to slavery. As to the Bogus, it is related that near the present site of Fort Naryn there is a

¹ With this legend it is interesting to compare the story given by King Hethum of the people living beyond Khatai, for which see APPENDIX III., at the end of Vol. I.



A WAYSIDE TOMB.

HUSBAND.

mountain called Ala-Myshak—the spotted cat—through which runs a tunnel. One day while out hunting the mountain deer, a Kirghiz of the tribe of Sary-bagysh came by accident to this place, and seeing a light coming from the other end of the tunnel, ventured into it. When about halfway through he met an animal with horns, which he took for a deer and killed, but on dragging it to the entrance he saw that it was a man with horns like those of the deer (*bogu*). Soon a woman with similar horns ran up, fell weeping on the body, and said that it was her brother. Not knowing what to do, and repenting his involuntary murder, the Sarybagysh proposed to expiate his crime by marrying the woman, and from them came the tribe of Bogu.

Among the Kara-Kirghiz the *Manaps*, or tribal and family chiefs, claim a sort of aristocracy as being descended from Togai. Beneath them are only the common people, *bukhara*, and the slaves, *kul*, although in those tribes under Russian rule slavery has now been abolished. Notwithstanding that by the Russian regulations the *Manaps* have no legal power, they still have an enormous influence among the tribes and the greatest respect is paid to them, as in general, in any place where the patriarchal system exists, respect is paid to age. Among the Kara-Kirghiz the son never becomes entirely emancipated from his father, although when he reaches the age of twenty he usually has a tent set apart for him, and cattle and sheep are given to him for his subsistence. He does not reach full age until he is thirty, and his accession to the dignity of manhood is marked by a feast, at which he must undergo the ceremony of having his moustaches shaved. He is then declared to be a man, and to be able to take part in the councils; but even this he cannot do if his father be present, for as long as his father may live he is supposed to be acting only as his deputy. Besides the *Manaps* there are always honoured Kirghiz—not necessarily of the aristocracy, called *Bis*, who are something in the nature of judges, and to whom disputes are referred for decision. Under the Russian administration the *Bis* have been made into actual judges, and are elective from each district; indeed, one is now located in every *aul*, or village.¹

¹ For further information about the Kara-Kirghiz, see Radloff's 'Observations sur les Kirghiz,' in the 'Journal Asiatique,' 1863, No. 9; Wilh. Schott; 'Uber die

On my return to Tokmak I found there a large encampment of Kara-Kirghiz, and soon learned that an extraordinary session of the Biis of the two large districts of Tokmak and Issyk Kul was taking place. Each single Bii has jurisdiction over those cases only which do not exceed one hundred rubles, five horses, or fifty sheep; cases involving amounts up to ten times that sum are given over to a council of Biis; while the extraordinary sessions of the Biis of two districts are held to consider cases arising between the Kirghiz of those different administrative divisions.

The Biis, who were all big, stout, well-to-do looking men, were seated on the ground in a circle in a large *kibitka*. In the centre was a small table, at which sat the Prefect of the district, while the interpreter with his bundles of papers, had a chair near by. The proceedings were marked by regularity and good order. Plaintiff and defendant told their stories, which were supported, if necessary, by witnesses. The interpreter related the gist of the case to the Prefect, and made a short note of it in his book, and after a consultation of the Biis of each district, first separately and then together, the decision was entered in the book and they affixed their seals.

When the Russians established the courts of the Biis, they abstained from appointing the Biis, which would have been in perfect accordance with native customs, but introduced the system of election, which was foreign to all Kirghiz traditions. There is now disagreement among the Russian officials as to the value of the present system. Some maintain, with very great appearance of truth, that the elections are a mere farce, as they are entirely in the hands of the tribal leaders and of the aristocratic families who compel the choice of their sons and adherents, so that the Russian system is only tending in an indirect way to strengthen the influence of the *Manaps*. Others, while admitting the truth of this, think the system in itself a good one, but propose that the influence of the *Manaps* should be counteracted by a similar pressure from the district prefects. In this case why would it not be simpler, and give on the whole greater satisfaction, if the Russian authorities directly named the Biis? As it is, if a Kirghiz can obtain a

ächten Kirgisen; in the *Abhandlungen der Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1864; and Michells' 'The Russians in Central Asia.'

little influence with the Prefect, or with his interpreter, he can always manage in some way to have the decision of the Biis set aside, or reversed by the authorities. One upright Russian magistrate, if he were willing to forego the formalities, red tape and paper-smudging so dear to his race, could accomplish more for justice and for order among the Kirghiz, both of mountain and of steppe, than all the pseudo-autonomy and the fictitious elective system that has of late been introduced. In the present state of things, in matters of grave importance, or for anything which concerns the Russians or the Government, the Kirghiz, as well as all the other natives, are entirely in the hands of the interpreters.

In general these interpreters are a sorry set, which is strange considering the number of Asiatics in the Russian service, and the excellent appliances which exist in Russia for learning the Oriental languages. With the exception of a few officers who have received a fair education, and who are sometimes honest and capable, they are Tartars who have wandered to this part of Asia for the purpose of making their fortunes, or Kirghiz who have been picked up on the steppe, or who have been serving as *jigits*. They usually know no Persian, have but an imperfect acquaintance with the Uzbek dialect, and understand Russian still less. Sometimes they are mere Cossacks, unable to read or write, who have learned the languages simply by picking them up in their daily intercourse with the natives. It is no wonder that such interpreters make glaring, and even amusing mistakes. I remember a case which produced no little sensation in Samarkand. A Sart came to the judge to complain that Nur Mohammed, one of his neighbours, while setting fire to the house of *Kalian Musha*, had through carelessness burnt down four acres of ripe wheat belonging to him. The judge, who thought he should have two cases to try, immediately ordered the arrest of Nur Mohammed. On a subsequent examination he enquired why *Kalian Musha* did not appear to give evidence, and was told that *Kalian Musha* had been burnt up with all his family at the time the house was set on fire. At this unheard-of atrocity the judge got much excited, and it was some time before the united efforts of several interpreters were able to convince him that the whole difficulty was one of mistranslation—that *Kalian Musha* was

the name given to a sort of large rat which ate grain, and that the fire was caused by an attempt to burn this animal's nest.

On one occasion General Kaufmann received a letter from the Amir, and was greatly annoyed on opening it to find that, according to his interpreter, it was addressed to the Emperor Alexander. Fortunately there was an officer present who knew Persian better, and on examining the letter it was found that the phrase which caused the trouble was one of mere compliment, calling the General a second Alexander the Great. At the public reception in Tashkent of the son of Khudayar Khan, General Kaufmann said, 'By coming here to visit me, you show that you are the obedient son of your father and a faithful servant of your country.' The interpreter, to the wonderment and amusement of the natives, rendered this 'By coming here to see me you show that you are really the son of your father.'

In a letter from Khudayar Khan to General Kolpakofsky, which treated of the rebellion in 1873, there was this phrase: 'The Kirghiz of their own accord (*onbash*) caused the surrounding (*tchit*) places to rebel,' which was translated by the official interpreter thus: 'The Kirghiz went out from the city Nash to the city Tchit.'

But such curiosities of translation might be indefinitely multiplied. The worst feature of the present system of interpreters is that these can take advantage of their position to deceive both Russians and natives, and the latter especially suffer greatly. The orders of the Russians are falsely translated to them, and sums of money are extorted from them under the pretence of setting things straight.

As the Kastek Pass is no longer used for vehicles, from Tokmak I turned back on my road as far as Pishpek, and then went north to the station of Konstantinofskaya, where there is an excellent bridge over that shallow, muddy, and utterly useless river—the Tchu. A few weeks after I passed, Mr. Kopylof, the clerk of Mr. Kuznetzof, a well known merchant and contractor for the post stations, attempted to descend the Tchu, in the hope of being able to discover the practicability of sending cargoes of grain and forage as far as Lake Saumal-Kul, whence there would only be one hundred miles transport to Fort Perovsky, for the better provisioning

of the post stations in that region. For the first forty miles, the current was rapid, and the river constantly made turns. After that, at the mouth of the Kurgaty the river widened out, the current became less rapid and the stream wandered from one side of the bed to the other. Further on the river flowed through reeds, through mud flats or between hillocks of sand, until, about forty miles below the junction of the Kurgaty, it branched off from the old bed of the river, which, according to the Kirghiz, was abandoned about thirty years ago. Here the river divided into ten streams which soon after reunited into one; but it then became so shallow that it was impossible to proceed, and further explorations had to be given up. The travellers passed the night in the rushes, constantly alarmed by the cries of tigers and lynxes. The next day they began to ascend the river and in many places were obliged to drag the boat after them, and they soon found that it was impossible to penetrate through the marshes and muddy flats. The boat became so leaky, that it was of no further service, and it became necessary to abandon it and everything that was in it. Fortunately they fell in with some Kirghiz, from whom they hired camels, and proceeded directly to Aulié-Ata across the desert Muyun Kum.

Although I left Konstantinofskaya early in the morning, yet crossing the mountains, through even this low pass, was slow work, and it was already night when I reached the station of Uzun-agatch, a place memorable in Russian annals in this part of Asia, for here in October, 1860, General (then Lieutenant-Colonel) Kolpakofsky with 800 men and six guns utterly routed an army of 19,000 Khokandians and Kirghiz, and thus permanently established the power of the White Tsar on the north of the Ala-tau.¹ The Khokandians, under the command of their ablest general, Khanayat Shah, had started about 30,000

¹ It is a curious fact that this title of 'White Tsar' is really of Chinese origin. In 221 B.C. *Tsin-Shi-Hwang*, adopted, instead of his former appellation of *Vang*, prince, the title of *Hwang-Ti* or *Huan-Di*, the supreme ruler who nourishes and cares for all creatures. The title still continues as that of the Emperor of China. The character which was pronounced *hwang* was formed by the addition of the small character *bai*, white, above the character *vang*, prince. When the Mongols conquered China, and assumed the title of *Hwang-Ti* they translated it literally into Mongolian as *Tchagan Khagan*, White Khan. This was subsequently adopted by the Russians for Asiatic use in the various forms of *Ak-Khan*, *Ak-Padshah* and *Biely Tsar*, or White Tsar. This name, however, was never spread among

men strong, fully expecting to rebuild Tokmak and Pishpek, which had been destroyed, and to drive the Russians from Semiretch. They had gained over the Kara-Kirghiz, and had secured at least the passive co-operation of the Great Horde of Kirghiz Kaisaks, to whom they had promised the booty to be obtained from sacking Vierny. The wives and daughters of the Russians in Vierny were even apportioned by name among the various chiefs and sultans. Yevgraf, the Russian renegade, who accompanied this army, told me that Khanayat Shah was in such high spirits that he even promised him five Russian slaves. The plan was not a bad one. There were few Russian troops disposable, and most of these had been concentrated at the small fort of Kastek, at the mouth of the pass, where it was expected that the attack would first be made. There was another detachment at Vierny, with a small force at Uzun-agatch to keep open the communication, while all the rest had been sent to occupy the fort on the Ili, and keep open the communication with Siberia. Kolpakofsky was left almost to himself, as the authorities at Semipalatinisk pooh-pooched the reports of the approach of the Khokandian army, and, in orders written even after the affair was all over, laughed at the possibility of a Khokandian invasion at that late season of the year, and forbade any useless movement of troops. Khanayat Shah and the Khokandians, instead of attacking Kastek, as was expected, crossed the mountains by another road, and, making a circuit, attacked the post of Uzun-agatch, intending after capturing that place to leave part of the forces to blockade the Kastek, and then to enter Vierny almost without opposition. But unfortunately for him the general to whom he had entrusted the attack on Uzun-agatch was half-hearted; the Russians held out well, and one messenger succeeded in getting through the lines. As soon as Kolpakofsky knew what the actual state of the case was, without losing a moment of time, he marched with all his troops out of Kastek, and attacked the Khokandians from the other side, completely defeating them. Yevgraf, who was with Khanayat Shah, heard the cannon and recognised the sound of the Russian

the Russian peasantry, and when therefore we find the title of 'White Tsar' in a popular document, as, for instance, in the recent address of the Polish Uniates, we may be sure that the paper is of official origin.

guns, at which in his inmost heart he was delighted. When the main body of Khokandians learned of the sortie of the Russians, they were so disheartened that they resolved on an immediate retreat, and, after crossing the mountains, the army soon dispersed and found its way back to Khokand in small bands. On the return, Yevgraf asked Khanayat Shah where were his Russian slaves,—a question which nearly cost him his head.

At the next station I found a Cossack waiting to escort me to Vierny, and on arriving there I was given a comfortable lodging in the house close to the post station belonging to Mr. Kuznetzof, from the windows of which I had a pretty view of the Ala-tau, the lower slopes of which had been covered the night before with a thin fall of snow, which formed a strong contrast to the red rocks and to the remains of the dark-green pine forests, with which these mountains were once well clothed. The top of the range, which is in many places 14,000 feet high, was covered with perpetual snow, and further to the left beyond the first range rose the great pyramidal peak of Talgar, 17,000 feet in height. The town of Vierny itself is at an elevation of 2,400 feet, at the very foot of the mountains, and stands on the little stream Almatinky, the name of which, like the Kirghiz appellation of the town, *Almaty*, is derived from the abundance of apples (*alma*) in the neighbourhood.

This Trans-Ili region was first occupied in 1853, and the next year a small post was established here. Cossacks and colonists were sent here from western Siberia and Russia, and what was at first an outpost had in 1871 more than 12,000 inhabitants.¹ The several parts of which Vierny is composed—the two Cossack stanitzas of Great and Little Almaty, the old town, the new town, and the Tartar suburb,—though rapidly fusing together, give the place a somewhat straggling air; still it has in every way the appearance of a flourishing Russian, or rather perhaps Siberian town, presenting a complete contrast to all places south of the mountains. The streets are wide and

¹ Change of circumstances has also brought about a change of name. It was formerly called Viernoje, an adjective in the neuter gender, qualifying *ukrieplenie*, meaning 'the faithful fort'; but since the appointment of the Governor-General of Turkistan in 1867, it has become a city and has therefore changed its termination to a masculine one—Vierny—to agree with *gorod*, city.

regular, and the houses are mostly built in the Russian style. There are the shops with their glaring and picturesque signs, the large official buildings, the dirty little hotels, the club, and everything which goes to make up a Russian town. The place has thrived so much that it is now being almost entirely rebuilt in brick, and ten years hence will have a much solidier and steadier look. Even in 1871 there were 239 brick houses, but now the new quarter of the town, where will be placed all the Government buildings, is nearly finished. It is the population, however, that distinguishes Vierny from other towns; for here we have all the races of this part of Asia, Sarts, Tartars, Kirghiz, Kalmuks and Chinese, and even a few Afghans. The Kalmuks with their brown faces and long queues, riding on cows and oxen, strike the traveller at once, and show him that he is approaching the Chinese border; in fact the Kalmuks and the Chinese form the main reliance for labour here. The trade in everything is rapidly increasing, and the commerce of the steppe, which formerly had its head-quarters in Kopal, is now coming to Vierny; besides this, caravans, which formerly passed through Vierny without stopping, now usually break their journey here and sometimes use this as a distributing point. There are several Chinese merchants established here, and I am told that through their economy and diligence they are getting the greater part of the commerce into their own hands, much to the annoyance of the somewhat careless Russians. There are a number of saw-mills, brick-kilns, distilleries and breweries, and in every way a spirit of enterprise is shown, so superior to that of Tashkent that it cannot be accounted for only by the ten years longer which the town has existed. There are two Russian schools, a school for Mussulman children, a trade-school for the education of artisans and good workmen, and a school of gardening and fruit-culture. The chief means of amusement are the club and the public garden. The latter is a piece of ground under the care of the gardening-school, which is even now a pleasant place of resort, and will in time be pretty. At present most of its verdure consists of half-wild apple-trees and grape-vines, although I found also a fair show of flowers. On one side of the garden is a pavilion which is used during the summer by the club, and here one evening in a week there is what is so well known in Russia as a 'musical

family-evening,' with illuminations, music, dancing, supper and the eternal *yeralash* and *préférence*, without which the non-dancing portion of the guests could not possibly spend a happy hour.

One of my first duties at Vierny was to pay a visit to General Rossitzky, the acting Governor of the province, whom I found domiciled for the summer in three large kubitkas at one end of the public garden. In a rainless region like this no more pleasant country residence can be devised than these roomy, cool felt tents. He promised me everything in his power, and especially with regard to my proposed visit to Kuldja.

Among the numerous persons whose acquaintance I made in Vierny there were three who struck me as being particularly remarkable. One was Mr. Kuznetzof, a typical Siberian merchant, whose enterprise has done much, not only for Vierny but also for Tashkent. Another was Mr. Berintzef, also a Russian merchant, but of an education far better than is common in that class. He was able to give me much information about the trade of the place, and concerning its relations with Kashgar and with the Stepe. He also kindly introduced me to the two leading Chinese merchants, both intelligent men, who spoke what one might call 'pigeon Russian,' for it bore exactly the same relation to Russian as the 'pigeon English' spoken in the treaty ports does to English. I found them at dinner, and as it was the first time that I had seen chopsticks in actual use I was glad that my presence did not hinder them. They seemed to have many friends, for during my visit several Russians and Sarts dropped in for the purpose of having a pipe of opium. I found the process of smoking so interesting that I at last concluded to try a pipe myself, but I took only a few whiffs, and therefore escaped with but a slight headache. The smoker reclines on a rug with a pillow under his elbow, and at first devotes himself to arranging the opium. A needle is dipped into a dark viscous half-liquid preparation, and the drop that is taken out is then heated for some time over a small lamp till it hardens, when it is again dipped into the bottle until a good-sized ball is obtained. This, after being dextrously turned over the lamp on the point of the needle, and then shaped in the palm of the hand, is placed on the pipe,—not in the bowl, however, for there is none. The pipe is

merely a tube, from the end of which a ball like an egg depends, above which is a small pointed tube set at right angles to the pipe. On this the ball of opium is stuck, which in smoking it is necessary to hold constantly over the flame of the lamp. The vapours of the opium, entering into the ball where the residue collects, are thus a little cooled before reaching the mouth. The taste was extremely bitter, yet with a tinge of sweetness.

I found that besides the trade in tea and manufactured goods, the Chinese buy up all objects of jade, and even the large pieces of unworked stone brought from Kashgar, for which they are willing to pay large prices, and which they then send back by way of Kiakhta to China. After the capture of Kuldja they even bought up porcelain and vases, and whatever was saved from the general wreck, to send back to China. Besides this another of their specialties is commerce in the young horns of the mountain-deer from the neighbourhood of Issyk Kul, of which I have already spoken.

The man who interested me perhaps more than all the others was Mr. Poklefsky-Koziel, a Pole. He had been educated at the Staff Academy, and when the Polish rebellion of 1862-3 broke out, was a Colonel on the staff at St. Petersburg. He ran away and joined the insurgents, and was for a long time the commandant of the Underground Government of Warsaw, the orders of which were universally respected by the Poles. The Russians were never able to find out the source whence these proclamations emanated. When the rebellion was on its last legs, he escaped to Germany, and going to France, entered into the service of a railway company. During the Franco-Prussian war he was commander of the Vendean Brigade. After the war, everything was disordered, he could get no position to suit him, and he was at the same time afflicted with a sort of homesickness; besides this, he had to provide for his wife and child. He therefore made propositions for his return, and asked for his pardon, which was granted, and he was told that he might freely return to Russia. He had no sooner arrived there, than he was arrested and confined in the fortress at Wilna; but after some months he was released on the condition that he would enter the army as a private soldier, although he was allowed to retain his decorations and rank. He chose the Cossacks of Semiretch,

and, when I saw him, he wore the uniform of a common soldier, although he was relieved from actual military duty, had been given the position of architect of the new city, and was received as an equal and a comrade by all the officers except one.

I heard of another political prisoner, a certain Schwartz, from the Baltic provinces, who had been sentenced to confinement in the fortress at Vierny. This arrival somewhat astonished the authorities of that place, for there was no fortress in which to confine him, and he was therefore placed in the ordinary prison. When Mr. Ashton Dilke was in Vierny, a few weeks before me, the chief of police was so struck with his real or fancied resemblance to this Schwartz that he had him constantly followed by a detective, and even reported to the Governor the necessity of arresting him,—a catastrophe which was avoided by the letters and proof of his undoubted identity which Mr. Dilke possessed.

In speaking of people at Vierny I ought not to pass over General Kolpakofsky, the Governor-General of the province, although I saw him only in Tashkent. The son of a subaltern officer of the province of Kherson, he was born in 1819, and at sixteen years of age entered the service as a common soldier among the volunteers of the Lublin Infantry regiment. In ten months he was made a non-commissioned officer, and remained such until 1841, when he received a commission. He served for a long time in the Caucasus, and afterwards in Transylvania during the Hungarian war, until in 1852 he was transferred to Siberia where he has passed the remainder of his life. He was for many years stationed in the inhospitable Berezof, the well known political settlement where many of the grandes of the last century passed years of exile. Ultimately, in 1858, he was transferred to the district of the Ala-tau. No man is more thoroughly acquainted with the country over which he rules. With an excellent constitution, and of indefatigable energy, he has ridden over every part of it, passing whole days in the saddle, in which he is so unwearied as to receive from the Kirghiz the sobriquet of 'the iron seat.' He understands the people too, and although he rarely shows his acquirements, he knows well the Kirghiz language, and is therefore a difficult man to deceive. Once already at Uzun-agatch he saved for Russia this whole province, and if anyone now can put down corruption in Turkistan,

restore to the Russians the confidence of the natives, and diminish the great expenditure of men and money, which has so long been going on, and is apparently destined to increase, it is he. A very short stay in Semiretch is enough to convince anyone of the vast difference between the administration of that province and the rule of the officials at Tashkent.

The province of Semiretch, or seven rivers, received its name from the seven largest of the numerous streams which water it,—the Lepsa, the Vaskan, the Sarkan, the Ak-su, the Karatal, the Kok-su, and the Ili.

Much of it is steppe and much a barren desert, but in the parts adjacent to the mountains, which are well watered, there are many fertile valleys, where great quantities of grain are raised, and where even greater harvests could be produced. Much wheat is now sent to feed the troops at Tashkent, and were there better communications, much could be sent to the stations west. Unfortunately there is a lack of forests. When Russian colonists first arrived, the lower hills and the mountain valleys were covered with trees, but now they are nearly denuded, and the administration has been obliged to take strict measures to preserve what little there is left by limiting the right of cutting timber, although even this seems to avail but little, and it may become necessary to station guards over the forests. It was with the view of extending tree-culture that the school of gardening was founded at Vierny.

I have previously spoken of Russian colonisation in Semiretch. The Russian colonies are for the most part along the northern range of the Alexandrofsky mountains, in the vicinity of Tokmak, on the northern and eastern shore of Lake Issyk Kul, or on the high road leading from Vierny to Sergiopol. The provinces of the Syr Darya and the Zarafshan have not yet been opened to colonisation, owing, in part, to the fact that the land question has never yet been settled.

I passed through many of these colonies on the road, and I stopped at some of them and entered into conversation with the farmers, by far the greater number of whom were peasants from the provinces of Voronezh, Tambof, and Saratof. They seemed quite satisfied with their lot; indeed, so far as mere physical well-being and immunity from taxes is concerned, they are far better off than they were in European Russia. They

are given their lands either gratis or at a low price, the payments extending over a long period, and they are freed from taxes and duties for a term of years. They make the journey at their own risk, and usually with their own horses and oxen. The fertility of the soil and the personal independence possible on this remote frontier more and more attract immigration, and during the last two or three years the number of colonists has considerably increased.

The remarks in the Russian papers about emigration to Central Asia refer to these settlements only and not to the region about Tashkent.

It is important to distinguish between the Russian colonies and the Cossack settlements. The former colonisation was voluntary, but the latter was forced. As soon as this region was annexed it was considered necessary to plant it with Cossack stations, in order that there might be a population capable of cultivating the soil, and able, at the same time, to keep off the Kirghiz and the Khokandians.

In order to supply this want, a certain quota was taken from the various armies of the Ural, Orenburg, and Siberia, who were formed into what was called the new line along the Irtysh, a portion of whom were subsequently known as the Cossacks of Semipalatinsk. In addition to these real Cossacks, peasants were drafted from various localities in Russia and sent to the frontier, given tools with which to build houses and cultivate the land, provided with arms, and told that they were in the service of the government, and were to regard themselves as Cossacks. These for the most part constituted the Cossack army of Semiretch. Having none of the traditions of which the Cossacks of the Don and the Ural are proud, they have not the same military spirit, and with difficulty keep up their organisation; the Siberian Cossacks are, in fact, considered the worst of all the Cossack troops in service in Central Asia.

In passing through their settlements it was noticeable that they seemed far less independent than the ordinary Russian peasants, and that they led a lazier and more useless life, devoting themselves either to hunting or to the pleasures of the dram-shop, while their wives were left to look after the family property. At the same time they endeavoured to preserve a certain *chic* of their own, which occasionally appeared

in curious forms. For instance, all along the Irtysh the Cossacks seemed to consider that it was the correct thing to speak Tartar, in the same way as persons in good society in St. Petersburg and Moscow prefer to speak in French when in public. It was therefore amusing sometimes to have them answer our questions in good Russian and then talk to one another in Tartar.

From Vierny the post road goes nearly north until it comes to the ferry over the Ili, at which there is a small fort. We crossed the yellow, muddy river on a large barge filled with Kirghiz and their horses, and for miles on the other side we made but slow progress, on account of the depth of the sand and the violence of the wind. The Ili is formed by two rivers, the Tekes and the Kunges, both rising in the Tian Shan and uniting a little above Kuldja, where they are joined by another, the Kash. Its general course is west to near the Ili station, where I crossed it; it then turns north-west until it falls into Lake Balkash. The successful navigation of this river would be of great service to the province of Semiretch, and even to that of Syr Darya, especially by bringing coal down from Kuldja, and thus supplying Vierny and other towns with fuel at cheap rates. A *pud* (36 lbs.) of excellent coal now costs at Kuldja from five to six kopeks ($11\frac{1}{2}d.$) while a *sazhen* of wood, which is in heating capacity equivalent to 60 *puds* (2,160 lbs.) of coal, costs at Vierny fifteen rubles ($2l.$), so that, with easy means of transportation, the houses and factories of Vierny could be supplied at far cheaper rates than at present, without at the same time injuring the country by denuding it of trees. The river would naturally be used also for the transport of fruits and grain from Kuldja, and of manufactured goods and spirits to that district.

One of the first steps taken after the occupation of Kuldja was to explore the navigation of the river, and in 1871 Captain Fischer descended it from Old Kuldja to the station of Ili. According to his report from Old Kuldja to New, or Mantchu Kuldja, the Ili is navigable at high water only for about two-and-a-half months during the year, and then with very great difficulty, on account of the shoals and gravelly banks. From New Kuldja to the Ili station, 280 miles, it is easily navigable at high water, and practically navigable at all times of the year. The section from the Ili station to Lake Balkash, about 240

miles, was explored in 1856 by Mr. Kuznetzof in a vessel constructed on Lake Balkash, which was sent with flour bought at Karkaralinsk, to the north of the lake, and was towed up the Ili. Although the river was proved navigable, yet the voyage was never repeated, as the venture was a losing one, the flour being considered too dear. It had been proposed to construct a small tug and to tow boats up and down the river; but apparently the trade has not yet sufficiently developed to admit of the possibility of this enterprise.

From the Ili my way lay north-east, sometimes north, as far as Kopal, always through a pleasant country, and usually close to or among the mountains. I travelled fast, for the roads were good, and the post here, as everywhere in Siberia, was well managed. The small Siberian horses have, however, one peculiarity. They resolutely refuse to be harnessed, and act as though they were still in a wild state. We had all to take our seats in the carriage before the side horses were put to, each of which required two or three men to hold him until the traces could be attached. No sooner was that done than the men would quickly spring to one side and our horses would start off at a gallop, keeping it up for two or three miles, and then subsiding into a steady easy trot, after which they were as mild and docile as could be wished.

The stations were comfortable and well built. One of them, I noticed, had before the door two stone monuments carved to represent human figures, such as are often found in the steppes of Southern Russia, and which are supposed to be relics of the ancient Scythians.

At the station Altyn Imel I turned to the right to Kuldja; but I reserve an account of that excursion for another chapter.

Kopal, which is finely situated in a valley among the mountains on a little stream of the same name, was founded in 1841, and has now about 5,000 inhabitants. It is well built, with spacious wooden houses, and maintains two schools, two churches, and a mosque. It formerly did a very thriving business in the steppe; but as this has now been chiefly transferred to Vierny, the importance of the town has diminished. Two hours' drive from Kopal brought me to the station of Arasan, the watering-place of Semiretch. Here are some hot sulphur-springs (*Arasan*), which are much frequented in

summer. Bathing-houses have been erected in a pretty garden, opposite to which is a small hotel for sojourners. Smaller mineral-springs exist in several parts of this region, the most notable of which are those lately brought to notice near Lake Sairam Nor, and which for many ages have been the resort of Kalmuks and Kirghiz.

We were now within the limits of the Great Horde, and frequently met Kirghiz on the road, sometimes changing their camp and travelling across the steppe with long files of horses and camels laden with their kibitkas and household goods, and sometimes in small parties, apparently out hunting, for they carried on perches fixed to their saddle-bows falcons and *burkuts*, large golden eagles which will bring down deer, foxes, and wolves. Just beyond Arasan is the Hasfort pass (named from General Hasfort, formerly Governor-General of Western Siberia), at one time considered exceedingly difficult, and the descent from which was indeed so steep that we thought it best to walk down and save the carriage, which by this time was showing in every part the signs of hard service. From the station beyond a road turns to the right through a little Kalmuk colony, now collected at Sarkan, to the Cossack settlements about the station of Lepsa. At the station of Arganaty I ascended a ridge, the last on our road, and had in the early morning a good glimpse of Lake Balkash.

This lake is called by the Kalmuks, *Balkatsi Nor*, Great Lake, and by the Kirghiz, *Ak-Tenghis*, or White Sea, *Ala-Tenghis*, or Striped Sea, on account of its islands, or simply, on account of its great size, *Tenghis*, the Sea. Its greatest length from WSW. to ENE. is about 330 miles, while its greatest breadth in the SW. part is 60 miles; it being at its narrowest place, opposite the mouths of the Karatal and the Lepsa rivers, only from five to ten miles wide.

Its N. or NW. shore is raised above the lake like terraces, covered with a sandy steppe, through which no river runs into the lake, even the largest one flowing in this direction, the Tokran or Aitek, being absorbed by the sands before it can reach the beach. The Ayaguz, at its extreme NE. corner, flows at the base of these terraces, and then reaches the lake in times of high water only. The southern shore has quite the opposite character, for in many places the change from dry land to

water is so gradual that it is almost impossible to say where the lake begins and the land ends. From the lake nearly to the foot of the mountains stretches a vast steppe of sand and sand hills bearing no vegetation but saksaul and similar shrubs. It was evidently formerly connected with Lake Ala Kul through the low sandy region which we passed after leaving Arganaty, and the Ala Kul has since become divided into three or four small lakes. Even now, along the shores of the Balkash, bays are being turned into lagoons and then dried up by the action of the sand drifted by the winds.

This sandy waste—the former bottom of the lake—being once passed, although with great difficulty, the road was easy enough to Sergiopol, a wretched hamlet, the last station in Semiretch. I had no sooner entered into what is officially Siberia, although geographically speaking, I had been in it since Vierny, than the weather changed and such a violent rain storm came on that I was obliged to seek refuge for several hours in the station, where I was soon joined by a Russian captain, who was travelling with his wife, the latter being dressed, I suppose for convenience, in man's clothes. I at last came to Semipalatinsk, an important district town which seemed far more Tartar than Russian, where I was detained several days by the rain; and then after much difficulty in recrossing the Irtysh, slowly travelled along the left bank of that river, having constant delays in getting post-horses on account of the Kashgarian envoy, for whom many horses had been bespoke, until I reached Omsk. Here I found that I was too late for the last steamer for Perm, down the Kama, and that in addition, the roads through Western Siberia were impassable on account of the mud. I was therefore obliged to turn again southward through Petropavlovsk and Troitsk to Orenburg, a route which was not without interest as showing the commercial possibilities of the Kirghiz steppes; and, after seeing once more my friends in that place, went directly to Samara, where I was but too glad to leave my carriage. Here I fortunately found the last steamer down the Volga to Saratof, where I took the railway and arrived at St. Petersburg on November 15, after an absence of about eight months

CHAPTER XII.

KULDJA.

A tyn-Imel—Borokhudzr—Ruined towns—Cultivated country reverting to steppe—Suidun—A Dungan town—The ruins of Ili—Early inhabitants of Kuldja—The Usun and the Uigurs—Rise of the Oirat or Kalmuks—Jungaria—Attempt to restore the empire of Tchinghiz Khan—Conquest of Jungaria by the Chinese—New colonisation—The Tarantchis—The Solons, the Sibos, and the military colonists—Return of the Kalmuks from the Volga—Their settlements on the Ili—The Mantehus and the Chinese—The Dungans—Mutual hatred of all these peoples—Difficulty of government—The Dungans rebel—They are joined by the Tarantchis—Incapacity of the Chinese authorities—Success of the insurrection—Capture of Ili and massacre of the garrison—Pillage and massacre of the military colonists—Disunion of the rebels—The Dungan rule overturned by the Tarantchis—Attitude of the Russians—The Tarantchi Sultan—Border difficulties—The Russian conquest—A Chinese account—Excursion to Lake Sairam Nor—Old Kuldja—The bazaars—A Chinese dinner—A dramatic performance—A Chinese Christian church—The up-country—Resources of the valley—Cheapness of living—The present state of the country.

From the station of Altyn Imel, we turned to the right up a long and gentle slope to a depression in the low range that rose between us and the valley of the Ili,—the pass of Altyn Imel, or 'the golden saddle.' Naturally there is a legend of some Kalmuk chief, who, pursued by his enemies, was obliged to bury in this spot his golden saddle; but it is probably the name that has given rise to the legend and not the legend to the name, which easily originated from the outline of the ridge-top. The descent on the other side was much steeper; the road zigzagged down between abrupt, rocky slopes, and a little stream gurgled by its side, marking its path by a line of verdure. Before us lay a great plain, bounded to the north and east by mountains, while to the south the Ili shimmered in the distance. This gravelly plain made an excellent road, and in

three hours and a half we made the thirty miles which separated us from the gorge of Koibyn, seeing no living thing to the right or to the left except a herd of *saigas* and an old grey wolf that sneaked away just out of shot.

Koibyn is a natural cleft in the low hills which serves as the bed of a small stream and in most parts also forms the only road. Even on a fair day the road is rough enough, but woe betide the traveller who meets with a sudden rain-storm in this long and crooked gorge, for streams then seem to pour down from every rock and in a few moments the water rises to a great height. In spite of the roughness the drive was a pleasing one, for the steep and scarped rocks were of many varying yellow, red and purple hues, owing to the presence of ochre and iron ore, while their bases as well as many little islands in the bed itself were covered with what seemed for Asiatic mountains luxuriant foliage. On a little plateau at the end of this defile was a rude cottage from which we at last unearthed a Russian and some Kalmuks, who after much delay furnished us fresh horses. A winding road up the side of the gorge taxed all the strength of the animals, but that once over we went on quickly over the plain to Borokhudzir, where the white walls of the barracks glimmered faintly through the darkness. This was formerly the extreme Russian post on the frontier of the old Chinese province of Kuldja, and here during the Dungan insurrection a corps of observation was stationed to prevent infringements of the Russian boundary.

The next day's journey was one of painful interest, for here on every hand were seen the traces of the ruin and devastation wrought by the recent insurrection,—dried-up canals, abandoned fields, withered forests and every few miles dismantled and ruined cities which but ten years before had sheltered a civilised and hard-working population.

Soon after leaving Borokhudzir it was necessary to cross the river Usek, which, at that time of low water, ran in several shallow streams through an immense waste of large stones and boulders. While not dangerous, the passage was in the highest degree slow and annoying, giving me constant apprehensions lest the wheels of the carriage should be wrenched off. In June and July, however, when the river is full from the melting snow, it is rapid and exceedingly dangerous, and all the neigh-

bouring steppe is turned into a marsh with the overflow, breeding myriads of mosquitoes which drive the traveller half-distracted. Fortunately on my journey there were so few of these pests that I hardly needed the pretty Chinese brush made of a white horse tail, which had been pressed on me by a friend as an indispensable accompaniment to my journey. On the further side of the river-bed, on a high steep bank (*jar* or *yar*), are the ruins, now almost indistinguishable, of the town of Jarkent, and passing this we soon came to the ruins of another formerly flourishing town, Akkent. Here it was necessary to wait for some time, as there were no horses, and I employed the interval in inspecting the ruins, as many walls of houses were still standing, some covered with carved tiles or with curious frescoes.

Shortly after leaving Akkent the road passed close under the walls of Tchimpanzi. The walls were still perfect, though the gates were gone; but inside of them not a single house was left standing. Close by the gate I noticed a large stone with inscriptions in Chinese, Mantchu, and Arabic characters, which I carefully copied, thinking that they might possibly be of interest. On showing my copy afterwards, and having it interpreted to me, I found to my great amusement that I had taken all that trouble to copy the door-plate of a former official, and I was told that, under Chinese rule, every official was obliged to have his name and titles written up in large letters over his door. In many cases there were painted signs, but the richer men had them carved in stone.

The ruins of Khorgos (Kurgash), which were a few miles further on, presented nothing but mere mounds of earth partly overgrown with grass. For nearly forty miles from this place there used to be an artificial forest planted by the Chinese and maintained by constant irrigation. With the massacre and flight of the inhabitants the irrigation system was neglected and abandoned, and the trees are therefore rapidly perishing. I saw the forest in all states, from the fresh, green, and healthy woods to those where all the large trees had withered and died, and where the young were feeble and sickly, as well as that where the trees had entirely disappeared, and where the land had once more reverted to the condition of a bare and barren steppe. Passing another ruined town, which I was told was Alimtu, on

the stream of the same name, and near to which was probably the ancient Almalyk, I came to the city of Tchín-tcha-ho-dzi,—a town left unharmed, having been chiefly inhabited by Mussulmans. It was a curious sight with its high, thick, battlemented walls surmounted by tall towers, its arched gates, its wide streets, and its unmistakable Chinese smell,—a smell which it is impossible to describe, mingled of opium, of garlic, and of filth of every kind; but which, once perceived, is never forgotten. I knew it at once, for it was the most highly concentrated form of that faint, curious, pungent odour which hangs about boxes and parcels brought unopened from China and Japan. It was then too late to look at the town, and we quickly changed horses, and after twelve miles more came to the town of Suidun, and to the kind hospitality of Captain Bozhovitch, a Montenegrin in the Russian service.


My first occupation in the morning was to look at the town. Such a *changement de décors* in five days, which are all that are necessary for a journey from Tashkent to Kuldja, is rare. Instead of narrow, crooked streets there were broad, straight avenues shaded with trees; instead of windowless houses built of mud, the blank walls of which stared one in the face at every turn, there were fine buildings of brick, beautifully carved and moulded, roofed with tiles, and with latticed windows and porticoes. Instead of female forms swathed in long, shapeless dressing-gowns, and faces hidden by black horsehair veils, there were stout, healthy, and smiling women chatting over their marketing, the bright orange-coloured marigolds in their wonderful coiffures, or their coquettish little caps, contrasting well with the indigo blue of their gowns. Instead of Sarts and Uzbeks in gowns and turbans, there were Chinese and Dungans in wadded petticoats, short jackets, long moustaches, and pig-tails.

A walk on the flat top of the city wall, which was wide enough for a carriage-road, quickly gave me an idea of the town, which is built on the same plan as all the other fortified cities in the province. The town itself is nearly or perfectly square, surrounded by a high, thick wall solidly faced on both sides with bricks. A battlement surrounds the top of the wall, and in the middle of each side there is a gate protected by a circular bastion, and over the gate a steep-roofed tower. Out-

side of the wall there is no ditch, but the gardens and villages begin at once. From the four gates run two wide streets at right angles across the town, each quarter being then divided independently by narrower streets and alleys. The buildings are all of brick, in many cases faced with large square tiles set in diamond shape, frequently with broad ornamented circles made also of brick, which had been carved before it was burnt, set into the sides. These bricks were of excellent quality, from four to six times as large as ours, of a grey colour and very hard. Evidently much care had been used in selecting and mixing the clay, in moulding the bricks (for the edges were very sharp,) and in baking them. The roofs, which were usually curved from the ridge-pole, were of tiles of the same material alternately convex and concave, the lower row of tiles having pendant ornaments decorated generally with the face of a lion. The corners were frequently raised like the brim of a hat and ornamented with dragons or other animals. In the windows were always delicate gratings or lattices, sometimes prettily carved, on the inside of which, in lieu of glass, was spread thin oil-paper. Nearly every house had a little garden with trees, vegetables and flowers. The most interesting building of all was the mosque of the Dungans, or Chinese-speaking Mohammedans, built almost like a pagoda, with two or three stories, increasing in height as they went up, and each surmounted with a curved roof with moulded and carved ornaments on the corners and peaks. The mosque stood back in a court, around which were houses belonging to the mullahs. Inside it was bare, excepting a few plans of Mecca with Arabic and Chinese inscriptions, and prayers and texts from the Koran written in large letters on hanging scrolls. In front of what is now the guard-house, but which, probably, was formerly an official residence, is a large stone lion seated on a carved pedestal. In his half-open mouth he holds a large ball carved from the same block, which revolves freely in his mouth, but which cannot be taken out without breaking the figure. I was shown through the town by La-tchu-yan, a fat, jolly-looking Dungan, now, under Russian rule, the Aksakal of the place, who afterwards invited me to his house. Over the door, as of old, was the large painted sign in three languages denoting his official rank. His reception-room was

not large, but very comfortable, looking out on his little garden, and was well furnished with screens, vases, and porcelain.

In spite of the smells I was much interested in walking through the bazaar, which occupied the greater part of one of the wide avenues crossing the town. Besides the little shops on each side there were many booths partly covered with




A BARBER IN SUIDUN.

square umbrellas of matting, partly open, and the chief trade seemed to be carried on in the open air. Here everything was different from Central Asia,—not only the articles in ordinary use, but even the very vegetables. Here were beets, large egg-plants, onions and other vegetables unknown in Tashkent, loaves of light, very white, and also very tasteless bread, but still real bread and not cakes. The butcher's shops were

different in character, and there were even stalls where men sold candy and barley-sugar. I was much interested in the operations of the barbers in the streets outside of their shops. The poor man who came to be shaved was made to sit on a narrow wooden stool and then recline almost horizontally on a cane-covered rest, where he closed his eyes and looked as if he were about to undergo some unpleasant surgical operation.

From Suidun, in company of Captain Bozhovitch, La-tchuyan, and some attendants, I made an excursion to the ruins of the former capital of the province, known by the various names of Ili, Hoi-yuan-tchen, New Kuldja, or Mantchu Kuldja. For the whole distance, about ten miles, the road lay through a country which had formerly been well cultivated, but is now a desolated waste. At last we approached the edge of the town, when heaps of ruins presented themselves on every side, and sometimes a whole wall or a roofless house could be seen. Soon the ruins extended on both sides of us as far as we could see, and in front of us up to the very walls of the fortress. These were the suburbs and the outside town which had been inhabited by the merchants, and by all who were not of Mantchu or of Chinese race, altogether, I was told, about 75,000 people. Inside of the fortress walls, which were too strong to be destroyed, a similar scene met our view; but here the destruction had been much more complete. The two broad straight avenues were still plainly visible, as they were too wide to be encumbered with ruins; but the other streets were all blocked up by the fallen houses, and their course could scarcely be traced. Of the lofty tower which stood in the centre of the town at the intersection of these two avenues, two stories still remained standing; elsewhere there were but fragments of walls. Many buildings, especially the official ones, had been utterly razed to the ground; although some of these, as for instance the Governor's palace, had been blown up by the defenders when they saw that all hope was lost. The ground was everywhere covered with fragments of pottery, among which I found a few Chinese coins, and in some places was really white with little fragments of human bones, while skulls and even nearly complete skeletons could at times be seen. Nothing had been left that was worth carrying away; even the beams of the houses had all been torn out, to serve

either for firewood or for new constructions. Standing on the walls, each face of which was 1,400 yards long, I obtained a full perception of the size of the place, and of the ruin wrought there. On every side were ruined houses or heaps of bricks, and close under the wall flowed the Ili, formerly a scene of life, now utterly deserted. To the right could be seen the white roofless walls of the Russian factory. In all this extent there are but one or two inhabited houses, where live a few Dungans



RUINS OF ILI.

who have recently come there. We went there to make our tea, and found at the side the court of a large Buddhist temple, with the frescoes on the walls only half effaced, but with all the large idols, which seemed to have been made of earthenware or baked clay, shattered almost to the foundations. In front of this temple, as indeed in front of every official residence, ran for some distance a blank but highly decorated wall, and through the intervening space it was formerly

forbidden to pass. Indeed before the governor's house such an act would have brought the penalty of death.

On my remarking to La-tchu-yan how deserted the whole place was, he said: 'It is accursed ground, no one will ever live here again,' and with a chuckle informed me that he himself had been the leader of the Dungan army which took the place. I then plied him with questions, but as his answers had to be translated from Chinese into Tarantchi by one interpreter, and from Tarantchi into Russian by a second, conversation was difficult. He summed it up however, very tersely. 'We besieged this town for two years; at last we took it. That morning there were in it 75,000 people with the army; that evening not a soul was left alive.' Many were butchered at once; many killed their families and then themselves; and many ran to the steppes only to be cut down there, or to die in a few days from starvation.

It is time for me to tell the story of the insurrection which wrought all this devastation, but in order to do that I must first unravel the tangled web of nationalities which covered the whole country.

The first we know of this country is that in the second century B.C. the Usun, who have been identified by many scholars with the ancestors of the Teutonic race (Suiones), were driven out from Mongolia by the Huns, and settled in the valley of the Ili in the neighbourhood of Lake Balkash. They were accompanied and followed by the Yuetchi (who have also been identified with the Getae and the Goths), but then, finding the country too well occupied, turned southward to ancient Sogdiana in the region of Samarkand, and founded an empire of their own on the ruins of the Græco-Bactrian kingdom. The Usun became a powerful people, but, becoming harassed by frequent attacks of the neighbouring nomads, in the fourth century of our era again migrated, and in the early part of the seventh century became subject to the Turks, and entirely disappeared from history. Then came the Uigurs;¹ and after them the valley of the Ili passed into the hands of the Kara-Kidans, until these, in 1218, were conquered by the

¹ The word *Uigur* probably means 'confederates' or 'allies,' a name of a kind frequently given to Asiatic nations. The Uigurs were chiefly of Turkish race but may have included tribes of a different stock.

Mongols, long before which time Almalyk, the capital of the province, must have been a large and flourishing town. In the partition of the realm of Tchinghiz Khan among his sons, this region, with others, fell to the share of Jagatai, and his successors possessed it until Timur came there with fire and sword, and made it a part of his extensive dominions.

Then followed a confused period of dissensions between Mongol princes and Mongol tribes, during which we are led to believe that the civilisation of Almalyk and of the neighbouring cities of the valley of the Ili entirely disappeared.

During the supremacy of the descendants of Tchinghiz, Jungaria was the camping ground of three powerful Mongol tribes—the Tchoros, the Hoshot, and the Torgot. About the middle of the fourteenth century disturbances arose in China, which soon turned into a war for independence; the Chinese threw off the Mongol yoke, and Togon Timur voluntarily abandoned the luxury and civilisation of Pekin, and sought refuge in a poor *kibitka* on the sandy shore of Lake Dal-Nor, about which his ancestors had formerly wandered. He did not long survive his change of circumstances, and died the next year, 1368. His successors enjoyed neither power nor respect, and Mongolia became the prey of contending factions. The strongest of them imposed its chief on the Khan, as a vizier, who, under the name of *taitsi* or *taishi*, really exercised the supreme power. At the end of the fourteenth century this *taitsi* was the powerful prince Eliutei, who enjoyed such a reputation among the Mongols, that his descendants received the name of Eliuts. The three Jungarian tribes of Tchoros, Hoshot and Torgot, then formed a union to counteract the tyranny of Eliutei, elected the Tchoros prince Mahmud as their chief, and took the name of *Oirat* or ‘confederates.’ Eliutei was unable to stand out against Mahmud, and from that time the Oirat had a preponderating influence, the office of *taitsi* becoming hereditary with the chiefs of the Tchoros until, in the fifteenth century, this tribe separated into two, the Tchoros and the Durbot, when the members of the union became known as the *Durben Oirat*, or ‘Four allies,’ and extended their influence over all Mongolia.

The steady aim of the allied tribes was to recover China for the heirs of Tchinghiz, and wars were frequent, until at last, in 1450, the Oirat defeated the Chinese in a very sanguinary

battle, took the Emperor prisoner, and marched to the walls of Peking. Chance alone saved China. The Mongols retired to the steppes; the *taitsi* Esen, who had killed his brother-in-law the Khan, and usurped his throne, was assassinated; and the most brilliant period of the Oirat power was at an end. They were unable to maintain their influence in Mongolia, and for a century and a half they almost disappeared from history.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the head of the union, Khara-Khula, with the intention of exercising absolute sway, began to limit the rights of his allies. Many of the petty chiefs, who possessed some strength of their own, endeavoured to make themselves independent. Some of them even left Jungaria, and settled in Siberia, which was already occupied by the Russians. It is probable that it was at this time, on account of this secession from the confederacy, that they received from the Tartars and Kirghiz the name of Kalmyks, Kalmaks, or Kalmuks, as *Kalma*, *Kalmak*, and *Kalmaklyk*, in the East Turkic dialects mean, 'remnant,' 'remaining,' 'rest.' The first small tribe which came to Siberia and entered into relations with the Russian authorities, was that of Telengut, under Abaka. Soon afterwards the clan of Uriankhai, under Altyn Khan, so well known in Siberian history, abandoned the confederacy.¹

Jungar, or Jungaria, is a name of much older origin than either Oirat or Kalmuk; for in the seventh century the Western Dulgus had divided into tribes, and further into two divisions, those of the right hand, Jun-gar, or eastern division; and those of the left hand, Boron-Gar, or western division. The country of the western division, now the Kirghiz Steppe, fell under the dominion of other races, and the name Borongar disappeared; but Jungar still continued, although it came into general knowledge only about the middle of the seventeenth century.²

One of the sovereigns of the Oirat, the son of Khara-Khula, Kho-no-kho-tsin, also known as Bator Kun-taitsi, a title he had received from the Dalai Lama of Tibet, meaning 'swan

¹ 'Historical account of the Oirat or Kalmyks,' by the Monk Hyacinth: St. Petersburg, 1834. 'Works' of Senkofsky, vi. 27: St. Petersburg, 1859.

² The name Jungaria is also variously transliterated, as *Tchungaria*, *Dsungaria*, *Zungaria*.



TARANTCHI AKSAKAL AND HIS ATTENDANTS AT KULDJA.

prince,' greatly extended the power of his people and evidently dreamed of reviving in its full extent the ancient empire of Tchinghiz Khan.¹ On his death, in 1654, the throne fell to one of his twelve sons, Zenga, whose elder brother Galdan had early in life become a Lama and had been brought up in Tibet at the Court of the Dalai Lama. Zenga was murdered by some of his younger brothers, and Galdan then obtained from the Dalai Lama permission to throw off his priesthood and returned in 1671 to his tribe, where he avenged the murder of his brother and led his people to conquest after conquest, his great aim being to reduce to obedience the Khalkas Mongols who were supported by the Emperor of China and who were at last obliged to take refuge within Chinese limits. In the meantime the children of his brother Zenga were growing up; Galdan therefore put them all to death with the exception of the eldest, Tsevan Rabdan, who escaped to the valley of the Borotala, and while Galdan was engaged in his eastern wars, founded a new realm in his rear. The Chinese, to whom he made overtures, made common cause with him, and the power of Galdan was at last overthrown in 1697, soon after which he himself died of the small-pox, alone and abandoned in the Kirghiz steppe. Tsevan Rabdan was not only a successful prince, but was really the heir to Galdan's sovereignty. The Oirat all submitted to him; he was recognised by China and Russia; he subdued many petty Mongol princes from the Altai to Lake Balkash, and compelled the cities of Eastern Turkistan, as well as Samarkand, Bukhara and even Balkh, to pay tribute to him, colonising the more disobedient of the inhabitants of these countries in the valleys of the Ili and of the Borotala. He also subdued one horde of the Kara Kirghiz and used them to counteract the invasions of the Kirghiz Kaisaks from the west. He then married the daughter of Ayuka Khan of the Torgouts, another branch of the Oirat living along the Irtysh, but soon fell out with him, utterly defeated him and compelled the Torgouts to move westward, until in 1703 the last of them crossed the Ural and settled in the lower regions of the Volga, where they are known as Kalmuks. He then conquered the southern branch of the Oirat in Tangut, and acting with bad faith put to death their prince, whose title he then gave to his

¹ 'History of the Oirat or Kalmyks,' by the Monk Hyacinth, p. 63: St. Petersburg, 1834.

own son, attacked Tibet, and even opposed the Lama. He was also successful in a war with China. Galdan Tsyran, the son of Tsevan Rabdan, who reigned from 1727 to 1745, pursued a similar career of war and bloodshed. He was succeeded by his son, who was murdered by a brother, and he in turn by another brother, until the latter was overthrown by two tribal leaders Davatsi and Amursana. These two conspirators quarrelled among themselves, and Amursana was beaten and went to Peking, where he was well received by the Emperor Kien Lun as a vassal of the Empire, and was given lands and titles. He subsequently received Chinese assistance to make himself the ruler of Jungaria. The joint expedition was successful, and in 1755 the forces of Davatsi were completely overthrown in a campaign of five months, Davatsi himself being captured and taken to Peking. Amursana, however, found that instead of being a sovereign prince he merely held a honorary Chinese rank. He therefore incited his people to rebellion. His armies were beaten, and he was forced to take refuge with the Russians in Tobolsk, where he died of small-pox in 1757. At that time the Chinese Emperor was so strong and the Russians were so weak in Asia,—their attention at the same moment being taken up in Europe by the Turkish wars,—that in order to buy peace they conveyed the dead body of Amursana to Kiakhita and gave it up to the Chinese.

The Emperor Kien Lun had no intention of giving up Jungaria; he even extended his new dominions by the conquest of Kashgar and Eastern Turkistan. The rebellion of the Jungarians gave the Chinese an excuse for getting rid of them, and they were massacred indiscriminately; so that, while before the conquest there were in Jungaria 24 *uluses* with a population of 600,000 souls, at the end of 1756 not one Jungarian remained, those who had not been killed having sought refuge among the Kirghiz or the Russians. The country was therefore open for settlement, and inhabitants were found by sending military colonies from Mantchuria, by deporting Chinese criminals and by bringing agriculturists from Eastern Turkistan, 6,000 families of whom were settled there at one time. For the purpose of keeping the country in order, the city of Ili, or what is called Mantchu Kuldja, was built as the seat of government and was settled by Mantchus. Six other forts were erected; one of them, Bayandai, in the immediate vicinity of Ili, con-

tained a Mantchu garrison, while the other five, Khorgos, Shin-sui-ho-dzi (Tchin-tcha-ho-dzi), Suidun, Losigun, and Tchimpantzi were defended by Chinese soldiers.

It is owing to these wars and invasions with their constant changes of population, and to the measures taken by the Chinese Government that the region of Kuldja has its present curious mixture of races and peoples.

The settlers from Eastern Turkistan became known as Tarantchis, literally agriculturists, or millet-sowers, from *taran*, millet. Their position was very much like that of the former Crown peasants in Russia. They were settled along the rivers and canals on both sides of the Ili, and each of the original 6,000 families received a piece of land of about 32 acres in extent and was obliged to furnish yearly 32 *tcho* of grain, which, according to the prices of grain and the comparative value of money would be worth about 2*l.* 10*s.* In 1834 the number of families had increased to 8000, and their yearly rent amounted to 256,000 *tcho*. Besides this tax the Tarantchis were obliged to furnish extra grain and horses in case of war, and were frequently called upon for labour upon canals and other government works. They were governed by officials of their own race, who were however the obedient tools of the Mantchu rulers at Ili, the seat of their administration being in the Tartar town of Kuldja. No restraints were placed on the exercise of the Mohammedan religion, and it may be imagined that the attachment of the Tarantchis to it was increased rather than lessened by living amongst people who do the two things which Mussulmans abhor the most,—who worship idols and who eat pork. In every Tarantchi settlement there was an Imam and a Mullah, and everywhere there were mosques and school-houses; so that from 30 to 40 per cent. of the people could read, although only about 10 per cent. could write. Almost the only Chinese influence apparent upon them was that the women were unveiled.

The language of the Tarantchis differs but little from that of Eastern Turkistan, being a descendant of the old Uigur dialect, and, although it has received many words and a peculiar colouring from the influence of the surrounding Kalmuk, Chinese, and Mantchu colonies, yet, according to Mr. Radloff, it is far more specifically Turkish than any Turkish

book printed in Constantinople. That dialect which is peculiarly Tarantchi was chiefly heard in the town of Kuldja, while small agricultural settlements frequently retained in a great measure their original speech, one, for instance, speaking the dialect of Turfan, and another that of Kashgar.

The military colonists were brought from Dauria, in north-western Mongolia, and consisted of Solons, who are still famous in all China for their skill in archery, and Sibos, a tribe on whose gratitude the Chinese government could especially count, because at the accession of the Mantchu dynasty they were freed from their slavery to the Mongols. Both tribes were given rich lands, the Solons on the right bank of the Ili, between the Usuk and the Kunges, and the Sibos on the left bank of the Ili, opposite the Tartar Kuldja. They paid no taxes, but, on the contrary, received from the government a salary equal to about ten shillings a month. All the men capable of bearing arms were counted in the active army, although in time of peace not more than a thousand men were actually under arms.

These colonists were divided into fourteen banners or *sumuls*, six of Solons and eight of Sibos.

About the middle of the present century two new *sumuls* were formed out of both tribes, and were settled among the Solons. Each *sumul* received land which was considered sufficient for 500 families, so that altogether they were counted as 8,000 families. As each family-plot was of considerable extent, it was calculated that each could produce at least three fighting men in case of war, which would thus bring the contingent up to about 25,000 men. The Sibos speak a Tunguz dialect very similar to the Mantchu, and, for that reason, those who received an education were most commonly employed as writers and clerks in all the offices of the province, while pure Mantchus who have been educated usually become so Chinese in habits that they utterly forget their own language, and learn it only as they would a dead tongue. In this province, owing to the Sibos, Mantchu was spoken and written with greater purity than elsewhere. The dialect of the Solons differs in some respects from that of the Sibos.

To these were added some Tchakhars. The Tchakhars had formerly been a ruling race in Southern Mongolia, and at

one time had even exacted tribute from China. The Mantchu dynasty on its accession, profiting by the internal dissensions of the Mongols, succeeded in annihilating the power of the Tchakhars. Even after 150 years there may have been some discontent among them, or the Chinese government must have remembered with discomfort their former might, and thought it best to avoid a possible insurrection by colonising them. The Tchakhars could not complain, because they received subsidies on the road to lands in their new country, and excellent pay. They were colonised with the Solons and Sibos.

The country being secured in this way, it was perfectly safe for the Chinese to send there the Jungars and the Oirat who had previously sought their protection; and subsequently they also allowed many to come back who had fled from the massacre and had taken refuge among the Kirghiz. The number of these colonists was soon increased by the return of the Kalmuks.

Soon after the final emigration of the Oirat tribes to the Volga, the Emperor Kiang-hi, being curious to learn the cause of this great movement, and having at the same time some business with the Court of St. Petersburg, sent an ambassador, in whose suite was Tuli-shen, the secretary of the Imperial Council, on a mission to the court of the Kalmuk Khan on the lower Volga. This embassy was allowed by Peter the Great to proceed through Siberia, and the journal kept by it is full of curious interest.¹

The Kalmuks were touched with this mark of interest of the Chinese Emperor, and from that time, in spite of the Russians, kept up relations with the court of Peking. When they heard that Jungaria had been conquered and depopulated by the Chinese, supposing that the country would remain vacant, they made up their minds to return to it, only a small number preferring to remain. They set out from the Volga in January and February 1771, and after an eight months' march, attended by much suffering, harassed and distressed by the Kirghiz,—a journey that has been immortalised by De Quincey in his 'Flight of a Tartar Tribe,'—arrived at Jungaria only to find the Chinese in full possession of the country, and to learn that they must either become subject to them, or fall into the

¹ This journal was translated by Staunton under the title, 'Narrative of the Chinese Embassy. London: 1821.

hands of the Khirgiz or of the Russians who were slowly pursuing them. They chose the former alternative, and thus the population of the 'new line' or 'new frontier,' as the province of Ili, together with Eastern Turkistan, was called, was increased by nearly half-a-million of souls.

The Kalmuks were allowed to settle in the excellent pastures on the Kunges and Tekes, where they still live under the name of Torgots. Like the Kirghiz, they lead a nomadic life, and devote themselves to the breeding of cattle and horses. Some few of them about the river Nilka have mixed with the Tartars and have become agriculturists. The Kalmuks are all Buddhists. Their chief priest in the valley of the Ili was a Khamba Lama, who during the summer lived in a temple on the Tekes, but during the winter came to another temple on the right bank of the Ili, between the Tartar and the Mantchu Kuldja, to which once a year the Dzian-Dziun, or Mantchu governor of the province, came for prayers with all his officials in state and ceremony. At first no taxes were laid upon the Kalmuks, but subsequently they were obliged to furnish the agricultural and military colonists with 2,000 cattle and 500 horses yearly, and, furthermore, were obliged to serve in the copper and lead mines, and to supply a contingent of soldiers for the frontier pickets.

All these different races were kept in order by a military force of Mantchus and Chinese, and the governors and the higher officials were in all cases Mantchus.

The Governor-General, or Dzian-Dziun, lived in Ili, the Mantchu Kuldja, while the *amban* of Eastern Turkistan, residing at Kashgar, and that of Tarbagatai, resident at Tchugutchak, were subject to him. A force of 6,000 Mantchu soldiers was kept up, of which 5,000 garrisoned the fortress of Ili and 1,000 were stationed in Bayandai. The Chinese troops, which were called those of the Green Banner, raised, not by conscription, but by recruitment, as in England and America, amounted to 3,000, and were stationed to the number of 500 in each of the five forts of Khorgos, Shin-sui-ho-dzi, Suidun, Losigun, and Tchimpantzi. The other half of the *Khambi*, as this force was called, were settled on the same terms as military colonists on the right bank of the Ili, between the Solons and the Tarantchis; and from the river to the mountains the whole force was under the government of a Mantchu officer.

Besides the forces of the Green Banner, criminals, chiefly from Southern China, were sent to the Ili provinces, where they were known as Tchampan. They were put to forced labour of the hardest kind in the mines for three years; but after that were allowed to live freely in the province, except that, in case of war, they were all counted in the infantry. In the country they were for the most part either fishermen or carriers, and in the cities workmen of the lowest class or thieves.

The agricultural Tchampan were reckoned at about 5,000 men, and were chiefly settled near the banks of the Ili, where they devoted themselves to the cultivation of opium. They were the most despised portion of the population, and were subject to persecutions and hardships of all kinds.

But to all these nationalities yet another was added,—the Dungans. These are supposed to be remnants of the old Uigurs, who, under the name of Gao-tchan, were in very early times colonised in the provinces of Han-su and Shen-si, to the number of 800,000 men. Later we find people in this province, in all probability the same, because they were Mohammedans, known by the name of Salar, who by their frequent insurrections gave much trouble to the Chinese authorities. Still later we find in the same place the Dungans, who had become Chinese in dress, language, and manners; in short in everything save their religion, of which, however, they knew but little, although they rigorously observed the two dogmas of abstinence from the use of swine's flesh and of spirits. The Dungans are a healthy, hardy race, in part perhaps owing to their temperance and abstinence from opium, and are bolder and braver than the Chinese. For this reason they have always been found to be excellent recruits, and the police force in Peking is, or was lately, drawn almost entirely from their ranks. In this manner many of them came to the new western provinces as hired soldiers, and after their term of service had expired, the most of these, finding a livelihood easy, remained there. At the same time one of the chief occupations of the Dungans is the carrying trade, and most of the carters in the north of China are of this people. A regular post route was established to the Ili, along which many flourishing towns grew up; and as the Dungans in the exercise of their trade

followed this route, many of them settled in these towns, so that at last in some of them, as in Urumtsi for instance, they constituted the main population. In 1862 in the province of Kuldja, they were estimated at 60,000 souls.¹

In order to govern this mixture of races, the Mantchus were obliged to rely in a great part upon the hatred between the different nationalities; but as Mr. Radloff remarked in 1862: 'Woe to the Mantchus if the hatred against them ever becomes stronger than the hatred of these races to each other! If only two of them unite, the power of the Mantchus in the West will be for ever annihilated.' Events proved how true his words were.

During the infancy of the colony the Chinese government was kind and considerate, giving good pay to the military colonists, and granting subsidies and alleviations of various kinds to the others. With 1826, however, began a time of calamity for the province, and especially for the Tarantchis. During the war not only were they obliged to deliver a double quantity of grain and forage, but they were compelled to transport it with their own horses to the scene of military operations. At the same time the winter was so unusually severe that the trains of transport-horses perished, and many hundreds of Tarantchis were frozen to death on the road. Things were getting worse and worse, when finally the Chinese succeeded in repressing the insurrection and in restoring order. But the affairs of the province had only begun to look a little better, when, in 1834, it was considered necessary to dig the canal Tokus-tara-östen, to provide for additional culture and settlements. The work was difficult, and lasted two years. After this came bad harvests and other calamities; and besides forced labour, heavy taxes had to be paid for the improvements, so that it was not till 1839 that the agriculturists began to better their position. In 1836 there had been an attempt at rebellion under the leadership of a Persian, but this was pu-

¹ For a fuller account of the races inhabiting Kuldja, see 'Das Ili-Thal in Hoch Asien und seine Bewohner,' von Dr. W. Radloff, in Petermann's 'Mittheilungen' for 1866, pp. 88, 250. The articles of Mr. N. Aristof on Kuldja in the second volume of the 'Turkistan Annual' are worth consulting, as also those of Baron Kaulbars in the second and third volumes of the same publication, the 'Sketches of Semiretch' of Colonel Khoroshkin in the 'Turkistan Gazette' for 1875, and the article of Colonel Venjukof in the 'Bulletin' of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for 1871, p. 333.

down, the leaders were executed and banished, and many Tarantchi settlements were plundered by the soldiers. Again, during new disturbances in Kashgar in 1840 and 1844, the agricultural settlements had to suffer heavily. Still the Tarantchis were so oppressed that they hardly dared even to think of insurrection; and when the Dungan rebellion broke out, they did not at first join in it.

It was the Tarantchis and the native Mussulmans that the Chinese chiefly feared as a source of disturbance, and it was against them that their precautions were all directed. The danger, however, was to come from another and unsuspected source,—the Dungans. These people had long been discontented with their position in the country in which they had, as it were, surreptitiously established themselves. Vigorous and industrious, they had at one time squatted on outlying lands and had undertaken to cultivate them; but as whole districts had been set apart for the use of military colonists, even though much of the soil remained uncultivated, the colonists complained and the Dungans were removed. They then sent a petition to the Emperor, saying that they as well as the rest were his children, and that they were desirous of gaining their bread by working the land. This petition was heard, and certain lands were set apart for them. After this arrangement the causes of their discontent are not easily explainable. The Dungans were under no special disadvantages as compared with the other peoples; on the contrary, they occupied a position in some respects better than many, but yet they had a contempt as well as dislike for the Chinese and the Mantchus,—whose strength and character were enfeebled by their misuse of opium,—and they felt in themselves that they were better men.

The financial condition of the country, it is true, made everyone discontented, but not the Dungans more than others. The government at Peking, exhausted by wars and dissensions, had not only for many years neglected to pay either the regular troops or the military colonists in the province of Ili, but even desired to collect taxes from them. High officials among the Mantchus were devoting all their energies to making their personal fortunes, as well as to grinding out of the merchants and farmers,—for on both of these fell the burden of the distress,—enough to give them the actual means of subsistence. Instead of

lessening the number of troops, and thus trying to economise the resources of the country, the Government had recourse to financial speculations,—some of an indefensible character. For instance, they resolved to give to the copper money a forced value, and began to coin large *yarmaks*, equal in actual value to fifteen small *yarmaks*, which they endeavoured to make pass for one hundred *yarmaks*. The action of the Government was immediately imitated by private persons, for it was easy enough to make moulds, and to melt down the small *yarmaks* and reissue them at their higher value. Threats and the most severe punishments availed nothing, and at last the Government was obliged to issue a decree that the large pieces should be taken at their real value of only fifteen *yarmaks*. This excited a new storm of discontent, and a revolution seemed on the point of breaking out; the palace of the Governor-General at Ili was mobbed, and he was forced to make a promise that the pieces should be taken for a month at forty *yarmaks*, after which they would be worth only fifteen. During this month at least twenty times as many pieces were presented as had been coined by the Government, so that there was an immense loss to it, as well as to all honest people. Subsequently great mining speculations were undertaken; expensive works were constructed in many places to open silver mines, but no silver was discovered. Searches for sunken treasures in the river Kash were similarly fruitless; and in this way large sums of money were wasted, and many families, especially of Tarantchis and Kalmuks, were ruined.

To return to the Dungans. In 1860 a conspiracy was discovered, having for its object the murder of the Governor General and other officials, which was easily suppressed; but it would have cost the life of the Russian Consul had it not been for his diplomatic skill and presence of mind. He had hired a Dungan to prepare some sable-skins which he destined for a coat, for, in addition to their monopolising other trades, the furriers were nearly all Dungans. As the Consul was in no hurry he gave the Dungan a room in the Factory, and told him to come and work there at his leisure, so that it was fully a year before the skins were ready for use. The man was paid and sent away and nothing more was thought of him. More than a year after (this was in 1860), a Mantchu officer who

was frequently sent by the authorities for conference with the Consul, made him a visit, and in the course of the conversation spoke of this Dungan, asking if he still lived at the Factory. The Consul replied that he had not been there for a year. The conversation took another channel. It seemed strange to the Consul that the officer had no special business, and that he should remain so long talking of indifferent matters. Again there was an allusion to the Dungan, and the Consul was asked what had become of him. He expressed his surprise that this man's fate should weigh so heavily on the officer's mind, and when a third remark was made, and the question was again put whether he was not still there, Mr. Zakharof laughingly said: 'Why you can look through the Factory if you please; it would be difficult to hide a man here.' This answer seemed perfectly to satisfy the officer and he went away. A few days afterwards some of the Governor's council called on the Consul and explained to him the circumstances, saying that a conspiracy of Dungsans had been discovered; that on this very man had fallen the duty of assassinating the Governor-General, and that it was said that he was living in the factory under the protection of the Russian Consul. The officials added, 'We all know you, and know that you would be incapable of assisting in such a plot, but still there were two or three members of the Council who so insisted that all foreigners were villains, and that the Russians must have some connection with the conspiracy, that we almost came to blows; we therefore took this measure of finding out.'


If, instead of taking the matter in good part, Mr. Zakharof had become angry, and had stood on his dignity and demanded satisfaction for the supposed insult to his honour and to his flag, the Chinese would probably have been convinced of his participation in the plot, and in all likelihood the Factory would have been sacked and all its inmates murdered. The position was very similar to that at Tien-tsin, and had the French Consul there shown a little more adroitness and not at once resented the action of the Chinese as an insult to his flag, that frightful massacre might perhaps have been avoided.

Although the insurrection in Kuldja was an entirely independent one, under native leaders, yet it seems to have had a

certain connection with the rebellion of the Chinese Mussulmans which broke out in the province of Shen-si in 1862 and rapidly spread to Han-su, Li-tchuan and Yunnan.

This rebellion was not entirely suppressed, but the insurgents were driven out of Han-su and took refuge in the various towns on the road to Kuldja, many of which were, as I have before said, thickly settled with Dungans, and especially in the town of Urumtsi, where a Dungan government began gradually to be established. The news of the insurrection in Han-su reached Kuldja towards the end of 1862 and at the beginning of 1863 many Dungans from different places collected in Shin-sui-ho dzi to plan an insurrection. At first they could come to no agreement, but finally two fanatical priests succeeded in getting together a few hundred men and attacking the little town of Targi. Their plan, however, was defeated; many were taken prisoners, and their leaders were beheaded. The severe action of the authorities seems to have had its effect, and there were no new disturbances until March 1864, when there was a riot in Khorgos, which was immediately put down; but in the summer news was received of the rebellion in Ku-tche, of the capture of Urumtsi by the Dungans, of the murder of the Mantchus and of the Chinese living there, to the number of 130,000, and of the burning of a part of the town and of the bazaar with all its rich depôts of tea. The capture of Urumtsi gave the Dungans great force, as it cut off the province of Kuldja from communication with China either by the ordinary northern route or by the southern one. It also had a great effect upon the state of things in that province, for from Urumtsi the Dungans marched towards Manas, and the Governor-General sent a Solon officer with an army of several thousand men against them. As the Chinese army was by far the more numerous an immediate attack might have dispersed the rebels, but divided counsels prevailed, there were negotiations, and finally when the battle did come off the Chinese forces were beaten and had to return to Ili. A rebellion in that province at once broke out.¹

¹ In the slight account which I shall give of it, I shall chiefly follow the report of a Chinese official. *Lu-tsun-han*, who had come to that province as a student in 1856, had taught in schools, and had subsequently bought an official post. He wrote a detailed report of the rebellion and of the capture of Ili, as well as another subsequently on the occupation of the province by the Russians, which were



DUNGAN WOMEN.

After this, the disturbances among the Dungans daily increased, so that the Governor-General began to call to Ili single bodies of troops and of Sibos, and to impose extraordinary taxes on all the merchants. The acting Russian Consul, with most of the Russian merchants and all the Cossacks, except one who had been left there by mistake, had gone from Kuldja a few months before on account of the dangerous state of affairs. Now, when the Governor imposed on the Tashkent merchants living there a tax of 300 horses, the rest of them ran away and crossed the frontier. Gradually 8000 troops were collected in the citadel of Ili and the Mantchus began to take heart, when they were alarmed by the news that the Dungans had finally succeeded in persuading the Tarantchi inhabitants of Kuldja to take sides with them. A state visit which the Governor paid to the mosque had no effect, and a day or two after street fights began at night in Old Kuldja, news of which was immediately brought to Ili, and in a few hours disturbances began there also. The rebels had now gained an important central point, but if the Mantchus had acted with energy, had collected all their troops and directed them against that city, and had possessed at the same time the slightest courage or capacity for command, they could easily have crushed the growing insurrection. This, however, they did not do; on the contrary, they waited quietly in the citadel until attacks were made against them. After beating these off, they finally resolved to send a body of troops to attack the united forces of Tarantchis and Dungans, who had entrenched themselves at Da-di-pu, a few miles to the east. They were defeated and came back in disorder. But the Dungans apparently also suffered greatly, for they made no attempt at pursuit, and for a few weeks both sides were quiet. A few days after an order arrived from Peking removing the Governor-General Tchang and replacing him by his assistant Ming, the *amban* of Tchugutchak. Unfortunately the new Governor acted with as much stupidity and folly as the old one had done. A new attack was at once ordered on Da-di-pu, but was repulsed with great loss, the infantry being surrounded and very many of them massacred.

destined for the Chinese Emperor, but which, by some means, found their way into Russian hands, and were published by Professor Vasilief in the 'Russian Messenger' for May 1872.

The Dungans now began to undertake more active operations. They divided into two parts and regularly besieged the fortresses of Ili and Bayandai. At the same time by promise of plunder they persuaded the Kirghiz to join them, and many families and tribes crossed the frontier and began plundering the Chinese settlements. A good portion of the outer city of Ili had now been destroyed, but the burning of the Russian Factory seemed to inspire the Governor with special terror and he repeatedly sent to the Russian authorities at Semipalatinsk with requests for help. Finally, towards the end of the year, a great battle was fought, in which the Dungans were entirely defeated and were obliged to leave the district. Then was the favourable moment had the Governor taken advantage of it, as the Kirghiz, who had only joined the Dungans while they were in luck, had now abandoned them, but he feared for the safety of the city and refused to march his troops out. As a last resort therefore, the Dungans, seeing themselves in straits, made overtures to the Tarantchi peasants,—the rebellion up to this time having been confined to the city dwellers. Then, withdrawing their forces from near Ili, they bent all their energies to the siege of Bayandai, and in the beginning of 1865 took it by storm. The garrison of about 8,000 men, with their commander, was all killed, with the exception of two soldiers, who, with their noses split, were sent to Ili. Houses were plundered, the peaceable Chinese with their wives and children were strangled, and the young girls enslaved.

The fall of Bayandai seemed greatly to encourage the insurgents, who, before this, were in such desperation that they had sent to Urumtsi and Ku-tche for assistance, and on the news of the capture of Bayandai, a defensive and offensive league appears to have been entered into. In the meantime Suidun was also surrounded, but the Governor could afford it no assistance. At this time also the insurrection broke out in Tarbagatai, so that after the capture of Tehugutchak and the occupation of the country, the Mantchus were entirely cut off from any communication with China except through the Russian territory. Shortly after, a letter arrived at Semipalatinsk from the Governor again asking for assistance, and begging that a packet of official documents might be transmitted to Peking. The siege of Ili slowly progressed, varied

only by a sortie which the Governor made against Da-di-pu, and which was repulsed with great loss. Meanwhile the Dungans had begun measures which it could easily have been seen would be successful. They sent small bands to plunder and ravage all the lands of the military colonies, thus compelling the 'banners' that had stayed at home to take their part in order to save their own property, and detaching even others from the Mantchus. The Kalmuks on the river Tekes had not sent the assistance demanded by the Governor, being angry that he had not assisted them when they had been attacked a few months before by the Kara-Kirghiz. At last, however, when their great temple on the Ili had been plundered by the Dungans, their Lama excited them to revenge. They therefore marched down to near Ili and signally defeated the insurgents, who after that dared no longer show themselves in the vicinity. The harvest was now ripe, and the grain was greatly needed by the suffering garrison and town population, but no one dared to reap it for fear of the Dungans. The Governor therefore ordered the Kalmuks to gather the harvest, but, as they were nomads who despised agriculture, they refused, and when threats were offered, they all decamped, and no persuasions could bring them back. After their departure the Dungans immediately resumed operations. Of the frightful position of affairs in the fortress, we learn something from Colonel Reinthal, who was there in July and September 1865, to obtain information on the position. It is much to be regretted that the Russian Government did not act upon the information contained in his reports, and either give some active support to the Chinese authorities, or itself occupy the country to prevent bloodshed.

The scarcity of provisions in Ili became such that the Governor at last saw himself obliged to dismiss his last auxiliaries, the Thagor Kalmuks. In the meantime both Solons and Sibos were being attacked and plundered, and were obliged to make peace with the insurgents, so that only Ili, Khorgos, Losigun, and Suidun, remained in the hands of the Mantchus. Ili was now entirely surrounded, and it was resolved to reduce it by famine. The situation there was indeed frightful; all the provisions had been exhausted, and the only food was horses, dogs, and cats. Typhus so raged that from 50 to 100 men died daily. The

dead lay unburied in the streets, and the furniture and the roof-beams of the houses were used for fuel. Finally, about the middle of January the Dungans made an attack; they blew up two bastions and one of the gates, and burst into the fortress. Men, women, and children were indiscriminately murdered, and many spared their enemies the trouble by killing first their families and then themselves. All the Mantchus sought refuge in the Governor's palace, which they defended with the courage of despair. Tchang, the former Governor, fell into the hands of the insurgents and was at once murdered, but the others, as the Chinese reporter puts it 'fulfilled their duty of devotion,' *i.e.*, they blew up the palace, and all perished in the ruins. Some treasure was doubtless found in the houses, and in the palace of the Governor 80,000 ounces of silver were discovered, but in all probability much still remains buried in the city. After a few weeks rest the Dungans turned towards the northern cities, took Suidun and Losigun almost immediately, while the town of Khorgos, where many rich merchants had taken refuge, made peace with them by paying a very heavy contribution, and surrendered on a promise of safety. The Tarantchis then returned home and the Dungans went northward, but returned in five days and fell upon this city, plundered and burnt it, and put all the inhabitants to the sword. The Dungans then made an attack on the Solons, who had before this entirely submitted to them, burnt all their towns and murdered the inhabitants, so that the remainder fled for refuge to the Russian territory, hotly pursued by the Dungans, who killed many in their flight.

The Dungans and the Tarantchis had kept together as long as they were in the face of a common enemy; no sooner were they masters of the situation than dissensions broke out between them. The two parties met in April 1867, near Old Kuldja, when the Dungans were badly beaten and lost their leader, Mayagur Akhun. A month later the Dungans collected a new force, increased by many of their race from Urumtsi, amounting in all to 10,000 men, and attacked a force of Tarantchis, Sibos, Mongols, and other inhabitants of that locality, at Da-di-pu, whom they defeated and compelled to fall back on Bayandai. There the retreating army made a stand, and remembering how the Dungans had started the insurrec-

tion, and how they had everywhere murdered, robbed, and pillaged, resolved to strike one more blow for their lives, and made a sudden onslaught, which so overwhelmed the Dungans, that few of them escaped from the battle. Those who did not flee to Urumtsi or over the Russian frontier, were obliged to submit to the Tarantchis. Late in the summer of the same year there was a report that a Chinese army was on its march, which so excited the Sibos and the few remaining Mantchus and Chinese with joy, that the Tarantchis grew seriously alarmed, and proposed to massacre them all to avoid disturbances; but the Sultan and the Akhun did not agree, so that their lives were preserved, although they were subject to all kinds of persecution and extortion.

From that time on the Tarantchis ruled the country. They had had many a change of leaders since the beginning of the insurrection. Their first chief, Abdrasul Amir, an influential man in old Kuldja, was murdered by Mazam Khan, who had been released from prison by the Chinese on his promise to use his influence in putting down the insurgents, whose leader he immediately became. In the capture of Bayandai he was killed by an adventurer from Andijan named Patcha Hodja, who hoped, with the assistance of some of his countrymen, to accomplish in Kuldja much the same as Yakub Bek was then doing in Kashgar. Patcha was soon disposed of, as was also his successor, who was followed by a certain Maltchet Akhun, a Tarantchi, and the leader of that race at the time of the capture of Ili. He in his turn was relieved of the cares of sovereignty by Abil Ogla, or, as he is sometimes called, Ala Khan, who sewed him up in a sack and threw him into the river. Abil Ogla, who had been a leading man in Kuldja before the insurrection, now took the title of Sultan. After the massacre of the Solons by the Dungans, their vacant territory had been immediately occupied by Kirghiz, some coming from the country to the north, and some from Siberia. These continued to plunder the country, and caused many more to seek Russian protection. In this way the emigrants during 1866-7, amounted in all to about 5,000 souls, by far the most of them being in a state of utter destitution. They were temporarily settled in the districts of Kopal and Vierny, and assistance was given to them by General Kolpakofsky in

food and money, for which he subsequently received the thanks of the Government at Peking, and had conferred upon him by the Emperor of China the dignity of Mandarin of the first class, with a robe of honour embroidered with dragons, which, being placed on the same footing with a decoration, he received the special permission of his own Emperor to wear on state occasions. The Chinese Government after they had recovered possession of Tchugutchak, demanded the release of all those emigrants who had been in the army or in the military colonies, and as the Chinese authorities had always been very exact in delivering up Russian refugees, it was thought proper to comply with this request. In consequence of the insufficiency of money and supplies, their return to China was postponed until 1868, and in the autumn of that year, 3,500 of them, after marching 600 miles, encamped for the winter near Tchugutchak, where in fact they were obliged to remain for several years, as the place marked out for their colonisation was not then ready. More than a thousand, however, refused to obey the orders of the Chinese Government, preferring not to remove so far from their former settlements, and resolved either to stay under Russian rule or await an opportunity to return to their homes.

During the whole of the insurrection all the efforts of the Russians had been directed to keeping the frontiers intact, but no movement whatever had been made to interfere. The districts of Vierny were then governed through Semipalatinsk, and Semipalatinsk in turn received its orders from Omsk, the capital of Western Siberia. As far as concerns Central Asia, the attention of the Russians was concentrated on the new line of frontier and on the occupation of Tashkent and the adjacent regions; as far as China was concerned, the only object was to keep up good relations and to do nothing that might injure them.

When Semiretch became a province of the government of Turkistan under General Kaufmann it was evident that the policy here would change. The first attempt of the insurgents to enter into relations with the Russians came from the Dungans of Tchugutchak, and immediately after the rising there in January 1865, the Imam of Tchugutchak hastened to inform the Russian Vice-Consul that the Factory was still safe,

being watched over by the Dungans, and invited him to return and renew commercial relations.

These, as well as two subsequent letters, remained without answer, as the government could not take upon itself to enter into relations with persons who had taken possession of a city of a friendly power. After the capture of the citadel in 1866, the Dungans again tried to enter into relations, promising to satisfy all the Russian complaints.

These letters also remained without reply, and as the Dungans thus became convinced of the hostile disposition of the Russians, and were at the same time influenced by a report circulated by the Chinese, that Russian troops were to march against them, they decided to abandon Tchugutchak and its vicinity, and to settle in the neighbourhood of Manas. They thus left for a time the whole country between Manas and the frontier, 300 miles, utterly depopulated, and it so remained until it was again easily occupied by the Chinese forces which advanced with Zhung, the new Dzian-Dziun, in 1871.

The kind reception given to the refugees, and the establishment of a corps of observation on the frontier, inspired the Dungans and Tarantchis in Kuldja, during the insurrection, with fear of the Russians, and for that reason at first they took great care to prevent any infringement of the boundaries by the Kirghiz or others. In the early part of 1867 there had been a slight conflict with the Dungans at Borokhudzir on the frontier, in order to protect the Solons who were seeking Russian protection, but otherwise there were no dealings with either Dungans or Tarantchis until 1869, except that, in 1868, the Tarantchis having learned that there was a report that they were intending with an army of 40,000 men to fall upon Vierny, sent a messenger to one of the Kirghiz chiefs to deny it, and to express their desire and intention to live in peace and amity with the Russians.

In March 1868 the Sultan Abil Oglä sent two envoys to Vierny with letters expressive of his desire for peace, and asking that measures might be taken to restore the plunder which the Russian Kirghiz had taken from his subjects. To this the General commanding replied in a friendly way, saying that he was at his post to put down marauding expeditions on the Russian side, and asking similar measures to be taken on

the part of the Tarantchis. A second envoy came in the same year, but was stopped and robbed on the way. The robbers, who turned out to be Russian Kirghiz, were arrested, and all that had been taken was restored. Yet, in spite of all this, robberies continued even on the Russian post-roads, and although it is probable that in all cases the marauders were really Russian Kirghiz, yet they made the province of Kuldja their head-quarters, and returned there as to a safe retreat. In order to put this down a small expedition was made in October of that year, and 20,000 head of cattle were taken from the Kirghiz. At the same time a part of the forces at Borokhudzir advanced to Khorgos and took from the Kirghiz 5,000 sheep. In this way mutual complaints arose and mutual demands for indemnity, which gave rise to many embassies from the Sultan, and finally to the mission of Baron Kaulbars to Kuldja at the end of 1870.

The efforts at arrangement turned out to be fruitless, and there is some reason to believe intentionally so. General Kaufmann had begun to think that the existence of this little principality could no longer be allowed; fears were expressed that it would fall into the hands of Yakub Bek of Kashgar, who was then making great progress in his war against the Dungans of Urumtsi and Turfan. It was for this reason that the Muzart Pass was occupied, as I have already mentioned.

Finally, when matters had reached a head, preparations for an expedition were made, the forces at Borokhudzir were increased, and General Kolpakofsky took command of them. A shrewd and well written report was sent to St. Petersburg, showing all the reasons which rendered it necessary to occupy Kuldja for the security of the frontier, and to counteract the designs of Yakub Bek, and asking permission for a movement.

Almost simultaneously, the Tarantchis having luckily attacked a Russian outpost which had crossed the boundary, the onward movement was begun. The campaign was rapid and decisive. On June 24 the main forces left Borokhudzir, on the 28th they defeated a body of Tarantchis, about 4,000 in number, at Alim-tu; on the 30th they drove them from a position in front of Tchín-tcha-ho-dzi, and immediately occupied that city. On the next day, July 1, they occupied Suidun without opposition. On July 3, near Bayandai, the Sultan

sent in his submission through his envoys, one of whom was his son. In the evening of that day he delivered himself up, and on the next, July 4, General Kolpakofsky entered the capital.

The Russians, however, were unable to stop one further act of barbarity. When the Tarantchis in Kuldja learned the surrender of their Sultan they wreaked their vexation and despair on the poor Dungans and Chinese. During that night they massacred more than 2,000 in the city and in its neighbourhood. On the next day, when this became known, General Kolpakofsky informed the Sultan and his counsellors that, if this massacre did not cease, they should answer for it with their heads. The threat took effect, but the worst had already been done. The troops, in advancing from Bayandai to Kuldja, found everywhere mutilated bodies, and wounded and dying men. In one of the canals just outside of the city were 500 corpses, which it was said had been brought out from Kuldja at daylight and thrown there.

Lu-tsun-han, in reporting the Russian occupation, says: 'Once again they fought; the Turkistanis were dispersed, each one seeking to save his life. The Dziau-Dziun of Semiretch (General Kolpakofsky) accepting the declarations of submission both from the Chinese and the Turkistani troops, and assuring them of mercy, immediately marched to Suidun. Here the Turkistanis and the Chinese Mussulmans again met the enemy in battle. The balls and bullets of the Russian army flew like a shower, like a flight of grasshoppers. Of wounded and killed of every kind of people there were not few. The Turkistanis were defeated, and in great confusion returned to the city of Kuldja. The Dziau-Dziun of Semiretch quieted in every way those who remained in Suidun, both Mantchus and Chinese, both soldiery and civilians, as well as the Chinese Mussulmans, not harming anyone; not even a single blade of grass, nor a single tree, nor a fowl, nor a dog received any harm or injury, not a hair was touched. All this is owing to the orders of the Dziau-Dziun of Semiretch. . . .

'But, although the Turkistanis (after the submission of the Sultan) in words expressed their submission, yet their poisoned tongues did not vanish. There were many instances that in lonely places they actually caught Mantchus and Chinese and killed

them. Happily heaven did not permit the human race to end. Now the leader of the great Russian Empire, the Dzian-Dziun of Semiretch, with his army, inspired with humanity and truth, has quieted everyone. This petty foreign power¹ saved the nation from fire and water, it subdued the whole four countries without the least harm, so that children are not frightened, and the people submitted not without delight and ecstasy.

The authorities at St. Petersburg were not over pleased at the occupation of the new territory, and although General Kolpakofsky received the St. George, he did so not, as is customary, by the will of the Emperor, but in a still more complimentary way on the vote of the Chapter of the Order. The Foreign Office immediately informed the Chinese government of the occupation of the province, and declared its readiness to restore it to China whenever a sufficient force could be brought there to hold it against attacks and to preserve order. So far this has not been done, and the question of the permanent occupation and annexation of the province still remains undecided.

The Sultan Abil Ogla was taken to Vierny, where he still resides. He was allowed to keep all his property, which was said to be very considerable, as at the time of his capture he had, among other things, 6000 horses. He seems to have been loved by his people for his goodness, generosity and justice, but nevertheless he had constant fear of secret enemies,—as indeed well he might have had considering the fates of his predecessors and the passions raging among the insurgents,—so that he rarely slept at home, but spent the nights in the houses of his most devoted adherents. After he arrived at Kuldja and was presented to General Kaufman he said that the previous night was the first time he had slept with a feeling of safety and comfort since he had mounted the throne.

From Suidun I made another excursion to Lake Sairam Nor, north of the range of Borokhoro. Captain Bozhovitch gave me six Cossacks as an escort, and I had besides for the first day the company of a young Russian officer. As it was some distance further to go by the regular road, we took a short cut across the

¹ A touch which shows the true Chinese official writing to his Emperor.

meadows for twenty miles until we reached the opening of the Talki ravine. Through some misapprehension of the Kirghiz guide we lost our way and had to make a greater circuit, first through plains covered with dry and yellow grass, and then over a higher steppe thickly overgrown with wormwood. The entrance to the ravine was in some respects different from any that I know. Instead of gradually rising and imperceptibly penetrating among the mountains, we came to a cleft, as it were, in the high mountains which seemed to rise directly out of the plain, where the little river Talki came bounding over the rocks in a succession of pretty cascades. The ascent began at once. In a dozen paces we had turned a corner and had immediately found ourselves between high walls of rock completely shut out from the plain and apparently in the very heart of the mountains. After the bare and desolate mountains which I had so frequently seen I was unprepared for anything so charming. The vegetation was superb, especially on the eastern side of the ravine, where wild apples, wild apricots, elms, poplars, and willows grew in profusion, often festooned with the luxuriant and familiar foliage of the wild hop. It was then autumn, and the leaves of the trees were becoming yellow and red with a brilliancy that I had not expected to find out of America. The road was everywhere excellent, for this was the old Chinese road, and although the bridges had been destroyed it mattered not to us, who were on horseback. This road was built by the Mongols to keep up their communication with Central Asia, and from the number of times that we had to cross the very clear but icy-cold stream of the Talki, I think that there might have been at least the forty-eight bridges, of which the old historians speak. The road was renewed by the Chinese after their capture of the province and was only abandoned during the recent insurrection. A very small sum would suffice to put it in complete repair as a carriage road. About ten miles up the defile we reached a Cossack picket, where we were to pass the night, as darkness and cold were rapidly coming on. The half dozen Cossacks stationed there, who had been quite alone all the summer except for the passing of Kirghiz migrating from beyond the mountains, or for the occasional visits of a topographer or a surveyor, were delighted to meet their comrades and equally glad to be regaled with the sheep which we had brought with us. As their

share towards our supper some of them went out to the stream and brought in some nice fish. Although the day had been so warm, the night was very cold and we were glad to have a fire kept up all night in the middle of our kikitka. The next morning I resumed my journey towards the lake, but unfortunately the Russian officer who was accompanying me received a message from his commander to return immediately and take charge of a party of soldiers who had served out their time and were returning home. I was therefore obliged to proceed alone. As we went on the valley got narrower and steeper. At last, after riding twelve or thirteen miles we ascended a very steep hill, and no sooner had we reached the flat rocks on the top than we beheld before us a scene of wonderful beauty. Immediately below, although at an altitude of 7,200 feet, lay the lake of Sairam Nor, of a rich dark blue, apparently oval, about twenty miles long by fifteen broad, on every side of which rose high mountains, those beyond being often covered with snow. I thought I could discern where the pass lay into the valley of Borotala, and to the eastward there was an evident opening through which the old road went on to Manas and Urumtsi. After enjoying for a while the view we went down to the shore of the lake, where we rested for a few hours near a little spring of excellent water and took our lunch. The water of the lake is slightly saltish and is unfit for making tea. From the shore the water of the lake was beautifully clear, and small objects could be discerned at the bottom from a distance of many feet. The natives believe that the lake throws up on the shore whatever impurity may be cast into it, and they insist that there are no fish there. I walked along the edge for some distance without seeing any, and did not even see the shrimps which Mr. Dilke told me he had found there. The legend is that the spirit of this lake appears in the form of a stony he-goat with great horns and a thick beard, and that misfortunes follow its appearance. In the mountains on the west and south-west of the lake are numerous warm springs of a medicinal character, called *arasan* by the natives. Beyond the Ohala-tau mountains to the north is the valley of the Borotala, a stream which runs through sandy plains parallel to the Ili, but exactly in the opposite direction, falling into Lake Ebi Nor. The fall of ground is very singular, as in the seventy miles which separate

the Sairam Nor from the Ebi Nor the difference of altitude is 6,500 feet. The regular post-road to Tchugutchak left the road from Urumtsi to Sairam Nor at Kur-kara-usu, but there was another more direct road possible for carts which went through the defile in the Ala-tau near the head of Lake Ala Kul at a place called Sabada, famous for its violent winds. This is a deep cut through the mountains, and whenever there is an east wind it blows with such violence through this pass that it can be felt even at Sergiopol, 250 miles further.

Mr. Zakharof, in passing through it, was met by what the Kirghiz called only a moderate wind, and was immediately obliged to leave the main road and take a steeper path through the mountains. The Cossacks who rode in front of him were laid up for several days with sore eyes caused by the sand and gravel. He told me that the accounts of Rubruquis and others were literally true; for that when there was a violent wind it was impossible for horses or camels to stand against it, and large pebbles were sometimes carried along by it.

Nor is a Mongol word meaning lake, corresponding to the Turkish word *Kul*, but as to the origin of *Sairam*, which the Chinese write *Sai-li-mu*, there is much doubt. The Mongol name, *Sairam Tchagan Nor* Klaproth translates as 'The Great Lake of Tranquillity.' It is apparently the same as *Sut-kul*, or 'Milk Lake,' mentioned by King Hethum in his 'Journey to the Court of Mangu Khan.' The old monk Tch'ang Tch'un gives an excellent description of it, which I cannot forbear quoting.

'After having left the sandy desert, we travelled five days, and stopped on the northern side of the Yin Shan. The next day, early in the morning, we proceeded southward on a long slope seventy or eighty miles, and stopped in the evening to rest. The air was cold; we found no water. The next day we started again, and travelled south-westward, and at a distance of twenty *li* suddenly got sight of a splendid lake of about two hundred *li* in circumference, enclosed on all sides by snow-topped peaks, which were reflected in the water. The master named it the *Lake of Heaven*. Following the shore we descended in a southern direction, and on either side were nothing but perpendicular cliffs and rugged peaks. The mountains were covered to their summits with dense forests, consisting of

birches and pines more than a hundred feet high. The river winds through the gorge for about sixty or seventy *li* with a rapid current, sometimes shooting down in cascades. The second prince, who was with the Emperor at the time he went to the west, first made a way through these mountains, cut through the rocks, and built forty-eight bridges with the wood cut on the mountains. The bridges are so wide that two carts can pass together.

‘We passed the night in the defile, and left it the next morning; we then entered a large valley which stretched from east to west, well watered, with abundant grass, and here and there some mulberry trees or jujubes.’

A short drive of about twenty miles easterly from Suidun, brought me to what is called Old or Tartar Kuldja, formerly known as Kuren. Under the Chinese rule it was the seat of the administration of the Tarantchis and Mussulmans, then the capital of the rebels, and now the chief place of the Russian administration.

On the road I passed the ruins of Bayandai, one of the six great fortresses built by the Chinese to control the country; now, hardly one stone is left upon another.

At Kuldja I was most hospitably received by Colonel Wartmann, the Russian commandant, who occupies the Sultan’s old palace in the citadel. Apart from the warmth and kindness with which I was greeted, and which I never shall forget, an additional charm was added to my stay in this curious and uncivilised town of the far East, by finding there excellent servants, and the cleanliness, the neatness, and the thousand little conveniences which tend to make up the comfort of an English home.

But the pleasure and comfort within doors could not long detain me from the strange world without. The appearance of the town is much like that of Suidun, but it is built on a larger and grander scale. It is nearly square, each side being about a mile in length, and is surrounded with high and thick walls, which are sufficiently well built to withstand a vigorous attack, and are so wide at the top as to allow carriages to pass on them. Two broad streets cut it into four equal parts, and these are again sub-divided by numerous lanes and alleys.

One soon sees that Kuldja was a Tartar town, and that the

Chinese polish and civilisation it acquired was superficial. Except the two mosques and some of the large buildings which belong to the Government, there are but slight traces of Chinese architecture in the broad streets and in the smaller lanes. All the houses are built of clay, with flat roofs, as in the Uzbek countries of Central Asia. Even the palace in the citadel bears few traces of Chinese taste, and these few are chiefly in the form of lattices and some slight ornamentation on the walls. It has indeed been somewhat refitted, but in general, except for its larger size, it is no different from houses of rich merchants in Tashkent. Most of the long streets of Bazaar-Kutche, just outside of the citadel, are given up to Tarantchi shops, which are for the most part small and insignificant, but just beyond the suburbs, where Dang Dungan and Maimatchen begin, the bazaar is tenanted by Dungans and Chinese indiscriminately. The majority of the shops are larger and more comfortable than at Tashkent, and the dealer is separated from his purchasers by a counter, or at least by a railing. Besides the shops there were many dealers, who had nothing but a board on trestles on which to display their wares, while others were merely itinerant vendors, carrying all their goods on a tray slung about their neck.

In spite of renewed visits I found little of value that had come down from the Chinese times; all articles of worth or beauty, such as porcelain and bronzes, had been bought up by the Russians soon after the conquest, and little can now be obtained except by what is tantamount to force—by asking the Aksakal to send private people to you who have articles to sell. All the good jade articles that had been found, had been gradually bought up by the Chinese merchants, and sent back to China through Kiakhta. All the articles I could obtain were of slight value, such as chop-sticks, slippers, spectacles, mandarins' buttons, and bows and arrows.

I was shown several mills on the outskirts of the bazaar, amongst others, an exceedingly interesting paper mill, and a factory for the manufacture of vermicelli, where the paste, after being properly prepared, was placed on a perforated board raised several feet above the floor, and allowed to descend by its own weight.

The two most remarkable buildings in the town are the

great mosques; the Jumma mosque of the Tarantchis, which is situated within the walls, and the Dungan mosque just outside. These, judging by their size and their Chinese architecture, were in all probability constructed at the expense of the Government. They are faced with large diamond-shaped tiles, and the walls, as well as the friezes of the cornices, are profusely ornamented with arabesques carved in burnt clay. The roofs are large and flaring, with turned up corners in the well-known Chinese style. The Dungan mosque has a wonderful minaret, built of small-roofed pavilions one on top of the other, making a most bizarre effect. The floors of the mosque are of tiles, and there is little ornamentation within, except around the point which marks the direction of Mecca.

There is but one Buddhist temple in Kuldja, and that is not yet completely finished; but what interested me more than either this or the mosques, was a small Christian church which had been established years before by French and Italian Catholic missionaries. These Catholics, who had not for many years been visited by missionaries, were among the first who welcomed the Russian troops subsequent to the occupation. After going through one or two courts and narrow passages we came to the church, which was a small room. Besides a rude altar with a crucifix, there were two pictures, one of Christ and the other of the crucifixion. Over the altar was a large Chinese inscription. I asked the cheerful young deacon who accompanied us, what that meant. He found some difficulty in expressing himself, but at last slowly said *Deus*. That was the utmost extent of his Latin conversation, but on my handing him one of the mass books, he read it fluently enough, although with a pronunciation which was at least singular. Whether he understood it is a different question.

In one of my walks I had the advantage of being accompanied by Bushri Hauipi, the Tarantchi Aksakal of the city, still a young and handsome man, who gained his prominence by being a good rider and a favourite of the last Sultan. In the various commotions he has succeeded in amassing a good fortune, and his rule is strict if not just. Wherever we went, all classes of the population seemed to stand in great awe of him, and at once explained to him in detail anything I desired

to examine; but agreeable as was his company, I began to think that it was perhaps not my best introduction to the confidence of the natives. I therefore preferred for the most part to go about alone, looking into the shops, peeping into the manufactories and mosques, and walking lazily through the bazaars and squares, watching the sports of the children, or looking at the Tarantchi women with their blue gowns and pretty embroidered caps, to being accompanied by an official like Rushri Haupi. But if I wished to ask questions I fared badly, for if Bushri Haupi did not go, it was necessary to take two interpreters, one who could speak Russian and Tarantchi, and the other Tarantchi and Chinese.

One morning an officer of my acquaintance invited me to breakfast with him at the chief Chinese restaurant. The ground-floor was given up to the lower classes of the population, while the upper story was reserved for persons who wished for a more substantial meal or for more luxury,—not that the luxury was in any case very great. The walls were lined with wooden tables, at the sides of which were placed rude benches; but at the table which had been prepared for us in one corner were placed Chinese chairs. The board had been well scoured, and all the apparatus for eating was clean and neat. The room served for a kitchen as well as a dining-room. In the middle was a great furnace, and at the further end were cooks in white gowns and aprons, busily engaged in carving, chopping, and mixing the great variety of dishes necessary for any well ordered meal. Exactly what we ate I am unable to say; but strict orders had been given that no meat should be used in the preparation of the dishes except fowls and mutton, for the Chinese are greatly addicted to the use of pork, which in this region is not always sound. I found everything, with the exception of some of the sauces, exceedingly palatable, and the delicacy of the preparation and the beauty of the dishes added greatly to the pleasure of the repast. Everything was served in small bowls, and we were provided with chop-sticks, although as a general rule the Chinese carry these for themselves, and my friend had had the forethought to send by his servant some forks and spoons. Great care had been taken in the arrangement of the dishes; the mutton, for instance, was cut in small thin slices and symmetrically

arranged in a bowl, the edge of the white fat being tinted a delicate rose colour. A salad was made of exceedingly thin slices of radish, each of which was pure white with a red border, and to relieve the dish were a few strips of green pepper. Other dishes, such as rice and fowls, were slightly tinted with saffron or relieved by the bright red of fresh peppers or the dark green of leeks. The number of vegetables found here was really surprising, especially after the paucity of them through Central Asia. We had brought with us a bottle of wine, for the only drink to be obtained besides tea was an extremely strong liquor called by the various races *Ju*, *Junjun*, or *Shavju*. This liquor is made by the fermentation of barley, sorghum, rice, and other grains, and contains sixty per cent. of pure alcohol, a great quantity of fusel oil, and sometimes a mixture of opium. The taste is disagreeable and the odour is in the highest degree disgusting. The little which I took seemed like liquid fire. During the Chinese rule *ju* was distilled under government supervision, and an excise duty was levied upon it. It appears that it is now freely manufactured, but it has of late been found necessary to prohibit its sale where troops are stationed, as its effects are sometimes poisonous. The Russian soldiers are exceedingly partial to it, on account of the length of time the effects of intoxication produced by it last. They say that when they get over being drunk, all they have to do is to warm themselves a little in the sun, and they feel again as happy as ever.

On the order of the Commandant, Bushri brought to us one evening some Chinese musicians and comedians. The musical instruments were few and simple. One of the musicians had a kind of flute, another a guitar with two strings, while the third filled in the harmony by beating with a little stick on three porcelain bowls of different sizes, which he held in his hand. The music was very singular, and I was not sufficiently accustomed to it to perceive all its beauty. It must have had some beauty as the natives seemed to enjoy it greatly. We had one or two dances by a man dressed in Chinese costume, who held a long stick of bamboo covered with little bells and jingling pieces of metal. The comedians were only two, a man, and a boy dressed as a woman. They wore the ordinary Chinese dress, except that they were masked for the occasion by the

application of flour and a little red chalk to their faces, by odd wigs, and by a few bits of trumpery finery about their clothes. The first piece, which was in the nature of an opera sung in alternate strains, represented first a courtship, then the joys of early married life, and finally the distress of the wife at the long absence of her husband on some trading expedition. He returned, but only to relate with grief to his wife that he had lost all his money and was utterly ruined, and to upbraid her that during his absence she had spent what little he had left at home. Then followed mutual reproaches, threats of suicide and murder, and finally a reconciliation, which was comic in the extreme. The other piece was a farce, but of such a very Chinese character that it was impossible for me to learn what was the subject or what were the situations. Apparently—to judge from the laughter of the few spectators who understood Chinese—the jests were of the broadest character.

Of the population of the city of Kuldja, which is estimated at 10,000, the Tarantchis constitute fully one-half. The number of Tarantchis in the province is now estimated at about 40,000. Baron Kaulbars gives the highest total population of the province at 130,000, divided as follows: Tarantchis, 40,000; Dungans, 10,000; Chinese and Sibos, 5,000; Kalmuks, 30,000; Kirghiz, 35,000; and Torgots, 10,000. The number of Dungans is probably over-estimated, while the number of Chinese is in reality more. Other investigators estimate the total population at less than 100,000. We know that before the insurrection the number of Dungans was about 60,000, of Chinese 100,000, and of Mantchus 80,000, of which last hardly 500 now remain. According to these data the nomad population have remained about the same, because they suffered little during the war. The total population of the country during Chinese times would have been at least 350,000, *i.e.* three and a half times more than it is now. From this it is easy to understand the devastation caused by the war, and the ruin which, owing to the diminution of the population, fell upon the trade, agriculture, and prosperity of the country.

The resources of the province are still great. The soil is fertile, and needs only patient industry and care to render it very productive. As to minerals, the mountains abound in iron and copper, and coal of a very excellent quality is found

within fifteen miles of the city of Kuldja. This coal is constantly worked, as it forms almost the only fuel of the population, and, in spite of the general rise in prices caused by the Russian occupation, the price of coal, according to the quality, is from 3 kopeks to 5 kopeks a *pud* (5s. to 8s. a ton). Other articles of consumption are as cheap in proportion. Beef and mutton cost $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ to $2d.$ per lb., and a fowl can be procured for $2d.$ Flour costs 20 kopeks, or $7d.$ for a *pud* of 36 lb.; unground wheat is half that price, and rice is less, whilst other grains are even cheaper. Prices of grain and flour have doubled and even tripled since the advent of the Russians, as in 1870 a little more than 100 lb. of excellent flour sold for 18 kopeks. The trade of the province is at present unimportant, and even in the Chinese times, in spite of the efforts made by the Russians to encourage commerce, neither the imports nor the exports ever reached 30,000*l.* per annum.

Almost everything I saw in the valley of the Ili led me to believe that this was in every respect the richest portion of the Asiatic provinces recently occupied by the Russians. In the present unsettled state of affairs—as the Russian Government has not yet decided whether it will retain this province, or restore it to the Chinese—Russian colonisation is not allowed. While Kuldja offers a rich field for Russian labour it is open to doubt whether Russian peasants, with their shiftless habits, would be able to make as much out of the country, and support as large a population, as did the Chinese with their economy and well-organised system of cultivation. It, however, seems to be the only part of Central Asia that will ever repay the expenses bestowed upon it; and, from economical and other motives, it would seem to be very unwise for the Russians any longer to entertain the idea of giving it up to China, even should the Chinese send an army sufficiently large to preserve order in the event of the province being handed over to them. At present, as the Russians have but a small garrison there, the population is only kept down by the mutual hatred of the different races composing it. At the time of my visit there were rumours of an approaching Chinese force, and that the Russians were soon to evacuate the country. I heard a Tarantchi say, ‘As soon as the Russians have turned their backs we will massacre all the Chinese and Dzungans who are left.’ The few Chinese still re-

maining in Kuldja have frequently stated that in the event of the Russians abandoning the country they would either precede them or accompany them.

The Russian administrators are naturally greatly impeded by the uncertain tenure of their sway; and as they regard their occupation as possibly merely a temporary one, they are unable to take any measures looking to the permanent improvement of the country or of its inhabitants. Temporary measures, however, have been taken by Colonel Wartmann, who has established a small school for the benefit of the Russian soldiers as well as of those natives who desire to learn Russian, to which he has succeeded in attracting about thirty native children. In addition to this six sons of Cossacks were placed at a Dungan school, and at the time of my visit were rapidly displaying great proficiency both in Chinese and Kalmuk. As I was unable to hear of more than one person in the Russian service who spoke these languages, the boys will, in the course of a year or two, undoubtedly be of great use.

The inhabitants of the immediate neighbourhood of Kuldja are nearly all Tarantchis, this being the region in which these people were settled by the Chinese authorities. With but few exceptions they are agriculturists. The valleys of the Kunges and of the Kash are inhabited by the Torgots and the Kalmuks, remnants of the old Jungarians and descendants of those Kalmuk tribes who, as I have before mentioned, returned from the Lower Volga in the beginning of the last century. I had no opportunity during my short stay to get so far into the valley, but as the condition of these people is of some little interest, I shall quote a few observations from a report of Mr. Aristof, who visited them in the spring of 1873, and who was for some time director of the chancery for the affairs of Kuldja, and is an exceedingly well-informed and careful observer.¹ 'The valley of the Kunges,' he says, 'is the natural prolongation of the valley of the Ili to the east, extending about 110 miles from its union with the Ili to the mouth of the defile from which it issues; its breadth is from ten to twenty miles. Including the salt pools and places destitute of water, no less than half of this valley is fit for agriculture, and it is able to support at least 2,000 families. The middle and the upper

¹ Quoted by Khoroshkin in 'Turkistan Gazette,' No. 13, 1875.

parts of the valley are the best in regard to the abundance of water, pastures, and meadows, as well as for forests. The lower part of the right bank for about thirty miles is waterless and salt, but the left bank of the Kunges, even on its lower course, is only in places covered with salt pools, and is watered by the river Tsanma and by canals brought from the Tekes, which formerly irrigated a great extent of the arable land now abandoned. In the upper part of the valley, and in the mountains, there are many species of trees, such as poplar, apple, apricot, elm, fir, birch, and mountain-ash, besides many kinds of bushes and shrubs. The valley of the Kunges is lower than that of the Tekes, but the climate is warmer, and is nowhere unfavourable to agriculture. The river is everywhere deep, and flows chiefly in one channel, which has a rocky character only in the upper part of the valley. There are few fords.

During Chinese rule the valley of the Kunges was occupied by nomad Kalmuks of the tribe of Arbun, who now live on the Kash. Since 1871 the valley of the Kunges has been occupied by Torgots, who came here to be under Russian protection from the Yulduz and from Karashar, where they were oppressed by the Kashgarians. The Kunges valley is not entirely suitable for nomads and their herds, for although forage is abundant it is very warm in summer, and in the winter the snow is deep. I therefore met in the valley but a very small number of *auls* with sheep. The greater part of the *auls* wander during the summer in the mountains between the Kunges and the Tsanma and along the Tsanma and Jirgialan. Here there is plenty of room for them and much grass. The upper parts of the mountain valleys abound in excellent land, owing to the abundance of good soil and water, but the grass is woody, high, and broad-leaved. The Torgots have their winter quarters on the Jirgialan, and especially in the mountains between the Kunges and the Kash, next the tribe of Arbun. Until the Mussulman insurrection the Karashar Torgots were governed by a Khan, who exercised immediate authority over fifty *sumuls* and companies. In all there were fifty-four *sumuls*, with one hundred to two hundred kubitkas in each. At the beginning of the insurrection the Khan went to Peking for the usual presentation to the Emperor, and after that could not return to his tribe, because the Chinese, in part

by promises and favours and in part by threats, retained him in Mongolia, so as through him to keep up relations with the Torgots, from whom they expected to receive help in their campaign against the Mussulmans. Up to 1871 the Khan could not return to his people, in part through the difficulty of getting to the Yulduz through the Mussulman countries. After the occupation of Kuldja in the autumn of 1871 the Torgots emigrated from the Yulduz to the Kunges, and the Khan was informed by General Kolpakofsky that he could return to his people. He did not, however, return, for the Chinese were unwilling to let slip from their hands a force which could act upon one of the races living in the valley of Ili. In consequence of this instructions were given that no order of the Khan, in whose name the Chinese began to collect cattle, grain, &c., should be obeyed by the Torgots. After the departure of the Khan for Peking the second Prince, Gun, was the most powerful individual. In 1871 he came to the Russians as the head of the race, and was afterwards entrusted with the task of relieving the Torgots. The other princes and chiefs, however, did not leave him; and continued to have relations with the present Khan and with the Chinese Government. With them were associated the wife of the Khan, who with her two sons had remained amongst the people, and the Lamas, of whom there are very many among the Torgots, and for whose support heavy contributions are yearly raised from the people.'

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION.

Difficult'es of administration—The Steppe Commission—Project for the government of Turkistan—New projects proposed—Opposition to them—The results of Russian rule—Financial and economical—Deficits—Cost of government—Effect of the Russian administration—Character of the officials—Personal relations of Russians to natives—What has been done for the country—Roads—Schools—Hospitals—Passports—Too much civilisation—Elective institutions—Change and variability of Russian rule—Arbitrariness of officials—Influence of bad natives—Corruption and venality—Corrupt officials unpunished—Consequent discontent—Evidences of it in recent events.

THE extent of the country occupied by the Russians in Central Asia,—325,000 square miles English, as large as Germany and Italy—together with its scanty and scattered population of 1,600,000 men, no more than that of Denmark, and its distance from the home government, have rendered the work of administration a difficult one.¹ The real strength of the Russians—the power by which they keep down or attach to themselves the native inhabitants—has been, and must for some time be, the army, which in 1873 numbered about 36,000 men, including the Cossacks, and which, since the capture of Khiva and the war in Khokand, has been considerably increased. But no sooner had the first step in conquest been taken, and the permanent occupation of Tashkent been decided upon, than the Russian Government set itself seriously to work to provide some method for the civil administration of the country, and endeavoured to give the

¹ This is the Russian estimate without the more recent acquisitions of Kuldja, the Amu Darya district and Khokand, which would bring up the population to 2,500,000—a large estimate, though less than that of Switzerland,—and the extent of territory to 460,000 square miles, equal to that of the Austrian Empire, Germany, and Belgium taken together.

inhabitants a more settled government and better laws than they had enjoyed under their native rulers.

The movement of 1864 for the formation of a new line to fill up the gap between Fort Perovsky and Vierny, and of which the unforeseen result was the capture of Tashkent, had been made by troops moving both from Siberia and Orenburg under the orders of two Governors-General. Colonel—afterwards General—Tchernaief, after the withdrawal of General Verevkin had for some time almost independent command, and with great good-sense administered the newly acquired territory with as little change as possible from native usage and native law, and by means of native officials. On his recall in 1866, General Romanofsky was appointed Governor, with only a few general rules to guide his conduct in the administration; but, instead of having an independent command, he was made subject to the orders of the Governor-General of Orenburg. At the same time, in order to learn the special necessities of that part of the steppe which had been newly annexed, as well as of the city population, which was so different in character from the nomads, a special commission was appointed, consisting of Mr. Giers and Cols. Dandeville, Geins, and Protsenko, which devoted itself for two years to travelling over the country and to studying the wishes and interests of the population.

This commission—known as the Steppe Commission—did very good service, and in the spring of 1867 was ready with a report and a project for the better government of the country. The experience of two years had also been useful in showing the Government what it was necessary to do. The project was referred to a committee composed of delegates from the Ministries of War, of the Interior, and of Foreign Affairs, under the presidency of the Minister of War, was accepted with modifications, and was put in force for a term of three years. The most important of the changes decided upon by this committee were to detach Turkistan from the province administered by the Governor-General of Orenburg, and to add to it a part of the Siberian province of Semipalatinsk, now known as Semiretch, and place them under the rule of a separate Governor-General, who should report only to the Emperor at St. Petersburg, and who should have full powers granted to him in certain respects so as to meet emergencies. Against this arrangement

General Kryzhanofsky, the Governor-General of Orenburg, naturally protested, on the ground that such an arrangement would be premature, as it would be necessary first to bind the region somewhat more strongly to Russia; for Turkistan being far off from the rest of the empire, and separated by regions inhabited by nomad tribes, an independent administration would seek the motives for its acts exclusively in Central Asiatic life, and would sooner or later come to be in disaccord with the interests and the views of the Imperial Government. General Kryzhanofsky added: 'The period of conquest without a determined purpose has now passed; therefore the causes also have ceased which would render indispensable in Turkistan persons of authority with wide powers, so that all that the political, military, and administrative needs demand can be met by a military governor acting within the fixed rights given to him.' Another reason was, that as a great part of the province of Turkistan was inhabited by Kirghiz, of exactly the same tribes and families as those in the province of Orenburg, the Kirghiz would be forced to live under two administrations, a state of things which would be productive of disputes and difficulties.

Experience has shown that the reasoning of General Kryzhanofsky was sound, but at the time he was alone in his opposition.

Mr. Giers and Colonel Protsenko were opposed to including Semiretch in the new province, as the interests of the Siberian frontier were so totally different from those on the side of Khokand and Bukhara; but the military authorities, having once resolved on creating a new Governor-General, wished to provide him with a sufficiently large territory over which to rule, in order to prove the necessity of his appointment. One other resolution was arrived at by the committee, which was that the interests of the State demanded that all the administration be concentrated in the hands of the War Office.

The main features of this project are as follows. The Governor-General is appointed directly by the Emperor, and has much the same powers as Governors-General in other parts of the country, with the exceptions provided for by the project. He has besides the right in case of need to suspend the regulations or to make exceptions to them. He is at the same time commander-in-chief of the forces, and possesses full power to carry on diplomatic relations with the neighbouring countries.

The amount of his salary, which is said to be 50,000 rubles, is not fixed by the regulations, but is determined by a direct order of the Emperor. Under him are the two provinces of Syr Darya and Semiretch, each governed by a Military Governor, receiving a salary of 7,000 rubles, appointed on the nomination of the Ministry of War, and having a general position similar to that of Governors of provinces in other parts of the Empire. The Military Governor of Semiretch is at the same time the Ataman of the Semiretch Cossacks. These Governors are assisted by a council known as the Provincial Regency, appointed, with the exception of the heads of departments, by the Governor.

The province of the Syr Darya was divided into the districts of Kazala, Perovsky, Turkistan, Tchimkent, Aulié-ata, Kurama, and Hodjent, besides the city of Tashkent, which forms a separate administrative division, and that of Semiretch into the districts of Sergiopol, Kopal, Vierny, Issyk Kul, and Tokmak. At the head of each of these departments or Uyezds is a Prefect or commandant, who has both the police and the general supervision of all the inhabitants of the district, Russian as well native. The Prefects receive salaries of 2,000 rubles; and although originally resembling in functions the district police officials in the provinces of European Russia, they now occupy a much more powerful and independent position. The nomad population, chiefly Kirghiz, is divided into *auls* and *volosts*, the *auls* comprising from one to two hundred families, and the *volosts* about ten times as many. These subdivisions are governed by administrators and elders chosen by the people themselves, and under the supervision of district prefects, who have power to remove them in case of failure of duty. Among the settled population one *aksakal*, literally 'greybeard,' is chosen over each considerable village by the vote of the people themselves; and in the cities each ward has its own *aksakal*, whose duties are the same as those of the elders in the police administration among the Kirghiz.

Justice is administered by courts of three kinds—a military court, which judges natives for inciting to rebellion, attacks on the post or on military transports, and for the murder of Christians, or of persons who have declared a desire to become Christians, as well as for the murder of officials. For the trial of Russians and for that of natives for most other criminal

offences, as well as for the settlement of disputes between Russians and natives, courts are established on the basis of the general laws of the Empire. For all disputes between each other, and for some of the lesser crimes, the natives are allowed courts of their own. In the courts of the nomad population, of which I have already spoken,¹ the judges are called *Biis*, elected by the population, and judge according to the tribal and national traditions. These courts also decide cases of *baranta* or pillage, and of murder when committed by Kirghiz on each other. In the towns the *Kazis*, or native judges, deciding according to the Shariat or Mussulman law, are allowed to remain; but as they are made elective by delegates from the population their importance in the eyes of the natives is much diminished. For the management of the municipal and the communal affairs of the cities and villages in the province of the Syr Darya inhabited by natives, and for collecting the taxes, there were instituted 'economical communal regencies, the members of which are elected for three years at the same time with the *aksakals*; and although they are under the general direction of the *aksakals*, and of the district prefects, they are supposed to have a freedom of action, and no regulation pertaining to the local needs or to the taxes is thought to pass without their assent. Some of the taxes imposed during Mussulman rule are retained, such as the *haradj* and *tanap*, or taxes on land, and its products being fixed at one-tenth of the harvest. The *zekat*, or customs duty,² was fixed at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the value of all goods imported into the country, and the same tax is imposed on the trading capital of merchants. A tax is imposed on the nomad population of two rubles seventy-five kopeks for each *kibitka* or family.

As the native inhabitants have to provide for the payment of their own officials, as well as for the repairs of bridges and post-roads, and for the erection of prisons and Government buildings, another tax is imposed upon them, called the *zemskey*, or communal tax, the amount of which is to be settled by the police administration and by the Russian officials, and is then levied directly on the towns and villages by the Communal Regency.³

¹ Vol. i. pp. 166-169; ii. p. 140.

² See vol. i. pp. 204-6.

³ Vol. i. p. 305.

Although the term during which this project was to stand expired in 1871, the country has been governed in the main according to its provisions up to the present time. There are, however, certain exceptions. The district of Zarafshan, which was annexed in 1868, never came under them, and the rule of the Governor has therefore been almost of an arbitrary kind. The position of affairs in Kuldja and in the Amu Darya Rayon is similar. Certain changes, too, were made in the regulations by the Governor-General, in accordance with the powers granted to him, and among others the *haradj* and *tanap* taxes were merged in one general land-tax, which was divided *en bloc* among the villages, and which has since that time constantly increased in an arbitrary manner, as no survey or measurement of lands has been made. While the government of the provinces still remains in the hands of the Ministry of War, certain exceptions have been made. Instead of the financial arrangement proposed by the regulations, district treasurers and a central finance bureau were established upon the same basis as those in European Russia, subject, not to the control of the Ministry of War, but to that of the Ministry of Finance. Soon after a bureau of control was established in Tashkent independent of all other branches of the administration, which has been productive of great good in reducing expenses. The postal system—the sphere of which was subsequently enlarged by the addition of telegraph lines—was taken partly out of the hands of local authorities and rendered subject to the Ministry of the Interior.

When the term of the regulations expired—in 1871—an order of the Governor-General forbade, until the decision of the land settlement, the closing of any sales of real estate by the natives; in other words, one of the most important rights of civil society was annihilated. It may be added to this that the instructions which, by the regulations, were to be drawn up for the administration of the district prefects never went into force, and the administration of each district was, therefore, different from that of the others—sometimes in the most essential particulars—thus securing no unity of law or method.

In 1871 a new project was drawn up, but was not approved at St. Petersburg, and was returned for reconsideration. It was again brought up, in an amended form, in the autumn of

1872, but it did not even then receive the Emperor's consent. In the winter of 1874-5 another and more carefully considered project was brought from Tashkent, and was immediately discussed by a commission containing delegates from all the ministries interested in it.

The objections to this project were so serious from a financial point of view, that General Kaufmann, seeing no hope of the project passing the Council of the Empire, withdrew it, but presented it again in an amended form in the early part of 1876. It is said that this project meets with the same opposition from the Ministry of Finance as did its predecessor. The officials of Turkistan have been so long in the habit of spending large sums of money without control, that they have provided for the necessities of the Government on what is, for Russia, a very extravagant scale. The ordinary expenses of the Government are to be increased by the new project to almost double what they were under the old regulations. The expense for the police administration of a city like Vierny, for instance, of 12,000 inhabitants, is estimated at 13,800 rubles, while similar cities in European Russia demand only from 3,000 to 5,000 rubles a year.¹ It must be admitted, however, that

¹ The present annual expense for the police government of Vierny is only 1,200 rubles, so that the allowance in the new project is *eleven* times greater than the old. The police of Wilna, a city of 69,464 inhabitants, costs only 13,845 rubles. The police in Petrozavodsk, Polotsk, Pinsk, Altsensk, and Bediansk, cities of about the same size as Vierny, costs from 2,575 to 4,448 rubles yearly. It is proposed to expend on the police administration of Tashkent 29,600 rubles, or three times as much as at present. As the native town has its own police, the maintenance of which is a separate item of the budget, this expense is chiefly for the small Russian population. Even were the expense for the benefit of the whole population, the cost of the police in Kishinef, a city of 94,124 inhabitants, is only 17,158 rubles, and in Saratof, of 84,391 inhabitants, is only 15,328 rubles. The inhabitants of Kishinef and Saratof pay 18 kopeks per head, while the much poorer Tashkentians pay 37 kopeks, twice as much. In Kief the police administration has 50 members and costs only 24,473 rubles: in Tashkent for a *personnel* of 11 it is proposed to spend 29,600 yearly. The total pay of the Prefect of Tashkent, according to the project, will be 5,500 rubles, surpassing that of all police-masters (in St. Petersburg these receive 4,450 rubles, in other cities from 1,182 to 1,478 rubles), and of vice-governors (who receive from 2,273 to 3,441 rubles a year), and equalling that of many governors (29 Russian governors receive from 5,350 to 5,380 rubles each yearly.) For the chancery of the Governor-General 52,800 rubles is set apart, surpassing the cost of the chancery of every other governor general except that of Wilna. The yearly expense of the Governor-General's chancery at Moscow is 36,561 rubles, at Kief, 54,048 rubles, at Oren-

the Ministry of Finance looks upon this from a purely bureaucratic point of view, seeing no reason why the expenses of a provincial district, or city government in one part of the country should be more than in another, and believing that, notwithstanding the distance from St. Petersburg, the expense of administration in Turkistan should be no more than in other remote provinces, such as Yeneseisk or the Amur.

From a general point of view, however, the ideas of General Kaufmann are more probably correct, for it is impossible to find honest men, who will prove themselves at the same time capable administrators, for the beggarly salary which they in general receive. It is perfectly well known that in the provinces of European Russia almost every police and administrative official adds to his scanty income two or three and even ten times the amount properly received from the Government,—getting it in various ways out of the public. In this case, however, while the salaries have been greatly raised, the chief increase of expenses arises from an increase in the number of officials, who are already far too many. Where the Ministry of Finance is clearly right is in thinking that the importance of Turkistan to the Empire and the necessities of its administration do not demand so great an expenditure of money, and that some of the bureaux and boards of administration comprised in the project are utterly useless and unnecessary, and will only cause a waste of money. Such, for instance, is a Forest Department,—in a country where the trees can almost be counted on one's fingers,—which, with its central board of administration, its officials in each district, and its officers and guardians, is expensive and superfluous. The Mining Department is open to almost the same objection.¹ The Ministry also objects to paying

burg, 39,234 rubles; at Riga, 33,412 rubles; of Eastern Siberia, 40,242 rubles; of Western Siberia, 35,090 rubles; and at Wilna, 67,628 rubles. By the present system the expenses for the *civil administration* of the province of Turkistan are nominally 438,340 rubles; by the new project they are estimated at 1,360,570 rubles, or more than three times as much. In extent the province of Turkistan (without Kuldja and the Amu Darya) is about equal to that of Semipalatinsk or Tomsk, and in population it is rather less than the provinces of Perm or Viatka in European Russia.

¹ For the Mining Department, the sum of 12,750 rubles yearly is asked beside the 28,000 annually spent in exploration for coal. It is also proposed to establish a central Bureau of Archives, at a cost of 5,500 rubles yearly, of which 2,000 rubles go to the salary of the Director. It would hardly be supposed that,

22,000 rubles a year for the support of the 'Turkistan Gazette,' while the 'Journal of the Ministry of Ways of Communication,' and the 'Journal of the Ministry of Crown Domains,' cost about 7,000 or 8,000 rubles a year only, and are of much more importance and use.

Another and perhaps more serious objection to the new project, which has also been a drawback of late to the general efficiency of the administration of Turkistan, is the attempt made to apply Russian laws to the natives, and to assimilate the administration of the country to that of the other provinces of the Empire. The attempt to introduce the benefits of a high civilisation, and especially the effort to spread elective and democratic institutions among people whose education for ages has been entirely in an opposite direction, is a most dangerous one. Gen. Tcherniaief, who as an administrator was unequalled, and who seemed to know by instinct what it was best to do, strongly condemns the present methods of the Russian administration, and lays great stress on the rule which he adopted when he was at the head of affairs, that the Russian power should not be placed at the head of the local administration, but as it were on one side, so as merely to control the Government and to protect the inhabitants in case of injustice; in other words, his idea was to allow the country as much as possible to govern itself in accordance with the old-established laws and institutions, thus giving the Russians—by not mixing in the details of the government—a greater moral power, and effecting an enormous saving of money and forces. Another officer of great experience writes as follows: 'The new *régime* will assimilate the position of Asiatics to that of Russians and subject them to the same laws, notwithstanding the fact that our Government on annexing the country formally declared to the inhabitants that their judicial system called the Shariat should be guaranteed to them. This declaration constituted one of the chief elements of our moral and political influence over the natives. Of course Russian legislation must be applied sooner or later to the Asiatic peoples who enter into the circle of our

in the ten years of Russian rule enough important papers had accumulated to render such a bureau necessary. The Archives of the Senate at St. Petersburg cost but 6,144 rubles a year, those of the Ministry of Crown Domains but 2,164 rubles, while two of the most important Archive Bureaux in the Empire, at Wilna and Kief, together need only 6,109 rubles.

possessions, but it would be better for this to be brought about later than sooner, for it is impossible to use constraint with regard to the manners and customs of the country, and annul a *régime* of tolerance, especially when we do not even know the country which we wish to reform from top to bottom. In acting thus we committed a great fault, of which our antagonists have always taken advantage. It is evident that there ought to be no question about introducing new things into a country where we have not yet succeeded in acquiring a just idea of the old.'

With these remarks on the theory and character of the Russian administration in Central Asia let us now consider how these ideas have been carried out, and what the effect has been on both the Russians and the natives.

We will first consider this from a financial and economical point of view. The actual cost of the conquest was very slight. When the first movement in Central Asia was made General Tcherniaief received 15,000 rubles for the expenses of the campaign, and General Verevkin 200,000 rubles, to which subsequently 50,000 more were added; 234,000 rubles only were spent, the remaining 10,000 being transferred to General Tcherniaief. Tcherniaief was greatly in need of money, and was obliged frequently to give receipts for the camels and the provisions he took, and also to borrow from the natives. In reality the first campaign was conducted almost entirely upon credit, and when the commission settled up affairs it was found that the whole cost of the conquest was only 519,500 rubles. This was exclusive of two journeys of General Kryzhanofsky, which cost perhaps half that sum, and of the pay and rations of the troops, which they would equally have drawn had they remained at home in the provinces of Orنبurg and Western Siberia. The campaign of General Romanofsky in 1866 is estimated at 250,000 rubles. The expedition which resulted in the capture of Samarkand cost 150,000 rubles. In this way the cost of acquiring nearly the whole of the territory at present occupied by the Russians amounted to 900,000 rubles, of which 500,000 were paid by Bukhara as a military contribution. Of course the Khivan campaign and the late campaign against Khokand, to say nothing of the expeditions

in the mountains of the Zarafshan, against Shahrisabs and Karshi, and the expedition against Kuldja, have materially added to this cost, but the extension of territory caused by them has been in reality but slight.

Central Asia was then thought to be a rich country, and was regarded almost as a promised land. It was believed that not only would it support the troops stationed there, but that it would also afford large and increasing revenues to the Government. What I have said in a previous chapter about the commerce, agriculture, and mineral resources of the country will show how far this was in reality from being the case.¹ It is probable that the erroneous idea of the resources of the region had some influence in the establishment there of a Governor-General and in making Turkistan a separate administrative region. At the time the argument certainly was used that this would cost no more than before, for no more troops would be necessary, and that there would be merely a transference of accounts from Orenburg and Western Siberia to the new province of Turkistan. It was stated in the report to the Committee of Ministers of June 30 (July 12), 1867, that the military administration of the new province, with all the local military boards dependent upon it, would not be any further drain upon the Imperial treasury, as all the expenses could be met by the moneys already at the disposal of the Minister of War, in consequence of the economy which would be effected in the administration of the military districts of Orenburg and Western Siberia, from the territory of which the new province was taken. It was said also that the military-civil administration, although it was a source of new expenditure of considerable amount, would yet make no real difference to the Imperial treasury, as all these expenses would be covered by the province itself, a considerable portion of which would still be left free to aid the treasury in covering the expenses of the troops. This, however, has proved to be very far from the truth. The military expenses of Orenburg and Western Siberia have not to any perceptible degree diminished, but have rather increased. The army in Turkistan, owing to new military movements, has been constantly increased, and the military expenses are far beyond what was expected; they even exceed those of Orenburg and

¹ See Chaps. V., VII., and VIII.

Western Siberia combined. In addition to this actual increase of expenses the revenues have been so small as not only to leave no surplus, but even to prove insufficient to cover the expenses of the administration.

So far, there have been only deficits in the budget of Turkistan, which have increased year by year, until in 1872 it amounted to 5,500,000 rubles, and in 1873 it was probably more than 7,000,000 rubles. The income and the expenditure of Turkistan for the five years from 1868 to 1872 were as follows, in rubles¹:—

Year	Income	Expenditure	Deficit
1868 . . .	1,204,906	4,392,940	3,188,034
1869 . . .	2,356,241	4,592,460	2,236,219
1870 . . .	2,915,983	6,114,883	3,198,900
1871 . . .	2,102,955	6,820,945	4,717,990
1872 . . .	2,008,374	7,576,116	5,567,842
Total . . .	10,588,459	29,497,414	18,908,955

In these statements of expenditure are not included the preliminary expenses for the army for articles which are made in Russia. These enter into the general budget of the Empire, where there is no comparison of one part of the country with another, so as to show what would be properly charged to the province of Turkistan. Besides this there were received in 1871 400,000 rubles as a war contribution from Bokhara, which are not included in the budget, but were spent without account there. The revenues of the Zarafshan district from 1868 to 1872 do not appear in the budget, being until that time at the special disposition of the Governor-General. These revenues amounted to 335,458 rubles in 1868, to 454,931 rubles in 1869, to 762,058 rubles in 1870, and to 1,414,092 rubles in 1871. In 1873 the taxes were diminished, and the revenues were included in the general budget.

An idea may be obtained of the capacities and state of the country by analysing one of the budgets, say for the year 1872.

The income of the country is of two kinds: first, that coming especially from the country itself and its population;

¹ The income for 1875 was estimated at 2,509,234 rubles, showing no great development of the resources of the country in the last three years.

and, second, that which is, as it were, moved on from Russia, obtained from the Russians who live there. The local revenues amounted to 1,328,200 rubles only. Of these the personal taxes and taxes on kubitkas amounted to 566,000 rubles, the road-tax brought 154,000 rubles, and the tax on land and its products brought 276,000 rubles. The duty from internal trade was 15,000 rubles. The entire indirect taxes on articles of consumption, including the duty on articles of foreign trade, amounted to 224,000 rubles, to which should be added the duty on tea imported from India, amounting to 10,000 rubles. The receipts paid to Government for articles sold were 13,000 rubles, from Government property—as, for instance, rents of shops in the bazaar—32,400 rubles; and for freights on steamers of the Aral flotilla, 800 rubles. The coal taken from the Government mines amounted to 4,600 rubles; but the quantity actually sold in 1872 brought in only 100 rubles. Wood and timber brought in 8,500 rubles. This shows the unproductiveness of the country and the undeveloped state of its mineral wealth. There were collected 21,400 rubles of previous taxes; and, among smaller items, foreign passports for natives brought in 700 rubles. The revenues received chiefly from Russians were as follows: Direct taxes of various kinds, 6,200 rubles; in direct taxes, from articles of consumption, 255,000 rubles, most of which was from the excise on spirits. The taxes for rising in official rank brought in 19,000 rubles in the year; the postal revenues amounted to 44,000 rubles; and the telegraph, which was at that time open to Vierny only, 3,000 rubles; while the sale of powder and cartridges brought in 1,200 rubles. The sale of treasury notes produced 16,000 rubles; the sale of various Government property, such as medicines, useless things, &c., brought in 14,000 rubles; and private work at the Government printing office was done to the amount of 2,500 rubles. The return of money illegally obtained from the treasury, fines, and the pension capital brought in 20,000 rubles. The chief increase in articles of revenue is in the excise on liquors, the stamp-tax on documents, and the postal revenues. The excise on liquors and rights for sale of liquors in 1868 was 114,000 rubles; in 1869, 129,000 rubles; in 1870, 213,000 rubles; in 1871, 240,000 rubles; and in 1872, 255,000 rubles. The stamp-tax produced in 1868 3,000 rubles,

and in 1872 26,000 rubles ; but this was not placed on a proper basis before the year 1870. The postal revenue was only 9,800 rubles in 1868, and in 1872 was 65,300 rubles. As the natives do not use liquors to any extent, it being against the principles of the Koran, the excise is paid, of course, by the Russian population only ; and as in the course of five years the produce of the tax has more than doubled, it would seem as if the Russian population had also doubled in that time. It is, however, not probable that the Russian population of Turkistan is more than 100,000, from which must be deducted the Tartars, who do not drink ; consequently every Russian in the province during 1872 paid a tax of at least two rubles per head for the right of drinking ; a large sum as compared with the usual statistics for the use of liquors in other populations. It was at first expected to unite all branches of the administration under the War Department, but this was found to have a very bad effect upon the finances of the country, and it subsequently became necessary to take the finances, as well as the post, away from the control of the military. Since that time a branch of the control department has been established in Tashkent, which has succeeded not only in greatly reducing the expenses, but in returning to the treasury sums which had been erroneously taken from it.

The main items for expenses in 1872 are in round numbers as follows :—

	Rubles
1. Salaries and expenses of officials	802,400
2. Pay and maintenance of the army	3,015,200
3. Horses for the cavalry and artillery	1,249,100
4. Medical department of the army	138,800
5. Building expenses	205,000
6. Lighting and heating	252,900
7. Munitions of war	36,900
8. The Aral flotilla	57,800
9. Travelling expenses	129,200
10. Transportation	222,700
11. Postal expenses	696,800
12. Printing Office	29,700
13. Extra expenses	486,200
14. Schools	12,600
15. Geological and economical investigation	20,300
16. Provincial expenses, roads, budget, &c.	146,150
17. Assistance to Cossack troops, &c.	38,700
18. Various expenses	51,400

The total expenses amount to 7,576,186 rubles; to this sum should be added at least 500,000 rubles for the expenses for articles for the army, &c., made in other parts of Russia, but destined for this province. If we at the same time deducted those revenues raised exclusively from the Russians residing in the country, about 361,000 rubles, we should find the real local income as about 1,627,000 rubles, while the expenses would be 8,000,000 rubles.

It will be seen that the expenses of government are very large, but it is difficult to say exactly where economy should begin. Before the recent war with Khokand, and the popular discontent manifested at the time, good judges of the country—men who had themselves served there—believed that only half the present number of troops was necessary, but it is doubtful whether such is now the case. Such a diminution of the troops would of course materially reduce the expenses. There are also other things which, perhaps, are not great in themselves, but which mount up to a large sum. For instance, the expense of the Tashkent fair, during 1872, amounted to 150,000 rubles—an expense utterly useless and uncalled for. The sum of 30,000 rubles is expended on the repairing and keeping up the house and garden of the Governor-General; 30,000 rubles a year are also given to the horse-breeding establishment, which,—although if properly cared for, it might be of some service to the country,—is not an absolute necessity, and serves merely as a comfortable berth for certain members of the Governor-General's Chancery. When the province of Turkistan was brought under a separate Governor-General it was thought that it might probably reduce the expenses of Orenburg and Western Siberia, but experience has shown that the expenses of these provinces are not at all diminished, and we have the addition of very large sums to keep up the officials, and staffs of officials, who are now in Tashkent. As Turkistan is a separate governorship-general and military district it must have all the central administrations, in order that it may be entirely independent of others. Thus, there is a central administration of artillery, a central administration of the army, a central administration of the finances &c., all of which could be quite as well managed at Orenburg or Omsk. General Tcherniaief, who certainly knows the country as well as anyone, in a long and able

report which he made in 1872 to the Ministry of Finance expressed his strong opinion that it would be advisable on financial as well as on political grounds to return to the old order of things—to abolish the office of Governor-General, and to restore the province of Turkistan to the Governor-General of Orenburg.

At the time of the march of the Russian troops to Tashkent it was thought that it would be of great advantage to occupy the fertile oasis of Central Asia, for one reason, among others, that it would be so much easier and cheaper to support the troops. It is questionable, however, whether this has proved to be the case. In 1872 the Treasury spent, for the provision of the army, 972,777 roubles, which, with an average of 30,000 enlisted men, the number returned, would cost $32\frac{1}{2}$ roubles per man; and in these figures are only included flour and groats. The expense therefore is enormous, but it is easily understood when we see that a quarter of flour costs in Tashkent from 10 to 12 roubles, which in almost any province of European Russia would be considered a famine price. The maintenance of the cavalry is still dearer. The number of horses belonging to the Government in the whole district is between 4,000 and 5,000, and 1,000,000 roubles is spent for forage, consequently about 200 roubles per horse; yet this is the country where we are constantly told that the harvest is sometimes eighty to one hundred fold, and that twice a year, while clover and hay can be cut four times a year. Although cattle-raising is the main occupation of the Central Asiatic Steppes yet the Government pays not less than 2 roubles 40 kopeks for a *pud* (36 lb.) of beef or mutton, a price which would even be dear where cattle-breeding was unknown.

There is one curious thing in connection with the prices paid for provisions: grain is dear because there is a tax of ten per cent. on the products of the land. The Government in 1872 received as the produce of that tax 276,000 roubles, and at the same time spent about 2,000,000 roubles for flour and forage. Ten per cent. on this is 200,000 roubles, and supposing that three-fourths of these provisions were produced in the country, the Government must have paid itself, in the province of Syr Darya, at least 150,000 roubles of this tax from one hand into the other. The remainder of the sum received, therefore, 126,000 roubles, must have fallen on the population, which in the province of

Syr Darya is not less than 800,000, who, it follows, were supported on 1,260,000 rubles, while 30,000 troops required 2,000,000 rubles. It would seem from this that something must be wrong with the commissariat or with the financial system. It is evident from the foregoing that Turkistan is not, and will not be for some time to come, a self-sustaining province; but, at the same time, such a result could hardly be expected in the ten or twelve years that the Russians have had possession of the country.

The primary objects which led to the occupation of Central Asia were rather military than financial; and as long as the province is considered valuable from a military and political point of view the financial burden must be borne. It seems, however, difficult to expect great ultimate profit from the country from any point of view; the utmost that can be desired in this case is that strict economy be practised, the expenses of the country reduced, and its capacities developed, so as to diminish the burden as much as possible. Many wars will constantly be made, and the Russians will have to go further on, not with the desire of conquest, but from circumstances over which they have no control; for in such a case it is always necessary to maintain the prestige of the country, and not allow the neighbouring powers to take advantage of any seeming weakness or hesitancy.

So much has been said in Russia, of late, of the cost of the government at Turkistan, that, by a skilful manipulation of figures, an effort has been made on the part of Tashkentan officials to prove that, instead of there being a deficit of nearly 19,000,000 rubles during the five years, 1868-72, there has been, on the contrary, a surplus of nearly 4,000,000 rubles. This has been done by deducting from the expenses all those which relate to the support of the army, or indeed to the military forces; and this method of viewing the subject is advanced on the ground that the cost of defending the frontier and of maintaining intact the boundaries of the Empire should not fall alone upon the province where the troops are stationed, but should form part of the general expenses of the Empire, of which the province in question should bear its own proper proportion only. There is, indeed, a grain of truth in this, but the 40,000 troops now stationed in Turkistan are not there for

the sole purpose of protecting the frontier. Their main *raison d'être* is to keep down and govern the population of the province. Besides this, in estimating the cost of Turkistan to Russia it would be unfair to leave out of view the military expenses, because, had the province not been occupied, these military expenses would not have existed. With the exception of the few Siberian, Orenburg, and Ural Cossacks who have been sent into Turkistan, the troops are all local, as may be seen by their being called Turkistan battalions. They are acknowledged as an army for the purpose of defending Turkistan, and were enrolled for that purpose. They are an addition to the military forces of the country, no regiment or company of which has been abolished to make room for those new battalions. It may not, perhaps, be necessary that the province of Turkistan should be able to pay the whole expense of its government, but in that case the question must necessarily arise to every reflecting man, what are the advantages resulting from the occupation of the province which counterbalance so great an additional expense?

The effect of the methods of Russian administration in Central Asia upon the troops and officials themselves is a matter of curious inquiry. In this respect I can hardly do better than rely upon the report (written in 1871) of an officer who at that time held a high position in Turkistan, which, being written from an almost exclusively military point of view, is all the more valuable. According to this authority the natives profess profound respect for the Russian army, for it is, in their eyes, the only expression of Russian power. 'The military instruction and the *morale* of our soldiers have sensibly improved. The victories which they have gained over the Asiatics, and the tradition of former exploits, have raised their spirit and rendered them capable of supporting unheard-of fatigue. Our troops have done more than could be desired. They construct houses for their own needs and establishments for the administration. They clear up the old roads and make new ones. They cut wood, assist in the colonisation of the country, and furnish vigorous workmen. It is impossible to say that they execute all these works without prejudice to their military qualities, although their

actual state is very satisfactory, especially for a country such as Central Asia. In order that they may attain the desired degree of perfection which the Russian army ought to present much time is necessary, as well as a whole series of reforms, which would tend to ameliorate their condition. For our troops in Turkistan to attain the desired degree of instruction they should first of all be relieved from the outside work that occupies the greater part of their time. Their moral state and their discipline will reach the desired degree of perfection when the Administration is able to satisfy their most pressing needs and give them their arrears of pay which are still due. The spirit of our army will be raised when it sees that the Government is careful of its good maintenance, and that measures are taken to prevent it from suffering any delay in its supplies.

‘But the true scourge which engenders the moral unhealthiness consists in the corps of officers. That is an essential point in the defective condition of our military organisation in Turkistan, which in more ways than one merits the attention of our Government. As long as the military administration does not give up the habit of getting rid of its bad officers by sending them to Turkistan, and as long as the army of this region does not cease to serve as a refuge for the scum of military society, we cannot in any way elevate the *morale* of the army or organise its discipline on a more solid basis. In the mass of the army this category of officers passes unseen, especially where large bodies of troops are collected together; but in Turkistan, where the troops are disseminated over a vast territory in small numbers, and where the best officers are kept at the principal points, the bad officers must necessarily paralyse by their presence results which could be obtained through ameliorating the corps of officers of Turkistan, by sending out young officers who had finished their courses in the superior military schools. With what eyes, in truth, can we regard a great part of the officers which the Guard and army furnished to the troops of Turkistan? Most of them, pressed by circumstances which they themselves create, by an irregular life, so that they find themselves incapable of fulfilling the simplest duties of their profession, seek to pass into the army of Turkistan as the only hope of regaining their lost time. The presence of

bad officers in the ranks of this army, not to speak of the deplorable influence that it exercises on the soldier, creates serious embarrassments in the military administration, for the reason that the facilities which war in Asia presents to officers to distinguish themselves and to obtain promotions pushes on individuals with whom the Government does not know what to do when they have reached the rank of colonel. They claim superior employments when they have never fulfilled the duties of subalterns. Simple good sense indicates that it would be much more rational to send to a country where promotions are obtained with greater ease than anywhere else officers capable and worthy of exercising superior functions.'

The institution in Turkistan of a local military government, which has taken the name of Civil Military Administration, constitutes also one of the principal causes of the defective condition of the troops. The best officers, on account of their good instruction, easily obtain places in this administration, which presents to them without contradiction more advantages than would be offered to them by simple service in the army. There are few officers who do not pull every string of intrigue in order to secure some place in the local administration, which will guarantee to them notorious advantages over the ordinary service. The enormous difference that exists between the position of an officer who makes part of the administration and that of a simple officer of the army poisons their mutual relations and feeds a continual antagonism between them. On the other hand, the very organisation of the local military administration has encouraged a state of things which keep up among officers of all ranks relations which should not be tolerated in the military service. For example, an officer in the army who should desire to pass into the administration, or to obtain a commission, or to be sent as courier to St. Petersburg, would address himself, not to his immediate chiefs, but to the persons from whom he hoped to have the greatest chance of success. Thanks to the continual tendencies of the local administration to overpass the sphere of its action and of its authority, it has known how to arrange it so as to obtain all that it wants.

It is to its influence, therefore, that the officers have recourse to obtain their desires.

The decisions of the administrative authorities with regard

to the steps taken by aspirants to positions as members of the local administration are sometimes contrary to the usual formalities. It is thus that the nomination of officers of the army to administrative posts is made by a decree of the Governor-General without the preliminary authorisation or consent of their superior chiefs; and these latter, seeing the futility of their efforts to ameliorate the state of the troops confided to them, and to create a good body of officers, prefer to quit the country. It is difficult to measure all the gravity of the consequences which can result from such a state of things, and the corrupting influence which it must exercise on the discipline of the officers, in consequence of the arbitrary acts of the persons entrusted with the superior administration of the country, as far as the nomination of officers of the army to administrative posts is concerned. The absence of all regulations on this head, notwithstanding the frequent notifications that have been made by the Government to the authorities of Turkistan inviting them to conform to the prescriptions of the regulations of military service, is very detrimental.

The best officers of the army naturally seek in every possible way to take part in all military operations, in order to obtain rewards which may recompense them for all that they endure in ordinary times in comparison with their comrades who exercise administrative functions, and whose service is easier, more lucrative, and more advantageous as concerns their career. After having obtained an advanced grade they covet in their turn the administrative posts.

It is, besides, to be remarked that in purely military service the officers of the army meet with rivals even among the civil functionaries. These latter sometimes take upon themselves the duties of aides-de-camp, of ordnance officers, or chiefs of control, and sometimes of officers of the staff; that is to say, that they intervene in the dispositions and against orders without understanding them. The soldiers ridicule these improvised military men, and the officers take offence at them, for these intruders enjoy a great influence over the superior officers, to the prejudice of the army.

‘ All that has been said sufficiently proves that the army of Turkistan, the only source of our power in Central Asia, is considered as a gate through which one ought to pass in order

to create for himself an advantageous position outside of its ranks. For that reason we ought not to be astonished that this same army is worse cared for in other respects. Crown lodgings have been taken away from military commanders to be given to the officers of the local administration, for whom the Government has extended its kindness so far as even to construct country houses. The chiefs of the sections of the Chancery of the Governor-General receive salaries and presents far superior to those of generals. In 1870 the extra rewards of each of them surpassed the total of the salary and perquisites of the commandant of the artillery of Turkistan. 'The pecuniary rewards that the simple copyists of the same Chancery received for having taken part in the expeditions of 1870 were greater than those received by officers of merit for all the hardships that they underwent.' The preponderance exercised by the administrative element, and the preferences granted to it to the detriment of the military class, explain with sufficient clearness why our officers of merit, who know very well that the army constitutes at present the only source of Russian political preponderance, profess hostile feelings towards the functionaries of the local administration; and if they are not devoted to their profession they seek by every possible means to leave the precarious position which they occupy in the ranks of the army. Under the influence of all these conditions most of the officers of Turkistan think little of their army service, and are not in a state of absolute subordination to their immediate chiefs, who cannot obtain for them lucrative situations.

'One of the essential conditions for the good *morale* of the army is the regular provisioning of the troops, which is a proof of the constant solicitude of the chiefs with regard to their subordinates; but, as respects the commissariat, the military region of Turkistan is far from being in such a situation that we can say with assurance that the troops receive all they need and remain satisfied. The provisioning of the troops is done in a slow and indecisive manner. The service of the commissariat is subjected to a crowd of minute formalities and to the requirements of the Control Department, which are applied with difficulty under the conditions which govern the troops of Turkistan, and especially the Cossack troops. These last generally leave Turkistan in exchange for others without

having received all the articles which ought to be furnished to them, which provokes correspondence without end between the staff of the Cossacks and the commissariat of Turkistan. This correspondence takes much time from the service of the commissariat, and prevents it from occupying itself with current affairs and the provisioning of the army of Turkistan, which produces continual discontent in the army. Complaints come from every side, and remain disregarded. The troops suffer from this state of things,—to which it is impossible to see any end. The true cause of all this disorder consists in the insufficient number of the *employés* of the commissariat department, which cannot suffice for such a vast region as that of Turkistan. The absence of capable and experienced individuals, and the defects in well-organised communications, are also two of the principal causes of this state of affairs.'

'The administration of the engineering department is also one of the sources of difficulties. It contains several good officers, but it is badly directed, for its chief gives more importance to his *rôle* of subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the region than to his own functions. The investigation which has been carried on, and which has already revealed many abuses, will certainly explain the bad state of engineering works in the region of Turkistan, which are slowly carried on, thanks to the penury of the administration of the engineers, the resources of which have been so restricted as not even to permit winter lodgings to be constructed for all the troops of the region. In the month of November of last year (1870), two battalions of sharpshooters of Tashkent (2nd and 3rd), belonging to the best troops of the region, were still encamped in their huts, and themselves worked in making bricks to build barracks, which were not ready before the end of the month of December. At the same time a bazaar was built quite close to the barracks, which cost 40,000 rubles. By passing the winter in a place which had just been built, and was consequently very damp, the soldiers suffered much; and they must have been astonished at the activity displayed by the administration in the construction of the bazaar, while a small portion of the sum which this edifice cost would have spared them much suffering by erecting for them suitable winter lodgings. It is evident that such facts cannot exercise a

salutary influence on the morals of the soldiers and officers. In other localities of the district of Syr Darya there are also no barracks, and the soldiers are crowded in hovels, which occasions among them much disease. The commissariat and the administration of engineers leaves, as we have seen, much to be desired.¹ . . .

‘In the eyes of the natives we are far from being on the moral height on which we ought to have placed ourselves as soon as we arrived in Central Asia. We have not been able to inspire the natives with confidence, which ought to be the principal source of our moral influence and of our political preponderance. The high moral qualities which ought to have carried the civilising mission of Russia to the natives have been wanting. The most of the functionaries of our administration in Central Asia have been distinguished by their bad characters. They have wasted the money of the crown on their own pleasures; and, notwithstanding that several of them have been pardoned while their inferiors have been condemned, the investigations which the Government ordered to discover the guilty parties lingered on for several years, and remained without results. The natives see all these regrettable facts, and comment on them in their manner. They say, “How are the Russians better for us than the Khokandians? They also take away from us our daughters and our wives, and also love presents and waste the money of the Tsar, as the Beks wasted that of the Khans.”

‘The Asiatics have not found in us what they hoped to see, and what we promised them; and consequently they can without the least scruple point their fingers at our social sores, for they see them and understand them better than we. Our example produces on the people that we have conquered, as well as on their neighbours, an impression much more unfavourable than will at first be believed. Our civilising mission has been limited up to this time only to the propagation among this people of our paper money, and in return we appropriate all their faults. That cannot give them a high idea of our moral superiority. And this is the reason why for a long time since

¹ The evils here complained of have since been partly remedied, and the state of the troops is now greatly improved.

we have not pretended to rule the Asiatics otherwise than by the continual pressure of our arms.

‘In pointing out the principal causes which derange all the springs of our moral influence in Central Asia we must consider for a moment the question of the present organisation of the Government of Turkistan. The general administration of the country has no uniformity, and shows in no way the presence of an established principle or a unified power. The divergency of views and conduct is felt at all grades of the official ladder, and maintains a continual antagonism between the different organs of the Government, which gives rise to parties and renders a settled policy impossible. Each party forms the centre of a group of persons eager for office and profit. Such a state of things enfeebles our *morale*, and, thanks to it, our civil and military *employés* are busy for the most of the time, not in doing their duty, but in carrying on intrigues for which our administrative system in Turkistan offers a vast field. Everybody thinks only of making a quick career, of occupying an advantageous post, and of obtaining increased rank, and nobody gives himself the trouble to take into account the duties imposed upon him by the fact of his being a Russian, and by the civilising mission which Russia pursues in Central Asia. Thanks to the condition of our administration itself, our functionaries arrogate to themselves the right of explaining their duties as pleases themselves. At Tashkent, which is the centre of the administration, there is no public life, for properly speaking there is no society—there is nothing to unite men who are fully absorbed in their own thoughts. The chief evil consists in the confusion of the military and administrative powers, and in the complete absence of any distinction between them. The superior military and civil authority is concentrated in the person of the Governor-General, who is at the same time the commander-in-chief of the military forces of the region; but in inferior instances it is divided between the chief of the chancery of the Governor-General and the chief of staff of the region. According to the law the action of the first should be confined to purely administrative affairs, but in reality he enjoys all the prerogatives of a chief of staff, especially in all that concerns the local administration of the country. The officers who administer

the country depend much more upon the chief of the chancery of the Governor-General than upon the chief of staff. In the provinces the two powers are, again, united in the persons of the military governors, who are at the same time the commandants of the troops of their provinces. They unite the two distinct powers divided in the preceding instances, the interests of which, thanks to the actual *régime*, constantly clash and sometimes become hostile. In the districts the military-administrative authority is further divided between the administrators of the districts and the chiefs of the troops who are quartered there. These last are sometimes in great perplexity, not knowing to whom they ought to turn, whether to the military commanders upon whom they directly depend or to the representatives of the administrative power, who enjoy considerable influence, and consequently in these cases they prefer to obey those who at the given moment have most weight with their superiors.

‘The preponderance which the military-administrative element exercises to the prejudice of the army is hardly an advantage for our influence in Central Asia. In the eyes of the natives the military uniform does not enjoy a great importance. In their conscience they regard the military commanders as the sole representatives of power and force. They do not understand that a chief can inflict a punishment or a fine without being able to make his orders respected by the force of bayonets. In the eyes of a native a chief by rank only who does not command soldiers is not a chief, but as, at present, the influence and credit enjoyed by the military chiefs of the district depends chiefly upon the degree of favour which they have been able to obtain for themselves with their superiors, it very often happens that the natives address themselves in their affairs by preference to commanders of troops, who cannot satisfy them, for fear of encroaching upon the rights of the persons set over the administration of the country. This, of course, provokes continual discontent among the natives. On the other hand, the commanders of the troops seek by all means to acquire the goodwill of the administrative authorities, and for greater security prefer to submit to their orders even in purely military affairs. It is evident that our influence cannot become consolidated so long as such a *régime* exists. The

army, which represents our force, and the administration, which is the expression of the civilising order which we have introduced into the countries conquered by our arms, are two distinct elements which cannot be amalgamated without hindering the progress of the work we pursue in Central Asia. The commander of the troops ought to be detached from the administration of the country and to enjoy a complete independence in the sphere of his activity. But a purely military administration was also indispensable, and we ought to have begun by declining every interference of the civil element in the affairs of the country. We were not sufficiently strong morally to admit the existence of a civil administration independently of the support of the military element. As the creation of a mixed administration—military and civil—which is what has been introduced into Central Asia, presents only an accumulation of military and administrative functions, the sole result is to confuse the situation. In order that the results of our conquest may be consolidated the administrative element must be prevented from interfering in military affairs. The two powers must act separately, and consequently there must be an entire separation between the civil and military administrations, or the civil administration must be replaced by a military element. Since we feel ourselves too weak to govern without the help of military force, we ought to yield to a purely military organisation, supporting ourselves by the force of arms, which is for the moment the only stay of our political *rôle*, and which still continues to exercise its prestige on the natives in spite of the fatal blows that have been given to our moral influence by our defective administration in Turkistan. So long as this administration exists we cannot make ourselves respected, and our army ought to make unheard-of efforts to regain the ground which our administration has made us lose. The full powers which are enjoyed by the persons who administer different localities encourage them to use their authority arbitrarily, without consulting the real state of things or the true interests of our situation. They sometimes arrogate to themselves political *rôles*, and, strong in the protection which they enjoy near the superior authorities, they sometimes permit themselves to utter threats and defiances which they are not able to carry out by arms, and which are attended by the

gravest consequences. Such proceedings can only degrade us in the eyes of the natives.

‘As long as the present *régime* continues in force our administration in Central Asia will remain sterile, and our commerce can only progress under the patronage of our bayonets. In undertaking our civilising mission in the East we had principally in view the opening of new markets for our products, which would not support the competition of Europe. In comparison with the state of Asia, Russia will always be a civilised power, but it cannot consolidate its military and political influence so long as its administration gives the example of internal confusion. It will be still more difficult to counter-balance the resistance offered to it by a powerful and pre-eminently commercial nation, whose resources are far above those which are at present at the disposal of the actual administration of Russia for advancing its mission in Central Asia.

‘The demands for extraordinary credits remain several months and sometimes a year or more without being satisfied. Consequently arrears are not paid, and the provisioning and the arming of the troops are subject to delays which cannot but cause discontent. The army of Turkistan is placed in thoroughly exceptional conditions, and cannot be assimilated in administrative relations with troops of other regions of the Empire. The insufficiency of the financial resources set apart for the administration of Turkistan, and the deductions made by the central Government from the demands of the Turkistan Administration, with the sole object of economising, evidently cannot improve the course of events in Central Asia, or restrict the expenses, which are necessitated by circumstances. In all other parts of the Empire the financial administration is able to satisfy the demand for credits with promptitude and without the least embarrassment, while in Turkistan it allows delays which cause much suffering. I have been able to judge to what point these delays are hurtful. They exercise the worst influence on the morals of our army, for the officers and soldiers remain several months without receiving their pay, and it is not astonishing that the former regard their position as precarious, and exert all their efforts to obtain a place in the administration of the country. The position of the soldier is far from being as disadvantageous as

that of an officer, for in Turkistan the troops can find resources in work. Most of the workmen and artisans are soldiers, and earn much money. The native population does not furnish good workmen to the Russians, and accordingly the greater part of the residents and the *employés* in the administration are obliged to have recourse to the labour of soldiers. Unhappily the number of military workmen is very restricted, and cannot satisfy the always increasing demand of the population. It follows that the soldiers, feeling themselves masters of the situation, only augment the price for their work, but the true evil is that the artisan-soldiers receive orders from the officers and officials, and for the most of the time fulfil them in a very bad way. They often insist upon being paid in advance, either wholly or in part, without fulfilling their orders, and such things remain unpunished. The pecuniary relations which are thus established between the officers and soldiers, who know that their superiors cannot find workmen except in their ranks, and that consequently they are in their hands, produces an injurious effect on the morals of the soldiers, and especially from a disciplinary point of view. It is, moreover, to be remarked that drunkenness is widely spread among the troops; and owing to this vice, which is a great scourge, the conscientious execution of orders is very rare.

‘It has often been my duty to bring soldiers before a court-martial for drunkenness, but they almost always found protection with their immediate chiefs, who, for fear of producing the discontent of their subordinates, sought in every way to excuse them. It was with great difficulty that I succeeded in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against a soldier of the Arsenal, who had his private lodging, wore a civil dress, and kept a carpenter’s shop and a drinking-house. This individual took part payment from fully twenty persons under the pretext of guaranteeing by the money he received a contract for wood which he had with the Government, and deceived them all, for he neither performed nor repaid the advances. The consumption of spirits in the army takes prodigious dimensions. Our medical staff has always condemned the usage introduced into Turkistan of regularly furnishing the troops with liquor together with the rations. This usage has a pernicious effect upon the *morale* of the troops in habituating them to the

use of strong drinks. On the other hand, the advantage of the use of whisky in exceptional circumstances cannot fail to be recognised when a certain dose of cordial can be of real service to the soldiers, and the commissariat ought to have in store a supply of whisky for the use of the army in case of war. The continual distribution of spirits ought to be abolished, and the money that the commissariat can economise under this head ought to be applied to increase the meat ration received by the soldiers.

‘The military instruction of the troops in Turkistan is without any preconceived plan. The military authorities do not take into account the tactical education of the soldiers. Their exercise at every review ought to terminate with a tactical manœuvre. The military commanders, after being convinced that their soldiers are accustomed to the exercise of arms and know how to manœuvre, ought to set them to resolve some tactical problems, as, for example, the passage of a river, the occupation of a strategical position, the attack on a height, &c. Without this tactical education, to which the military administration at present attaches very great importance everywhere except in Turkistan, our armed forces in Central Asia will always be inferior to the Russian troops of other districts. It will perhaps be alleged that our brave soldiers of Turkistan, even without this tactical instruction, know how to conquer their enemies. This allegation is just, but it is not necessary to lose sight of the fact that our soldiers have so far had to struggle against undisciplined and badly armed masses only; consequently they could easily conquer them without possessing the fighting qualities which are indispensable in a war against regular armies. The courage and self-denial of our troops are two superior qualities which make them triumph over all obstacles in a war with half-savage people. But our army in Central Asia will have many other difficulties to overcome in Asia itself, and will have to confront very different enemies as, after having triumphed over barbarian hordes, we approach nearer to India—they will have to struggle against enemies armed in the English way, and therefore in possession of every means of offering an obstinate resistance to us. The purely moral qualities, and the aptitude for the use of arms, cannot guarantee to our troops in the future the same success as that which they have achieved against irregular masses.

It is especially necessary to take pains with the military instruction of the Cossack troops, and to make of them a true combative force, for at present their organisation leaves much to be desired. The greatest power of our armed force in Turkistan is represented by the Cossacks, who have received no military instruction, and can only fight in irregular masses. As regards tactics they hardly differ from the nomadic hordes which we have to fight. The short period of their service, which does not allow them to learn the trade of arms while fighting side by side with organised troops, and their being scattered over a vast territory, would oppose great difficulties to every effort tending to transform their masses into a well-organised combative force. In this respect it would be desirable that measures should be taken to remove the inconveniences presented by the Cossack troops, whose presence in Turkistan has no other effect than that of augmenting the expenses incurred by the army in our Asiatic possessions. The natives have no fear of our Cossacks, considering themselves their equals in tactics. It is absolutely necessary to increase the term of service of the Cossacks to five years, to give them a special chief, who could constantly watch over their military education, and to unite their scattered masses in a single body. So long as there is no chief of the cavalry vested with entire authority, and thoroughly competent in his sphere, we cannot expect any profit from the Cossack troops. The corps of Cossack officers is far from showing the qualities which have generally been attributed to the children of the Don and the Ural. Those amongst them who are not nominated to the command of a *sotnia*, which procures for them certain profits, are impatient for the arrival of the Cossacks who come in exchange, thinking it the day of their deliverance. Many of them try by every means possible to leave Turkistan before their time, and neglect their service. They sometimes push their neglect so far as to cause the most flagrant insubordination among their inferiors. It is natural that under such conditions the Cossack troops will become in time a real cause of embarrassment for our military organisation in Central Asia.'

Since this report was written the state of the Russian troops in Turkistan has no doubt greatly improved, although they are still lax in discipline. The importance of a sincere opinion

from one thoroughly acquainted with the subject, is so great as, I think, to justify the long quotations I have made.

The Steppe Commission, of which I have spoken, which elaborated the project of 1867, worked honestly to discover the needs of the country, and drew up their report in the interest both of Russia and of the natives and for the purpose of giving to the region a fairly good government. The Russians have always displayed a certain facility in dealing with half-civilised peoples. Personally they have not so much of that contemptuous feeling towards the natives which is so marked in the dealings of the Anglo-Saxon race with people of lower culture and civilisation. This is plainly shown from the fact that they do not hesitate to entertain social relations with them. There is not that feeling of the vast difference which separates, or which in the opinion of some should separate, an inferior from a superior and ruling race, so that Russian officers and officials are willing not only to receive natives in their houses but do so receive them and meet them upon terms of social equality. It is questionable whether in some cases this does not diminish the authority of Russian officials, for I have sometimes seen natives display less respect towards Russian officers in their dealings with them than would have been permitted to Russians of similar social rank. Indeed, it may be said that the natives hold aloof from the Russians rather than the Russians from the natives, a circumstance in part due to an antagonism of religion rather than to a difference of race. But the gulf between the conquerors and the conquered has been widened and deepened through defects inherent in methods of government subsequently developed, as well as through the faults of the administrators, of which I shall speak later on.

When the Russians advanced into Central Asia they found many ready to welcome them, partly because they were discontented with the law of the Khan and of the Amir, with the extortions that were practised and with the frequent executions, and because they desired anything for the sake of peace and quiet. Immediately after the Russian occupation there was a great feeling of relief and of assurance that every man's life was safe and his property secure from arbitrary taxation and seizure. The Russians, too, manifested at first a desire to

improve the condition of the natives, and some of the measures which were taken were properly appreciated; but with the abuses which crept into the administration these measures were turned from their proper destination, and the administrators seemed to care more for their personal advantage than the welfare of the Government. What has been actually accomplished for the people, therefore, is really very little.

Another officer, writing in 1872, after five years' service in the country, during part of which time he was a district prefect, writes: 'We constantly demand more and more from the population. With regard to taxes, unfortunately, we are always demanding more and more. But what have we ourselves done for the people? We have, indeed, given them quiet. We have protected them from rapacious neighbours, and we have lessened the constant capital punishments. But that is all. To the economy and the life of the people we have brought absolutely nothing except eloquent speeches made in Tashkent and in the sessions of various commissions.' This is perhaps the pessimistic view of one who, as I well know, had devoted himself heart and soul to the interests of the people under his charge, and who found no reward for his work except discontent, as he was constantly overruled by the higher powers in Tashkent, and even in years of bad harvests was obliged to exact increased taxes.

The Russians have done something for the material interests of the country, and have endeavoured even to accomplish more than they have done, though their efforts, sometimes from wrong direction, have failed. The roads are being greatly improved, which seems a little strange when good roads are almost unknown in Russia itself. Bridges are being constructed over the chief rivers, and canals for purposes of irrigation are being projected. Russian engineers, however, have yet to learn from the natives with regard to irrigation, nearly all the attempts in this direction having proved failures.

I have already spoken of the little which has been done for commerce and manufactures, of the commercial treaties which are practically useless, of the effort to establish a fair, and of the failure of so many projects for starting factories for spinning cotton and silk, not to mention others of less importance. Russian colonists not being permitted to settle in the province of the

Syr Darya, the Russians have had no opportunity, except in the immediate vicinity of the larger cities, of showing the natives improved methods of agriculture. But even in this respect nothing but failure has resulted. The growth of cotton, as I have before remarked, has not been improved; and even the vineyards and mulberry plantations in the neighbourhood of Tashkent, owing to carelessness and inefficiency, have proved failures.

As far as religion is concerned the conduct of the Russians is deserving of the highest praise. No restrictions have been placed on Mohammedan worship or practice except that the Derwishes have generally been forbidden to appear in the streets, being considered disturbers of the public peace. No efforts have been made to spread Christianity; and although churches exist in Tashkent and in the various garrisons, and there is a bishop of the province, General Kaufmann has speedily put down all missionary projects. The consequence of this is that Mohammedanism, instead of growing stronger, has grown weaker, the natives not having been led to attach themselves more dutifully to their religion because it has been forbidden by the Russians. On the contrary, the abolition of native functionaries to compel the performance of regular religious rites has allowed much indifference and carelessness to creep in.¹

Sanitary measures in the cities have been taken by the Russians, hospitals have been established, and during the cholera time a well-organised method of visitation attended with excellent results was arranged for the purpose of preventing the spreading of the disease. These things the natives begin to appreciate.

As far as education is concerned the Russians have done but little. In Samarkand, owing to the vigorous efforts of the prefect—himself a Mussulman—a small school was opened for the instruction of Mussulman children in Russian; but at the time of my visit no schools for natives under Russian auspices existed either in Tashkent or in any other town in the province of Syr Darya, except the small Kirghiz schools in Perovsky and Kazala. It has several times been proposed to introduce the teaching of Russian and modern sciences into some of the Mussulman high schools, and this project was upon the whole viewed with favour by the authorities; but owing to the lack of initiative the matter was neglected. In

¹ See vol. i. pp. 161, 162.

1875 General Kaufmann had a plan for the regular establishment of a scholastic district in Turkistan, subordinate to the Ministry of Public Instruction, and inspectors have already been appointed. This, however, chiefly refers to the education of Russian children. For the instruction of Mussulman children, it is necessary to begin at the beginning, and this will more easily be done by a private initiative assisted by the Government, than by a plan of schools under the direct management of the central government. But in Russia it seems impossible to do anything unless a regular system be provided, with all the grades of directors and inspectors, visitors and teachers, with all the usual bureaucratic apparatus, and with a constant interchange of reports and documents.

One of the Russian institutions which has been introduced, although without that profit which the Russians perhaps expected, is that of passports. In the independent countries of Central Asia passports have never existed, except in the form of protections issued by the Khan, or Bek, to persons who specially demand them. For that reason the rule which was made, that every native travelling from Russian Turkistan into the other countries should be provided with a passport, has not favourably impressed the natives, being considered a financial measure adopted for the purpose of obtaining the fees which are to be paid when the passport is given; for in the native countries, of course, the passport is never looked at. These passports are in Turki on a printed form, which for some reason bears a Persian heading, the meaning of which was intended to be 'open leaf,' the term by which a certain class of passport is known in Russia. In Turki the words for 'open' and for 'bitter' are very similar, so that the translator in asking the appropriate Persian word obtained the word for 'bitter.' The passports, therefore, are headed *talkh nameh*, or 'bitter paper,' a name which the natives find singularly appropriate.

One great defect of the Russian administration has been the introduction of institutions which were not in consonance with the feelings and the usages of the natives. Such has been the introduction of elective institutions, the *Mekkeme*,¹ or

¹ The *Mekkeme* of Tashkent was a sort of City council with the functions of a court of justice, founded by General Romanofsky. Its members were partly Sarts and partly Kirghiz, elected by a popular vote. It was never useful, circumstances soon compelled a change in its constitution, and it is now practically abolished.

City Council of Tashkent, the Aksakals and Regencies chosen by the settled and nomad population, and the elective judges. What was intended to be a real advantage to the natives, in allowing them to have a certain voice in the management of their affairs and in enabling them to express to the Russians the wishes of the population, and to explain their own customs and traditionary observances, degenerated into a mere farce. If the population chose as their representatives men of great popularity, and who previously had exercised considerable influence in the country, these elections were viewed with distrust, as showing the fanatical spirit of the people, and were frequently set aside. It was always easy for the Russian authorities to insist upon the election of any one they wished. The result has been that many persons refuse to allow themselves to be elected, and even abstain from voting, so that the members of the Provincial Regencies are, in fact, named by the Russian officials, and serve merely as their tools.

With regard to the judges, the power of the Russian Government to appoint Kazis is admitted even by Mussulman law. Under the Mussulman rule the Kazis had always been appointed by the chief of the state, and their appointment by the Russian authorities would only have been the carrying out of an old custom. In practice either bad and weak men are chosen, because they are able to secure Russian influence, and perhaps enjoy a certain popularity amongst the natives, or men are chosen who were Kazis under the Mussulman rule, and are able to get into their hands an amount of power and influence which render them objects of suspicion to the Russian authorities. The first case is equally bad, for the decisions of inefficient and corrupt judges in the end necessarily caused distrust and complaint, and the Russians are obliged to interfere either to quash the decisions or to insist upon their being carried out, which excites discontent under the Russian rule. The interference of the Russians in these affairs has sometimes been very injudicious. For instance, lately, Azim Kazi, of the Bishagatch ward of Tashkent, who had a very bad reputation amongst the natives, was not re-elected, in spite of the support given to him by the Russian authorities. But, as the successful candidate was accused of being a fanatic, his election was quashed, and the choice of Azim was rendered obligatory,—the people were simply ordered to elect him.

The elected members of the Regencies and of the councils have no voice in the management of affairs, and are never consulted. All the resolutions are drawn up by the district or local commanders, and the natives are ordered to set their seal to them. Sometimes these decrees are explained to them, sometimes not. It is seldom that they are written out in Turki, so that the natives have no method of ascertaining for what they have voted, except through the explanations of the interpreter. An official report says: 'No member of the economical Regency knows either the rules or the duties of the Regency, a fact which I ascertained by personal conversations with them. The estimates are made up not only under the influence but directly by the orders of the district prefect. The expenses are increased by no reason emanating from the Regencies, but by the will of the prefect, the members of the Regency naïvely assuring me that the taxes for the general purposes of the district had been augmented by the will of the White Tsar—that so the *hakim*, or prefect, had stated to them.'

One of the consequences of this system is that in almost every district there is some shrewd native, who has learned to speak Russian, who has succeeded in ingratiating himself with the officials, and who is used by them and uses them for the purpose of oppressing the natives and making the fortunes of individuals. Sometimes these natives bear an official character—usually that of a native assistant to the prefect. Sometimes they are simply private friends of the officials. The latter position was enjoyed by Said Azim in Tashkent, of whom I have already spoken, while an example of the oppression worked by a native official may be seen in the case of Omar, in the district of Kurama.

Another difficulty arising out of the ignorance of the Russians of the country and its institutions, as well as of the temporary character of the regulations, is the constant change in the laws and decrees. Both governors and prefects are constantly making new regulations and changing in some slight respect either the duties of the inhabitants or the ways in which they should be performed. These changes are especially observable in all that concerns taxes, and it is here that they are most deeply felt by the natives. Many years ago a prominent inhabitant in Tashkent said to a Russian

general, 'We could understand if the Russians tormented us to get money out of us as the Khokandians did, but we cannot understand the reasons which induce the Russians to spend their own money for the purpose of tormenting us without getting any advantage for themselves. What he meant by 'tormenting' was the constant efforts of the local administration for what they imagined to be the welfare and advantage of the natives in ways which they could not understand. I fear that such a remark would hardly be uttered now, as it begins to dawn on the native mind that the Russians are as eager for money as were the Khokandians. On this subject I will quote from a paper written by the Prefect of Ura-tepé, in 1872, to explain the cause of the riot at Hodjent in the spring of that year.¹

'This mob, discontented with the orders of the Government, is an expression of the dissatisfaction of the whole population with the entire series of quickly succeeding supplements, explanations, additions, and institutions, which were foreign to all the ideas of Central Asiatics. That the confidence of the population in the sincerity of the Russian rule has been rudely shaken by such constant changes I am deeply convinced. It has been shaken, and cannot help being so. On every new regulation the natives look distrustfully. It cannot be otherwise. I explain this by facts of which I was in part an eyewitness and in part an agent, for more than once I have been obliged to declare one thing and afterwards to do another.

'On the organisation of the districts in 1868 we collected thousands of people and talked to them of the elections, saying

¹ This Prefect—Captain Antipin—who was a remarkable exception to the general rule of officials in Tashkent, and who during the years he was at Ura-tepé thoroughly devoted himself to the welfare of the people under his charge—was so indignant on hearing that the riot at Hodjent was attributed to vaccination only, that he considered it his duty to write a paper showing the true cause of the mob to be the general discontent with the Russian rule, and explaining the cause of that discontent. This paper, to which he signed his name, was intended for publication, but was previously submitted to a high military official at St. Petersburg, who, in turn, showed it to General Kaufmann, who then happened to be at the capital. The General forbade the publication and requested the destruction of the manuscript. The Prefect was at once removed from office, and was sent away from Central Asia, as being 'politically worthless. Fortunately a copy of the document had been kept, and was afterwards published in the 'Russian World.'

directly to them: "Choose from your masses really good men who mean well towards you, men who are capable and honest, and can understand and appreciate your wishes, and who will always have in view the advantage and welfare of the people and the increase of their prosperity. Choose men who will be really mediators between you and us, for the Government cannot listen to requests proffered by a whole crowd. Mediators are necessary to tell us of your real needs, and we shall always be ready to listen to them and find a just reply." This was, so to speak, the introductory speech with which each of us engaged in the work of organisation turned towards the people, and I believe called out the warmest sympathy from the native population, and caused them to look on their delegate as a man in whom they reposed a special trust. The rich and ambitious men even intrigued and contended with each other to be elected *aksakals* or members of the Administrative Regency. But a year passed, another passed, and these delegates, in consequence of the imperative requests for one thing or another, turned out to be merely agents of the higher power without any real share in the administration. No one consulted with them or listened to them about the wants of the people, and they themselves dared not speak, for orders were given to them which they were obliged to obey. At last these delegates were not received further than the anteroom of the district prefects, and sometimes they were even turned out of the doors of the Government offices by the mere scribes. When there was such a contempt on the part of the Russian authorities for the representatives of the population, it is not astonishing that the importance of the native representatives fell; and now, instead of trying to secure these offices, many delegates refuse the honour. Such a position of the native delegates is not in consequence of the arbitrariness of the authorities nearest to them, although in one way these last are partly to blame. Instead of turning the attention of the superior authorities in Tashkent to the injurious effects of certain proposed measures, they, as a rule, limit themselves to the literal fulfilment of the orders emanating from Tashkent, not entering into the position of the inhabitants or the condition of the country. On the other hand, the civil administration seems to forget that we are in Central Asia, where much

is unsuitable that is possible in Russia. It leaves without due attention the character and needs of the people, and it seems to desire to show that everything is possible for us, that everything can be done, and that it is only necessary to order, exactly as would be the case in the province of Yaroslav.

‘On the organisation of the districts the following taxes were declared to the whole population collected in the bazaars : 1. The *haradj*, or one-tenth of the harvest, instead of the one-fifth which had up to that time been collected. 2. The *tanap* tax in its former quantity, though not from a *tanap* of 140 feet wide and long, as before, but from one of 175 feet square, according to the abundance of the harvest, and according to the prices fixed for each kind of produce. 3. A tax for the salaries of the *aksakals* and their officials according to a decree of the community, in the proportion which it should think needful and proper. 4. Instead of a bazaar tax from shops and country people who brought their productions to the bazaar, it was decided to take one-fortieth part of the capital of the shopkeepers who had on hand wares of the value of not less than 40 *tillas* (150 rubles). As concerns the nomad population the *zekat* on cattle was retained and a *kibitka* tax of 2r. 75k. was established on each *kibitka*. At the same time a proclamation was made to the people that besides these taxes nobody should pay anything more to anyone, that this law was made once for all for increasing the prosperity of the people, and that an end had been put to all arbitrary acts and unlawful taxes and contributions which had existed under the rule of the Beks and the Khans. Let us see how these promises were kept.

‘1. The *haradj* had been declared to be one-tenth part of the harvest. Not a tenth alone, however, is taken, but as much as is ordered by the authorities at Tashkent, who two years ago turned the *haradj* into a fixed land-tax which might be a tenth, a twentieth, or perhaps a half of the harvest, even during the two years in succession of bad harvests—in 1870–71 in the district of Hodjent. We must suppose that the *haradj*, which, in direct opposition to our original promise, had been turned into a land-tax, did not aid in increasing the welfare of the taxpayers and consequently that of the whole mass of the people.

‘2. The *tanap* tax has met with the same fate. It also, from being a tax dependent upon the quantity of the harvests and the

prices of produce, has been turned into a fixed tax, which has been increased every year, notwithstanding the bad harvests of 1870-71. The amount taken from the *tanap* lands in accordance with superior orders was not higher than in preceding years. The Administrative Regency of the district in these two years proposed to diminish the tax or to defer collecting it, as there had been no harvest, and pointed to the fact that, according to the ancient customs of the country, the rulers had always entered into their situation, and when assured of its reality had diminished or had entirely given up the tax; but the requests could not be taken into consideration by the District Prefect, because he had already received his orders that a fixed sum of taxes must be raised; although in order to explain his refusal in some way he felt himself obliged to say that the declaration of the Regency was false and improper.

‘3. The tax for the salaries of the *aksakals* and other officials. On the organisation of the district it had been stated to the people that besides the Government taxes the population should take upon itself the support of the *aksakals* and of the elders of the *auls*, paying them a certain salary according to the judgment of the community, but under this head there were afterwards invented by the administration many other taxes under different names, which altogether are now united under the general head of “taxes for the economical needs of the community.” It is easily intelligible that the mass of the community cannot sympathise with these taxes, which, in opposition to what had been stated on the organisation of the district, have been increased to almost double what they were. This increase of taxation has of course corresponded to the gradually increasing needs of the people; but still, to the majority of the population, this tax seems only a means of getting money out of them for some purpose they do not understand. I will give an example. In the beginning of the year 1870 there was at Ura-tepé a session of native officials from all the villages for passing the budget proposed by the District Prefect for the general needs of the community. In this budget were certain expenses, besides the salaries of the *aksakals*, with new names; and the amount to be raised was considerably greater than in former years. At this session there were more than 300 persons. Each item of the proposed budget was fully explained to them, but still the dele-

gates did not admit the necessity of the new expenses. Some of the rich and respectable people, who were not delegates, asked my permission in the name of the whole community to give their opinion about these taxes. I allowed them to do so, and here are their exact words: "The tax for the communal expenses and the salaries of the *aksakals* according to the decision of the community is in our opinion unnecessary. The persons elected can very well serve for three years, receiving as much from the Government as their services deserve, but increase of taxes is by no means necessary. If this increase be made through the wish of the Governor-General, then let him say so and order it, and it will be collected, for we consider his wish as law. If this tax be made by the order of the White Tsar, and be necessary for the support of the Russian soldiers who have given peace and protection to the country, to-morrow even we will give twice as much as this sum and all that the Government will consider necessary and possible for the district of Ura-tepé."

'4. From the nomad population it was declared that there would only be taken a *kibitka* tax of 2r. 75k. from a *kibitka*, and that the *zekat* on cattle should be in proportion, but that there should be a small additional tax for the salaries of *aksakals* and of *aul* elders to be fixed by the community. All this was declared in 1868, but since then a new tax—a road-tax of 75k. on a house or *kibitka*—has been imposed, both on the nomad and on the settled population. There was afterwards an addition to the taxes for the economical expenses of the community, so that at last the payment for each *kibitka* was brought to five rubles and even more. This road-tax and the tax for the general expenses excited at the time much criticism, and not criticism alone. It is perfectly well known that in order not to excite the discontent of the people on account of the imposition of new taxes in 1869 and 1870, these taxes were paid by the Administrative Regency out of the proceeds of the *haradj* and *tanap* taxes.

'The reasons for this were that at the organisation of the district there had been no mention of the road-tax; and as the sum raised for the payment of the salaries of the *aksakals* had already been made into a fixed tax, the Administrative Regency, understanding that the declaration of the new taxes would

bring upon themselves suspicion that the tax had been imposed by their sanction, as the people formerly believed that the Government had once declared that the tax would never be increased, thought it better for the first years of this new tax to take the sum ordered by the Government from the *tanap* and the *haradj*, increasing these taxes in a proportionate measure.

‘Although this action of the Regency—the illegality of which is apparent—was known to the superior authorities, it was thought best to say nothing about it. In this way, notwithstanding the promises to the people to impose on them no taxes except those declared on the organisation of the districts, yet during a period of nearly three years a whole series of new taxes had been inflicted upon the poor population, which even without that had been impoverished by the preceding wars and disturbances. These taxes, which brought us no actual profit, necessarily had a very injurious influence on the material prosperity of the inhabitants, who at the same time see no necessity for them. Therefore, when these supplementary and new taxes little by little became known to the people, when the *haradj* of the tenth, and the *tanap* according to the harvest and the fixed prices for produce, were turned into a fixed tax; and further, when the *zekat* on cattle driven to the bazaar, which had been abolished on the organisation of the districts and replaced by the *kibitka* tax (to which were subsequently added a road-tax and a tax for the general needs of the community,) was still collected in spite of the formal promises of the Administration; and finally, when the bazaar-tax, which had been abolished, was replaced in the form of a tax upon weights and measures, it became evident to the people that the promises for diminution of taxes which had been made on the organisation of the district were only empty words, and they became convinced that the demands of the Russian Administration were gradually becoming worse and worse under the new taxes and imposts which had been passed upon the people for the last three years. They then proposed to pay the *haradj* and *tanap*, not as one-tenth, but as one-fourth of the harvest, and they asked to be freed in that case from all other taxes and imposts of any kind, which ruined the poor and were burdensome even to the rich.

‘It is clear, then, that since the occupation of the country by the Russians the condition of the population, in spite of all her

promises, has not only not grown better, but, on the contrary, is every day getting worse and worse. How far this constant increase of taxes and imposts can go, the population of course cannot understand. It is therefore not strange that the frightened imagination of the Asiatics saw in the late collection of statistical information the desire of the Administration to get hold of their whole property. An instance of this belief is the fact that after the registration of property made for the purposes of statistical information several natives went to Russian acquaintances and asked them if a fowl could be taken to the bazaar for sale, or did it already belong to the Government? With such a state of the popular mind it is evident that only a spark is necessary to inflame it.

But no matter what institutions the Russians may introduce into Central Asia, it would seem hopeless to expect anything like good government until either the character of the officials is changed or they are submitted to a stricter discipline and inspection. It seems almost impossible for a Russian administrator to conceive of such a thing as legality. They are strict in observing the forms of law so long as they relate merely to modes of procedure and to the filing and signature of papers, but overstep it at once the moment it seems easier or more convenient for them to do so. I am not now referring only to officials in Turkistan; how to confine the administration within the strict limits of legality is a subject which has exercised many statesmen and political students in European Russia. It seems to be a principle firmly implanted in their official breasts that law and respect for law are very good things for ordinary everyday life, but that the moment a circumstance arises, which in the opinion of the official most nearly concerned is exceptional, law is no longer practicable, but that what he calls administrative methods must be employed. To those who have been brought up to respect the law this constant overstepping and transgression of legality seems scarcely conceivable. On the Central Asiatic, who of course has no idea of what Russian law is or in what way it is transgressed, the arbitrary action of the officials produces a similar and yet different effect. This arbitrary action and these administrative methods are seldom alike in two adjoining districts, and a native can hardly help regarding the whole system as an irresponsible tyranny of the

worst sort. Under Mussulman rule his Khans and his Beks were tyrannical, but still they were Mussulmans, men of his own race and of his own belief, with similar character and holding to the same customs and traditions. Cruel and tyrannical as they were in many respects, there were certain bounds which custom forbade them to overstep, and were these bounds too greatly or too frequently passed the popular discontent was such as to drive them from power. But for the Russians there seem to be no limits. They are of an alien faith, they seem to know little and care less about the old customs and traditions of the country, and to a man of Tashkent or Hodjent, who knows nothing of the intricacies of Russian law or of the methods of Russian administrative life, honour and prosperity seem to be at the mercy or the whim of the Russian official.¹

¹ Mr. N. Petrofsky, in a remarkable article on Khokand in the 'Messenger of Europe,' October 1875, says: 'As concerns the Mussulman despotism destroyed by Russian institutions, it would be difficult for us to guarantee that these institutions seem less arbitrary and despotic to the natives than did their former Mussulman ones. Under Mussulman sway tyranny and arbitrary rule indeed existed, but this tyranny was far from being without limits, and was as much a product of the country as were all its other institutions, morals, and customs. It was native there and it was understood there. Although the Mussulman ruler and his officials educated in the same *milieu* and with the same ideas as his subjects acted arbitrarily, they nevertheless knew well where their tyranny could begin and where it ended, knew its extent and its limits. In consequence of their exclusively religious education of the same character as that of the whole mass of the population, and of the common character of their life, of their customs, and of their habits, the Mussulman rulers confined their tyranny within certain well known and fixed limits, and their arbitrariness was considered as a necessary attribute of their power, without which the very existence of their rule would be inconceivable. On the other side, the people too looked on this arbitrariness with the eyes of their ruler, seeing in him not a tyrant and a persecuting despot, but a lucky favourite of fortune, who had received the right to arbitrary and uncontrolled power. Brought up with such ideas the native of Central Asia well knew all the ramifications of this tyranny, from the Bek to the lowest *Aksakal* inclusively, for the ground on which and the limits within which the arbitrary power was exercised, were as well known to the first as to the last. In a word, the native was at home with Mussulman tyranny. He had ages ago been accustomed to its existence, and knew how to live under it. From a European point of view such an arbitrary rule as we see in Mussulman states, may of course appear horrible, but from a Mussulman point of view it is perfectly natural and legal. The rebellion against Khudayar Khan is no proof to the contrary, but rather strengthens my position. Khudayar Khan lost his Khaute because his tyranny ceased to be Mussulman and became a mere mad exercise of power unlimited by any traditions. If this despot, instead of the unconcealed and, so to say, open pillage of his subjects, had covered it up by fictions of law, or by the rules of the Shariat (as the Bukharan Amir does) and had continued it, he would have re-

It is not only the fact that cases of glaring corruption and venality have occurred, but that these cases when brought to the notice of the Governor-General have frequently been condoned, and the guilty officials allowed to go unpunished, which has exerted a very bad influence on the minds of the natives. The superior officials have their favourites, and are disposed to uphold them in spite of charges of maladministration. The natives have been hindered in every possible way from making complaints. They have even been turned away from the house of the Governor when they had assembled there to present a petition.

A very striking illustration of this was shown in the management of the Kurama district, one of the most fertile and thickly settled of all the provinces, surrounding, but not including, the city of Tashkent. The prefect of this district is said to have levied 90,000 rubles of illegal taxes, all of which he spent for his own use, besides Government money, and yet he resided within five miles of the palace of the Governor-General, and was known to be living in a style, with frequent dinners, suppers, and gambling parties, entirely impossible upon his small salary. Among other charges against him was one with regard to a misappropriation of savings funds. These

mained on the throne, and would probably never have been compelled to journey to Orenburg from "unavoidable circumstances." After describing the various projects for the government of Turkistan, and the changes introduced into the laws, the author continues: 'It is necessary to remark that neither the first regulations nor the project which was subsequently applied, were ever translated into the native language. The natives were expected of themselves to understand the—for them—complicated organisation of the Russian government, and to guess at the relations of the various branches of the administration which were quite new to them, and not easily intelligible. If we add to this that Turkistan has but few men who know the native languages, and has great need of good interpreters, it will be understood with what eyes the natives look upon our institutions, even were they the best and most perfect in the world. Naturally these institutions appear to the natives to be far more arbitrary and far more tyrannical than those under which they formerly lived under Mussulman rulers, not because they are really arbitrary and tyrannical, but because, seeing their frequent change, the native is not able to understand and explain to himself either the meaning of the frequent changes, or the existence of these institutions. All this—I say it without finding fault—creates among the natives a general discontent with the Russians, which is not diminishing, but on the contrary is increasing, and is being propagated in the neighbouring Khanates, exciting vain hopes for the return of what they have lost, and encouraging them to such acts as the constant demands for the return of Samarkand, and even to the invasion of our territories.'

funds had been instituted for the benefit of the population, but by a subsequent regulation, approved by the Governor-General, permission was given to spend them on the administration needs of the district. This money, about 22,000 rubles, entirely disappeared, and no accounts of expenditure were given, although it was said that part had been given to the horse-breeding establishment, and that part had been used in fitting up the house of the prefect. This affair was creating a great impression when I was in Tashkent, in 1873, and finally a series of inquiries ensued as to the disposition of the money—inquiries which for a long time remained without answer. The natives complained also that money had been taken from them at different times, on all sorts of pretences, and in an entirely illegal way. A decree had been issued forbidding all persons to cross the Syr Darya at any other point than the places specified in the order, threatening persons who did so with being sent to Siberia. The points specified were places belonging to the friends of the prefect. At last matters became so scandalous that the Governor-General was obliged to take some notice of it. He therefore removed the prefect from the district, and sold his property for the benefit of the Crown, not realising, however, one-twentieth part of the sums which had been misappropriated. But, instead of punishing this man, he merely removed him to another locality, stating that he considered him a most useful official.

A letter from Tokmak, dated May 3, 1873, published in the 'Golos,' No. 172 of that year, stated a similar occurrence with regard to the savings funds in the district of Tokmak. Since 1865 a tax of twenty kopeks on each *kibitka* had been collected from the nomads of Semiretch, to be devoted to the general needs and to the demands of the local Kirghiz, especially for making loans to them. This fund, with the interest, amounted in 1871 to more than 23,000 rubles. Up to 1873 not a single Kirghiz had received any of this money on loan or as a grant, and out of this Kirghiz capital more than 18,000 rubles had been applied for other purposes—10,000 for loans, 5,000 of which were not to be repaid. In this sum were included the journeys of different officials and their extraordinary expenses, searches for coal-mines, the expenses of completing and repairing the house of a former assistant-prefect, and loans

were even to be made to Russian merchants, one for 8,000 rubles, for completing a distillery. The conduct of the Prefect of the district of Perovsky was investigated, and he was removed for extortion and bribery. Instead of being punished he was appointed to the district of Aulié-ata, where his conduct again called for investigation, and he was removed for exacting an illegal contribution from the natives on the occasion of a demand for camels for the Khivan expedition. Other persons have in like way been removed from one post for maladministration, and have immediately received another. An *employé* in the Construction Department, in addition to advances for work subsequently not performed succeeded by forged orders in obtaining from the treasurer at various times an amount stated to be about 15,000 rubles. When this was first discovered, his friends, including the acting Governor, whose duty it was to arrest him, endeavoured to make up the amount, or to so arrange the accounts as to cover up the defalcation; but the deficit finally proved too great, and it became necessary to take official notice of the fact. He was allowed to escape; but meanwhile the matter had become so well known that he was again arrested, and will probably at last be brought to trial.

On the other hand, any persons who endeavoured to enlighten the public as to the state of affairs were immediately punished. Correspondence with newspapers was strictly forbidden, and the commandant of the district of Ura-tepé was removed and sent out of the province, for a paper on the riot at Hodjent, of which I have already spoken.

In some cases acts, not only wrong in themselves, but bringing with them very important consequences, have been committed, not from a desire of personal gain but from a wish to appear zealous in the performance of duties, or from motives of intrigue. A case which happened in 1873 is especially noticeable. An officer named Eman, in possession of a considerable amount of Government funds, gave information that he had been robbed by the Kirghiz. The chief Kirghiz living in the neighbourhood of the alleged occurrence were arrested, and after a long examination twelve of them acknowledged their guilt, though the money could not be found. While their trial was going on Eman committed suicide, leaving a letter in which he stated that he was not the honest man that had

been supposed, as he had himself spent the money and made the excuse to clear himself. The Kirghiz were then, of course, released; but the question arose, why had they confessed? and on an investigation it was found that the judicial officer, Baron G—— of Vierny, had extorted confession from them by means of torture, a practice wholly at variance with Russian law and certainly very disastrous for Russian influence amongst the Kirghiz. As the result of this investigation, Baron G—— was transferred in the same capacity to the district of Perovsky.

There was another case in the same neighbourhood, at Kopal, where a district prefect had been robbed, beaten, and severely wounded. As he was most deservedly unpopular for the extortions he practised upon the natives this was not to be wondered at. Over sixty Kirghiz were accused of participating in this act, the chief of them being the Sultan Tezak, holding the rank of a major in the Russian service, the most aristocratic and respected of all the Kirghiz chiefs, and a well-known and lifelong friend to Russia. The chief evidence against him was that some of the property stolen from the prefect was found in his tent. One investigation succeeded another, until a Cossack finally confessed that he had placed these articles in the tent of Tezak at the instigation of the judge himself. It is said that this was done because the judge wished to please the clique of officials at Tashkent by convicting of robbery and sedition a man very much favoured by General Kolpakofsky, of whom they were jealous. Among the papers of the investigating commission is a letter from the prefect to the judge with regard to the means of obtaining this evidence. For various reasons it was long impossible to finish the investigation, for as soon as a commission showed a leaning to the side of the authorities of Semiretch, it was immediately dissolved by General Kaufmann,—but it was thought necessary to remove the judge and bestow upon him a similar post in the city of Hodjent, where his methods of administering justice also gave rise to loud complaints.¹ The effect of such a proceeding was, of course, to make the natives thoroughly displeased with the workings of the Russian courts. A decision was finally rendered in 1875 by the Senate at St. Petersburg, by which Sultan Tezak was acquitted. This was

¹ See vol. i. p. 313.

regarded as a great triumph for the authorities of Semiretch over those of Tashkent.

Another case of the ill-advised action of the authorities, regardless of the effect produced upon the natives, was the forced contribution of camels during the Khivan campaign, in spite of promises of payment. Of this I shall speak more fully in another chapter.

There had been so much said at St. Petersburg, not only in Government circles but in the papers, with regard to the disorders of the Russian administration in Central Asia, that when General Kaufmann returned to Tashkent, in 1875, he felt it necessary to take some measures to bring about a better order of things, or, at least, to ascertain where and to what degree the disorders existed. He therefore commissioned officials under his immediate orders to make what is called in Russia a 'revision' of several of the districts in which official corruption and disorder had been said to exist to a great extent. The powers granted to these inspectors were very limited; they were not to go below the surface of things, and were to abstain as far as possible from questioning the natives about abuses alleged to exist, and were chiefly to confine themselves to the mere inspection of the books and the accounts of the different administrations. In spite of the limitations imposed upon them, the inspectors of the districts of Kurama and Hodjent, and of the city of Tashkent, brought to light a very remarkable state of things. They found that in many cases no accounts whatever had been kept, that expenses from the communal sums had frequently been authorised by the prefects and the military governors without votes of the Regencies, and that money had been paid out in large sums for alleged expenses without receipts, while the papers which did exist gave evidence of the extravagance and mismanagement of the officials. In Tashkent, for instance, the *zemsky* tax for the communal needs increased from 16,000 rubles in 1868 to over 86,000 rubles in 1874, and it was found that, although the accounts were properly arranged under different headings, money had often been paid from one account for expenses incurred in others, and even for purposes that did not properly come under any title. Some of the heaviest items were large yearly sums for the repairs and refurnishing of the residences of the Prefect and his officials. In Hodjent matters

were fully as bad. The *zemskey* tax for communal needs increased from over 16,000 rubles in 1869 to nearly 64,000 rubles in 1874. In addition to this, in 1874, 18,000 rubles were collected as city taxes in Hodjent and Ura-tepé, over 9,000 rubles as a tax on weights, and 6,000 rubles as the bazaar-tax. In 1873 the taxes were even greater. The total taxes, exclusive of the land-tax and the tax on trade, which came to the general Government—those only which were intended for the support of the native administration and the economical necessities of the district, had increased from 17,000 rubles in 1869 to 107,000 rubles in 1873, and 96,000 in 1874, while the receipts for 1875 up to August amounted to 78,000 rubles, which would make 134,000 rubles for the completed year. The land and other taxes belonging to the Central Government between 1869 and 1875 increased by $52\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., while the highest estimate of increased population was not more than 19 per cent.

In speaking of the expenses at Hodjent in 1873 the official report says:—‘The expenses as compared with 1872 have increased five times, and have increased in an entirely unproductive and arbitrary way, as they have not been called out by the actual needs of the population. Notwithstanding the enormous increase of the estimates, expenses have been allowed which were not included in them, and which were not even ratified by the vote of the Regency, although not the highest significance should be given to the votes of the native officials.’ In confirmation of the justice of this conclusion I may quote the vote for the purchase of a carriage for the use of the Regency of Hodjent. No member of the Regency ever once used this carriage, although it was a very expensive one. We must be astonished at the relative moderation of the prefect who could have ordered a still more original decree to be made than this one about the carriage. I am compelled to believe that such freedom in the dispensation of the communal funds necessarily leads to evil results, demoralises the officials who have charge of them, exhausts the means of the population, wastes them in an unproductive manner for the natives, and leads not only to present but to future evil, by destroying the confidence of the natives in the Russian administration, which takes charge over them and gives them nothing.

‘Special attention should be turned to the expenses for the

repairs of roads, buildings, and bridges, which demanded more than 5,000 rubles. What called out such a great expense, whether it was absolutely necessary at the given time, whether the repairs were properly conducted, whether the prices for the work and material are regular, are questions which are not to be answered by any entries in the books or papers of the Regency. Nothing in the accounts show us that this and similar great expenses were called out by any necessity. The formation of an army of *jigits* which existed only on paper; the construction of a hospital of four beds for a population of 150,000 men, and the yearly expense of 2,000 rubles for the repairs of this one room; the construction of a house for the district prefect on a large scale, and with luxurious furniture, which cost over 28,000 rubles; the heating of the Government buildings, which cost nearly 4,000 rubles, although in 1872 but 1,000 had been necessary; the appointment of an inspector of public buildings, with a salary of 600 rubles, who in the leisure time allowed from his official duties fulfilled the functions of cook for the district prefect; the wages of gardeners and of watchmen, the allowance made without guarantee to the district prefect, to the judge, and to other persons; special grants of money to assistants of the district prefect and district physician—all these were expenses which were not called out by the communal needs, and are not to be justified by economical considerations, and certainly bring no advantage to the local population. We can only wonder that the military governor confirmed the tax estimates which had increased in this remarkable way. Notwithstanding the uncontrolled calculation and formation of the estimates, the expenses are constantly greater than the sums assigned to meet them.'

In explanation of one item given above the report in another passage states that a whole band of *jigits*, or mounted messengers, was formed, the cost of maintenance of whom for one year was estimated in 1872 at over 12,000 rubles, being double the expense for the communal needs in 1870. Nothing in the accounts shows the actual number of *jigits* or the salary paid to them, but the report states that this is really very small, the remaining money going into the pockets of the officials. From other sources I learn that the wages of the *jigits* are seldom more than twelve rubles a month, and a

prefect seldom has more than five *jigits* in actual service at the same time.

The inspection of the Kurama district brought out even worse results, but I have not yet been informed of the details. A high official, however, remarked that what was now going on in the district of Kurama made the occurrences in that district of which I have already spoken seem mere child's play.

The Russian maladministration naturally could have but one result—that of causing discontent among the natives. Before the war with Khokand this dissatisfaction was not believed in by the higher authorities, until circumstances occurred which rendered it very plain that in certain districts the population was disaffected to the Russian rule. Ordinary intercourse among the natives, even without making special inquiries, was sufficient to bring to light the same state of feeling.

The occurrences to which I refer were these:—In 1871 an attack was made on the station of Kara-su, on the high road between Tashkent and Hodjent. One officer was killed, and the station was destroyed. Although this was at first supposed to be merely an act of marauders, it was afterwards found to be the work of a political conspiracy, in which the Tashkent people had been asked to take part. The leader was the Ishan Ish Mohammed Kul, a well-known fanatic, a disciple of a Khokandian Wahabi preacher, Sufi Badal, and his expedition of some twenty men went out quietly from Tashkent by a roundabout way and then fell upon the post-station, with the aim of breaking the communication, exciting the country which lay beyond, and inviting the Khokandians to an invasion. The Government was warned of this movement several days in advance, and might easily have prevented it, but they refused to act, believing there was nothing serious on foot.

In 1872 there was a great disturbance in Hodjent, to which I have already called attention. This disturbance necessitated the action of the troops, and the mob was put down and its ringleaders were executed. It had been stated at the time that this riot had occurred in consequence of the order for general vaccination, which the natives thought to be a process for branding them, for the purpose of employing them as recruits for the army. The real cause, as has been shown, was discontent with the increased taxation. During the early

spring of 1873, in consequence of disturbances in the district of Tchimkent, most of the Kirghiz inhabiting that region left the country, preferring the sands of the Kyzyl-Kum desert to being under Russian rule. Their movement, however, was made in vain, for, after the Khivan expedition, the whole of Kyzyl-Kum was formally annexed.

The circumstances attending the war with Khokand are, I think, quite sufficient to show the feeling of the population. Before the siege of Hodjent the Khokandians had put themselves in communication with the *aksakals* and other native officials of the neighbouring districts, and the Bek of Makhrum had even spent two days in the city of Hodjent. His presence there, although known to many of the inhabitants, was concealed from the Russians. As soon as the Khokandians approached, the natives of the districts through which they passed immediately joined them, taking part in the attacks upon the Russian post-stations and in the murders of officers, *aksakals*, and travellers, while the city population remained quiet, waiting to see which side gained the preponderance.

Government officers began to open their eyes, and the consequence was that arms were distributed to all the Russian inhabitants, and no one was allowed to go through the streets unless armed. In some of the bureaux the clerks even sat at work with their muskets at their side. I have every reason to believe, from many circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that the chief reason of the Khokandians maintaining such a desperate resistance against the Russians was from fear of being brought under Russian rule, and the assistance on which they confidently counted, in case of success, from all their fellow-believers within the Russian boundaries. In a communication which I received from an influential Kashgarian official, it was stated that Yakub Khan was constantly receiving petitions from the inhabitants of Tashkent and other Russian towns urging him to invade the country and relieve them from the Russian yoke.

In this connection it is interesting to refer to some articles which were published in the newspaper 'Moskva,' in 1867¹ by Professor Grigorief, in which he sketched the policy which in his opinion should be pursued in Central Asia. This was soon

¹ Nos. 23, 24, 32, 53, and 54.

after the conquest of Tashkent, and it is curious to see how exactly some of the prognostications of the writer have been realised. 'If we sit still in Tashkent for a year or two the people in Khokand will begin to think that this proceeds from nothing else but our weakness, and from the impossibility of further conquest, and will again try to measure their strength with ours. Asiatics are wonderfully forgetful, and quickly as they give themselves up to fear, are none the slower in recovering their self-confidence. The Khokandians can also be incited to take up arms against us by the discontent of the local population with our rule in Tashkent. If this arise from any mistakes of the Russian administration, the Khokandians will hardly fail to profit by such a favourable occurrence. We cannot count on the permanency of the good disposition towards us of the inhabitants of the districts of Turkistan and Tashkent, especially because these people are accustomed to internal disorders, to political revolutions, and to the change of rulers,—habits which are not easily lost; and besides this, they will be excited by the religious influence and secret intrigues of Bukhara. One of the English statesmen best acquainted with the East says, "I don't know a single case where the close relation of a civilised people with an uncivilised one, have not turned to mutual hatred in the course of three years." Professor Grigorief's idea was that the number of troops should be the smallest number for keeping internal order and protecting the country from invasions, every effort being made to proportion the cost of governing the country to its resources; and he thought that it would be better to collect the troops at different points, from which they could easily be moved, rather than dispose them in small bodies throughout the country. 'Great care,' he said, 'should also be taken that the relations between the soldiers and the native women do not produce disorder. The murders of Grigboyedof at Teheran and of Burnes at Kabul were due to intrigues with women. Next in importance to the trouble caused by the intrigues of the soldiers and the native women, nothing in Asia so excites the discontent of the natives against these troops, and consequently against the Government which these troops serve, as the dearness of the prime necessities of life, and especially of provisions, which is the inevitable consequence of the acquisition of a larger number of consumers.

Should 10,000 Russian troops come into the country of Tashkent there is no doubt that from the time of their arrival the prices of our provisions would be raised in Tashkent, and in the other places where the troops were stationed they would be much higher than they were before. The cause of this is the poverty and small productiveness of the country. Asia is rich only in the imaginations of those unacquainted with it. To agriculturists and land-owners the raising of the prices for the productions of the soil cannot fail to be pleasing, but afterwards, when the dearness spreads to other articles of consumption, in consequence of which the profits of the country people turn out to be fictitious, this class becomes discontented. As concerns merchants and artisans, the dearness growing up from the new order of things will certainly not dispose them to the new rule. How this cause of discontent can be removed, I do not know. The administration of the conquered country will cause the greatest difficulty. There should be no attempt to impose foreign ideas. There should be as little bureaucracy as possible, and in general the government should be carried on by the natives as far as may be.'

The dearness of provisions of which Mr. Grigorief speaks, was speedily brought about,¹ and the period of discontent is now coming on. The relations between the Russians and the native women, which have been in a measure approved by the authorities as means of extending Russian influence, are frequently productive of difficulties, several instances of which came under my knowledge. A sentence in Professor Grigorief's account of the expulsion of the English from Afghanistan is singularly applicable here.² 'Many husbands and brothers for the love of gain sold their wives and sisters to the foreigners, but they were the first to raise cries against the insults thus given to religion,—cries which were at once taken up by the Mullahs, who carried these complaints into all the by-ways.'

¹ See vol. i. p. 285.

² The whole of this passage on Afghanistan is a very true description of the state of things in Turkistan. 'Kabulistan and Kafiristan' (Russian translation of Ritter's 'Erdkunde'), p. 895.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA.

Alleged will of Peter the Great—Former Russian policy—It cannot be inferred from the fact of conquest—There is really no policy—Prince Gortchakof's circular—Difficulties arising from the constitution of the Government—Fear of English remonstrances—Views against India—Paul's proposed expedition—The neutral zone and the Afghan frontier—The full powers of General Kaufmann—Consequent awkwardness—General Kaufmann's policy—The Diplomatic *employé*—Embassies—Presents—Relations with Khokand—The commercial treaty—Karategin—Unquiet state of the country—Rebellion of 1875—The war with Russia—Violent struggle—Annexation of the Khanate—Bukhara—Disagreeable relations—The Samarkand campaign—Commercial treaty—Subsequent relations—Slave-trade—New treaty of 1873—Afghanistan—Kashgar—Difficulties attending friendly intercourse—Mission of Baron Kaulbars—Treaty—Subsequent relations—Chinese frontier questions.

THE fictitious character of the so-called testament of Peter the Great¹ is now so well established that it would be absurd to discuss the principles there laid down for the conquest of Europe and of Asia, or to investigate the reasons dictating such a policy.

Professor Grigorief, who, from his profound and intimate knowledge of the history and literature of the country, and from his practical experience at Orenburg, as Governor of the

¹ The forgery of the will of Peter the Great was due to the desire of Napoleon to frighten Europe, and thus to give him excuses and pretexts for entering upon his Moscow campaign. It first appeared in the book called 'Des progrès de la puissance russe depuis son origine jusqu'au commencement du XIX^e siècle,' published at Paris in 1812, by Lesur, an attaché of the Department of Foreign Affairs, without doubt on the express command of Napoleon I. Many copies of this book were taken by the Duke de Bassano with the army. Lesur does not say that he had ever seen this will, and gives no proofs of its existence, but merely says in his introduction: 'On assure qu'il existe dans les archives particulières des Empereurs de Russie des Mémoires secrets écrits de la main de Pierre le Grand, où sont exposés sans détours les projets que ce prince avait conçus, qu'il recommande à l'attention de ses successeurs et que plusieurs d'entre eux

Lesser Horde of Kirghiz, is certainly the greatest Russian authority on Central Asia, has plainly shown the vacillation, the ignorance, and the want of good sense which marked the policy of Russia towards Asia from the reign of Peter the Great to that of Alexander II. in an article which I have translated in APPENDIX IV. at the end of this volume. The circum-

ont, en effet, suivis avec une persistance pour ainsi dire religieuse.' When in 1836 the Polish question had been for the moment finished, and the Eastern question seemed menacing, and it became again necessary to show Russia's desire of world-conquest, the will reappears, but this time re-written in more diplomatic and precise language, in the form of an actual testament in 'Les Mémoires du Chevalier d'Éon,' by Gaillardet, one of the celebrated collaborators with A. Dumas of the melodrama 'La Tour de Nesle.' It is here introduced as follows: 'En même temps que l'acte d'adhésion d'Elisabeth au traité de Versailles, le Chevalier d'Éon avait apporté un document précieux dont il dut la découverte à son intimité sans bornes et à ses investigations sans contrôle dans les archives les plus secrets des tzars. Ce document, dont tout le monde a parlé depuis 1812, dont l'existence était connue, mais que nul ne possédait et n'a pu reproduire, fut remis confidentiellement par le Chevalier d'Éon, avec un travail spécial sur la Russie, entre les mains de l'abbé de Bernis, ministre des affaires étrangères, et entre celles du roi Louis XV lui-même, en 1757. C'est une copie littérale et fidèle du testament laissé par Pierre le Grand à ses descendants et à ses successeurs au trône moscovite.' Neither the famous—or infamous—Chevalier d'Éon, nor M. Gaillardet, can be considered as authorities on an historical question. In 1839 a Polish writer, Léonard Chodzko, in his 'La Pologne illustrée,' brought up again the will, with still greater details. He says: 'Ce fut en 1709 après la bataille de Pultawa, que Pierre I traça le plan de son testament qu'il retoucha en 1724. Par un hasard dont les incidents romanesques seraient superflus ici, l'ambassadeur de France près la cour de la czarine Elisabeth, en 1757, trouva moyen de prendre copie de cette pièce étrange, et aussitôt il l'envoya à Versailles, avec toutes les reflexions que mérite un pareil document.'

Finally, during the Crimean war, in 1854, M. J. Corréard published a map of the successive enlargements of Russia since the time of Peter the Great, and added in the margin a copy of the supposed will, with a still more exact account: 'Ce testament politique fut esquissé par Pierre I^{er} en 1710 après la bataille de Pultawa, retouché par lui en 1722, après la paix de Nystadt, et formulé définitivement par le chancelier Ostermann. Il fut connu de Louis XV et de ses ministres dès l'année 1757.' In this state has the legend come to us.

See 'Les Auteurs du Testament de Pierre le Grand, page d'Histoire.' Paris: E. Dentu, Libraire-Éditeur, Palais-Royal, 17-19 Galerie d'Orléans, 1872.

It is almost unnecessary to remark that the language and the expressions as well as the ideas in this alleged will, are such as never could have been used by Peter the Great or in his time. The state archives of Russia are liberally open to all historical students, but no one has ever yet been able to find there this famous will, nor, in spite of the allegations of M. Gaillardet and M. Chodzko, has anyone succeeded in discovering the copy of the document in the French archives.

There are strong reasons for believing that the only will left by Peter the Great—that naming his wife as his successor—was forged by Catherine and Menshikof immediately after his death.

stances of his present official position will explain the reason why he did not touch upon the policy which has been pursued during the present reign; but what his opinions are on that subject are to be found in the letters in the 'Moskva.'

The policy of Russia cannot be concluded merely from the conquests and extensions of territory, without taking into account the causes of these movements. Yet this is what is usually done; and the fact that since the Crimean war Russia has annexed considerable portions of the three khanates of Bukhara, Khokand, and Khiva is put forward as a proof of a scheming policy and of a plot to dominate the whole of Asia. With much greater force might it be said that the extension of British rule in Asia is the result of a long-matured and traditional policy of Asiatic conquest; yet no one who knows how the spread of British rule in India and in the adjacent countries has been brought about would think of accusing the English Government of such a design. Why, then, should such accusations be brought against Russia? Simply because there is a widely spread belief in Western Europe—and irrational ideas of this kind are often hardest to eradicate—that as Russia is governed (so it is thought) by a single will, and as the political steps of Russia are taken without the publicity which attends such measures in constitutional countries, Russian statesmen are almost preternaturally wise and skilful, and that there exists a traditional and hereditary policy. Such a policy would be difficult enough anywhere, and it does not and has not existed in Russia; in fact not only in Asiatic but in other Eastern as well as in European affairs Russia is guided by no policy whatever, except so far as yearly and almost daily changing circumstances may dictate. Were it to be generally admitted, —I will not say as true, but even as possible,—that Russia had no foreign policy except that of carrying out such views as might for the moment seem advantageous, the present situation of affairs both in Europe and Asia might be more easily understood and difficulties might be better avoided.

It seems, therefore, exceedingly unfair towards Russia to bring up the Circular issued by Prince Gortchakof after the capture of Tchinkent as a proof of the bad feeling of the Russian Government in its dealings with Central Asia. Under ordinary circumstances such a step as that taken by Russia in 1864 for

rounding off her frontier and filling up the gaps between the lines of the Syr Darya and of Siberia would have excited no remark and would have needed no explanation. But England had always been jealous of the independence of the Central Asiatic Khanates; and the English press,—with a feeling which would seem to imply that it believed the English hold on India to be weaker than it really is,—immediately raised a cry of alarm, as if this were an advance made towards wresting that great empire from English hands. Prince Gortchakof, therefore, thought it best to explain the object of the movement in a circular which he issued to the different Russian embassies and legations. In that circular the Prince set forth what were undoubtedly the true reasons for the Russian advance. He also stated that there was no intention of advancing further, for this campaign had been undertaken purely to prevent the necessity of subsequent campaigns. ‘We find ourselves,’ he said, ‘in face of a more solid, more compact, less unsettled, and better organised society; and this marks with geographical precision the limits to which interest and reason prescribe us to advance, and at which we must halt, because, on the one hand, any further extension of our rule meeting henceforth, not with unstable communities, like independent nomad tribes, but with more regularly constituted states, would exact considerable efforts and would draw us on from annexation to annexation into infinite complications; while, on the other hand, having henceforth for neighbours such states, notwithstanding their backward condition and the instability of their political action, we can nevertheless be assured that to the common advantage regular relations will one day be substituted for the disorders which have hitherto paralysed the progress of these countries.’

There would seem to be no ground for charging Russia with duplicity in this Circular, for there is nothing in it which was not at the time generally believed. Its great fault was in believing that the home authorities, with the peculiar system of government which prevails in Russia, would be able to control the movements of the generals in command, and in thinking that the Khanates of Central Asia were well-organised states, that political relations might be had with them, and that they would be amenable to reason or would respect the obligations of treaties. Prince Gortchakof could not then know

that General Tcherniaief, in violation of orders, would the next summer attack and capture Tashkent. He was misinformed also as to the value of the country annexed. One thing, however, he saw clearly,—although the efforts necessary were much less considerable than he had supposed,—that a further extension of rule over the Khanates would lead from annexation to annexation and to infinite complications. How some of these annexations were brought about and why some of these attacks took place I shall endeavour to explain.

I referred above to the peculiar constitution of the Russian Government. This has a more important bearing on the Asiatic policy of the Empire than has been generally supposed. Each minister being independent and responsible only to the Emperor, there is no Cabinet, properly so called, and can be no united policy. The councils of ministers do not so much discuss questions of policy as questions of detail, the solution of which depends upon two or three ministers jointly. Sometimes a subject is deemed so important that a special commission is appointed to study it and to come to a conclusion, which may or may not be ratified by the Emperor. Still, even in this case, as each minister has the right of a personal audience with the Emperor, when he can explain in detail all his arguments for the proposed measure, the decision of the commission may be set aside almost as soon as it is made. A striking instance of this occurred in the formation of the Trans-Caspian military district. The plan for the establishment of this district was opposed both by Prince Gortchakof and by the Minister of Finance, the one on political and the other on financial grounds, and it was rejected by a large majority in the commission specially appointed to consider it. Yet the united influence of the Grand-Duke Michael and of the Minister of War was so strong as to obtain the Imperial sanction to the scheme but a few days after.

It will be seen from this one example that it is possible for a measure to be put into operation although it may be contrary to the ideas and desires of the Foreign Office. But this is not an isolated case; such things are of constant occurrence. The difficulty in such cases is that in the end no one is responsible, not even the Government, for it is guided by no settled policy. As matters now stand there are five distinct rulers

over large provinces in Asia, all of whom have differing interests, and some of whom are in constant rivalry, if not in actual bad relations with each other. All are nominally dependent in military matters upon the Minister of War; all are practically independent of the Foreign Office; all have the right of reporting personally and *vivâ voce* to the Emperor, and really acknowledge no other authority. These are the Grand Duke Michael, the brother of the Emperor, and the Lieutenant of the Caucasus, and the Governors-General of Orenburg, of Turkistan, of Eastern and of Western Siberia. The Governors-General of Turkistan, of Eastern and of Western Siberia, on account of the affairs of Kuldja, have to do with Chinese officials, and in spite of telegraphs and post-roads each of them pursues a policy which at times differs from that of each of the others, as well as from that of the Russian Minister at Peking, who acts under the direct instructions of the Foreign Office. The Governors-General of Western Siberia, of Turkistan, and of Orenburg have different methods for the government of the Kirghiz, who are nearly equally divided between the three provinces. General Kryzhanofsky and General Kaufmann, as is well known, look at the affairs of the Steppe and of the Central Asiatic Khanates from entirely different and almost irreconcilable points of view. The Grand Duke Michael, to whom the Trans-Caspian district has lately been subjected, has still different ideas, and in his anxiety to find some occupation for the large army placed under his orders frequently makes propositions to the Ministry of War, which, on account of foreign complications that would arise, are as often rejected by the Emperor on the advice of Prince Gortchakof; and yet almost without exception they are merely adjourned and not utterly forbidden, for we see that the Grand Duke is sometimes allowed to carry out his plans on a smaller scale than he at first intended, as well as to take steps for larger projects, and we know the great influence which both the Grand Duke and the Minister of War have with the Emperor.

The fears of English remonstrances and of diplomatic complications have had great influence on the Russian policy in Asia. The Foreign Office has been exceedingly annoyed by the persistent manner in which, on each movement of troops, questions have been asked in Parliament, or the

British Ambassador has hinted or stated to Prince Gortchakof his desire to know the reasons for such a step; and not unfrequently movements quite insignificant in themselves have been forbidden for fear of English remonstrances. This has not been unnoticed in the Russian press. A recent book on Central Asia¹ says: 'This has caused us to explain to England every one of our movements, to quiet her with regard to our intentions and to define our policy. This cannot but have its effect on our actions, which receive a tinge of indecision and display a possible fear of awakening vain apprehensions on the part of our rival. The wish to quiet the English disbelief in us and to give no cause for English protests has made us look through our fingers at many greater or less breaches of international law on the part of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kashgar. England would never have permitted half of these wrongs and insults. Our moderation, however, has been vain. In the eyes of Englishmen we have won nothing, and if England for a time appears to believe in us and to be friendly, the feeling is not sincere.'

It is impossible to believe that there is any settled intention on the part of the Russian Government of making an attack on India, or even of preparing the way for it, nor is there any desire for the possession of India. Young men in the army of Turkistan, whose only thought is for advancement and decorations, may, indeed, talk loudly; but the men who control the policy have no such thought. What might happen in case of a war between Russia and England on other questions is, indeed, hard to say. If Russia could then—easily for

¹ 'Russia and England in Central Asia,' by M. A. Terentief, p. 252. St. Petersburg, 1875. While not sharing all the opinions or approving the tone of Mr. Terentief, who is very *chauviniste* and needlessly hostile to England, I frequently refer to his book in this chapter, because when serving in Central Asia he had access to the papers contained in the chancery of General Kaufmann, and may, therefore, when he quotes documents, be considered as an authority. Many of the facts which he mentions in the book referred to, I already knew from other sources. During the later years of Mr. Terentief's stay in Tashkent, he was a violent opponent of General Kaufmann, and was seeking information of every description to convict him of maladministration and incompetence. After the administration of Turkistan had been attacked in the Russian press search was made for a writer with a ready pen, and the officials of General Kaufmann's staff succeeded in presenting to Mr. Terentief 'convincing arguments' for defending rather than attacking the General's administration. This may in some measure account for the two different lines of thought which run through his book.

herself—make a diversion on India she would certainly be justified in doing so, but the position of Russian affairs in Turkistan is hardly such as to allow her to do so for many years to come, to say nothing of the distance of Turkistan from European Russia, the bad communications, and the intervening deserts and mountains between Turkistan and India, which would render such a movement exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The only danger to India from Russia lies through Persia. Experience has proved that all invasions of India have come through Afghanistan, and Afghanistan can only be approached by Russia through Persia.

The Emperor Paul, from his hatred of the English and his sympathy with Napoleon, did, indeed, propose an expedition to India, but his plan was so wild that even Napoleon laughed at it. His idea was that Russia should concentrate in Astrakhan 25,000 regular troops and 2,000 Cossacks. France was also to send a body of 35,000 men up the Danube to the Black Sea, when they were to be conveyed in ships to Taganrog, and were then to march to the Volga and sail to Astrakhan. From there both armies were to go to Astrabad, and it was expected that the troops could march from Astrakhan to the Indus in forty-five days. Napoleon having refused to consent to this expedition, Paul resolved on undertaking it with his own means; and in order not to make the conquest too much of a burden upon the Government, he intended to effect it by means of the Don Cossacks alone, to whom he presented India in a letter of January 12 (24) to General Orlof, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, in which he said: 'All the wealth of India will be your reward for this expedition.' The Cossacks were to march from Orenburg to Khiva and Bukhara, and thence to the Indus. Several other letters with new orders succeeded, and Orlof promised to undertake the expedition and carry it out successfully. The Cossacks prepared for their march, which was fixed for the beginning of May, when on the night of March 23 the Emperor Paul suddenly died, and the change of Government put a stop to the whole plan.

In the early part of the Crimean war another project for the invasion of India was presented to the Emperor Nicholas by General Duhamel, but Russia's attention was too much taken up with what was passing on the Danube and in the

Crimea to pay much attention to it. The success of such an expedition would, of course, depend upon which country had the preponderance in Persia, for it is only with the consent if not the active co-operation of Persia that such a plan would stand the slightest chance of fulfilment.

Apprehensions for the safety of her Indian possessions led England to engage in the only negotiations on the subject of Central Asia which have yet taken place. They were begun in the early part of 1869 by Lord Clarendon, who in a conference with Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, said that while Her Majesty's Government had not the slightest cause for alarm in the rapid progress of Russia in Central Asia, yet something must be done to allay the excitement and the suspicions of the British public and the British press. He therefore proposed what became known as the 'neutral zone,'—that there should be a strip of territory between Russia and the Indian possessions the neutrality of which should be guaranteed by both parties. Prince Gortchakof received this suggestion in very good part, and proposed that Afghanistan be selected as that zone. This, however, did not suit the views of the Indian Government, which was by no means desirous of having Afghanistan remain neutral,—so far at least as England was concerned. Subsequently Lord Clarendon had an interview at Heidelberg with Prince Gortchakof on this subject, and still later in the autumn of the same year Mr. Forsyth, as the representative of the Indian Government, visited St. Petersburg, and held several conferences with Prince Gortchakof, and other Russian ministers. It was found that a neutral zone in its strict sense was impossible. The idea of the Indian Government then was to establish on the frontier of each country a girdle of semi-independent states, those nearest India—Afghanistan, Kelat, and Yarkand (Kashgar)—to be subject to British influence, and those on the other side of the Oxus, including Bukhara and Khokand, to be subject to that of Russia. As the plan of independent or semi-independent states was found an impossible one, it was barely proposed to Russia, and after several conferences it was substantially agreed, that 'Afghanistan should be completely outside the sphere within which Russia should be called upon to exercise her influence,' while it was understood that all the countries to the north of that should be considered to be under

Russian influence, and that no interference should be made there by England. The only question to decide was as to the actual boundaries of Afghanistan, it being agreed that all the countries in the effective possession of Shir Ali Khan, and which had formerly recognised the sovereignty of Dost Mohammed, should be considered as Afghanistan, and it was arranged that the memoranda and papers on this subject should be submitted to General Kaufmann, as the person nearest the spot capable of judging the question, in order that he might report to the Russian Government what the actual boundaries of the country were. The matter drifted on, for no reports were received from General Kaufmann, who seemed to find it exceedingly difficult to ascertain the real boundaries of Afghanistan, in spite of the pressing reminder of Sir Andrew Buchannan in the autumn of 1871. Finally, on October 17, 1872, Lord Granville wrote a dispatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, for communication to the Russian Government, in which it was stated that the English Government not having received any information from Russia, had been obliged to make up their minds from the best information they could receive, and had concluded *to consider* as fully belonging to the Amir of Kabul:—1. Badakshan, with its dependent district of Vakhān, from the Sarikul (Woods' Lake) on the east, to the junction of the Koktcha River, with the Oxus (or Penja), forming the northern boundary of this Afghan province throughout its entire extent. 2. Afghan Turkistan, comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh, the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus from the junction of the Koktcha River to the post of Khoja Saleh inclusive, on the high road from Bukhara to Balkh. Nothing to be claimed by the Afghan Amir on the left bank of the Oxus below Khoja Saleh. 3. The internal districts of Aksha, Seripul, Maimena, Shibberjan, and Andkhai, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north west, the desert beyond belonging to independent tribes of Turkomans. 4. The Western Afghan frontier, between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian province of Khorassān, is well known, and need not here be defined.¹

¹ Sir Henry Rawlinson (in his 'England and Russia in the East,' London, 1875, p. 310), seems to claim on one point a still greater extent of territory. He states that in paragraph 1 the words 'on the west; the stream of the Oxus' were

This despatch brought out a reply from Prince Gortchakof, conveying the report of General Kaufmann, and a memorandum by Mr. Struve, who claimed that Badakshan and Vakhan were not subject to the rule of Shir Ali Khan. Prince Gortchakof therefore, objected to having them included within the limits of Afghanistan under his objection. He, however, subsequently withdrew his objection, as he said, to please the English cabinet. He added, 'We are more inclined to this act of courtesy, as the English Government engages to use all its influence with Shir Ali, in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up all measures of aggression or further conquest. This influence is indispensable. It is based not only on the material and moral ascendancy of England, but also on the subsidies for which Shir Ali is indebted to her. Such being the case, we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of peace.' When this correspondence came to be published, some alarm was felt as to the obligation of England, implied in the last paragraph of Prince Gortchakof's note, to maintain Shir Ali's peaceful attitude and to restrain him from all measures of aggression or further conquest. It was said that this committed England to an armed intervention for the preservation of peace. Mr. Gladstone, in a speech in Parliament (April 23, 1873), repudiated this responsibility, saying that the influence of England was only to be exercised by means of friendly advice. The Russians looked upon this as a formal repudiation of the whole transaction on the part of the English Government, for it was evident that Russia would not guarantee the inviolability of Afghanistan territory, if the English did not agree that they would compel the Amir to respect the territory on the other side of the Oxus,—territory which is now Bukharan, but what will probably some day be Russian. The 'Official Gazette,' remarking on Mr.

accidentally omitted after the words 'the Oxus of Penja,' and he maintains therefore on the basis of subsequent explorations that the main stream of the Oxus is not to be taken, as that rising in Woods' Lake, but a branch to the north rising in the little Pamir Lake, which, under the name of Murghabi, flows down the Shugnan valley. He has accordingly thus marked the boundary on his map. The official documents, however, published both by the English and the Russian Governments expressly mention the branch rising in Wood's Lake. It certainly was not the intention of the Russians to include in Afghanistan the principality of Shugnan which is now well known to belong to Bukhara.

Gladstone's explanation, said : ' If England has preserved her freedom of action Russia has also preserved hers, and consequently the two Governments have not in reality pledged themselves to any inconvenient obligations which might have the effect of placing them in false relations.' In reality, therefore, the matter remains exactly where it was before the negotiations of 1869 and 1872 were begun, except that an agreement has been brought about as to what are the boundaries of Afghanistan. Unless some new arrangement should be made, Russia has a perfect right, in case of troubles on the Oxus, to cross it and inflict punishment upon the troops and provinces of Shir Ali.

The attitude of England toward Russia with regard to Central Asia, can hardly be called a dignified one. There are constant questions, protests, demands for explanations, and even threats—at least in the newspapers and in Parliament—but nothing ever is done. Outcries were made about the expedition to Khiva, but when the occupation had once become a *fait accompli*, the same men and the same journals said that no harm was done. Again there were outcries and questions about the possibility of a Russian movement on Kashgar. Now, after Khokand is occupied, the conquest of Kashgar is looked upon as not so alarming after all. At present there is a similar uneasiness about Merv, and the Russophobic party are using all their efforts to show, either that the Russians must not be allowed to take Merv, or if they do take it, that Herat must be occupied. In all probability Merv will be occupied by the Russians, and in all probability the English Government will do nothing at all. It would seem wiser and more dignified, instead of subjecting the Russian Foreign Office to constant petty annoyances, to allow the Russians plainly to understand what limits they could not pass in their onward movement. A state of mutual suspicion bodes no good to the relations of any Governments.

One of the great causes of the Russian advance in Central Asia, and one of the greatest difficulties with which the Foreign Office has had to deal, has been the full powers granted to General Kaufmann to carry on diplomatic relations with the neighbouring states. Whatever reason might have existed for this at first, now that the post-roads are in better order, and that the telegraph is completed to Tashkent and Hodjent, the policy of Turkistan should certainly be entirely

governed by that of the Government at St. Petersburg. These powers, however, General Kaufmann has regarded as the apple of his eye. There are the best reasons to believe that full details of the actual state of the relations between the Khanates and Tashkent have not always been communicated to the Home Government, and that at times formal permission has been asked and explanations have been given only after military expeditions have actually started. The policy which has prevailed at Tashkent, so far as it can be distinct from the policy at St. Petersburg, has been a purely personal one. The great desire of the Governor-General has been to play the part of pacificator of Central Asia. With this view treaties were made with various states—which were far from being kept—by which, in the opinion of many— not only at St. Petersburg but even in Tashkent, to say nothing of those abroad who followed the movements,—the surrounding Khanates were reduced to vassalage. How far this is true may be seen from the late war with Khokand. It being supposed that both Khokand and Bukhara were perfectly subdued, and were ready to carry out all the wishes of the Government, the campaign against Khiva was undertaken without great necessity, but to round off the whole with a successful military expedition, which would put down the last elements of disorder in Central Asia.

One consequence of this full power has been to keep up diplomatic relations where properly no diplomatic relations should have existed. When the Khanates had been once awed by force of arms, the Russians might well have taken a leaf from the English policy in India, and have appointed residents near each of the Khans, whose position would indeed have been a semi-diplomatic one, but whose duties would have consisted, with the help of a guard of native Cossacks, in enforcing the orders of the Governor-General.

No attempt, however, has been made at anything like this. The Russians have never maintained in any of the Khanates an official or secret agent who could give them information. They have trusted to the reports of prefects and commanders on the borders, and to the effect of occasional missions. The nominal conduct of diplomatic affairs was, up to the end of 1873, in the hands of Mr. Struvé, the son of the well-known astronomer, and now the Russian minister in Japan. Since that time they

have been conducted by Mr. Weinberg, a dependent of the Foreign Office. Diplomatic relations have been kept up by occasionally sending special missions—frequently without any special object except the interchange of compliments—to Khokand, Bukhara, and even Kashgar. These missions are frequently, but not always accompanied by the diplomatic *employé*. In addition to this, the Khokandian Government up to its fall maintained in Tashkent a resident envoy, one Mirza Hakim, a man of little repute in his own country, but a favourite of the Khan.

The Russians complain that their Government shows no firmness in its diplomatic relations, and does not assert the influence to which it has a right from its actual power, and accuse the diplomatic *employé* and other envoys of yielding too much to what is called Asiatic usage. One of these usages is that of giving and receiving presents. When Russia first opened relations with the Khanates, and when it was itself in outward character an Asiatic power, it is but natural that the system of presents should have been maintained. It was, however, found exceedingly burdensome. The Khans approved of it in order to obtain rich presents from the Tsars, as well as to reward their favourites at Russian expense by sending them on missions. In consequence of this, it became necessary to issue an order that Asiatic envoys could not be received more than once in three years, and then only under special circumstances, and that the direct relations between the countries should be carried on by the governors of the nearest provinces.

When the Russians, by the occupation of Tashkent, came into close relations with Bukhara and Khokand, it would have been far wiser if they had asserted their own customs, and refused either to give or receive presents. Having at that time inspired the neighbouring Khanates with awe, it would have been easy to have maintained their ground. For presents and expenses of ambassadors, a very large sum is required. ‘The Governor-General for Turkistan receives for these purposes 35,000 rubles yearly; but this sum is quite insufficient to cover the actual outlay for the reception of ambassadors and the purchase of articles for presents. In consequence of this, the Governor-General is obliged to give to one presents received from another, or else to sell those presents, in order with the

money thus obtained to purchase others to be given in return. The second method is, perhaps, to be preferred to the first, so as to prevent the absurd incidents which it is said sometimes formerly happened. The Bukharan Amir, for example, in the horses sent him from Khokand, recognised the same animals which he had previously given to the Bek of Tashkent. These horses, with their gorgeous trappings, had succeeded in making several visits, and had returned to their own stable. But even now it sometimes happens that the robes sent from all quarters to Tashkent get mixed, and instead of Khokandian robes, Bukharan robes are sent to Bukhara, so that people believe there that the present has not been accepted, but has been returned. Every right thinking man must admit that this system of presents is a very bad one. A certain sum is assigned to the higher officials for presents, which is all spent, in addition to certain varying amounts realised by the sale of presents received in exchange. The remainder of these presents, however, does not constitute the property of the Treasury, but of the officials; so that a lover of such things without spending a penny can form an excellent collection at the cost of the Government. Every agent who is sent to the Khanates is in the same way allowed by the Governor-General money for presents. The agent repeats the procedure, and if he be an adept he never returns with empty hands. Of course the missions to the Khanates generally fall to the diplomatic *employé*. This is his monopoly. In his case the presents bear no proportion to those given to other people; . . . for instance, the Khan of Khokand created Mr. Struvé a *taksaba*—field-marshal of the Khokandian army . . . and gave him a velvet uniform with gold braids, ornamented with pearls and precious stones. They even say the *taksaba* receives money in the shape of the rents of *vaqf* lands.¹ . . . ?

With this system the dignity and importance of the Russian Government are lessened. Another usage to which the Russians have unthinkingly conformed, is to appear before the native Khans and Amirs dressed in native robes, a conformity to custom which the natives have never appreciated at its real value, but have regarded as a proof of the Russians' weakness, and of their desire to keep up good relations even by acts which lower the national dignity.

¹ 'Russia and England in Central Asia,' by M. A. Terentief, pp. 331, 332.

In one case even a member of a mission to Bukhara was so desirous of doing everything that politeness required, that to all appearances at least he kissed the hand of the Amir at the farewell interview, a circumstance which did not increase the respect of the Bukharans for the mission.¹

In former times Russian envoys did not allow themselves to perform acts so derogatory to the dignity of the Russian names, as witness the instances given in the paper of Professor Grigorief, Appendix IV., at the end of this volume, and especially the demeanour of Khokhlof, the Russian envoy to Bukhara in 1620, of the Brothers Pasukhin in 1669, and of Nikiforof, envoy at Khiva, in 1841.²

¹ 'Russia and England in Central Asia,' by M. A. Terentief, p. 337.

² In 1620 Ivan-Khokhlof was sent on a mission to the Bukharan Khan, Imam Kuli. In his instructions it was said that if any duties or payment should be demanded in order to admit him to the Khan, he should not pay them, but should return; and that if the Khan invited him to his table he was not to accept the invitation except on condition that no other foreign envoy should be there, or if any should be there, that they should sit below him. Khokhlof penetrated to Samarkand, and was there received by the Khan. On going into the palace one of the officials desired to take the Tsar's letter from Khokhlof's hand, who refused to give it up. On presenting to the Khan the compliments of the Russian Tsar, and seeing that he did not stand up at the mention of the Tsar's name, he remarked to him that in similar cases out of respect to the name of the Tsar all kings were accustomed to rise. The Khan immediately complied, excusing himself on the ground that it was so long since he had received a Russian envoy and had heard the words of the Tsar, that he had forgotten, and assuring him at the same time that the omission was unintentional, and that there was no unfriendliness or real want of respect.

In 1669 the brothers Pasukhin were sent to Bukhara by the Tsar Alexis. The day before their reception by the Khan the envoys demanded that in the first place there should be no other envoy received at the same time, and secondly, that horses should be sent for them. On being answered that this was not customary in Bukhara, Pasukhin replied that horses from the Tsar's stable were given to the Bukharan envoys in Moscow, and that therefore they must be similarly treated. Not only was this request complied with, but every other made during the mission — which was very successful.

Captain Nikiforof was sent on a mission to Khiva in 1841, immediately after the unlucky expedition of Perovsky. Although he was accompanied by only a small escort of twelve Cossacks, instead of cringing and yielding to all the demands of Khivan etiquette, he did exactly the opposite, and by his bold demeanour and his rude and almost brutal treatment of the Khan's officials, he succeeded in inspiring great respect. Seeing the great delays in the negotiations, he roughly stated to the Khivans what the Russian Government would henceforth consider as the boundary, and threatened every Khivan with death who should be found on the other side of it. This was shortly after the murder of two pliant English envoys in Bukhara.

In forming a judgment on the methods and the results of the Russian policy in Asia, it may be of use to consider the relations of Russia with each country separately.

FIRST—KHOKAND.

By the campaign of Tchernaiief in 1864-5, and the subsequent capture of Hodjent in 1866, the Khan of Khokand was restricted to a very small portion of his former territory,—which had at one time extended west to the mouth of the Syr Darya, and north almost to Vierny,—and was left to govern a small fertile territory completely surrounded by mountains, except on the western side near Hodjent. At that time the Russians proposed to occupy also the province of Namangan, thus limiting the Khokandian rule to the south of the rivers Syr Darya and Naryn, and General Romanofsky himself was desirous of rectifying his then irregular frontier by occupying the city of Khokand and by the conquest of the whole country. But the shrewd advice of Ata Bek caused the Khan to send envoys to congratulate the Russians on the capture of Hodjent from the Bukharans; and as there had been no actual cause for war except the feeling supposed to prevail in Khokand, General Romanofsky was reluctantly compelled to abandon the project. He was soon afterwards removed, and as the policy indicated by the Government at St. Petersburg was always against fresh conquests, and as nothing occurred on the side of Khokand of such great importance as to render a war absolutely necessary, the country remained unattacked until the rebellion of 1875 made Russian interference imperative.

On his arrival at Tashkent late in the autumn of 1867, General Kaufmann informed Khudayar Khan of his accession to power, and requested him to send an envoy to conclude a treaty of commerce. Subsequently, on account of the movements of troops in Khokand and fears of a change in Russian policy, he was obliged to write the Khan an assuring letter. To this the Khan replied with an autograph letter and an envoy, who assured General Kaufmann that the movements of troops were only the usual autumn manœuvres caused by the distribution of winter clothing. General Kaufmann informed the envoy in plain terms of the demands which he had to make with regard to the rights of Russian traders, and the diminution of the duties, and

sent by him a copy of the treaty which he proposed. A small Russian mission went to Khokand at the same time for the purpose of investigating to some extent the resources of the country. To the conditions of the treaty the Khan would not at first consent, maintaining that he could not allow Russian merchants to travel freely over the country, as he could not guarantee them against attacks from the more fanatical of his subjects. In addition to this he desired to send an embassy to St. Petersburg, and, if this could not be allowed, at all events to obtain a letter directly from the Emperor, assuring him of peace and friendship, which would be a guarantee of good relations independently of the change of the Russian governors, for, with all the respect he had for them, he could not but notice that in the course of three years there had been four Russian commanders, each of whom had proposed his own conditions for peace.

General Kaufmann replied to the Khan formally and decisively in a letter of January 29 (February 10), 1868. 'The great Russian Tsar never allows any dissension between the Khans and the people in the countries neighbouring to us. Your Highness writes that you cannot answer for the crimes of some of your subjects with regard to Russian traders. To this I reply, either they must obey your commands or they do not acknowledge your authority over them. A nation must have a head. Those of your people who, in spite of your commands, do harm to Russian merchants, must then obey my orders. I cannot allow unruly and independent people in the neighbourhood. The general quiet demands that they shall submit either to you or to me.' To Mirza Hakim, one of the envoys, General Kaufmann spoke in strong terms of the indecision of the Khan, and said that if he had wished to occupy the Khanate he would not have wasted time and words, but would before that have moved his troops and ended the whole matter. At last the Khan withdrew from his pretensions of carrying on direct relations with St. Petersburg, and agreed not only to accept the Treaty of General Kaufmann as the representative of the Emperor, but to sign it as well. The main privileges secured by the treaty were five: 1. The right of Russian merchants to visit all the towns in the Khanate; 2. That of establishing caravanserais and depôts for goods where they wished; 3. That of having *caravan-bashis*

or commercial agents in all the towns of the Khanate; 4. The reduction of the customs duties to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and the rendering them equal both for Christians and Mussulmans, and, 5. The free passage through Khokand of Russian caravans desiring to go into the neighbouring countries. The treaty was finally signed, and was approved by the Emperor in November 1868.

This treaty was never carefully observed. Additional duties on cotton and silk were imposed, as I have mentioned on p. 17, vol. ii., and difficulties were placed in the way of freely travelling in the country. The Russian merchants resident in Khokand were kept under the severest restrictions, and one was even attacked and nearly killed, an offence which was condoned by a small compensation paid by the Khan.

In the Russian campaign against Samarkand, the attitude of the Khan was anything but favourable to the Russians, and his troops were kept ready while he was on the watch for an occasion to attack the Russians in the rear. The speedy capture of Samarkand, and the reports from the Russian camp of his envoy Mirza Hakim, who was greatly under Russian influence, kept him for the moment quiet. The Russians seemed so satisfied with the results that finally, as a mark of satisfaction, General Kaufmann allowed Mirza Hakim to go to St. Petersburg, where he was received by the Emperor. After his return Khudayar Khan was invested with the order of the first class of St. Stanislas, and a slight difference was made in the title by which the Russians addressed him. A year later, in December 1869, Khudayar made a complaint to the Governor-General against the Amir of Bukhara, saying that in subduing the Beks of Hissar and Kulab, he had fallen upon a vassal of Khokand—Shir Ali, the Bek of Karategin—who had consequently been obliged to take refuge in Khokand. Negotiations were therefore entered into on this subject with the Amir, and he sent to Tashkent as his excuse a letter of Shir Ali, which showed his participation in the disturbances in the Bekship of Hissar. Khudayar declared this letter to be forged, and sent for comparison a genuine letter of Shir Ali. The seal did indeed seem to be a counterfeit one, and the Governor-General proposed to the Amir to return Karategin to its lawful ruler. In the meantime Shir Ali Khan raised some troops and marched into Karategin, but

was defeated by the united forces of the Beks of Kulab and Hissar and was taken prisoner.

Wishing to avoid any contest between the rulers of Bukhara and Khokand, because the success of the former would lessen the moral value of the Russian protection received by the latter, General Kaufmann proposed to Khudayar Khan to restore Karategin to its former ruler, Mozaffar Shah, who was kept a prisoner in Khokand, and asked the Amir in return to free Shir Ali. The compromise was accepted by both sides and was immediately put into execution.¹ In this way Karategin was formed into a practically independent state lying between Khokand and Bukhara, and the Russians succeeded in attaining a sort of moral weight and influence in the concerns of that locality. Although the Khokandians claimed a nominal sovereignty over Karategin, it was never enforced, and certainly, of late years especially, since the Kirghiz insurrection, the rulers of Karategin have paid no tribute to the Khan, nor recognised in any way his authority over the country.

After the capture of Shahrisabs in July 1870 Jura Bek and Baba Bek fled to Khokand, but owing to his previous enmity combined with the threatening demands of the Russians, the Khan consented to infringe the laws of hospitality and delivered the fugitives at Tashkent. Mr. Struvé was then sent on a mission to Khokand to thank the Khan for his action and to discuss certain questions which had never been satisfactorily settled. Among these were the regulation of the boundaries, the settlement of the claims of Russian merchants, the explanation of the circumstances which had delayed the return of Mozaffar Shah to Karategin, the appointment of a permanent agent in Khokand, and indemnity for the attack made by the mountaineers on the Cossacks of Colonel Dennet during the expedition in the Upper Zarafshan. This last claim the Khan for some time resisted, but finally, through the advice of the more sensible of his councillors, he yielded, and paid the sum of 5,000 rubles, part of which went to those wounded and to the families of the killed, and the rest to the fund for regimental churches. To the request for permission to appoint a permanent agent the Khan gave his consent, as indeed he had done on one or two previous occasions. But curiously enough, as soon as the consent

¹ Terentief, *id.* pp. 43, 71.

was obtained the Russian authorities thought no more about it and no permanent agent was ever appointed.

A contrary course would have been much more beneficial to Russian interests, for a resident agent, if a man of ability and well supported, could have succeeded in obtaining a strong moral influence over the Khan, and the Russians would have been sufficiently well informed of the state of the country to have foreseen and prevented the explosion which resulted in the war of 1875. It seemed, however, at that time to General Kaufmann as well as to Mr. Struvé, that the Khan was even then thoroughly a vassal of Russia, and opportunity was taken to propose to him the conquest of Kashgar. Yakub Khan had not at that time been recognised by the Russian Government, which was considerably disquieted by the attitude he had taken, and it was thought to be a very shrewd plan to get rid of him in this way, and instead of two neighbours to have but one. Khudayar Khan could not, however, sum up resolution enough to agree to the proposal, and did nothing more than declare his readiness to act as mediator between Yakub Bek and the Russians.

In 1872 the Khan's eldest son, Nasreddin, Bek of Andijan, was allowed to visit Tashkent, where he remained for about three weeks. Although he engaged there in secret intrigues against the Russians, this visit was thought greatly to strengthen Russian influence in Khokand.¹

Khudayar Khan, who had never been a popular ruler, and who had twice been driven from the throne on account of his cruelty and rapacity, continually excited discontent among his subjects, and more especially among the nomad tribes of Kiptchaks and Kirghiz who lived in the mountainous regions of the north-east and south-east. Rebellions therefore were frequent, and a revolt broke out in 1873 which, though quelled for the time, was renewed in 1874, and finally, in 1875, terminated in the war which led to the occupation and annexation of the Khanate by Russia.

The policy of the Russian administrators during these insurrections seems to have been a mistaken one. They endeavoured to remain neutral, but they were so insufficiently informed of the position of affairs and of the actual state of feeling in Khokand, that they did not seem to understand that they were looked upon as the protectors and supporters of the Khan; and indeed

¹ See also pp. 40, 142.

the Khan would have been dethroned long before had it not been for the fear of the inhabitants that the Russians would immediately march into the country and restore him. The officials at Tashkent did not seem to have sufficient foresight to see that the absorption of the Khanate by Russia was inevitable sooner or later, and that their best plan therefore was gradually to prepare the way for this by gentle means, so that the end might come without a shock. They further believed that the Khan was an obedient vassal, and they lulled themselves into a false security; if they thought at all about annexation, they thought that the fear inspired by their arms throughout Central Asia was such as to render conquest a work of the greatest ease. This would have been true a few years ago, but of late the Russians had lost their moral weight in the country, and the natives of the Russian provinces had become discontented. They had begun to look upon their new rulers as no better than their old. They had published their discontent in letters and petitions to the neighbouring countries, and the people in Khokand had not only resolved to attempt all rather than come under Russian rule, but had begun to believe that the Russians were weaker than they had previously supposed.

At the outbreak of the rebellion in 1873 both Kirghiz and Kiptchaks so hated the Khan that they were inclined to be favourably disposed towards the Russians.¹ Many of them migrated across the boundary and asked the Russians to intervene and dethrone the Khan, and afford them protection. Nor was this movement confined to the nomads. Similar petitions were received from the inhabitants of towns. Had the Russians in the summer of 1873 chosen to occupy Khokand they could have done so without striking a blow, for both nomads and Sarts would have joined them, and the Khan would have been driven into exile at the first news of their advance. General Kolpakofsky saw this, and telegraphed to St. Petersburg for permission to intervene, but the diplomatic storm with regard to the occupation of Khiva was then in full blast and permission was refused.

When the Russians declined to interfere on the side of the nomads it was believed that they maintained the side of the Khan, and as the feeling grew more and more bitter against Khudayar Khan it increased proportionately against the Rus-

¹ See Appendix I., Vol. I.

sians. Finally, in 1875, a step was taken which without a doubt increased the hostile feelings against the Russians and possibly precipitated the conflict.

It was resolved to prepare for an expedition against Kashgar.¹ In order to accomplish that end more speedily, it was desirable to send a part of the troops through Khokand, and Mr. Weinberg, the diplomatic official, was despatched on a mission to Khokand to secure the consent of the Khan to the passage of troops. Colonel Scobelef accompanied him, charged to explore the pass of Terek Davan leading to Kashgar. The mission took as a propitiatory offering to Khudayar Khan a boy of seventeen, named Abdul Kerim Bek, who had been put forward by the Kirghiz as a pretender to the throne. Abdul Kerim had lived in Hodjent all his life, knowing nothing of his extraction until the year before, when he was approached by the Kirghiz, and when he was removed to Tashkent on the complaint of the Khan, while his chief adviser, Abdul Kaum, was sent to Tchimkent. His surrender had never been asked for, and was entirely gratuitous on the part of General Kaufmann. This, like the surrender of Tokhtamysh Bek of Shahrissabs to the Amir of Bukhara, being contrary to the rules of asylum and hospitality which even Central Asiatics recognise, was not only a shameful act on the part of the Russian authorities but it turned out contrary to their expectations; it lowered rather than increased their influence with the natives. In surrendering Abdul Kerim, General Kaufmann, it is true, requested the Khan to be gracious and pardon him, which, indeed, he promised to do. The boy, who was confided to the care of Ata Bek, was lost sight of in the ensuing rebellion.

The Russian mission, with a guard of twenty-two Cossacks and *jigits*, accompanied by Mirza Hakim, the Khokandian envoy, arrived at Khokand on July 25, 1875.

When permission was asked for Colonel Scobelef to make his investigations of the mountain passes, the Khan consented, but said that part of the country was unsafe owing to disorders

¹ It has been said that this expedition was in consequence of an arrangement made between General Kaufmann and Colonel Scobelef, by which to secure the good-will and family and court influence of the latter, who had been formerly opposed to General Kaufmann. For this purpose he was to be allowed to head a military expedition, and to receive the honours and advantages which accrued from it

which had broken out among the nomads, although he had sent 4,000 men against them under the command of Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, and hoped that quiet would soon be restored. The Khan, however, seemed troubled by the course events were taking, and was disposed to listen with calmness to the advice given him by Mr. Weinberg on the part of General Kaufmann with regard to the treatment of his people, who urged upon him more moderation and justice.

A few days later, on July 31, a report reached the capital that Nasreddin, the Khan's eldest son, had gone over to the rebels, and that the cities of Ush, Namangan, Andijan, and Assake were occupied by them. It became known at the same time that the real head of the insurrection was Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, who had been sent to quell it. The next day information was brought that the Khan's brother, Sultan Murad, Bek of Marghilan, had joined the insurgents. They had that day occupied Marghilan and were already within thirty or forty miles of Khokand. Khudayar Khan then resolved to put himself at the head of the troops which remained favourable to him and to march against the insurgents. The Russian envoys unwisely decided to accompany him, thus giving him the appearance of having Russian support. The march was fixed for August 3, but during the preceding night the greater part of the Khan's army, together with his second son, Madamin Bek, abandoned him to join the insurgents. Resistance was no longer to be thought of, and Khudayar Khan decided to place himself under the protection of the Russian envoys and to seek a refuge in Tashkent. The Russian merchants in Khokand, with their clerks and assistants, also joined the mission.

The exit from the city through the excited and angry mob was attended with considerable difficulty, but after a ride of two days under constant attack the party reached Hodjent in safety. The Russians had two *jigits* killed, while one disappeared. The retreat was a perilous one, for the party fell at one time into an ambuscade, and the soldiers who started with the Khan abandoned him from time to time, and always fired at the Russians as they were leaving. Some of the messengers sent to Hodjent for assistance were killed, but one finally arrived in safety, and a force of troops was immediately despatched to the boundary. The Khan was accompanied by

his younger son, Urman, Ata Bek, the Atalyk, Mullah Maaruf, Bek of Sokh and nephew of Khudayar, and a suite of 643 people, many of whom were women. He had also a large train of carts, on which he succeeded in bringing part of his treasure, to the amount of over a million pounds sterling. For the bravery shown during this march each of the Cossacks was subsequently recompensed with the Cross of St. George, and a grant of 14,000 rubles was made by General Kaufmann to cover the loss of baggage and equipments, each Cossack receiving 500 rubles as his indemnity.

Mr. Weinberg insists that a *hazavat* or religious war against the Russians was proclaimed at the opening of the insurrection. This, however, was not believed at the time, and the subsequent friendly overtures to the Russians made it in their opinion improbable. The arrival, however, of the Russian mission, which, by accident, coincided with the opening of the insurrection, the surrender of Abdul Kerim, and the protection afforded to the Khan, his family, and his treasure, all, doubtless, had their weight in inspiring the insurgents with the belief that the Russians were taking the part of the Khan and would endeavour to restore him to the throne. It was, therefore, but natural that they should attempt to gain time in order to be themselves the first in the field.

When Colonel Scobelef and Mr. Weinberg returned from Khokand, General Kaufmann was at Vierny on a tour of inspection, but hastening his departure he arrived in Tashkent on August 12, with the intention of taking such measures as would be necessary for the protection of the frontier. A few hours before his arrival a Khokandian envoy appeared bearing a letter from Nasreddin, who had been elected Khan after the flight of his father, as well as letters from the three chiefs of the insurrection, Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, Mullah Issa Aulié, and Halyk Nazar Parmanatchi. In these papers the causes of the insurrection were stated to be the crimes which Khudayar Khan had committed against the Shariat and his oppression of the people, facts which, it was stated, were necessarily well known to the Governor-General. A desire was expressed to live in peace with the Russians, and a hope was indulged in that there would be no change in the relations between the two countries. General Kaufmann answered the new

Khan, with a promise to recognise him as such if he would bind himself to carry out all the treaties and engagements entered into by his father, and would recompense Russian subjects for any losses they had sustained during the rebellion. This answer was returned with some confidence, because the Russians believed the young Nasreddin would prove a pliant tool, as he was known to be good-natured, not fanatical, to have adopted many Russian habits—especially that of drinking *volka*—and they thought that from his visit to Tashkent he would have a knowledge of Russian ways and of Russian aims. But, almost at the same time with the letter, emissaries had been sent to stir up the inhabitants on the border, and proclamations had been issued, which were soon circulating throughout the country, calling upon all good inhabitants to rise against the Russian tyrants and to unite with the Khokandians in a war for the faith. As usual on the proclamation of a religious war, a formal summons was sent to the Russians to become Mussulmans.¹

¹ This proclamation was brought to Hodjent by an officer, Eichholm, who had been taken prisoner at the station of Murza-rabat. It is curious enough to be given entire.

‘To the Russian officers and to all officials my words are as follows:—In consequence of the evil character of Khudayar Khan, which resulted in carelessness in regard to his subjects, his troops, and his realm, and in consequence of his tyranny, by the order of the All-highest God, and to punish our carelessness, part of our possessions fell under your rule. The said Khan thought only of earthly rule, and, therefore, for some years was friendly to you, for which reason we were greatly discontented, and waited until the fulness of time came. Now all the nomad and settled inhabitants there, small and great, who consider themselves Mussulmans, have agreed, since the mouths of all have become one mouth, and their heads one head, and have sent many troops to the side of Aulié-Ata and many to Tashkent out of Desht-i-Kiptchak, and we are here. By our Shariat we are bound to fight with you,—so says the All-high God. If we win we shall be warriors for the faith; if we die we shall be martyrs. We strive for one or the other. By our Shariat it is necessary once to ask you to accept Islam. If you wish to turn to the true way and become Mussulmans, then you will become our brothers, and more than our brothers. If you do not consent to this we shall fight. At the present time we advise you to accept Islam. If you consent, then using the mercifulness of God, and of the Prophet, we grant you life and will be merciful towards you, and will raise you even higher than you are; but if you say that you are not content to become Mussulmans, and shall ask us to grant you mercy, and allow you to remove with your families in your former place of abode, we will consent even to this; but if in obstinacy you do not consent, and you have a desire to fight, then we will fight, and one side or the other shall be turned to ashes. This is the aim of our wishes. By our law and custom we cannot refuse this. Our God and our word are one. Consider, as becomes you, the profit and

A small force had been long before sent to Tilau, on the road leading across the Kendyr Tau mountains to Khokand, to watch the frontier, but little attention was paid to the rumours of disturbances, and no attempt seems to have been made to find out, by means of native spies, the exact position of affairs in Khokand. When, therefore, on the night of August 6, authentic intelligence reached Tashkent that bands of Khokandian troops had entered the district of Kurama, and occupied the village of Abyk, and that a force estimated at 10,000 men was descending the valley of the Angren; when, the next day, Khudayar Khan arrived with his suite, who soon spread rumours of all kind among the native population; and when, shortly after, news arrived that Hodjent was besieged, that post-stations were destroyed, and communications with Tashkent entirely cut off, the bewilderment and excitement of the Russian population speedily reached a great height. General Golovatchef was at once sent with a force to Tilau, while Colonel Scobelef, with a body of cavalry, undertook to patrol the district; and the intelligence, which quickly came, that the invaders had been dispersed and had retreated homewards, hardly succeeded in allaying the panic. Rumours of every kind were rife;—that Piskent had been burned, that Aulié-Ata had been attacked, that the Khokandian troops were but a few miles from Tashkent, and that on a certain day the town would be attacked, that Abdurrahman Aftobatcha had even sent an order to the stud at Kaplan-bek, demanding that seventy horses should be furnished for the breakfast of his soldiers, and that the population of the native town was about to rise. The presence of the numerous followers of Khudayar Khan did much to increase the excitement, and was very probably dangerous, as, although these men were enjoying Russian hospitality, they inveighed against the Russians as infidels, and endeavoured to excite sympathy for the Khokandians. It therefore, became necessary to disarm them, and for that purpose companies of troops were sent out at night to the bazaar, near which the Khan was living, and into the native town. The Khan was also despatched as soon as possible to Orenburg.¹

the harm which will be to you. Send an answer quickly. If the bearer of this give our words verbally, I beg you to believe him. The 22nd of Redjib, 1292.

Sealed, MULLAH ABDURRAHMAN PARAMANATCHI, Son of Mus-ud-din Kul.

¹ For the convenience of carriage it became necessary for the Khan to change

In anticipation of an attack the Prefect ordered the natives to take all their goods from the fair-grounds, which were situated on the outskirts of the city, while many people in the bazaars, under the influence of the panic, buried their valuables. Arms from the Government arsenals were distributed to all the Russians, and strict orders were given that no Russian should appear in the street without them. In some of the Government departments the clerks even sat at work with their muskets by their sides. Orders were also issued that in case of an attack the women should be sent to the fortress, and the men should collect near the house of the Governor-General and round about the church. The night before the anticipated attack on the town all the troops were withdrawn from the barracks—thus leaving the city defenceless—and were stationed in the fortress, where they were kept under arms all night.

Better news from Hodjent soon relieved the anxiety and allowed the inhabitants to breathe more freely.

The alarm at Tashkent was not without reason, for the inhabitants of the districts of Kurama and Hodjent were not slow in yielding to the persuasions of the Khokandian emissaries, though many of them were shrewd enough to make their aid conditional on the defeat of the Russians, while subsequent investigation proved that the *aksakals* appointed by the Russians had been the first to side with the Khokandians. Besides this, three stations on the post-road from Tashkent to Hodjent, as well as that of Nau, between Hodjent and Samarkand, had been burned and sacked, and the station masters and post-boys had either been murdered or carried off as prisoners. Travellers shared the same fate. The heads of two officers at Nau were cut off, and two others on the Tashkent road were taken prisoners and were threatened with death unless they turned Mussulmans.

into Russian notes the silver he had brought with him from Khokand. He first went to a branch of the Government Bank, where he received for a *khokand* 14 $\frac{3}{4}$ kopeks, the real value, but finding that the Treasury received the *khokand* at the fictitious rate prevailing at Tashkent of 20 kopeks, he transferred his business there, thus subjecting the Treasury to an actual loss, and remaining himself under the impression that the Government Bank had endeavoured to cheat him of a considerable percentage. When he was about to start, it was discovered that one of his boxes of silver had been stolen. The Russians refused to allow him to wait to find it, but promising that the police would find it, sent him off in great haste.

The movement of General Golovatchef towards the Angren and Tilau was attended with complete success. A large body of Khokandians, estimated at 5,000, was speedily dispersed, while a smaller body of 800, under the command of Zulfukar Bek, sustained a desperate struggle with the Cossacks and finally ran away, leaving half of their number dead upon the field. The district of Kurama was in this way entirely cleared of marauders, and the road from Tashkent to Hodjent was reopened.

Even before the news of the attack on Hodjent, a battalion of sharpshooters and a division of mounted artillery had been despatched there, and it now became necessary to advance with sufficient force not only to relieve Hodjent from danger, or to retake it if already captured, but to enter upon an offensive campaign. Including the troops already sent to Hodjent and those under command of General Golovatchef in the district of Kurama, the whole force amounted to 16 companies infantry, 20 guns, 9 sotnias of Cossacks, and 8 rocket-stands; in all about 4,500 men, with 1,500 horses, commissariat, artillery, and engineer-trains, and a military hospital of 150 beds. Provisions were carried for fifteen days, and for the purpose of transport it was necessary to hire 1,500 carts at Tashkent at the rate of 30 rubles a month each. The expedition was commanded by General Golovatchef, while all the cavalry was placed under the orders of Colonel Scobelef, for which purpose it was necessary to select the Cossacks in such a manner that he should have no ranking officer.

General Kaufmann in person, with all his staff, accompanied the expedition, taking with him Jura Bek and Baba Bek of Shahrisabs, and Seid Bek of Farab, who were devoted to Russia, and had a grievance against Khudayar Khan, and who proved themselves of great use. The road being now clear, and the difficulties which retained for a time a portion of the troops at Kuiluk being obviated, the march was successfully accomplished, no Khokandians being seen except a few scattered marauders in the distance, and General Kaufmann with his main force arrived on August 30 at Hodjent, from before which the enemy had already disappeared.

Of the details of the attack on Hodjent I have already spoken (vol. i. pp. 316 to 319). A day's rest was given to the troops, and on September 1 the expedition set out for Makhram,

where, according to all reports, the main body of the Khokandians was collected. The first camp was on the banks of the Syr Darya, at Ab-khurek. The next day's march brought the troops to Karatchkum, near which they were exposed to a running fire from large bodies of Khokandians, who, however, kept themselves at a considerable distance on the hills, and with each charge of cavalry dispersed to meet again further on.

The camp at Karatchkum was about three miles' distance from the fort of Makhram, the only fortified position between the frontier and the city of Khokand. This is a large square fort with battlemented walls, surrounded by a deep ditch situated on the very bank of the Syr Darya, and guarding the road, for it is at the narrow opening of the valley of Ferghana, the ground in the neighbourhood soon rising into low hills and then into mountains. The sole entrance to the fortress is on the eastern side. The Khokandians had increased the ordinary defences of the place by making a fortified camp on the southern side, as also by directing the water from the irrigating canals in such a manner as to inundate the road for a long distance, and to turn the immediate neighbourhood of the fort into a marsh.

The troops left Karatchkum at five o'clock in the morning arranged in order of battle. They had no sooner began their march than they were annoyed by the Khokandian cavalry, which appeared first on their right and then surrounded them on all sides; but some Cossacks thrown out as skirmishers, with rockets and artillery, succeeded in keeping the enemy at sufficient distance, so that the march was not impeded. General Kaufmann had command of the movements of the day in person.

Having obtained information of the obstacles in their way, General Golovatchef suggested that a flank movement should be made to the right, so that the troops should march along the hills until the fort was passed, when by a direct movement the place might be taken without entering upon the inundated ground, or being exposed to the immediate fire of the fort.

This was safely accomplished, and as soon as the troops had passed the further angle of the fort, they stopped. Guns were then placed in position, and a cannonade directed against the town which lasted for nearly an hour. A battalion of sharp-

shooters was then directed to assault the works. In spite of the enemy's fire, and supported by their own artillery, in a quarter of an hour the Russians had carried the outworks and put the Khokandians to flight. This battalion was closely followed by another, and, the fortified camp thus taken, the troops advanced by the bridge over the moat, and placing their shoulders against the wooden doors, by repeated blows keeping time to a soldiers' chorus, they burst the gates down and entered the fortress. They were met by scattered shots from the roofs of houses; although few of the enemy had been left in the fortress, and these quickly took to flight. In less than an hour the whole place was cleared. In the meantime the Cossacks under Colonel Scobelef, and the rocket batteries under Captain Abramof, attacked the masses of the enemy's cavalry drawn up in the gardens to the right, and after a short hand-to-hand contest put them to flight, and pursued them along the banks of the river for five or six miles. Many were cut to pieces, and others were driven into the river and drowned by 'hundreds.' On returning, the Cossacks suddenly came upon another large body of cavalry, and while hesitating to attack them, a fortunate discharge of rockets by Captain Abramof put them to flight, and the Cossacks returned to Makhram.

This was the battle of Makhram, which was immediately heralded as a wonderful victory, the number of the Khokandians being estimated variously at thirty, forty, and fifty thousand men.¹ The Russian loss was eight wounded and six killed, including Colonel Khoroshkin, an excellent officer, who had devoted himself to the study of the country, and had contributed many valuable articles to the 'Turkistan Gazette' and the 'Military Journal.' The native loss it is difficult to estimate. Official reports state that in the fortified position and the fortress 100 bodies were found, and that on the scene of the cavalry fight nearly 1,000 bodies were buried, besides those who were drowned in the river, who were killed at a distance, or whose bodies were carried away.² In Makhram the

¹ The number of the enemy in this as in all the subsequent contests is doubtless very greatly exaggerated, for which it would probably be easy to find a reason. 40,000 — which frequently occurs, — is, in Turki, *Kyrk-ming*, which is generally used by the natives as an indefinite expression for a great number.

² A military reader might perhaps estimate the severity of the engagement by learning that 149 artillery shots were fired, 29 rockets, and 9,387 rifle cartridges.

Russians captured 39 pieces of artillery, 1,500 muskets and matchlocks, besides falconets and sabres, and more than 50 banners and standards. They also found a provision of powder and ammunition, including shells and lead, as well as flour and forage, which last was exceedingly welcome.

In one of the glowing reports it was said, 'Thus by one blow we have annihilated the idea of the fanatics to raise against the Russians all the Mussulman population of Central Asia.' This, as will be seen, was by no means strictly true, but naturally the defeat inflicted upon the Khokandians did produce a great effect, especially among the surrounding population. Proclamations were sent out at the same time by General Kaufmann urging all persons to return to their occupations, placing the country under Russian rule, promising mercy and safety in case they should remain obedient to the Russians, and assuring them further that Khudayar Khan, who had lost the throne in consequence of his crimes, should not return to it. The surrounding inhabitants soon came in with protestations of submission and with provisions for sale.

The troops remained at Makhram, waiting for the arrival of transports from Hodjent, for three days longer, and on September 7 advanced toward Khokand. On the way General Kaufmann was met by envoys from the new Khan Nasreddin with presents and a letter explaining and apologising for the 'accidental conflict of troops upon the frontier and the consequent unpleasantness.' General Kaufmann refused to receive the presents, and declared to the envoy that he could not answer such a letter, but that he would explain himself personally with the Khan of Khokand. At the same time word was sent that if the Khan and inhabitants of Khokand should meet him with proper submission and with *dosturkhans*, the troops would do them no harm, but that if they should attempt to resist, Khokand would be stormed and destroyed, and 'the blood of the unhappy victims would fall on the heads of those guilty of disobedience and unjust war against the Great White Tsar.' Issa Aulié, who had accompanied the mission, received a severe reproof from General Kaufmann for his duplicity and evil conduct towards the Russians, and was not allowed to depart, being retained 'until he could

In the affair of the previous day, on arriving at Karatchkum, besides 7 rockets and 9 artillery shots, 2,795 cartridges were discharged.

explain the part which he had played in exciting the Mussulman movement in Khokand against the Russians.'

The march from Bish-aryk to Khosh-Kupyr had the character of a triumphal procession. Everywhere along the road the inhabitants came out to meet the troops and present *dosturkhans* to the commander.

A new mission arrived from Khokand, consisting of a deputation from the merchants of the town, and an envoy from the Khan sent a *dosturkhan* and returned all the prisoners which remained from those who had been taken at Nau and the various post-stations, among them being the little daughter of Dr. Petrof, who had been beheaded at Nau. The prisoners—who had all had their heads shaved—reported that they had been well treated, the women and children being confined in the harem of the Khan.

The information obtained by Colonel Scobelef during his mission at Khokand now proved of good service, and the troops were led round the walls of the city to the gate of Sary Mazar, on the southern side, where was the most convenient place for attacking the city in case of resistance. No resistance, however, was offered, and on September 10 the troops occupied the gates and part of the walls without a shot. The Khan came out to meet General Kaufmann, who, accompanied by his staff, entered the city, rode for a short distance along the streets, and then, together with the Khan, returned to his camp. For some days the Russians remained encamped at the gates of Khokand, where a bazaar soon grew up to which the natives brought cattle and provisions for the soldiers. The topographers used the time in making surveys of the country in the neighbourhood. It became necessary, on account of the unhealthiness of the situation, to change the camp to the other side of the city, and General Kaufmann, with his usual love of theatrical display, chose this as an occasion to march the troops through the town. He accompanied them, and made a short visit to the Khan as well as to the former envoy, Mirza Hakim. Meanwhile, there being rumours of an enemy's force gathering in the mountains near Isparah and in the vicinity of Kandbadam and Makhram, flying columns were sent out from Khokand and Hodjent and soon dispersed the small marauding bands.

Although the Khan came every day to the Russian camp

with news of what was going on in the city, yet there had been but little response to the proclamation issued by General Kaufmann, and no declarations of submission had been made by Marghilan, Andijan, Namangan, or other large cities in the Khanate. General Kaufmann had sent a special messenger to Marghilan, requesting the elders of the place to be sent for conference, in order that he might convey to them the will of the Emperor, but no one appeared. A letter, indeed, was received from Sultan Murad Bek, of Marghilan, in which he expressed a hope for the renewal of the former friendly relations, and subsequently another paper was received, stamped with the seals of seventy elders of the Kiptchaks, among them Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, the subject of which was, that as the fate of war had given the Russians the victory over the Mussulmans, it befell them to ask that the people should receive the same quiet as the city of Khokand enjoyed. General Kaufmann again demanded that a person should be sent to his camp with whom he could confer, but no one appeared. It is strange that this appeared surprising to the Russians when they had retained as a prisoner Issa Aulié, who had accompanied the first mission from Khokand.

In the meantime intelligence had been received that the Aftobatcha was making a resistance, and had compelled the Bek and the inhabitants of Marghilan to join him, and was collecting a large force in the immediate vicinity of that place. Although the inhabitants of Khokand were apparently submissive, they yet seemed uneasy. The bazaars were almost empty, few of the shops were opened, and even those few exposed but a small quantity of wares of any kind for sale. It was, consequently, considered necessary to send forces towards Marghilan for the purpose of examining the condition of affairs, and of putting down any attempted resistance that Abdurrahman Aftobatcha might make.

General Kaufmann, therefore, set out with the troops from Khokand on September 17 for Marghilan; but on the 19th, Abdurrahman, who was encamped at Gurgil, three miles from Marghilan, with a force estimated at from 5,000 to 10,000 men and four guns, suddenly gave up the idea of fighting and retreated, his forces rapidly dispersing, and it was said that he left Marghilan with only his Kiptchaks, who were devoted to

him, and who still, according to a Russian account, numbered from 3,000 to 5,000 men.

On the next day, as the Russians took up their position close to Marghilan, a deputation came out from the city, gave their complete submission, and asked to have the city spared. The same night a flying column, composed of Cossacks, rockets, and artillery, with two companies of infantry in carts, was sent out under command of Colonel Scobelef to follow up Abdurrahman and his band. This column followed up the traces of Abdurrahman and turned off the direct road to Assake as far as Ming-tepé, near the mountains, where there was a small engagement, the combatants being rendered nearly invisible on account of the dust. The Russians suffered no loss, and found forty bodies of the enemy. Scobelef then pushed on as far as Ush, which he reached on September 22. The city immediately surrendered, and, after a stay of two hours, the cavalry passed on the road to Karasu; but as it was reported that Abdurrahman had finally been abandoned by nearly all his followers, and as General Scobelef had received orders from General Kaufmann not to go too far in pursuit, he returned on the next day to Marghilan. His advance to Marghilan, and the capture of Ush had for the moment a good effect. Andijan, Balyktchi, Shahrikhana, Assake, and many villages immediately sent in their submission, and Halyk Nazar, one of the three leaders of the insurrection, was delivered up. Before his departure from Ush, General Scobelef levied a heavy contribution in provisions and horses upon that city, sent to Uzgent to demand the submission of all the Kirghiz, and to say that if Abdurrahman, who it was thought had taken refuge there, were delivered up, the city would be spared.

The whole of the country in this way having given in its submission, General Kaufmann supposed that peace and quiet were thoroughly restored, and that the end of the expedition was reached. He therefore invited Nasreddin Khan to Marghilan, in order to arrange terms of a treaty of peace. By this treaty Nasreddin Khan was to pay the sum of 3,000,000 rubles (410,000*l.*), as a war indemnity, in the course of six years, and was to cede to the Russian Government all that part of the country north of the Syr Darya, the chief town of which is Nainangan. Everybody was pardoned in honour of the occasion,

including Issa Aulié and Halyk Nazar, and even those natives of Tashkent and Kurama, Russian subjects, who had taken part in the war. But, to quote a Russian account:—‘It was soon apparent that with these humane measures it was necessary also to take severe action against those who knowingly counteracted our plans and actions, and had an injurious influence upon the young and still inexperienced Khan. One of these evil-minded persons turned out to be Mullah Issa Aulié. His cunning speeches had a very bad influence upon all with whom he was brought into contact. At a council which the Khan assembled the day before he was to sign the treaty, Issa Aulié, in the presence of two Russian officials, dared to speak impudently to the Khan. This had to be stopped. The commander-in-chief of the armies called the Khan and all his high officials to his camp, and, explaining to the Khan and to all who surrounded him the injurious influence which some of those highest in rank had upon him, ordered that Issa Aulié, Zulfukar Bek, and Mahmud Khan Tiura, three of the chief persons who had incited the people to rebel and to fight against the Russians, should be arrested and immediately sent to Siberia.’¹ It is almost unnecessary to state that the Russian account goes on to say that this arrest produced an excellent impression, and that many of the suite of the Khan expressed delight and pleasure at this act of justice.

Nasreddin Khan was now left to his own resources, and on the 5th of October the Russian troops left Marghilan, and on the 8th arrived at Namangan. According to Russian accounts, which seem not a little amusing when compared with what happened subsequently, the inhabitants of Namangan, even before the treaty, expressed to the Russians their delight and gratitude at the defeat of the Khokandians, and ‘that they had been for ever freed from these robbers.’

After the treaty was signed, a deputation was naturally sent from Namangan, to which General Kaufmann returned a suitable answer. In consequence of this a written address, expressed in the most fulsome terms (Namangan was near enough to Tashkent to know how such things should be managed), was sent to General Kaufmann, expressing the utmost delight at his kindness in receiving them as subjects of the

¹ ‘Golos,’ No. 304, 1875.

White Tsar. Nor did the inhabitants confine themselves to words, 120 carts were sent for the use of the soldiers on their forward march, and 40,000 cakes of bread were provided for them. On the banks of the river a large tent with a *dostur-khan* was prepared for General Kaufmann. The road from the river to the tent was covered with silk stuffs, and while the General walked from the bank to the tent, silver coins were showered down upon him.

General Kaufmann thanked the representatives of the people for this reception, urged them to live according to their laws and not to listen to the advice of evil-minded people, and always in any circumstances of life to speak the truth. 'When on the other bank of the Darya I met with much lying and falsehood, I hope that here this will not be,' said the commander-in-chief. 'The Russian law demands that everyone shall live peaceably and grow rich. Let every one of you live as the law requires, and pray to God as his fathers have taught him. God is one, and both Russians and Mussulmans all pray to the same God. The Russian law does not force anybody's conscience, nor demand that God should be prayed to in one way rather than in another. It only demands a good and just life.'

When all the troops had crossed to the right bank of the Syr Darya a loud hurrah was raised for the Emperor. 'Cross yourselves, children,' said General Kaufmann, turning to the crowd of soldiers surrounding him. 'We are now in our own land, and God grant that here shall be good fame of us from one end to the other.'¹ This annexation of the district of Namangan was made on General Kaufmann's own responsibility without waiting for the authorisation of the Emperor, which did not arrive until long after.

The Russians, however, had not been long in Namangan before the hasty arrival of Mr. Kuhn and Captain Petrof, who had been sent from Marghilan to Andijan to pursue scientific investigations. They had been ill-treated by the inhabitants, and reported that Andijan was again in insurrection.

It was, therefore, considered best to punish that city, and an expedition of 14,000 men and eight guns and four rocket stands was sent thither under the command of General Trozky.

¹ 'Golos,' No. 304. Letter from Namangan, September 27 (October 9), 1875.

This expedition set out on October 10, and on the evening of the next day encamped a few miles from Andijan.

The armed forces in the city were estimated by the Russians to be between 60,000 and 70,000 men, under the leadership of Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, which was a little strange, considering that a few days before he had retreated to the mountains with only three or four followers. All the bridges had been broken, and Pulad Bek, who had been proclaimed Khan by the Kirghiz, was encamped in the neighbourhood with 15,000 Kirghiz, for the purpose of attacking the Russians in the rear and cutting off connections. Pulad (or Fulat) Bek professed to be the son of Atalyk Khan, the son of Alim Khan, one of the former rulers of the country; but in reality he was a tobacco-seller of Piskent by the name of Mullah Iskak, who the year before had been chosen by the Kirghiz to personate the real Pulad Bek, and was by them proclaimed Khan. The real Pulad Bek, who was then eighteen years old, was living quietly with his mother in Samarkand.

As Abdurrahman showed no signs of submission, it became necessary to take the city by storm, and General Trotzky, dividing his command into three detachments, entered the city the next day. The streets through which the troops passed were barricaded, and it was a hand-to-hand contest to reach the centre of the town, where the palace of the Bek—which had been built by Nasreddin in Russian style—was situated. Here the three detachments met, but, after a stay of two or three hours, it was considered that the object of the expedition—to punish Andijan—would be completed if the troops retired, burning everything on their way. They found retreating, however, as difficult as advancing, and their whole movement through the town was a running fight. One detachment, however, having provided materials from the powder which had been found in the palace, was able to set fire to the bazaar and all the chief buildings on the route, and, on leaving the town, the greater part of it was in flames. The fortified camp was reached in safety, but, as it was necessary to complete the punishment and prevent the inhabitants from putting out the fires, General Trotzky, two hours after the retreat, sent out six guns under cover of two sotnias of Cossacks, commanded by Colonel Scobelef, and the city was bombarded for three hours.

Meanwhile, the Kirghiz had come near the camp, and had kept up a sharp fire upon the soldiers remaining there.

The next day, being convinced that the city had suffered great loss from the fires, and feeling assured from the report of spies that the inhabitants admitted their inability to contend with the Russians, and that no harm could be done to the Kirghiz and Kiptchaks,—who were considered the real hostile elements,—by the further ruin of Andijan, General Trotzky thought his best plan was to give a little rest to his troops, and, the next day, retreated to Namangan. He, however, profited by the time he had left to give the city, and especially the bazaar, a further bombardment. On October 15 he retired in the direction of Namangan, burning and ravaging all the villages and farms on his route,¹ but his march, as far as the river, was accomplished under a heavy fire from the enemy, who closely followed him. On October 17, however, the enemy was not in sight, and he met with the troops of General Kaufmann, who—not having received any intelligence, his messengers having been intercepted—had marched out to meet him.

The losses from October 12 to 16 consisted, according to one of the Russian reports, which vary, of ten killed and seventy wounded, but private letters state the actual loss to have been from four to five times as many. From the official reports, even, it is impossible to consider the attack on Andijan as anything less than an unsuccessful attempt at an occupation of the city and a forced retreat. Officers who were present confirm this, and it is no wonder then that the natives considered General Trotzky beaten. The telegrams of the commander-in-chief to St. Petersburg about this affair represented that Andijan was taken by storm; and, immediately upon this, General Trotzky was presented with the Cross of St. George, of the third class, and with a gold-mounted sword.

On the return of the troops to Namangan, it was found that the state of affairs in the newly-acquired province, which had expressed so much joy at its annexation, was not entirely satisfactory. The inhabitants had abandoned their villages and formed bands under the command of Batyr Tiura, the former

¹ The Russian officers were apparently unaware of the negotiations which had taken place at St. Petersburg to ensure the success of the Brussels Conference on the laws of war!

Bek of Namangan. The little expeditions sent against them produced no decided results, as the nomads always succeeded in evading the troops.

General Kaufmann, however, considered the state of affairs such as no longer to necessitate, or indeed to warrant, his presence in the country, and he therefore started for Hodjent on October 28 with the whole of his staff and a portion of his troops, leaving in command Scobelef, who, by a telegram from St. Petersburg, had just been raised to the rank of major-general, in the suite of the Emperor, as a reward for the services he had rendered during the campaign. Unfortunately, the march of General Kaufmann was harassed by Kirghiz and Kiptchak bands, and the troops were under fire for the whole distance. The natives, therefore, may be pardoned for thinking, as they did, that General Kaufmann had retreated because his position was no longer tenable.

Shortly after the unsuccessful attack of General Trotzky on Andijan, the inhabitants of Khokand, learning the conditions of the treaty which their Khan had concluded, and being displeased not only with them but with him, drove him out of the city in such order that he was unable to take with him either his wives or his treasure, as his father had done. Nasreddin arrived alone at Hodjent, almost the same moment as General Kaufmann. Khokand was immediately occupied by the partisans of Pulad Bek, and Abul Gaffar, the former Bek of Uratepé¹—who had been living for many years in Tashkent as a Russian pensioner, but who had made his way to Khokand on the first outbreak of the war,—seized upon the Government.

Soon after the departure of General Kaufmann from Namangan so much disturbance was created in the provinces by marauding bands, that General Scobelef found it necessary to take a portion of his command to Tiura-kurgan, a small fortified town eight miles west of Namangan, where on November 4 he defeated the band of Batyr Tiura, and at the same time punished the city for its share in the rebellion. Thence he went on to Tchust. He had, however, no sooner left Namangan than the Kiptchaks of the neighbourhood, joined by many from the other side of the Syr Darya, entered the city, the inhabitants of which, who had so lately received the Russians with joy, rose to a man.

¹ See vol. i. p. 87.

An attack was made on the small force of Russians in the yet unfinished citadel, and on the camp outside of the town. The Russian troops succeeded in defending themselves until, on the 7th at noon, General Scobelef arrived, having heard of the state of affairs at midnight before, and having had a severe fight for the last eight miles of his march. Placing sixteen guns in position, the next day he bombarded that portion of the city occupied by the Kiptchaks and then advanced to the storm, which was rendered unnecessary by the flight of the enemy. Most of the town, however, was destroyed. The Russian loss is set down as six killed and thirty-two wounded, the Kiptchak loss at 3,800 killed! The soldiers were then quartered in the few houses that remained.

Meanwhile the state of anarchy in Khokand which followed the expulsion of Nasreddin was giving the Russians serious disquiet, and Makhrum was occupied by the forces under Major Rodzanko to protect the Hodjent frontier.

The defeats inflicted on the Khokandians at Andijan and Namangan, and even the wholesale destruction of their villages and towns, did not seem to dishearten them. It was found that large bands of nomads were collected in the neighbourhood of Balyktchi, a city situated near the junction of the Naryn and Syr Darya. It was reported that several bands of 3,000 to 4,000 men each were collected near the city, and that in the city itself were fully 20,000 armed men. In consequence of this on November 4 General Scobelef set out for Balyktchi and after a sharp fight defeated the enemy and took the city, where he found a quantity of provisions. The enemy's bands at once dispersed, and General Scobelef returned to Namangan.

As the population of the Khanate was still unquiet General Scobelef received orders from General Kaufmann to ravage during the early winter the territory situated between the Naryn and Syr Darya, which was considered the centre of the Kiptchak population. The people could not then escape to the mountains, but would be concentrated in their winter quarters, and it would be a convenient opportunity for inflicting a serious punishment on them. On January 6 General Scobelef set out from Namangan with a command of 2,800 men, crossed the Naryn, and in spite of the severe cold pursued his march up the northern bank of the Syr Darya—or, as it is

here called, the Kara Darya—destroying Paita, the chief Kiptchak settlement, defeating a band of Kiptchaks, and destroying everything on his route as far as Sarkhaba, which he reached on January 14. After a small fight here he pursued his way to Andijan, where, ‘according to exact information,’ 30,000 of the enemy were collected. After four or five days spent in reconnoissances, ‘in order to avoid the shedding of blood,’ summonses were twice sent to the city to surrender. These summonses remained without result, and the last messenger was killed. On January 20 the village of Iskylik was taken by storm, and a battery was at once stationed to bombard the city. After firing 500 rounds two storming-columns entered and soon found their way to the centre of the town, where another battery was placed, and continued the bombardment for the rest of the day. The next day the troops met with no opposition and occupied the city. The Russian loss was two killed and seven wounded; ‘the loss of the enemy was immense.’ On the 22nd General Scobelef occupied the palace (although, according to General Trozky’s report, it had been burned), and on the next day made a reconnoissance in the direction of Assake, to which place the Khokandians had retreated.

On January 30 information was received that Abdurrahman Aftobatcha was, with 15,000 men, only six miles from Andijan, and was preparing an insurrection in the town, with the idea of falling upon the Russian forces. General Scobelef then advanced, but did not discover the enemy until he had nearly reached Assake, which place he took after a hard struggle. He stated the Russian loss to be ten wounded, while of the enemy forty corpses were found on the spot.

As the result of this battle the towns of Shahrikhana and Marghilan sent in their submission. General Scobelef returned to Andijan, and on February 1 Abdurrahman made proposals for a conference, which was held on the 5th, and he surrendered unconditionally, together with Batyr Tiura, Isfendiyar, and other chiefs, relying on the mercy of the Emperor.

After the surrender of Abdurrahman the whole country was at the mercy of the Russians, but it became difficult to know what to do. By this time the population of Khokand, which had so hastily dethroned Nasreddin, had become discontented with the exactions which they suffered under Pulad Bek and

Abul Gaffar Bek, and a deputation was sent to Hodjent to Nasreddin asking him to return. He finally decided to do so, and went to Makhram to watch for a favourable opportunity. On February 23 he left Makhram and advanced to a village in the immediate vicinity of Khokand, where he was attacked by the partisans of Pulad Bek and completely defeated, barely escaping with his life to Makhram. In some way or other he had made the inhabitants believe that the Russians greatly desired his return, and now, after the surrender of Abdurrahman, the chiefs were uncertain whether they ought to receive him or not.

Pulad Bek took refuge in the Alai mountains, near Utch-kurgan. A small force was despatched after him, which took the town, capturing at the same time many of his supporters, and standards, weapons, and ammunition.

Nasreddin then succeeded in reaching Khokand, but in view of his weak character and the disturbed state of the country, orders were given to General Scobelef to occupy that city, which he did on February 20. He found there 62 guns, and large supplies of powder and ammunition.

Long before the campaign in Khokand was actually finished General Kaufmann had gone to St. Petersburg, and General Kolpakofsky, who was now in command, considered it necessary to go personally to Khokand to bring order into the country. To render this easier Nasreddin Khan, Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, and other prominent persons, who had shown great hostility to the Russians, were sent prisoners to Tashkent.

On the anniversary of his accession (March 2) the Emperor signed an order for the annexation of Khokand, and General Kolpakofsky, who had just arrived, proclaimed to the inhabitants that their prayer to become Russian subjects had been granted, and that the whole country was now annexed to Russia, and would be known as the district of Ferghana (its ancient name). It was placed under the rule of General Scobelef.

Soon after this Pulad Bek was captured by an energetic Kirghiz and brought to Marghilan, where he was hanged, on the ground that he had killed twelve Russian soldiers whom he had taken prisoners.¹ The official reports are silent as to any

¹ The fate of the non-commissioned officer Thomas Danilof, although it was not known until long afterwards, excited great indignation. He was captured

prisoners being taken on either side, but we know from other sources that not only had the road from Namangan to Hodjent been unsafe since the first occupation of that territory, but that marauders had even penetrated within the Russian lines and there captured small bands of people. All the transports from Hodjent to Namangan were compelled to go under a strong escort, and on one occasion two Russian officers with twelve Cossacks had been captured and killed.

It seems that quiet has not entirely been restored even by the annexation, for we find that several tribes of the Kara-Kirghiz—especially the Bogus—refused to take part in the general submission of Khokaud and concentrated themselves in Gultcha, under command of Abdullah Bek. General Scobelef was sent there with a considerable force, and succeeded in obtaining the submission of all the Kirghiz chiefs, with the exception of Abdullah Bek and two of his companions, who fled further into the mountains, whither they were pursued by *jigits*.

The events of this last campaign will probably open the eyes of Russian administrators, who will see that a country which it would have been easy to secure by proper means has been found the hardest of all to take by force of arms; and although this is not so much owing to the warlike character of the nomad population as to the hatred which has grown up of recent years to the Russians and the dislike to falling under their rule, it remains to be seen whether this province, ravaged as it has been by the orders of Russian generals, will be easily governed; and it is to be hoped that this at least will bring the Russians to see the necessity of better administration and of a wiser treatment of the natives.

The new province of Ferghana will probably be of advantage to Russia in relieving the treasury, and will not be—like so

while forming part of a convoy between Tashkent and Namangan. Every effort was made to induce him to become a Mussulman, but he remained faithful to the last, and displayed remarkable fortitude when he was shot at Marghilan by order of Pulad Bek. The punishment of Pulad Bek seems to have been well deserved, for during the last days of his power he had revelled in execution, and when Marghilan was again occupied by the Russians it was found impossible to place troops in the citadel on account of the putrid blood and the numbers of unburied corpses. He particularly exercised his rage against the women and the retainers of Khudayar Khan and the family of Abdurrahman.

much other conquered territory—a mere barren acquisition. The Russians estimate the number of its inhabitants at 960,000, but this is probably far too large; 600,000 even would seem a large estimate. Mr. Kuhn, who accompanied the expedition for the purpose of making historical and statistical researches, estimated the revenues of the country under Khokandian rule, including only those which were allowed by the Shariat—the *haradj*, *tanap*, *zekat*, and salt tax—at about two and a half millions of rubles (340,000*l.*), a sum equal to the whole revenues of Russian Turkistan, up to the Khokandian Campaign. It is doubtful, however—bearing in mind the injuries inflicted upon the country by the war—whether for many years it will equal this amount. The Khan by his exactions obtained much more.

SECOND—BUKHARA.

The relations of Russia with Bukhara were always much pleasanter than those with the other Central Asiatic countries. Even before the reign of Peter the Great there were exchanges of embassies, which after that time became more frequent, and the caravan trade was unrestricted until the capture of Tashkent. The Amir of Bukhara then took up a hostile position, imprisoning Messrs. Struvé, Tatarinof, and Glukhovsky, the Russian envoys sent to him by General Tcherniaief, in retaliation for which all the Bukharan merchants within the Russian lines were placed under arrest. He was, however, so thoroughly defeated by General Romanofsky at the battle of Irdjar,—one result of which was the loss of Hodjent,—that he released the envoys and made peace, although no definite treaty was signed. The basis of one had been drawn up by General Kryzhanofsky and approved by the Emperor. General Kaufmann had introduced into it certain alterations, chiefly insisting that relations should be carried on exclusively with the Governor-General of Turkistan; and in September, 1867, the treaty was sent through the Bukharan envoy to the Amir for signature. Instead, however, of the ratification of the treaty the Amir sent a new envoy with a letter. In the meantime Lieutenant Sluzhenko and three artillery soldiers had been captured by the Bukharans on the road from Tehinaz to Jizakh; and Sluzhenko, by means of torture and threats of death, had been

forced to embrace Mohammedanism, and to become instructor of the Bukharan troops. From these circumstances, and from the action of the envoy it became evident that the Amir did not really desire peace, but was waiting for an opportunity to fall again upon the Russians. General Kaufmann, who in the meantime had arrived, sent a new demand to the Amir, insisting upon the immediate ratification of the treaty and the release of Sluzhenko. In March a letter was received from the Kush-begi with information of the release of Sluzhenko and his comrades, but giving an evasive reply about the treaty. At the same time disturbances began to take place all along the Bukharan frontier, although there is good reason to believe that these were not instigated by the Amir, but were set on foot by the two hostile parties who were discontented with him. The evasive conduct of the Amir and these disturbances were the immediate cause of the campaign which ended in the occupation of Samarkand and the annexation of the district of Zarafshan.

I have given an account of this campaign in Vol. I. pp. 241-247, but there are still a few details which may be interesting. Before risking his fortune again in contest with the Russians the Amir tried to obtain allies, but the exertions of his nephew, Mohammed Farissakh, at Calcutta and Constantinople had been fruitless, and even the Khan of Khokand had refused assistance, being desirous of watching the turn of events and waiting his opportunity. To obtain money for the war the Amir had recourse to two extraordinary taxes on merchants, and to raising the value of the *tenga* from 64 *tchekas* to 132 *tchekas*. As the silver had already been taken from circulation the course of the *tenga* rose to 200. The consequent stoppage of trade and the distress of the people excited much discontent against the Amir; and the fanatical Mullahs, being indignant at the sum taken from their incomes as teachers in the mosques, accused him of using the money for other purposes, and therefore insisted more strongly on the proclamation of a religious war.

The Amir, however, was still undecided, and put off the declaration of war from one feast to another, till finally, at the festival of Kurban Bairam, when he was absent at the shrine of Baha-uddin, the leading Kazis and Mullahs published a

decree declaring the necessity of a religious war against the Russians. The Amir on returning to Bukhara was so ill-treated by the mob that he immediately withdrew and retired northwards to Hizhduvan. The disorders in Samarkand had been so great that Osman, the commander of the troops—a runaway Cossack—had been obliged to march out to quell them, and had lost 62 men in doing so. At Hizhduvan the Amir, learning of the affair near Jizakh, and of the desertion of the Afghans under Iskender Khan, immediately went to Kerminch and proclaimed a war.¹

General Kaufmann at first intended to make the province of Samarkand into a semi-independent state under Seid Khan, the nephew of the Amir, but finding him too much under the influence of the Beks of Shahrissabs gave up that project and made two propositions to the Amir, one of which was that he (the Amir) should pay 150,000 tillas (750,000*l.*) and receive back Samarkand; the other being that he should pay the expenses of the war—about 18,000*l.*—while Samarkand and its provinces should be annexed to Russia. Neither of these propositions was accepted. The battle of Zera-bulak followed, which ended in the complete defeat of the Amir and in the repulse of the troops of Shahrissabs from Samarkand.

The Amir then offered an unconditional capitulation, requesting only an interview with the Emperor to ask permission to go to Mecca. This proposition General Kaufmann rejected, saying it had never been his intention to destroy the Khanate of Bukhara. What were his motives in refusing the advantages which would have been brought to Russia by the occupation of the whole country, or which would have ensued even from accepting the proposition and then restoring the Amir to the throne as a dependent prince and actually ruling the country through him, have never been known, but it must be remembered that the whole campaign was in positive dereliction of the orders of the Emperor to make no further advances.

Mozaffar Eddin was therefore left in possession of all of Bukhara west of Katta Kurgan. The valley of the Zarafshan up to that point was annexed to Russia, and by a secret article of the treaty which was signed on June 23 (July 5), 1868, the

¹ See vol. i. pp. 88, 89.

Amir bound himself to pay 125,000 tillas (80,000*l.*) during the course of a year.

The capture of Samarkand and the disastrous peace excited great discontent against the Amir among his own subjects, especially among the fanatical Mussulman party; and his eldest son, the Katta Tiura, the heir to the throne, was induced to take up arms against him, and issued a proclamation, in which his father, on account of his peace with Russia, was declared to be an infidel and to be unworthy to rule. The Katta Tiura was then in Shahrisabs, and the Amir advanced with his army to Tchiraktchi, hoping to force Jura Bek to give up his son.

General Kaufmann, to show his friendly disposition, at the same time ordered General Abramof to make an advance on Kara-tepé, Urgut, and Djam, so as not to allow the Beks of Shahrisabs to afford the Katta Tiura any real aid. The Katta Tiura, therefore, entered into negotiations with the Turkomans, with the Kirghiz, with Khiva, and with Sadyk, the celebrated Kirghiz chief, who got hold of Nurata, and marched on to Kermineh, where he had been named Bek. The Amir, frightened at this, left a small body of men at Tchiraktchi and returned to Bukhara, on which both Tchiraktchi and Karshi were immediately occupied by the Katta Tiura. The attitude of the Russians, however, compelled Jura Bek to withdraw with 4,000 troops from Karshi, and the movements of the Katta Tiura were therefore stopped. The Amir at the same time advanced from Bukhara, defeated Sadyk at Kermineh, and restored his power. Another Kirghiz chief, Nazar, with 10,000 men, besieged Khatyrtchi, and a part of his force crossed the new Russian boundary, over which they were speedily driven back. The Turkomans made forays in the close vicinity of the city of Bukhara, so that the Amir was almost besieged.

The Russians pursued a policy which has been several times adopted by them, but not always with success. They thought it better for their interests to keep the weak, unpopular ruler on the throne of Bukhara, rather than allow him to be overthrown by his son, who was young and energetic, and was not animated by too great friendship for Russia. It was feared that the Katta Tiura in case of success would not recognise as binding the treaty made by his father.

At this juncture, in order to give some active assistance to the Amir, who had at last applied for aid, General Kaufmann sent an expedition under General Abramof to Karshi, which was immediately taken. In order to prove the peaceable intentions of the Russians and their sincere desire to assist him, the Russian troops after two days were withdrawn, and Karshi was delivered up to the Amir, who was so pleased at this that he then requested the Russians to conquer Shahrissabs for him; and the Beks of that city, being disturbed by the Russian reconnoissances, of their own accord sent in their submission and agreed to return the town of Yakobak. The Amir, however, refused to receive the Katta Tiura, who turned for refuge to General Abramof, and begged him to reconcile him to his father, whom he would henceforth obediently serve. The Amir then agreed to pardon his son, who, however, feeling doubts of his sincerity, again requested the protection of Russia; but after receiving permission to go to Samarkand he turned on the road and occupied Katyrtchi, where he executed many of his opponents. He then moved on Kermineh, but the Amir was before him, and he therefore fled to Nurata, and thence to Khiva, Afghanistan, and at last to Kashgar, where he lives half a prisoner in the fort of Yangy-Hissar.

These circumstances prevented the Amir from paying his contribution punctually, and he delayed still more owing to rumours that a new Governor-General with a new policy was to be appointed in place of General Kaufmann, and on account of the disorders in the Kirghiz Steppe, which seemed seriously to threaten the Russian domination. But the disorders were quelled, General Kaufmann returned, and finally, in 1870, the last quota of the contribution was paid. Whether or not there may have been some ambiguity in the terms of the treaty, the Bukharans certainly seemed to think that Samarkand would be returned to them, for they took every occasion of bringing up this question.

In the autumn of 1869 Seid Abdullah Fattah Khan, a younger and the favourite son of the Amir—commonly known as the Tiura-Jan—was sent in company with two officials on an embassy to St. Petersburg. In spite of the warning received from General Kaufmann that missions must not address the central Government on any political question, the Tiura-Jan on

his reception by the Emperor did proffer the prayer of the Amir for the return of Samarkand. The categorical refusal of the Emperor did not seem to convince him that the request would not be granted, and he still endeavoured to talk on the subject with statesmen at St. Petersburg. On the return of the embassy the Tiura-Jan again addressed General Kaufmann on the subject, but to no purpose.¹ The feeling on this subject among the Bukharans was so strong that on several occasions when Russian embassies have gone to Bukhara rumours have circulated in the city that they came for the purpose of restoring the Zarafshan province; and even when I was in Bukhara in 1873, during the time of the Khivan expedition, questions were put to me as to whether the Russians did not at last intend to fulfil their agreement.

Until the Shahrissabs expedition in 1870 nothing of particular importance occurred in the relations of the two countries except the reconnoissances in 1869-70 in the Kyzyl Kum, the settlement of the Karategin difficulty, and the defeat on Bukharan territory of the robber band of Baban, who, with twenty-five other prisoners, was delivered up to the Bukharan authorities for execution.

Before the return of the Tiura-Jan from St. Petersburg there were rumours in Tashkent that the Amir was in negotiation with Khiva and the Afghans for a campaign against Russia, and Colonel Nosovitch was therefore sent to Bukhara to find out what was taking place, and to assure the Amir of the friendly disposition of the Russians. He found an Afghan embassy there, but the cautious Amir had already given them an evasive answer which could easily be construed into a refusal to enter into their plans.

In the summer of 1870 General Abramof undertook the Iskender Kul expedition,² which resulted in the annexation of the upper valley of the Zarafshan. This was immediately followed by the capture of Shahrissabs, the expulsion of Jura and Baba Bek, and the delivery of the country to the Amir,³

¹ The Tiura-Jan, who had been marked out by the Amir as his heir, subsequently died of a lingering disease. A Russian physician was sent to him from Samarkand, but he was unable to arrest the malady.

² See vol. i. pp. 280-283.

³ For an account of this expedition see p. 74. It should have been there stated that, after the capture of Shahrissabs, Aidar Hodja, the man for whose extradition the expedition had been nominally undertaken, was tried by the Russian authorities and was acquitted.

who agreed to pay to each of the exiled Beks a pension of 2,000 rubles a year. It has, however, been found very difficult to exact the payments, and sometimes they have been long in arrear. The surrender to the Amir of Shahrissabs, as that of Karshi previously, was made against the wish and in spite of the protests of the native population, who much preferred to remain under Russian rule than to be under that of Mozaffar Eddin.

The bad harvests of 1870 produced not only great distress but great discontent among the population, who accused the Russians of not allowing sufficient water for irrigation to pass through the Zarafshan into Bukharan territory, and also of forbidding the sale of grain. In consequence of this, as I have explained in another place,¹ a joint commission was appointed to regulate the water supply.

In 1871 there was an occurrence which was rightly estimated by many as derogatory to Russian dignity. The Beks whom the Amir had appointed to his newly acquired province of Shahrissabs were in some degree in sympathy with the population of that country, and were therefore popular. They could not help thinking that they owed in great measure their positions to the Russians. When therefore in 1871 General Kaufmann paid a visit to Samarkand, these Beks, one of whom was named Tokhtamysh, came to Samarkand to pay him their respects, and, as he entered the city, took part in the national game of *baiga*. According to Bukharan etiquette persons of their rank should do this in the presence of their lawful sovereign only. Hearing of this the Amir immediately removed them from their dignities, and ordered their property to be confiscated, on which they fled to Samarkand. Although the Bukharan Amir had never given up Russian deserters, yet General Kaufmann, wishing to ingratiate himself in every possible way with the Amir, complied with his request and ordered the Beks to be sent to Bukhara, expressing, however, the hope that the Amir would pardon their faults. For some time they were in exile at Tchardjui, but subsequently were restored to favour.

The relations of Bukhara with the Porte, in consequence of a certain Abdul Hai having been received in Constantinople as the envoy of the Amir, caused a diplomatic correspondence, when

¹ Vol. i. p. 288.

the Amir formally promised henceforth to abstain from direct relations with the Sultan. In spite of the benefits conferred upon the Amir, of the numerous friendly embassies, and of other means taken to assure him of the friendliness of the Russians, he likes them no better in his heart, though his experience of their strength leads him to avoid as far as possible causes of conflict. He has, however, made no efforts to carry out the treaty of commerce, the Russian merchants being compelled to pay illegal duties (although a portion has been refunded). For two years the Amir did not pay to the exiled Beks of Shahrissabs the sums due to them, notwithstanding repeated requests from the Tashkent authorities. It is strange that these requests were not made in a more forcible form, but it is probable it was feared the Amir might be hostile during the Khivan expedition. When the Khivan expedition started there was general fear in Bukhara that it was directed also against that city, and merchants even sent away their property and came to Samarkand to be out of harm's way. At one time the terror was so great that the population proposed to seize upon the Amir and deliver him up to the Russians. The Amir, however, professed friendliness towards the Russians, met them at the frontier with messages and presents, and sent an envoy with the expedition. He also furnished a certain amount of provisions and camels, though, with the exception of a small present, these were sold at high prices and not given away. He further held himself ready to take advantage of any circumstances favourable to himself; and while he was sending kind words and worn-out camels to the Russians he was giving his blessing and opening his purse to three Turkoman chiefs, who left Bukhara for Khiva. The Russian authorities, however, considered it best to wink at his conduct, and to reward his friendliness and the equanimity with which he regarded the establishment of a Russian fort at Khalata, within the Bukharan territory, by bestowing upon him a narrow strip of country on the right bank of the Oxus which had been in dispute between him and Khiva.

Nothing had been said in the commercial treaty with regard to slavery or the slave-trade, but it was impressed upon the Bukharan authorities that the Russians disapproved of this shameful traffic and desired its immediate cessation. In con-

sequence of this the Bukharans gave out to the Russians that the trade in slaves (the slaves here are all Persians) had entirely ceased, and dust was thrown in the eyes of the Russian officials who came to Bukhara, so that the diplomatic *employé* made a report to General Kaufmann in 1870, in which he stated that, after careful investigation, he was convinced that, in deference to the wish and principles of Russia, the slave-trade had entirely ceased. Merchants, however, who had better opportunities of seeing, knew that it was going on in full force, but their reports were disbelieved in Tashkent. Mr. Petrofsky, the agent of the Ministry of Finance, was in Bukhara in 1872, and having seen with his own eyes the sale of Persian slaves in the bazaar, made a strong report to General Kaufmann, of which no notice was taken.

My purchase of a slave at Bukhara caused a certain sensation at Samarkand and Tashkent, as it was at the same time as the release by General Kaufmann of the Persian slaves at Khiva; but the act was viewed with favour by most persons, official and otherwise, for it was said that I had given the Government actual proof of the existence of the forbidden traffic. Some of the more outspoken partisans of the Governor-General were displeased, wrongly thinking that my action was intended as an inuendo against him.

After the close of the Khivan campaign Mr. Struvé was sent on a mission to Bukhara for the purpose of making a new treaty. This treaty was signed by the Amir on September 28 (October 10), 1873, and a clause was inserted in it which read: 'To please the Emperor of all the Russias and to enhance the glory of his Imperial Majesty, his Worship the Amir Seid Mozaffar has ordered the shameful traffic of human beings, which is contrary to the laws of humanity, to be henceforth abolished in the dominions of Bukhara. In accordance with this resolve, Seid Mozaffar will give the strictest injunctions to all his Beks and a special order will be sent to all the Bukharan frontier towns to which the slaves are transferred from neighbouring countries for sale to Bukharan subjects, that, besides the cessation of the slave-trade, if, contrary to the order of the Amir, slaves shall be brought thither for sale, they shall be taken away from their masters and immediately set at liberty.'

Unfortunately, the Russians have always found it more easy

to make treaties in Central Asia than to enforce their observance, and I have received information from Russians as well as from natives that since this treaty the slave-trade has rather increased than diminished, although slaves are no longer sold publicly in the open market, as was done when I was in Bukhara.

By this treaty it was also provided that the strip of territory on the right bank of the Amu Darya from Kukertli to Meshekli, and thence to the Russian boundary, should be taken from Khiva and transferred to Bukhara; that Russian steamers and other vessels should have the right to navigate the Amu Darya; that Russians should be allowed to build piers and storehouses on the Bukharan bank, and for the safety of which the Bukharan Government should be responsible; that all the towns and villages in the Khanate should be open to Russian commerce; and that Russians should be allowed to travel without molestation anywhere within the Khanate, with no other duty levied than the one of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem* on goods belonging to Russian subjects, exported or imported; that Russian merchants should be allowed to send their goods through Bukhara free of transit dues; that Russian merchants should be allowed to have caravanserais and commercial agents in all the towns; that commercial engagements between Russians and Bukharans should be considered sacred; that Russian subjects should be allowed to exercise all branches of industry permitted by the Shariat, and should be allowed to purchase real property; that the Bukharan Government should not permit anyone to arrive from the Russian territory, whatever might be their nationality, unless provided with a special permit from the Russian authorities; that the Amir should appoint a resident envoy at Tashkent; and that the Russian Government should be permitted to maintain a resident agent at Bukhara.

The Russians have, thus far, made very little use of the rights granted to them by this treaty, for no Russian vessels have as yet sailed on the Amu Darya waters within Bukharan territory; no increase of Russian commerce has taken place, and no Russian agent has yet been appointed to reside at Bukhara. It cannot be said that the relations between the two countries have been improved by this treaty. On the contrary, during the Khokandian war in 1875 the Amir was on the watch for an opportunity to attack the Russians on the side of Samarkand, and

General Abramof forbade Russian caravans going to Bukhara, on the ground that if they did so their safety could not be guaranteed by the Russian Government.

The conquest of Bukhara—except for the purpose of getting control over the greatest market in Central Asia, and of putting an end to an independent, and sometimes troublesome Mohammedan State—will probably not have for the Russians the same advantages as that of Khokand. The agriculture of the country is in poor condition and Mr. Sobolef brings up weighty reasons to prove that the area of cultivable land is being gradually and rapidly diminished by the encroachments of the desert.¹ There is probably no reason to look for the occupation of Bukhara by Russia before the death of the Amir, whom the Russians, in spite of the loud complaints of his people, will probably continue to maintain upon the throne.

THIRD—AFGHANISTAN.

Russian relations with Afghanistan appear to have begun after Abdurrahman Khan had taken refuge on Russian soil. Abdurrahman before this had requested Russian intervention in Afghanistan, and had promised to submit it to Russian rule. His overtures had been refused; but at last, finding himself under too strict surveillance in Bukhara, he wrote: 'You know that our country is submitted to English protection. I place my hope in you, because I know very well that the possessions of the White Tsar are much larger than those of the French, German, and English taken together. Going to Vizir and Mashad, and learning there that Iran (Persia) is under the protection of the White Tsar, I came through the steppe of the Tekke Turkomans to Urgentch (Khiva), with the purpose of going on to you.' The reply to this of February 7 (19), 1870, was not received by Abdurrahman, as he had already gone to Samarkand. In this General Kaufmann promised him a good reception, but told him that he was to have no hope of assistance against Afghanistan, giving the reason for this as follows: 'The present ruler of Afghanistan has been recognised as the lawful sovereign of that country by England, which is friendly with us, and until he breaks the peace and makes a

¹ Bulletin of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, for 1873, vol. ix. p. 259.

disturbance on the frontier of Bukhara I have no reason to see in him our enemy.' When Abdurrahman reached Tashkent he made the following new requests: first, to receive 3,000 muskets and seven cannon, even should they be taken from the Bukharans; second, to form a military organisation of Afghans and Persians who had at previous times come to Bukhara; third, to obtain the permission of the Amir to establish himself at Kerki or Shirabad, in order to send proclamations to his adherents in Afghanistan; and, fourth, to be allowed to keep his suite. General Kaufmann refused to assist him in any way, and informed him that any relations with his friends in Afghanistan would be unpleasant to the Russian authorities; but that his suite, which consisted of 221 persons, he could retain in Samarkand if he could do so on the money assigned to him. As the money seemed to be insufficient, Abdurrahman subsequently dismissed the greater part of his followers. The Foreign Office approved of this decision of General Kaufmann and in a letter of May 16 (28), Mr. Strémovukhof, the Director of the Asiatic Department, suggested that it might be better to send Abdurrahman into the interior of Russia in order to avoid complications. 'After the friendly exchange of ideas with the English Cabinet with regard to Central Asian affairs, our Government tries to remove anything which, without bringing us any actual advantage, may be a reason for exciting distrust.'

General Kaufmann considered this a good opportunity to remove any misunderstanding, and at the same time to enter into friendly relations with the Amir of Kabul, and accordingly on March 10 (22), 1870, wrote to Shir Ali about his reception of Abdurrahman Khan. In this letter he said: 'The domains of the White Tsar in Turkistan, and the lands now subject to you, do not have a common boundary. We are separated by the Khanate of Bukhara, the ruler of which, Seid Mozaffar, has concluded a peace with Russia, and is in the friendship and under the protection of the great Emperor of all the Russias. Therefore between us there cannot be any misunderstanding, and we, although distant neighbours, ought to live in peace and union. I have no intention to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, both because you are under the protection of the English Government- which, as you well know, is in friend-

ship and concord with the Government of the White Tsar—and because I do not see on your part any intervention in the affairs of Bukhara. Afghanistan and Bukhara ought to have nothing in common, and each of these two countries ought to live its own life without troubling itself about what its neighbour is doing.’¹

This letter of General Kaufmann seems to have been in full accord with the opinion expressed to him almost on the same day, March 18 (30), by Prince Gortchakof, that, in view of the noticeable change in public opinion consequent on the frank exchange of views between the Ministry and the London Cabinet, it was indispensable to take measures for the contradiction of any false reports which might circulate in Central Asia. Baron Brunnow, however, in a despatch of March 18 (30), considered that there should be no direct relations between General Kaufmann and the Amir of Afghanistan, and that all such despatches should be sent through St. Petersburg. This General Kaufmann considered an infringement of the full powers which he had received from the Emperor, and he therefore paid no attention to the suggestion. In the meantime a rebellion broke out in Afghanistan because the Amir was thought by many of his subjects to be too subservient to the English. Information about the course of events was received by the Russians both through their mission at Teheran and through the correspondence of the friends and the adherents of Abdurrahman. After this insurrection was put down, about the end of August 1870, General Kaufmann received an answer to his letter. In this Shir Ali Khan said: ‘When I received from you the promise that the Russian Government would neither secretly nor openly by means of an army intervene in the affairs of Afghanistan, and that the enemies of Afghanistan would not receive help from you, I was greatly gladdened.’ He then stated that on receipt of General Kaufmann’s letter he had consulted with the Viceroy of India, and had forbidden his officials to mix in the affairs of his neighbours or to trouble them, or to allow any armed parties to cross the frontier. ‘All this,’ the Amir added, ‘was done not by me alone, but on consultation with the representative of the English Government,

¹ This, as well as much else with regard to Afghanistan, is quoted from Terentief, *id.*, pp. 154–191. See also ‘Parliamentary Papers on Central Asia,’ No. 2 (1873).

the Viceroy of India, who very well understands the friendly relations existing between his Government and the Russian Tsar. From my conversation with him I am fully convinced of the friendship of the two Governments, and I am now assured that quiet will reign in my empire.' It is worthy of remark that all the letters of General Kaufmann to Shir Ali are accompanied by an English translation, for the greater convenience of the Indian authorities, to whom it is expected they will be transmitted.

A further correspondence was called out by the desire of Iskender Khan, the nephew of the Amir, to return to Kabul.¹ General Kaufmann communicated this to the Amir, and asked him to pardon and to receive back this prince. To this the Amir replied favourably, and General Kaufmann in his turn congratulated him on the close of civil war in Afghanistan. Iskender Khan, however, did not return to Afghanistan, but was allowed to go to St. Petersburg, where he was given the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and attached to the Hussars of the Guard, with a salary of 4,000 rubles. His position there, however, was peculiar, he not being considered regularly in the service or capable of advancement. To the annoyances of this position was added an unpleasantness arising out of the treatment of his follower, Ramdil Khan, who had been received as a cadet in the convoy of the Emperor. At an inspection Ramdil Khan, who had done good service in Turkistan and had been decorated, was struck by the adjutant. Iskender Khan took the part of his friend and demanded from the adjutant a public apology before the soldiers. There was an altercation, and Iskender sent a challenge to the commander of the convoy, who refused to accept it; and Iskender then declared that the first time he met him in the palace he would insult him. For this he was placed in the guard-house for six days, while Ramdil Khan was also arrested and sent to the Caucasus, though he was subsequently recalled. Iskender Khan immediately resigned, entered into negotiations with the British Embassy, and went to London, where he was well received by the English

¹ Iskender Khan had been driven out of Afghanistan during the intestine troubles, and had put his Afghan followers into the service of the Amir of Bukhara. Owing to the treatment which he met with in that country he had gone over to the Russians just before the Samarkand campaign, as I have mentioned on p. 241, vol. i.

Government and assigned a small pension, on which he is still living in England. With Iskender Khan's family influence and his remarkable capacity, it is to be regretted that the Russians did not better appreciate how useful he could be to them.

The authorities at Tashkent have been considerably annoyed by the disturbances in Badakshan, over which place the Russians had, by their arrangement with England, acknowledged the suzerainty of Shir Ali. The natives of that country were unwilling to submit to the Afghans, and since Afghan troops were sent there in 1873 there have been several attempts at rebellion, caused in great part by the former ruler of the country, Jahandar Shah, who had been dethroned by his nephew, Mahmud Shah. Abdurrahman Khan has, since he came to Samarkand, married a daughter of Jahandar Shah, and Shir Ali has given one of his daughters in marriage to Mahmud Shah; so that it is the old feud being fought over again in this limited territory. Jahandar Shah took as the bases for his attempts Shugnan and Kulab; but it is said that since the failure of his last expedition in August 1874 he has taken refuge among the Turkomans.¹

FOURTH—KASHGAR.

Yakub Khan, the present Amir of Kashgar, was a native of Piskent, near Tashkent, and had signalised himself in 1853 by being for a time an officer in Ak-Masjid at the time of its capture by the Russians. In 1864, about the time Tashkent was taken, he went to Kashgar as one of the lieutenants of Buzurg Khan Hodja, a descendant of the ancient Hodja rulers, who, taking advantage of the insurrection just beginning, desired to re-establish the realm of his ancestors. The facts of his career are well known; how, after using Buzurg Khan as long as the shadow of his name was necessary, he threw him off and made himself the sovereign of the country; how he extended his rule to the eastward by the capture of Aksu, Turfan, and Urumtsi; how he took in succession the titles of Atalyk Ghazi, and Badaulet, and in the end that of Amir, conferred upon him by the

¹ Terentief says, p. 189: 'It is to be hoped that these rebellions will be periodically repeated, and that the disorders in the other provinces will compel the Amir of Kabul to withdraw his troops from Badakshan.'

Turkish Sultan in 1873; and how, from a mere adventurer, he has become the most powerful of Asiatic monarchs.

For a long time the Russians refused to recognise him, that is to say, they made no treaties with him and refused to allow his envoys to come to the Court at St. Petersburg, although naturally they did not abstain from those slight relations which generals on the border are obliged to maintain with neighbouring powers. As Yakub Khan disliked the Russians, he closed his country to Russian trade. No merchant, therefore, ventured to Kashgar, until in 1868 the merchant Khludof, a brave and enterprising fellow, started out from Vierny with a small caravan of goods. His caravan was attacked soon after crossing the border, and he was obliged to return. He then sent some presents to Yakub Khan, and requested the admission of his caravan. The presents were accepted, and the attack on the caravan was explained as being because the authorities had no official knowledge of its character. Khludof then obtained from the Governor of Semiretch a letter to Yakub Khan certifying that the venture was purely a commercial one. This obtained for him the desired permission, although the caravan was detained on the road. Khludof was received by Yakub Khan, and by his boldness and straightforwardness produced such an impression upon him that he agreed to send his nephew, Shadi Mirza, to Tashkent to conclude a commercial treaty.

The construction of Fort Naryn in the same year (1868) had, perhaps, some influence in producing this change in the views of Yakub Khan to favour Bukhara, and therefore hasten on the construction of the fortress. All of the Naryn country had been recognised as Russian territory by the treaty of Peking in 1860, but it was first occupied in 1863, when a Russian detachment destroyed the Khokandian fort of Kurtka, which had been built within the Russian boundaries.

Shadi Mirza together with Khludof arrived at Vierny in August 1868. He brought a letter from Yakub Khan to General Kaufmann, who had just gone on leave to St. Petersburg. For this reason, as well as because the letter of Yakub Khan to General Kaufmann was not expressed in polite terms, Shadi Mirza was not allowed to go on to Tashkent.

With regard to the accusation of hindering trade Yakub

Khan wrote: 'The land of the great Russian Tsar is great and broad, and full of all the sorts of wise men and artificers that there are in the seven great lands. Our land in comparison to yours is a poor ruin. Now, after the destruction of the Chinese power, during six years all has been destroyed that was good and that which commerce had created, so that nothing remains of it all. This was the reason why your rich merchants were not allowed here, for they could find nothing here but ruins.'

General Kolpakofsky informed Yakub Khan of the departure of General Kaufmann, mentioned the breach of polite form in his letter, and demanded the surrender of two Kirghiz robbers, Omar and Kaitchi, and the return of some prisoners they had captured. The letter of General Kolpakofsky was sent to Kashgar by Captain Reinthal, who was the first officer that penetrated there. In spite of renewed interviews with the Khan, in which he was treated with great politeness, he was unable to succeed in inducing him to come to an agreement for protecting trade. Yakub Khan, however, consented to send out an expedition to the settlement of the Kirghiz tribe, and captured the guilty parties, although he kept them in Kashgar as a kind of guarantee for the return of Shadi Mirza. The Russian captives he sent on to Vierny.

General Kaufmann, on receiving a report of what had taken place, granted Shadi Mirza permission to come on to St. Petersburg for conference with him. In answer to a letter about preventing trade, General Kaufmann insisted that commercial relations should be entered into, and proposed a treaty of exactly the same character as those concluded with Bukhara and Khokand. Shadi Mirza was not, however, received by the Emperor, and returned to Kashgar in January, 1869. In April a letter was received at Tashkent, in which Yakub Khan thanked General Kaufmann for the presents he had received, and promised to take care of the Russian merchants on condition that the Russian troops should not pass the frontier. He said: 'For the passage of caravans and merchants, quiet and safety are needed; and for this it is necessary to fix a boundary, so that merchants may come either from Russia or from other nations.'

Knowing that Yakub Khan would not be disposed to respect the treaties made by the Chinese, General Kaufmann in his

reply, insisted that the Russians were right in constructing the fort at Naryn, as it was on ground which had been made theirs by treaties with his predecessor the Chinese Emperor, and although since that time the country had passed into his hands, that fact could have no influence upon the boundary which had once been established. He offered, however, to appoint a commission to fix it accurately, and again demanded the return of one of the copies of the commercial treaty signed. To this letter no answer was received. The conditions proposed were not agreed to, and the merchants met with the same hindrances and obstacles as previously.

Meanwhile Yakub Khan endeavoured to enter into friendly relations with the Dungans and the Tarantchis, but his efforts seemed to be without result. He then changed his plans, and in the beginning of 1872 made war on the Dungans, the pretext being about the Torgots or Kalmuks who had been living in the valley of the river Yulduz, and over whom Yakub Khan claimed to have suzerain rights. The Dungans at first had the advantage, and occupied the cities of Karashar, Kutche and Sairam, but hearing of Yakub Khan's approach, they abandoned them after pillaging the merchants and murdering many of the inhabitants. The forces of Yakub Khan advanced, laid siege to Turfan, and, after a four months' siege, took it in July 1870.

The Russians, fearing that the object of Yakub Khan was the conquest of the province of Kuldja, thought it better at least to keep a watch upon his movements, and therefore occupied the Muzart pass. In spite of the difficulties of the pass, Yakub Khan had ordered that all the caravans coming into the valley of the Ili should take this way, and had sent a force of men to improve it, establishing in addition a picket at the southern side. As in spite of the Russian occupation of this pass, Yakub Khan would easily have been able to take possession of the valley of Kuldja, difficulties with Kirghiz marauders were made an excuse, and Kuldja was occupied by the Russians in 1871.

Yakub Khan, somewhat alarmed by the advance of the Russians, as well as by the position of affairs in the Chinese provinces of Han-su and Shen-si, took precautionary measures by fortifying the town of Aksu, and sending Akhrar Khan on an embassy to Calcutta.

Direct relations with Yakub Khan having been broken off for so long, General Kaufmann, having lost all hope of persuading him, resolved to make use of the Khan of Khokand. He therefore, as I have already said, proposed to Khudayar Khan to use his supposed suzerain rights over Yakub Bek, expel him, and add that country to his dominions. Khudayar Khan having refused to lend himself to the plans of the Governor-General, all that could be done was to have him act as mediator. At the request of the Russians, therefore, Khudayar Khan sent Sarymsak Udaitchi with a letter to Yakub Khan, counselling him to make peace with Russia, as the Russians would easily be able to overthrow him. Yakub Khan, while receiving the envoy with respect, insisted upon being treated as an equal, and took up that tone in his reply. In answer to the advice of holding friendly and commercial relations with the Russians, he said: 'The Russians that have come here look at these localities and become acquainted with the state of the country, and therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for they are a restless and crooked-minded people.' Before the receipt of this insulting letter, another messenger had gone from Khokand with a letter from General Kaufmann, himself, who, after mentioning all the unfriendly actions of Yakub Khan, and all the measures taken by the Russians for friendly intercourse, pointed out to him the necessity of following the example of Bukhara and Khokand in their relations with Russia, if he did not wish for an unavoidable and severe punishment.

The threat contained in this letter was in earnest. The Russians had decided upon war, if nothing else could bring Yakub Khan to reason, but while preparations were being made, Mirza Hakim was induced to write a letter to a certain Akhrar Khan, a Khokandian formerly high in service under Khudayar Khan, who had been for some years living in Kashgar, informing him of the preparations, and advising a more sensible mode of conduct. Akhrar Khan, by direction of Yakub Khan, replied that the Governor-General would do very well if he carried on friendly relations by himself, but that if he undertook to manage affairs through Khudayar Khan he could accomplish nothing, and further relations would not lead to the desired end; 'although the Badaulet well knows the might and greatness of Russia, still, as a brave man, he hopes in God and will never refuse to fight,

for he does not fear death, and considers it a good fortune to die for the faith.'

To the letter of General Kaufmann Yakub Khan replied personally. He said: 'The last envoy who brought your letter was not a Russian, not because there were no Russians to send, but because you seemed to think Khokand and Bukhara only worthy of this honour. If the Russians believed in my good wishes they would send me one of their men, which would show me their kind intention, and which I would consider a proof of their good disposition towards me. If your words be really an expression of good will towards me, let some one come to us of more account than your merchants. Send me some Russian, or even a Tashkent Sart, though he be only a shepherd, and I will send back to you an envoy of my own.'

In this way Yakub Khan compelled the Russians to take the first step. General Kaufmann then resolved to despatch a mission, of which Baron Kaulbars was the head, and to which were attached an engineer, a topographer, and a merchant, the duties of the last being to study the commercial capabilities of the country. In the meantime, however, the military preparations were proceeded with. Bodies of troops were stationed on the road from Lake Issyk Kul to the south, and a military road through the mountains was completed as soon as possible. All the necessary supplies and munitions were sent to Fort Naryn, near the Kashgar frontier, where they still remain.

Yakub Khan at first received the Russian embassy very well, but when he found that the military preparations still continued, he soon changed his tone to one much more threatening and warlike; and it was not until the advance of the troops had been stopped that he consented to sign the commercial treaty.

Mr. Kolesnikof, the merchant connected with the embassy, returned home through the Terek Davan pass and Khokand in order to pursue his commercial investigations, while the rest of the embassy took the usual route by Fort Naryn. The conclusion of this treaty was marked by an amusing instance of flattery. The treaty was actually signed on June 10 (22), 1872, but Baron Kaulbars managed to have it dated on May 21 (June 2), the day of St. Constantine, and immediately wrote to General Kaufmann that as a mark of especial goodwill Yakub

Khan had insisted on signing the treaty on the day of his (General Kaufmann's) patron saint. Such a despatch was, however, a little stronger than General Kaufmann cared to send to St. Petersburg, and the wording of it was so altered that it read, 'out of special regard for the Emperor of Russia, the Amir had signed the treaty on the saint's day of the Grand Duke Constantine, the Emperor's brother.'

This treaty differed in many respects from those previously concluded with Khokand and Bukhara. Yakub Khan was much pleased at the conclusion of the affair, and that he had now been recognised as an independent sovereign, and asked to be allowed as a still greater favour to send an envoy to St. Petersburg who should be presented to the Emperor. 'This,' he added, 'will be for me a great mercy, that you should lead me, a man of nothing, to the sun, and that to my share should fall a drop from that great sea.' General Kaufmann consented to this request, and the Mullah Tarap Hodja, the first Khokandian envoy, went to St. Petersburg in the summer of 1873, was received by the Emperor, was taken to the reviews, and was treated with great consideration.

In spite of the new commercial treaty, however, the course of matters did not much change in Kashgar as far as Russian merchants were concerned. In 1873 Mr. Pupyshef fitted out a caravan which he sent to Kashgar under the charge of his clerk Somof. The caravan reached the town of Kashgar in safety, but Somof was not allowed to go farther than the caravanserai, and his trading expeditions to Yarkand and Khokand were entirely forbidden. Yakub Khan bought the greater part of the goods for himself, and allowed the merchants of Kashgar to buy only one-third. Besides this, Somof was obliged to wait for more than two months without being paid, and it was only in the middle of October that he received his pay in Chinese *yambs* (gold coins), at the rate of 128 rubles each, while the real commercial value was only 115 rubles. In this way, for goods which were worth 48,000 rubles he received only 33,000 rubles, besides paying the duties which were exacted from him.

On the return of Somof to Tashkent explanations of his conduct were demanded from Yakub Khan, who, however, denied all the allegations of Somof, maintaining that this merchant had not in any way been opposed, and but had full power of

going where he pleased, and that he himself did not buy any of the goods, but that one of the custom-house agents had bought them in his own name, thinking that he might get them cheaper. At the same time the Kashgarian ruler sent four merchants to Tashkent who had known the progress of the whole affair. The commission in Tashkent, after having made an investigation, found that the loss actually sustained by Mr. Pupyshef was 12,000 rubles, and Yakub Khan was therefore requested to pay this sum. He immediately expressed his willingness to pay not only the 12,000 rubles but even ten times more. 'Our Government,' he wrote, 'is young, mistakes are possible, and they should not be too severely punished.' Months, however, elapsed before the money arrived.

In the meantime the English mission of Mr. Forsyth had been in Kashgar, and Yakub Khan felt that he could take even a stronger tone. The roads leading to Russia were well fortified, and Bek Kuli, his able son, had returned after a successful expedition against the Chinese. He had received the title of Amir from the Sultan of Turkey, he had declared himself his vassal, and had begun coining money with the inscription 'Sultan Abdul Aziz.' He now wrote again to the Russian authorities, still promising to send the money soon, but adopting a very lofty style: 'I have great desire,' he wrote, 'to live in peace with my brother the Emperor of Russia, and as I have heard that his daughter is married to an English prince, I desire to send a mission to congratulate him.'

Notwithstanding the ill-success of Somof's caravan, the merchant Morozof sent to Kashgar in the summer of 1874 a caravan with goods to the value of 25,000 rubles. As if to prove what the Kashgarians had maintained, that Somof's complaints were ill-founded, the caravan of Morozof was very well received. What goods were not sold to private individuals were bought by the treasurer of Yakub Khan. The members of the caravan, both Russian and Kirghiz, were allowed during the seventy days of their stay to go freely through the town in their own costume. They suffered not the slightest hindrance and all of their complaints were immediately redressed.¹ In

¹ The information about Morozof's caravan is taken from a letter in the 'Golos,' of November (12) 24, 1874, written from Semipalatinsk on October (10) 22. In a previous letter, the Semipalatinsk correspondent gives currency to the rumour

spite of this the relations of Kashgar to Russia are no better, and the Russians seem determined in some way or other to find an excuse for attacking the country.

The troubles about trade being such in 1874, General Kaufmann despatched to Kashgar Colonel Reinthal, the same who was there in 1868, nominally to take Yakub Khan some presents on the part of the Governor-General, but really, if he found it possible, to discuss the question of appointing a resident commercial agent in Kashgar, he being the person fixed upon for the permanent appointment. His reception there was such that he thought it imprudent to bring up the question in official interviews; while in private conversations with the Kashgar officials—who had full information from Tashkent of his intention—he utterly denied that any such purpose was intended. The Russians had always proposed by their commercial treaties to secure to themselves the right of having consuls or commercial agents in the surrounding countries, but unfortunately they had rendered this word by *caravan-bashi*, which really means the ‘leader of the caravan,’ a man of no more real importance than the conductor of a railway train. The Kashgarians, however, held the Russians to the strict letter of the treaty. They knew what *caravan-bashi* meant, and they were indisposed to let a merchant or political agent reside there under this name. Reinthal therefore returned without a shadow of success. This was probably the reason of the projected campaign against Kashgar in the spring of 1875, which circumstances turned into a war against Khokand.

A curious incident should perhaps be mentioned here. In the early part of 1875 a woman named Satara Patcha, a half-sister or cousin of Yakub Khan, who had been living for some time at Constantinople, where she had been received with honour by the Sultana Validé, went through Odessa and Russia that the complaints of Russian merchants in Kashgar and other countries are frequently unfounded, the pretended losses having been invented by the clerks and agents to conceal their own peculations. He is careful, however, not to vouch for the truth of this statement, and in the case of the caravan of Papyshof, I have every reason to believe that the complaints were well founded. It may be remarked that the news in regard to Central Asia given in the ‘Golos,’ by the correspondent at Semipalatinsk, never agrees with the statements coming from Tashkent. In both cases the letters are written by officials, but Semipalatinsk is in the province of Western Siberia, and the correspondents belong to hostile camps.

on her way to Kashgar. By the permission of the Ministry of Finance she was allowed to take the presents from the Sultan to Yakub Khan and her other luggage through the Custom-house without duty. She went through Siberia and arrived in safety as far as Kopul, where she was arrested by Russian officials sent from Vierny, who searched her baggage, took from her all her letters and papers, and detained her for some time in Vierny under arrest.

Both in 1874 and 1875 strong efforts were made to prove the complicity of Yakub Khan in the disturbances in Khokand, and Seid Mahmud Yakub Khan, who had been for some time a Kashgarian envoy at Constantinople, was refused an official audience until a telegram could be obtained from General Kaufmann that nothing compromising had been discovered about the conduct of the Kashgarian Government. This envoy had before been in Constantinople as well as in India, and was the one who accompanied Mr. Forsyth's party from India to Kashgar. He professed the readiness of Yakub Khan to make a postal treaty and to accept a Russian consul, but the main object of his mission was to secure the freedom of a young girl, a relative of the Khan living in Tashkent, whom a great partisan of the Russians, Said Azim, had endeavoured to marry without her parents' consent. The Russians endeavoured to put him off by referring him to General Kaufmann, but it was only after the Emperor, on his reception, had signified his wish that he should go to Tashkent to meet General Kaufmann, and had promised him a safe conduct—for he was originally a native of Tashkent—that he promised to go. He went, met General Kaufmann on the road, and succeeded in obtaining the release of the girl.¹

During the last few years the idea has obtained some currency in Russia that it would be well to aid the Chinese to re-occupy Kashgar, or even to conquer it by Russian troops and hand it over to the Chinese. It is thought that it would be far more advantageous to have as a neighbour the Chinese Government, which acknowledges treaty obligations and with which negotiations are more easily managed, than the small Uzbek principality under Yakub Khan. Persons who think this, believe also that Russia should not extend her frontiers beyond the Tian Shan, which forms a natural and excellent

¹ See vol. i. pp. 99, 100.

boundary. Against this opinion some objections have been raised, chiefly on the ground that for many reasons it would be impolitic to introduce Chinese rule again into that region. When Kashgar is taken, therefore, unless there be a strong Chinese army in the immediate neighbourhood, it will probably remain in Russian hands.

FIFTH—KULDJA AND TARBAGATAI.

With regard to the circumstances which led to the occupation of Kuldja, and concerning the present tenure of that country, sufficient has been said in Chapter XII. It will be remembered that the province is only held temporarily by the Russians, who have promised to restore it to China as soon as a sufficient Chinese force is brought to restore order. The Chinese force has not yet appeared, although the rumours of its approach have been frequent. One cause of its delay, it is said, has been that it has been obliged to stop *en route* to sow and reap sufficient grain to support it. The difficult circumstances under which the inhabitants of the province are now placed—owing allegiance to the Chinese Government, and yet being under the temporary rule of the Russians—together with the interests of Russia itself, have compelled the administrators of the province several times to propose that the *status* of Kuldja be once for all settled; but thus far their propositions for the permanent occupation of the country or for its abandonment, have been rejected by the Foreign Office, and the *status* of indecision has been maintained. It is now, however, scarcely probable that Russia will relinquish the province, as her interests are greatly against such a step. In any case she will hardly do so until Kashgar shall have been occupied by Chinese troops.

Between Kuldja and Siberia is an *enclave* which is known by the name of Tarbagatai, the chief town of which is Tehugutchak, close to the Russian frontier. Here the Dungan insurrection was speedily put down, and the Chinese have for some years been in full possession. A new *Dzian-Dziun* Zhun was appointed in 1871, and since he has been on the spot, relations between him and the Russian commanders have been at times somewhat strained. This is owing in part to his claiming authority over Kuldja, and endeavouring to instil into the minds

of the inhabitants that the Russians will soon abandon the country, and that the Chinese will return; and in part to the peculiar conditions under which diplomatic relations are carried on. The province of Semiretch is annexed to Turkistan, although neither by the character of the country or by that of the inhabitants has it anything in common with the other parts of that region. General Kaufmann, as Governor-General of Turkistan, has full powers for diplomatic relations, and is therefore in frequent correspondence with the *Dzian-Dziun* from the side of Vierny and Kuldja. On the other hand the Governor-General of Western Siberia, who is more nearly interested in the proceedings of the *Dzian-Dziun*, has no full diplomatic powers and is obliged to conduct his affairs—except in minor matters—through the Foreign Office and the ministers at Peking. The natural result of this is that a state of confusion arises, which the *Dzian-Dziun* occasionally turns to his advantage.

CHAPTER XV.

THE KHIVAN CAMPAIGN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Early relations of Russia with Khiva—Expedition of Bekovitch—That of Perovsky—Embassies—Recent relations—Expedition of 1873—Statement of grievances—Real reasons for the expedition—Its plan—The Turkistan column—Want of provisions—Attitude of Bukhara—Change of route—Khalata—Distress in the desert—Passage of the Amu—The failure of Colonel Markozof—The Mangyshlak column—March of the Orenburg column—It takes Khiva by storm—Simultaneous surrender to General Kaufmann—The Khan reinstated—The Divan—Foraging forbidden—Emancipation of the Persian slaves—Surveys—Reasons for the Turkoman campaign—Butchery of the Turkomans—Story of an eye-witness—The treaty of peace—Official explanation of it—The Amu Darya district—Further expeditions against the Turkomans in 1873, 1874, and 1875—Exploring expeditions—Navigation of the Amu Darya—The Trans-Caspian district—General Lomakin's expeditions—The Turkomans—Affairs with Persia—Caravans.

THE Russians came into communication with Khiva in the early part of the seventeenth century. As early as 1620 there were diplomatic relations, and about the same time the Cossacks of the Yaik or Ural, who were in the habit of robbing everybody they met, plundered some Khivan merchants, and having found out from them about their city and its unguarded state, quickly went through the steppe and actually took the town of Urgentch. They loaded a thousand carts with spoils, and carried off nearly a thousand women. Their success proved their ruin, for on their way home they were attacked and cut off from water; they were compelled to abandon everything, and were killed nearly to a man, and the memory of their exploit lives only in tradition. A second expedition of the Cossacks had the same fate, and a third fared even worse. Being caught by a severe winter the Cossacks lost the road, and were obliged from hunger to kill and eat each other, while the survivors were captured and enslaved by the Khivans.

The fourth campaign is the well-known one of Prince Bekovitch-Tcherkasski, in the time of Peter the Great.

It seems that in 1700 an ambassador from the Khan Shaniaz came to Peter the Great and begged him to take the Khivan nation under Russian protection, which he agreed to do, and confirmed this consent in 1703 to the new Khan, Aran Mohammed. No actual result however, followed, until in 1713 a certain Hadji Nefes, a Turkoman, came to Astrakhan, where he became converted, and told many stories of the gold which was to be found along the valley of the Amu Darya, and how the Uzbeks had closed the old channel of the stream which had flowed into the Caspian, and suggested to the Russians to break down the dam and restore the river to its former channel. At the same time, Peter the Great received information from Prince Gagarin, the Governor of Siberia, that in Little Bukhara there was gold sand. The mines in the Ural and in Siberia had not yet been discovered, and this information excited at once the interest of the great monarch, who ordered two expeditions to be fitted out, one from Siberia into Little Bukhara, and another to Khiva under Prince Bekovitch.

Prince Bekovitch occupied three years with surveys of the eastern shore of the Caspian and the establishment of various fortified positions, and it was not until June 1717 that he moved over the steppe towards Khiva with an army of 3,500 men, 6 guns, and a train of 200 camels and 300 horses. When about a hundred miles from that city on the banks of the Amu Darya, he had a decisive battle with the Khivans, which lasted three days and ended in their complete defeat. The Khan surrendered himself entirely to the mercy of the Russians, and after obtaining the full confidence of Prince Bekovitch, proposed to him to go and take actual possession of Khiva, after dividing his army into several parts for the greater convenience of provisioning it. This was no sooner done than the Khivans treacherously fell upon the separate portions of the expedition, massacred them almost without exception, and sent the head of Prince Bekovitch as a present to the Amir of Bukhara, who, however, refused to accept it.

Even this disaster did not prevent an ambassador of Peter's, the Italian Florio Beneveni, from penetrating to Khiva and being well received there. This was in 1725, a few months

after Peter's death. Subsequently a large number of Russian embassies visited the country, but none of them were ever able to bring the Khivan Khan to terms, or to induce him to stop capturing and enslaving Russians, or even to free those who were already in bonds there.

The disorderly state of the steppe induced General Perovsky in 1829 to undertake a new expedition against Khiva, with 5,000 men, 22 guns, and a train in which, besides horses, there were 10,000 camels, and as many as 2,000 Kirghiz to take care of them. This expedition was, as is well-known, a complete failure, in consequence of the ruinous idea that, on account of the want of water in the steppe, it would be easier to make the campaign in winter, and that Russian soldiers had nothing to fear from the cold.¹ The march, accordingly, was begun at the end of autumn, but unfortunately winter set in sooner, and was much more severe than usual. There was considerable trouble in furnishing the camels, and those that were furnished did not live, so that Perovsky was obliged to retreat when he had got only half-way. The retreat was awful: the provision supplies had not arrived, the transports were lost in the constant snowstorms and whirlwinds, and the expedition returned without seeing the enemy, but beaten by the cold, with but one-third of its original number of men, and those in a most wretched and miserable condition, and with only 1,000 of the 10,000 camels which had been taken with it.

Lest the Khivans might take heart by the failure of Perovsky's expedition, it was resolved at once to send another. Before, however, the arrangements for it had been completed, the Khivans saw their danger, and in the summer of 1840 sent an envoy to Russia with 418 Russian captives, and the Khan issued an order forbidding the capture and purchase of Russians. The next year Nikiforof went to Khiva as Russian envoy; but, although he awed the Khan and all his officials into a state of complete deference, he was obliged to depart without accomplishing anything. In 1842 another Russian envoy—Danilefsky—was sent to Khiva, and succeeded in inducing the Khan to sign a treaty promising not to engage in

¹ Some Russian accounts ascribe this plan, as well as the defective arrangements, to a settled desire on the part of the chief of staff, a Pole, to ensure the failure of the expedition, in revenge for the Russian acts in Poland.

hostilities against Russia, or to commit acts of robbery and piracy. The only real result, however, of this mission was the extension of the geographical knowledge of Central Asia. Every article of the treaty remained a dead letter.

The very next year Khiva protected the famous brigand Kenisar, and soon after sent emissaries among the Kirghiz, and even sent forces against the new Russian forts in the steppe; and in 1858 Colonel Ignatief—now General, and Ambassador at Constantinople—on speaking of the treaty made with Danilefsky, was told by the Khivans that nobody believed such a document, and that they were unable to find it in their archives. In the same year Captain Butakof suddenly appeared with a steamer in front of Kungrad and excited great terror among the population.

Although the Khivans from that time on did not stop their old habit of capturing and enslaving the Russians on the banks of the Caspian, and of pillaging and enforcing tribute from the Kirghiz who were under Russian subjection, and stirring them up to mutiny, yet the attention of Russia was so much taken up with the territory on the Syr Darya, and the strengthening of their position in that region, that they were unable to insist on the Khan of Khiva complying with their demands.

The letters of the Governor-General were either unanswered, or messages were returned which were considered insolent, and when in 1869 and 1870 the Khivans were accused of aiding the rebellion of the Kirghiz,¹ and of committing many depredations on the Russian post routes, the patience of the

¹ With regard to this accusation General Tchernajef, in the '*Russki Mir*' of February (2) 14, 1875, made the following remark:—'The Khivans did not excite the Kirghiz to rebellion, on the contrary, they were made to rebel by the introduction of the new regulations composed under the supervision of the Ministry of War, the liberal and humane aims of which somehow always meet a strange fate. So it was in the present instance. Instead of the expected gratitude of the population for the introduction of the humane and liberal regulations, the only reply was rebellion.

'When Cossack detachments were sent out to put down these disturbances, the Kirghiz threw the blame on the distant Khivans, and the officials accepted these excuses to cover their own mistakes. In this way the idea grew up at St. Petersburg of the instigation of the Kirghiz by the Khivans, who had no thought for foreign undertakings when they could scarcely maintain themselves at home against the Turkomans. We must remember, too, this fact, that when we are quiet our neighbours are quiet, but as soon as we excite the discontent of our own Kirghiz, some of our neighbours are immediately found to be to blame.'

Government became exhausted. It was resolved that some means must be taken to put an end to this state of things. For this, however, time was necessary, and owing to the difficulties in reaching Khiva, which had proved so formidable to other expeditions, it was necessary to send out various preliminary expeditions to survey the roads over the steppe.

During the summers of 1871 and 1872 the part of the Kyzyl Kum lying to the north of Bukhara was explored by the Russian surveying parties almost to the Khivan limits, and for some years also small detachments were sent from Kazala, and the country as far as Min Bulak, and the Bukan-Tau mountains was carefully investigated. The Governor-General of Orenburg also sent detachments to explore the country south of the Emba. On the side of the Caucasus the Russians in 1869 established a fort and a naval station on the bay of Krasnovodsk,¹ and subsequently another at Tchikishlar at the mouth of the Attek; and in 1871-2 expeditions were sent, nominally to explore the old bed of the Oxus, but really to investigate the road to Khiva to as great a distance as possible.

These expeditions brought the Khan for a while to reason, and in the beginning of 1872 he sent embassies to Fort Alexandrofsky and to Orenburg, thinking to establish good relations with the Governor of Orenburg and with the Lieutenant of the Caucasus, and thus gain friends against the administration of Tashkent, which he seemed to think independent of the others. The Government consented to deal with him on two conditions: first, that he should immediately free all Russian prisoners in Khiva, as well as the Kirghiz held there; and secondly, that he should give satisfactory explanations to the Governor-General of Turkistan about the letters received from him. These conditions were, however, refused by the Khan. 'However great, therefore,' says the 'Invalid,' in its official explanation of the causes of the expedition, 'Russia's patience and love of peace, they must have their limits. The dignity and interests of the State do not allow

For another Russian view of the relations of the Kirghiz to Khiva see APPENDIX V.

The disturbed state of the Kirghiz steppe seems to have been somewhat exaggerated, at least in 1873. Mr. MacGahan crossed the Kyzyl Kum without difficulty, and met with no opposition until he came to the Russian outposts.

¹ See APPENDIX V.

that the insignificant ruler of a half barbarous nation should dare with impunity to disturb the peace and liberty of our subjects and the safety of trade, and insolently reject all our efforts for establishing good relations with him. Mohammed Rahim Khan, by his weakness and by the obstinacy of his advisers, has himself called the tempest down on his country. The final refusal by Khiva to fulfil our demands renders it necessary to enforce them by other means, and show this Khanate that the steppes which surround it cannot protect it from deserved punishment.⁷

But there were other reasons than these which had their influence in bringing about the Khivan expedition.¹

It had become almost impossible to conceal the maladministration of Turkistan from the authorities at St. Petersburg. Indiscreet persons sometimes wrote letters to St. Petersburg newspapers when some more glaring fact came to the public notice, and the Ministry of War, which had the supervision of the Government of the province, occasionally asked questions which were exceedingly awkward to answer. At the same time the financial condition of the province gave rise to apprehensions at St. Petersburg. People were beginning to say that Turkistan was not worth the money that was spent in maintaining it, and especially was this the case when it became known that the deficits in the budgets were constantly increasing. Attacks were made on General Kaufmann in high circles at St. Petersburg, and his position became somewhat wavering. Indeed, a paper by General Tcherniaief, on the administration and financial condition of Turkistan, was considered of such consequence that it was shown to the Emperor by the Minister of Finance, and created such a strong impression on him, that General Kaufmann found great difficulty in replying satisfactorily to it.

It was desirable, therefore, to do something which would in a measure divert the attention of the public from the administration of Turkistan, and excite, if possible, the feeling of the country in support of General Kaufmann. Nothing seemed easier for this purpose than a new war, and though an expedi-

¹ After the vivid picture of the Khivan expedition given by Mr. MacGahan, I should hesitate to speak of its details, were it not that being in the country at the time, and not accompanying the troops, I saw it under a somewhat different light.

tion could easily have been made against Kashgar—in fact the idea had been entertained, and stores had been collected for it—yet the apparent submission of Yakub Khan put this out of the question. At the same time Khiva being nearer to Russia, there being so many scores to pay off against that country, and it being possible easily to arouse the patriotic feeling of the country by the tales of barbarity exercised towards Russian captives, and by the disturbance of Russian commerce and communications, a war in that direction presented much greater advantages. There was perhaps, too, in the Governor-General's mind a feeling that a successful Khivan expedition, while being in itself an achievement of considerable merit, would in a satisfactory way round off his whole Asiatic career. He had begun as a general in the conquest of Samarkand. He had succeeded in inducing Khokand, Bukhara, and Kashgar to make commercial treaties which appeared very well on paper, no matter how delusive in practice, and the conquest of Khiva would place him before the world as successful in the rôle which he had aspired to play—that of the pacificator of Central Asia. At the same time in a war against Khiva he would have the support of nearly every person in Tashkent. The officers, almost without exception—and one could hardly blame them for it—were always desirous of some new expedition by which they could win crosses and rewards. The 'St. Anne's fever,' as Mr. Grant Duff aptly expressed it in the House of Commons, is very prevalent in Turkistan, and more than one expedition in Central Asia has been undertaken, with really no higher aim than to secure decorations for the men who carried it on.¹

General Kaufmann came to St. Petersburg, and with his winning manners and social popularity—for in St. Petersburg he unbends and casts off the dignity which oppresses him at Tashkent—succeeded, after a struggle, not only in strengthening his position, but in obtaining permission for the expedition against Khiva. It was, however, expected that the expedition of Colonel Markozof from the Attrek, in the autumn of 1872, would probably render this unnecessary, as with some good luck he might have captured Khiva by a *coup-de-main*, and it was

¹ This was in a great measure, if not entirely, the case with the expeditions against Karshi, Shahrisabs, and Kuldja.

not until the failure of this expedition¹ became known that steps were taken for the immediate fitting out of a large expedition.

The great difficulty in an expedition against Khiva—as General Perovsky found out—is that of getting there. The population of the Khanate was small, and from the experience of Russians in Asia it was known that, however warlike they might be, the undisciplined forces of the Khan could not stand against modern cannon and breech-loading rifles. But Khiva was an oasis in the midst of a desert lying 600 miles from Tashkent, 930 miles from Orenburg, and 500 miles from Krasnovodsk on the Caspian, the only three places which, it was thought, could serve as bases of operations. It was impossible to send troops by water, partly because there were not sufficient transports at Fort No. 1, and partly because the mouths of the Amu Darya were shallow and unfit for navigation.

General Kaufmann proposed, therefore, to make a double attack upon Khiva by a force taken from the army of the Caucasus, which was to proceed through Krasnovodsk or Tehikishlar on the Caspian, and by another from Tashkent, which was to proceed by way of Jizakh through the desert close to the northern boundary of Bukhara, hoping by diplomatic means to prevent that Khanate from attacking them in the flank. With this latter was to be united a small force, drawn for convenience from Orenburg, which was to start from Fort No. 1 on the Syr Darya, proceed to the Amu Darya, and along the right bank of that river until it met the detachment from Tashkent.

General Kryzhanofsky, however, the Governor-General of Orenburg, who had been called to St. Petersburg to consult with General Kaufmann and the Grand Duke Michael, the Emperor's Lieutenant in the Caucasus, on the subject of the expedition, argued that this plan could not be followed, as it left open the steppes between Orenburg, the Caspian, and Khiva. This region had always served as a shelter for predatory bands of Khivans, and it might be expected that either the Khivan army or various bands of Turkomans, in order to escape from the attacks of the Russian forces, would march into the Ust-Urt, and by making dissensions among the Kirghiz create much disturbance; they even might possibly

¹ Colonel Markozof reached Igdy, but was obliged to retreat, after being attacked by the Turkomans and losing most of his camels.

attack the post-road and Orenburg itself. General Kryzhanofsky, therefore, proposed that the whole expedition should proceed from Orenburg ; or that, at least, in case of the acceptance of General Kaufmann's plan, another force should be sent from Orenburg directly south, along the Western shore of the Aral Sea, which might meet the other troops in front of Khiva. This would protect the steppe against the Khivans, and in case, on account of the floods of the lower Amu Darya, the Tashkent expedition should find it impossible to reach Khiva, it would be able to render effective assistance to the expedition of the Caucasus. The representations of General Kryzhanofsky had their weight, and it was decided to allow him to send this detachment, although it was never expected that it would reach Khiva, but that it would confine itself to keeping communications open. Finally, in December, 1872, the plan of the expedition received the Emperor's sanction. It was said at the time that the vote in the Council, which was presided over by the Emperor in person, stood 35 for the capture of Khiva to 9 against it, and that Prince Gortchakof was in the minority, believing that it would be better to punish Khiva than to take it.

The whole expedition was to be placed under the immediate command of General Kaufmann, who was to accompany the detachment sent from Tashkent, and who was desirous of retaining for himself the honour of capturing Khiva. Strict orders were, therefore, given to all the detachments that in case they reached the frontiers of the country sooner than the column from Tashkent, they should halt, fortify themselves, and be ready to lend assistance to the Turkistan column as soon as they heard of its arrival. In no case were they to attack the city or to enter into negotiations with the Khan. Minor changes were subsequently introduced into the scheme on account of the difficulty of procuring camels. The detachment of the Caucasus was divided into two : one, under Colonel Markozof, was to start from Tchikishlar on the Attrek, and advance directly to Khiva by the southern ridge ; the other, under Colonel Lomakin, was to start from Fort Alexandrofsky in the peninsula of Mangyshlak, joining the column from Orenburg about Kungrad. Four steamers of the Aral flotilla, with barges of provisions in tow, were to pass through the Sea of Aral from

Fort No. 1 and to attempt the ascent of one of the mouths of the Amu Darya. Preparations of all kinds were proceeded with as fast as possible, in order that the expedition might be ready to take the field in the early spring. The Turkistan detachment was, as I have said, divided into two columns; one a small subsidiary column moving southwards from Kazala and Perovsky, was under the command of Colonel Golof; the other, the main column, which was to rendezvous at Jizakh and then move westward, was commanded by General Golovatchef, the military governor of the province of Syr Darya. The Kazala column was accompanied by H.I.H. the Grand Duke Nicholas Constantinevitch, and the Jizakh column by H.I.H. the Duke Eugene of Leuchtenberg. In all, the forces of this detachment comprised 3,420 infantry, 1,150 cavalry, with 20 guns, 2 mitrailleuses, and 8 rocket-stands, making altogether about 5,500 men. For the trains it became necessary to obtain a large number of camels—8,000 according to official reports¹—which were chiefly hired from the Kirghiz of the province of Syr Darya, with a promise that 50 rubles would be paid for every one that died.

The Jizakh column left the river Kly on March 28, and on April 11 the different detachments all came into camp at the wells of Aristan Bel Kuduk, a distance of about 80 miles. The troops, in spite of unseasonable snow-storms, had not much suffered, and the number of sick was small. Great difficulties had, however, been experienced, for the Kirghiz fearing that they never would receive pay for the camels—which was, indeed, actually the case in the end—naturally furnished their poorest and weakest animals. In consequence of this the camels perished so rapidly from exhaustion and insufficient food that it was found impossible to move from the bivouac on the Kly with all the provisions, &c., it was desired to take. Many stores were therefore left there under charge of a small guard, and more were soon after abandoned *en route*. In addition to this there were difficulties about the provisions. The biscuits which had been sent with the expedition had been stored for several years at Tashkent and Tchinzaz, and had become entirely worm-eaten and mouldy, so that they were uneatable and were

¹ Private information collected in the various districts makes this as many as 14,000.

thrown away. It was, therefore, necessary to obtain from Samarkand five hundred quarters of wheat, which was hastily baked into biscuits, while a large quantity more was ordered.¹

At the wells of Temyr Kabuk the Beks of the neighbouring Bukharan provinces of Nurata and Ziaueddin met General Kaufmann with a few camels and some supplies of fuel and forage, which they had been ordered by the Amir to collect there. These supplies, as well as the presents sent by the Amir, were received with gratitude and as a mark of friendliness. General Kaufmann retained both Beks with him to the end of the campaign, though whether as guests or as hostages is not precisely stated.

The Amir of Bukhara had taken this step partly because he had been asked, and partly from a desire to propitiate General Kaufmann, as he constantly feared that the troops would turn and attack Bukhara.² However, as they proceeded further, and the difficulties of their position became better known at Bukhara, the Amir somewhat changed his tactics. The sutlers and contractors who were sent from the expedition into the Bukharan provinces to purchase grain and stores, were forbidden by the authorities to export them, and orders were given that they should receive no camels for their caravans. It was only after a *mélée*, in which one of the Russian clerks killed a Bukharan, and on threatening that the troops would turn against Bukhara, that the caravans were finally allowed to depart. The attitude at Samarkand of General Abramof, who was always ready for a march, had an effect upon the Amir, and finally additional provisions under the charge of Bukharan officials were sent on to the troops at Karak-ata. According to the official report the Amir refused to receive any pay for these provisions, but other information makes it appear that most of the supplies were not the property of the Amir but of private contractors, who were well paid for what they furnished. What was given in the way of presents by the Amir himself was very little; for this, however, he received warm thanks.

The Khan of Khiva, meanwhile, having become convinced that the Russians were in earnest about the war, repented, and sent an embassy to Kazala with a letter and excuses, and twenty-

¹ 'Golos,' No. 148, 1873. Letter from Samarkand of April 21 (May 3).

² See page 309.

one Russian slaves.¹ The expedition, however, had already started, and the letter of the Khan, with the information of the arrival of the embassy, was forwarded to General Kaufmann and reached him on his march. He immediately gave orders that the ambassador should be sent on to him, and that those of the prisoners who desired to serve in the expedition could join the Kazala column.

During the halt at Aristan Bel Kuduk, which was necessary to refresh the troops, it was decided to change the route of march. It appears that, by the rules of the order, the Cross of St. George can be given to the chief of staff of an expedition only when the route successfully followed has been prepared by him. Now Colonel Trotzky, who was the chief of staff of the expedition, had not personally engaged in the preparation of the route which was to be followed, it having been drawn up for him at the office of the staff at Tashkent. Therefore, in order to render him eligible for the military decoration, in the event of the success of the expedition, it became necessary to make a considerable change in the route. It was resolved, therefore, that instead of taking the route first proposed by a well-known road to the Bukan mountains and the wells of Min-Bulak, and then south-westerly to the Amu Darya at Shura-khana, to follow a new road through Khalata to Utch-Utchak, which seemed to be shorter, but of which absolutely nothing was known. Orders were therefore sent to the Kazala column to change its direction, and meet the rest of the expedition at Aristan Bel Kuduk. That column, a portion of which left Kazala on March 21, arrived at Irkibai on April 6, where the troops erected a small fort which they named Blagovestchensky. On April 14 it arrived at Bakali in the Bukan mountains, and advanced from thence to Aristan Bel Kuduk, where it formed the rear-guard of the whole Turkistan detachment.

After obtaining a fresh supply of 800 camels from the Kirghiz of the Kyzyl Kum tribes, General Kaufmann set out from Aristan Bel Kuduk on April 23 and 24, and on May 6 the troops were all collected at Khalata in a fair condition, notwithstanding the long marches, the intense heat, and the violent winds. Here it was considered necessary to fortify a

¹ See vol. i., p. 49; and also APPENDIX V.

mound, on which had previously been the tomb of the saint Khala-ata, to serve both as a defence and a provision depôt. The works were commenced on May 6, the day of St. George, who gave his name to the fort, and three days later the fort was finished and the Russian flag was hoisted.

Now began the real difficulties of the campaign. The eighty miles of good road which had been supposed to exist between Khalata and the Amu Darya turned out to be 120 miles of deep and shifting sand, about which little information could be procured, and where, as far as could be ascertained, the only water was at the wells of Adam Krylgan, about twenty-four miles from Khalata. The name, Adam Krylgan, meaning 'man's destruction,' seemed to be particularly applicable to the region. The first detachment which was sent out from Khalata, after going a short distance, was attacked by Turkomans, and two officers who, almost unattended, were in advance of the troops were wounded. After a slight skirmish the Turkomans rode off. General Kaufmann arrived at Adam Krylgan on April 12 at midnight. The place was an utter desert, with a few bad wells, including some new ones which had been dug by the first Russian detachment, and without a sign of vegetation.

After a day's rest it was proposed to send the troops on by a march with three halts of six hours each to Utch-Utchak on the Amu Darya. The advance-guard started shortly after midnight and marched until nine o'clock in the morning, in all about thirteen miles, when they halted for their first rest. It was found, however, that the sands were so heavy and the camels so weak, that the rear of this detachment did not arrive at the rendezvous until five o'clock in the evening. The heat was so intense, and both horses and camels were so worn out, that further advance was impossible. It therefore became necessary for some of the troops to return to the wells of Adam Krylgan and fetch water for the rest.

Affairs were now desperate. It was impossible to advance, and it seemed shameful to retreat, while the small quantity of water at Adam Krylgan rendered it ruin to remain, for the supply which had been brought was nearly exhausted. Even had it been desirable for the expedition to return to Khalata, and then retrace its steps and pursue the route first chosen

to Min Bulak, this was impossible on account of the lack of transports. For a moment it seemed as if the army would be entirely lost in the desert. General Kaufmann despaired, and gave orders that should anything happen to him the command of the expedition was to be given, not to General Golovatchef, but to Colonel Trotzky, his chief of staff.

Finally a hope of safety appeared in the shape of a ragged Kirghiz who had joined the Kazala detachment on the march from Irkibai, and whose excellent qualities the Grand Duke Nicholas and Colonel Dreschern had been the first to discover. He said that a few miles to the right of the road were the wells of Alty Kuduk. General Kaufmann handed him his pocket flask and offered him a hundred rubles reward if he would bring it back filled with water. This was done, and a portion of the troops was immediately sent to Alty Kuduk, where the wells were found to be few, and, what was worse, deep, but yet there was water. The pontoons were then unloaded and filled with water to serve as drinking troughs for the remaining horses and camels. The expedition was preserved, and after a halt of several days pursued its way in small detachments and by slow stages to the Amu Darya, which it reached on May 23, in eleven days instead of two.

Of the 10,000 camels with which the expedition had been provided, but 1,200 now remained. The whole road from Khalata was strewn with camp equipage, with officers' baggage, and with munitions of war. Ammunition and stores had in several places been buried in the sand, with the expectation that subsequent detachments would be sent out from Khalata for the purpose of recovering them. An officer who passed over the road a few weeks subsequently, told me that the whole distance was covered with the skeletons and decaying bodies of camels and horses, the stench from which was intolerable, while the articles strewn along the road made it appear almost like a bazaar. Nevertheless the expedition was safe. Water had been reached, and the troops, in spite of their sufferings from heat and from thirst, were in fair health and in good spirits, which they soon had occasion to prove, for near Utch-Utchak there was a skirmish with a small body of Turkomans under Sadyk.

Pursuing its way down the right bank of the river, on May

28 and 29, the expedition came in sight of a fortified camp on the opposite shore, guarding the ferry of Sheikh-aryk, from which they were greeted with a heavy artillery fire. The Russian guns were immediately put into position, the camp shelled, and the Khivans, who were supposed to number about 4,000 men, under the command of the Divan Begi Mat Murad, abandoned their camp and retreated. The Russian loss was only two horses killed, which in two hours were eaten by the hungry troops. The two pontoons which could alone be brought from Khalata had before this been put together and were going down the river, and together with the cavalry succeeded in capturing eleven boats belonging to the enemy, a lucky acquisition, as otherwise it would have been difficult if not impossible to cross the river.

The passage of the Amu was begun on May 30 and ended on June 3.

On May 28 a deputation from the town of Shura-khana, on the right bank, had appeared at General Kaufmann's camp, offering the submission of that city, and a detachment of cavalry was therefore sent there, remaining four days. Here the army succeeded for the first time in finding sufficient forage and fresh provisions (although the soldiers were reduced to rags from the loss of their baggage); for in consequence of a proclamation issued by General Kaufmann, the inhabitants of the villages, feeling that their lives would be safe, had begun to appear in the camp bringing articles for sale.

The town of Hazarasp was occupied on June 4, after being abandoned by the enemy. Here General Kaufmann received a letter from the Khan Seid Mohammed Rahim, informing him that the Russian prisoners had been sent back, and declaring his readiness to comply with all the Russian demands, but asking that the movements of troops should be stopped.¹ General Kaufmann replied, calling attention to the hostile

¹ Here is an extract from this letter. 'In your letter you speak of freeing the prisoners. In fact, we have from five to ten Russian men, but they are not at all prisoners, as they were not captured by my troops, but *they were bought* with money from the Kirghiz and the Adae tribes, and we from friendship to you only keep them.

'You ask us to send back with the prisoners an envoy to talk about the conclusion of a peace which would still further strengthen our friendly relations. With that purpose we sent you Murtaza Hodja Bii, who, however, was unable to go to

disposition of the Khan for the last six years, and said that although he was ready to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship, he should yet continue to advance, and counselled him to disband his troops in order to save his country from devastation. Here he also received a despatch from General Verevkin, saying that the Orenburg detachment expected to be at Yangy Urgentch, and would meet him if necessary at Hanki. Information received from the inhabitants gave further news of General Verevkin's movements, and showed that he had already arrived at Kosh-kupyr, twelve miles from Khiva. Of the 1,200 camels which had arrived with the expedition, 700 had been sent back to Alty-Kuduk to bring on as much as possible of the baggage with the detachment of Colonel Novomlynsky which had been left there. Of those which remained only 300 were serviceable, and it became necessary to find carts, 500 of which in the course of a few days were taken from the inhabitants, and formed the train of the army.

On June 8, after leaving a small garrison in Hazarasp General Kaufmann and the troops set off on the road to Khiva, a distance of forty-five miles. The night before the march another envoy from the Khan arrived bringing to General Kaufmann a renewal of the former desire for peace, and stating that he had sent back the Russian prisoners who had been in captivity in Khiva, and therefore he did not understand why the Russians had invaded his territory from different sides.

Tashkent through Bukhara. At that time a letter was sent from the Governor of Orenburg to the Kirghiz Zagyr Bii with a request to free the Russians. A similar letter was brought from Teheleken by the Tchudor Sary Ishan from the commander of the troops there. Learning that Murtaza Bii could not go through Bukhara we sent with the messenger who had left two of our own people to Orenburg and Teheleken, and promised to send back the men that we had detained, but neither in Orenburg nor in Teheleken did they receive our envoys or enter into communication with them, declaring that all that was entrusted to you. On the return of these envoys we confided the Russians who were with us to Murtaza Bii, and sent them through Kazala, and ourselves waited in peace and quiet. We hear our envoy has had an interview with you, and has given up your people, but up to this time we have received no news directly from you. Meanwhile your armies began to appear in various parts of our possessions. Then the inhabitants began to defend their families, went out to meet you, and, as far as possible, tried to keep you back. . . .

'If your wish was to receive the return of your prisoners, you have it already. If you want anything else, say so; according to our ability we will fulfil it. If you desire to conclude a treaty, then remain where you are, and do not come through the inhabited districts.'

He asked General Kaufmann to reply, and explain to him his conditions. The envoy was ordered to return to Khiva and declare to the Khan that the General would make conditions with him in Khiva only.

Owing to the constant raids of the Persian Turkomans across the Attrek, and to the report that many of them had gone to Khiva to take part in the hostilities against Russia, Colonel Markozof, the commandant of Tchikishlar, felt it necessary to give them a severe lesson before he began his march to Khiva. Accordingly, on March 12, he crossed the Attrek, and on reaching the banks of the Gurgan, he found large masses of Turkoman horsemen assembled, but these quickly dispersed and fled in disorder across the river. In pursuing them Colonel Markozof even crossed the Gurgan and entered what was certainly Persian territory; but he reported that he was received in a friendly way by the commandant of the Persian fort of Ak-kala, who thanked him for the punishment he had inflicted upon the rebels. He returned across the Attrek on March 8.

It was now time for the expedition to start for Khiva, but Colonel Markozof had only 2,600 camels, part of them furnished by the Turkomans, and part captured in the late raid across the Attrek. It was therefore impossible to send the number of troops at first proposed, and it was rendered necessary to limit the column to 20 companies of infantry, 4 sotnias of Cossacks, and 16 guns, together with sappers and rockets, in all 2,200 men, with provisions for two and a half months.

The proposed route was by Bugdaili and Aidin to the Uzboi—the old bed of the Amu Darya—and thence by Topatian, Igdy, Ortakuya, and Dandur to the ruined fort of Zmukshir, forty miles west of Khiva, where he was ordered to await the arrival of the Turkistan detachment. The distance from Tchikishlar to Khiva was estimated at 523 miles. The detachment set out on March 31, and on April 29 reached the wells of Igdy, about half way. The condition of the troops was much affected by the severe heat, which most inopportunistically and unexpectedly came on, and by the long forced marches they were compelled to make, it being Colonel Markozof's desire to reach Khiva and if possible capture it before the arrival of the other detachments.

Near Igdy the advanced guard was attacked by some Tekke

Turkomans, but the Cossacks soon put them to flight and captured 267 men, as well as 1,000 camels, 5,000 sheep, and many arms. From Igdy to Ortakuya was supposed to be three marches, or over fifty miles, through deep sand and with no wells. The troops were therefore provided at Igdy with sufficient water for double that distance, and they were to move from Igdy by four small detachments from April 30 to May 3. The weather was now intensely hot, and on May 1 a Réaumur thermometer, adjusted for marking up to 55°, showed 52° (149° Fahr.) at ten in the morning, and about mid-day burst. When but a short distance from Igdy, the troops were so overcome by heat, many having had sunstrokes, and the supply of water was even then so nearly exhausted, that it was proposed by the guides to turn off to the wells of Bala Ishem, but Colonel Markozof refused, on the ground that to do so would be wasting time and making the actual route longer. He pressed on therefore until he had advanced fifty miles from Igdy, but the position of Ortakuya could not yet be ascertained. The detachments were now all separated from one another, and each one was in the same desperate predicament. It became necessary to send scouts to search for the wells of Bala Ishem, and then to bring water from them by camels to refresh the troops. The losses became at last so great, that the impossibility of advancing was evident even to Colonel Markozof. They had not yet reached Ortakuya, and from there to Dandur and Zmukshir were waterless deserts of still greater extent. A council of war was called, and it was resolved to return to Krasnovodsk. The retreat from Igdy began on May 4, many of the troops from illness and weakness having to be carried on camels, and on May 26 the last of the detachment reached Krasnovodsk, having been followed for nearly the whole distance by bands of Turkomans, who from time to time attacked them. 'Almost the whole expedition was ill. Sixty men died of sunstroke. The troops returned to Krasnovodsk without their arms. The camels, the booty of the Turkomans, and various provisions, were abandoned in the steppe. One staff officer threw away a full service of silver plate and all his conserves. The expedition returned in a most miserable state.'¹ Some of the cannon

¹ From a letter in the 'Exchange Gazette,' June 10 (22), 1873, for publishing which the newspaper immediately received a warning.

had to be buried in the sand, but were afterwards recovered, and many rifles were brought in subsequently by the Kirghiz and friendly Turkomans.

In addition to the other difficulties the expedition had been put to the greatest straits on account of the scarcity and bad quality of the provisions, the supplying of the troops having been entrusted by favour to a rascally Armenian contractor.

Although the expedition of Markozof was in this way a complete failure so far as any direct influence on the success of the Khivan campaign, yet his previous movements on the Attrek had no doubt somewhat hindered the resistance of the Khivans by keeping back the Tekke Turkomans from sharing in the contest. There could be no doubt that apart from the bad provisions the failure of the expedition was directly due to the bad management of Markozof, who was ambitious of winning for the army of the Caucasus the glory of taking Khiva. The officials of the Caucasus shielded him as far as possible, and in the official reports he was absolved from blame; but notwithstanding this, he soon afterwards felt himself obliged to resign.

The formation of the Mangyshlak column had been caused by the disturbances among the Adae Kirghiz in January, 1873, —which had been started, it was said, by Khivan emissaries— who refused to furnish camels for the expedition. The disturbances were soon repressed, but it was thought best to send troops to Khiva through that district for the moral effect which would be thereby produced both on the Kirghiz and on the Khivans. The order for the formation of the column was only received in the Caucasus on March 12, but preparations were immediately begun, and on April 26 the expedition, under the command of Colonel Lomakin, composed of 12 companies of infantry, 6 sotnias of Cossacks, 6 guns, rockets and sappers, amounting to about 2,000 men, set out for Kinderli, south of Mangyshlak, which had been agreed upon as the rendezvous. Owing to the careful disposition of Colonel Lomakin the column arrived on May 24 at Kungrad, having accomplished in twenty-nine days a march of 400 miles through a desert country, the greater portion of which had been hitherto unexplored and was scantily supplied with water. The forced marches of the last

seven days, which were rendered necessary to join the Orenburg detachment, had severely tried the troops, but still they arrived in Kungrad in excellent condition. Here Colonel Lomakin came under the orders of his superior, General Verevkin.

The Orenburg column, although not the most numerous, was perhaps the best prepared to encounter the difficulties of the route. It was well fitted out and provided with everything necessary, and as far as the Emba the men, who were warmly dressed, were conveyed in sledges, while kibitkas were erected at night to shelter them. The different parts of the column were sent from Uralsk and Orenburg between February 25 and March 9, and met at the fort on the Emba. The forces amounted in all to 3,461 men, 1,797 horses, 12 guns and mortars, and 6 rocket-stands, and were placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Verevkin, an officer experienced in steppe campaigns, who in 1864 had taken Turkistan, and had since that time been Governor of the Ural Cossacks. For their transport 10,391 camels were provided.

By March 30, the troops had all collected on the Emba, but were obliged to wait some days for the transports, which had been delayed in consequence of the severe snow-storms. On April 11, the main forces of the troops left the Emba, the advanced guard having started four days before. As far as the Aral Sea the country had been thoroughly explored by the yearly expeditions sent out into the steppe for a long time previous, and it may even be said that the whole route was well known. The troops, therefore, after suffering no privations, and after no marches of great difficulty, following the western shore of the Aral Sea, arrived at Kungrad on May 20.

Kungrad, which had been deserted by its inhabitants, was occupied without opposition, and General Verevkin was there joined by the detachment under the command of Colonel Lomakin. Here General Verevkin learned of the sad fate of the detachment sent from the Aral flotilla, which had penetrated up to Ulkun Darya, one of the mouths of the Amu Darya, nearly to Kungrad. On May 19 a small detachment of ten men, a lieutenant, and a topographer, was sent out to examine the dam of the Ulkun Darya, and to report to General Verevkin. They were betrayed by their Kirghiz guide and were attacked and

killed, and their headless bodies were found six miles below Kungrad.

Leaving Kungrad on May 4, the now united columns of Orenburg and Mangyshlak pursued their march up the river, having, on May 27, a sharp skirmish with Khivan troops before Hodjeili on June 1, and another near Mangyt; and, after some further skirmishes on June 2 and 3, having been obliged to build a bridge 189 feet long over the canal at Klytch Niaz Bai, they encamped on June 7 in a pleasure garden of the Khan, called Tchanaktchik, scarcely three miles from the northern gate of Khiva.

On June 5 General Verevkin received an envoy from the Khan, with a letter asking for a truce of three or four days, saying that he had sent a similar letter to General Kaufmann, and that he desired nothing so much as to live in peace with the Russians. At the same time he urged the General not to change his conduct towards the Turkomans, whom he regarded as unruly subjects, and as really his worst enemies. General Verevkin considering that this letter was written with a view of gaining time paid no attention to it, but proceeded with his march. The same day General Verevkin received his first direct communication from General Kaufmann in a note (written in German to avoid being intercepted) dated June 2 from the left bank of the Amu Darya. For some days no further intelligence was received, but, on the contrary, rumours were prevalent that General Kaufmann, after crossing, had been obliged to retreat again to the river, in consequence of the lack of provisions and transports, so that he was still seventy miles from Khiva.

The constant attacks from small bodies of the enemy, and reports that the Khan was determined to make a last stand before the walls, brought General Verevkin to the belief that it would be unsafe to wait any longer for General Kaufmann, and that it was necessary to take energetic measures. At mid-day on the 9th a reconnaissance in force was made close to the walls, for the purpose of placing a breaching battery and beginning the bombardment of the city. The troops were obliged to march along the road, which was cut with canals, where they were attacked by sorties of the enemy; and as they approached the walls, they were exposed to the full fire of

the guns mounted over the gate, which were well aimed. The cannonade on both sides continued for some time and General Verevkin, who had come out to inspect the works, was severely wounded in the head. At four o'clock a deputation came out from the city, to ask for a cessation of the cannonade and for conditions of peace. Colonel Sarantchef, who had taken the command after Verevkin had been wounded, replied that the artillery would cease provided no further shot should be fired from the walls, but that conditions of peace could only be made with General Kaufmann, and that if the firing from the walls continued, the bombardment would go on until the city was reduced to ashes.

The first attack upon the walls before General Verevkin was wounded was made with such vigour that it would have been very easy then to have stormed the place, and Lieutenant-Colonel Payarof asked General Verevkin for ladders for the purpose. Verevkin refused, and ordered the troops to retire from the walls, but still kept up the cannonade.

No sooner had the deputation departed than the Khivans on the walls again began their fire, and a second envoy then appeared, saying that the Khan should not be held responsible for the firing, as this was done by the Yomud Turkomans, over whom the peaceful inhabitants of the city and the Government had no control, and that the Khan himself had fled, leaving the Government for the present in the hands of his uncle Seid Amir Ul Umar, an imbecile old man, and that he had sent an embassy to General Kaufmann to place himself and the city entirely in his hands. Of course no reply could be given, except that it was a matter of indifference from whom the firing came; and that as long as it was continued the bombardment would be kept up.

In the evening a letter was received from General Kaufmann, saying that the Tashkent column was seven miles east of Khiva, asking General Verevkin to join him at eight o'clock the next morning at a bridge three miles from the east gate of the town, and adding that the uncle of the Khan, who was charged with the Government, had promised at that time to surrender to him the city. The Russian loss on that day was 4 killed and 36 wounded.

The next morning (June 10) General Verevkin, who per-

sonally was unable to move on account of his wound, sent Colonels Lomakin and Sarantchef with a portion of the troops to the rendezvous appointed by General Kaufmann. They had no sooner gone there than the firing again began from the north gate, against the troops left in the camp. Colonel Scobelef therefore was obliged to renew the bombardment and silence the hostile fire, and finally stormed and captured the north gate with a loss of 15 killed and wounded.

At the moment this was taking place, General Kaufmann was receiving the peaceable submission of the city on the other side. The uncle of the Khan had come out with the Khan's younger brother Ata Jan, the Inak Irtagali, a cousin of the Khan, and other persons of distinction, with presents, and had given themselves entirely into the hands of the Russians. The gate was thrown open, and orders were sent to Colonel Scobelef to cease firing, as the city was already occupied. As soon as the noise of the cannonade was no longer heard, the troops, with colours flying and music playing, made their triumphal entry into the city. When the music of the advancing column was heard, Colonel Scobelef, who by means of a rocket fire had cleared the streets and penetrated to the palace, judged it best to retire to his camp.

General Kaufmann occupied the Khan's palace, and placed a guard there to preserve the property and the safety of the harem, the inmates of which had remained, and orders were given to disarm the inhabitants. He then visited the camp of the Orenburg detachment, although without seeing General Verevkin, and returned to his own. On June 11, the anniversary of the birth of the Emperor Peter the Great, a *Te Deum* was said, as well as a mass for the repose of the souls of Peter and of those of the men who in his time had died in the war against Khiva. The troops, under the command of General Golovatchef, remained in the city until June 13, and on the day following went to their camps, after occupying with a slight force three of the gates.

The great object of the expedition was now accomplished. Khiva at last had been punished, and was in the hands of the Russians. But in spite of the precautions which had been taken that General Kaufmann should have all the glory of the expedition, circumstances brought it about that the troops of

another detachment entered the city first. In fact the whole honour of the expedition belongs to the Orenburg detachment, and the views of the Orenburg authorities before the organisation of the expedition were completely justified. The detachment of the Caucasus under Markozof had been unable to cope with the desert; and had been obliged to turn back. The Turkistan detachment had nearly shared a similar fate, and if it succeeded in reaching the Amu Darya, in crossing it, and in advancing to the capital, it was owing to the fact that no troops of importance were sent against it, the whole attention of the enemy being directed to resist the advance of General Verevkin. The Khivans supposed that the desert would be sufficient to prevent General Kaufmann from reaching the Amu Darya, and the small bands of Turkomans who met him at Utch-Utchak, and were encamped at Sheikh-aryk, were hastily collected and sent there. It is the opinion of many who took part in the campaign, that if the whole force of Turkomans had tried to prevent General Kaufmann from crossing the Amu Darya, and if they had displayed the same spirit as they did during the Turkoman campaign, they would have greatly impeded his crossing, and perhaps have prevented him from marching to Khiva. The crossing at Sheikh-aryk then occupied five days, while on the homeward way, in crossing at Hanki with much greater facilities, ten days were consumed. The Orenburg detachment, to the formation of which General Kaufmann had given a reluctant consent, in order to protect the steppe against Khivan and Kirghiz marauders and the Mangyshlak detachment which joined it, and which had been formed by mere accident, were the only ones which were well organised, which found a good road, which met with few disasters, which encountered the enemy in force and suffered considerable loss,¹ which arrived safely, and which captured the city. Had the advice of the authorities at Orenburg been followed at first, no other expedition would have been necessary, and Khiva could have been taken quietly, without discussion, and without the consequent diplomatic unpleasantness.

¹ The combined Orenburg and Mangyshlak detachments lost during the whole campaign 30 killed and 101 severely wounded. The total loss of the Turkistan detachment up to the capture of Khiva was one killed and four wounded in the skirmish near Khalata.

It now became necessary to put a stop to the anarchy which prevailed in the country, and to take some measures to provide it with a Government. Ata Jan,¹ the brother of the Khan, who had been elected to fill the place of the fugitive Seid Mohammed Rahim, was temporarily confirmed in this office; but General Kaufmann, hearing that the former Khan was among the Yomuds, wrote him a letter advising him to return. This was sent on the morning of June 13, and on the evening of the next day the Khan, without going to Khiva, came to the Russian camp and gave himself up. As he seemed to be a young man of good capacities, although he had never applied himself to business, and was the lawful sovereign, he was retained by General Kaufmann as Khan, under the guidance of a special council or *divan*, composed in part of Russians appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, and in part of Khivan magnates, the chief of whom was the Divan Begi Mat Niaz, who was considered to be the only man in Khiva who had shown good sense and used his judgment during the struggle.² Mat Murad, the former chief councillor of the Khan, who always exerted a hostile influence to Russians, together with his confidant, Rahmet Ullah, was sent under arrest to Kazala and subsequently to Russia.

These arrangements being made, General Kaufmann declared to the population of the Khanate the mercy of the Emperor, on condition that they should live quietly and peaceably, and occupy themselves with their business and with agricultural labour. The excitement of the population gradually ceased, the streets again filled with people, and the bazaars were reopened. Strict orders were given at the same time to the soldiers to send out no foraging parties and to take nothing from the inhabitants, but to pay cash for everything at the bazaars. This was a mercy which the inhabitants had scarcely expected, and to which they were not accustomed; and not only were they not thankful for it, but they began to abuse it, for frequent complaints were made of the marauding propensities of the soldiers, in many cases unjustly. In one

¹ He subsequently entered the Russian service as a cornet of cavalry in the Caucasus.

² Mat Niaz afterwards came to St. Petersburg to submit to an operation of lithotomy, in consequence of which he died in March, 1875.

case a soldier was sentenced to be hung for stealing a cow. The evidence of the native accuser had been accepted without other proof, and he was only able to escape because his comrades and the officers of his company proved that the cow had followed the company ever since crossing the Amu Darya. At another time six soldiers were ordered to be shot; but these severities were exciting such discontent among the troops—officers as well as soldiers—that at the personal request of the two Grand Dukes the men were pardoned. There was certainly some excuse for the soldiers, for owing to the hardships of the march and to the loss of their baggage they were almost naked and without their usual comforts.

The question of the liberation of the Persian slaves, which was next to be considered, seems to have been first raised by General Verevkin, who had freed those Persians who joined the troops, and on June 12 had telegraphed concerning them to the Governor of Astrakhan. Two days afterwards he wrote to General Kaufmann upon the subject, and received a reply that this question would be proposed to the new *divan*. It was considered that it would be unbecoming of the Russian armies to allow the institution of slavery to exist in Khiva, even though the whole of that country had not come under Russian dominion, but the most impelling reason for the emancipation was, that slaves who had run away from their masters had begun to rob, pillage, and murder; and the masters, fearing to be deprived of their slaves, were imprisoning and torturing those who remained to prevent them from running away.

On June 24, therefore, by the direction of General Kaufmann, the Khan issued an order to his people abolishing slavery, and commanding them to free their slaves under penalty of severe punishment. The slaves were to be allowed to remain in Khiva or to return to Persia, as they chose. Those Persians who desired to return to their country were ordered to collect at the bazaars—of which there were thirty-seven in the Khanate—where their names would be recorded by an officer, and then they could choose their elders and go to the village of Naiman, which was the point of assembly. From thence, in parties of five or six hundred, they were to be sent to Krasnovodsk, and thence on Russian steamers to Persia. Some of them, however, preferred to go by way of Mashad; but in consequence

of the dangers to which they would be exposed by this route from Turkomans, they were ordered to go by the way of Krasnovodsk. We have accounts of but two parties actually sent to Krasnovodsk, one of which was attacked by Turkomans, when the Persians were either killed or reinslaved.¹ There were estimated to be 30,000 slaves in the Khanate, but it is supposed that not more than 5,000 of these were actually freed before the departure of the Russians.

During the encampment of the troops at Khiva, opportunity was taken to make surveys of the country lying between Khiva and the river, as well as of the chief canals, and officers were sent to study the resources of the Khanate.

In order to collect information about the Turkomans living within the Khivan boundaries, the Orenburg detachment was despatched on July 1 to Kunya Urgentch, and from thence to Hodjeili, while Colonel Glukhofsky, with the cavalry, made an expedition to Lake Sary-Kamysh, a salt lake about 200 miles to the south-west, in order to investigate the old channel of the Amu Darya, and to connect the surveys of Khiva with those made in the preceding years by topographers sent out from the Caucasus.

On both these expeditions the troops were everywhere well received by the natives, who not only professed their entire submission but showed it in deeds, as they provided lodging and provisions for the troops at every station free of cost.

In spite of the fact that the guns taken by the Orenburg detachment were by order of General Kaufmann delivered up partly to him and partly to the Khivans, the officers of the Tashkent detachment were not satisfied. They had started on the campaign for the purpose of obtaining decorations and increased rank. There had been great intrigues before the cam-

¹ A letter in the 'Moscow Gazette' quoted in the 'Journal de St. Petersburg,' October 12 (24), 1873, says a courier sent from Petro-Alexandrofsk, in coming from Tashaur to Iliali, saw the bodies of hundreds of Persians who had been massacred after the Russians left the country.

A letter from Khiva in the 'St. Petersburg Viedomosti,' of the same date, says 1,600 slaves were killed since the departure of the Russians.

The same statement is repeated in the 'Russki Mir.'

The 'Moscow Gazette' of October 16 (28), 1873 says a courier from Shura-khana to Mangyshlak saw hundreds of corpses of Persians by the roadside.

paign began as to the persons who should accompany it, and further intrigues during the course of it for prominent and advantageous commands. Decorations, it is true, had been distributed with a lavish hand for the skirmish near Khalata, as well as for all those on the banks of the Amu Darya. Nearly every officer had, three times at least, been presented for reward—for having safely made the march over the desert, for having crossed the Amu Darya, and for having reached and entered Khiva. Still there had been no actual fight, and the Cross of St. George—the highest esteemed reward—could not be given without that. Something had to be done, and it was suggested to make a campaign against the Turkomans. Now the Turkomans had not only been pardoned equally with the other inhabitants of the Khanate by the proclamation of General Kaufmann, but immediately after the capture of Khiva, and before June 16, the Yomuds had sent to the Russian camp their elders, whose rank and importance had been confirmed by the assurance of the Khan, with proffers of submission. These proffers had been received, and they had been promised that they should be untouched as long as they lived quietly and neither robbed nor pillaged. More than this, the expedition of Colonel Glukhovsky to Sary-Kamish had been in the very midst of the Turkomans; the officers of the surveying parties had lived among them, had shared their hospitality, and had been treated with the greatest kindness. The officers of the Turkistan detachment, on their march back to Kunya Urgentch and Hodjeili, spoke in the highest terms of the honesty and straightforwardness of the Turkomans in their dealings, and considered them as faithful friends in time of peace, as they had found them bitter and brave enemies in time of war.

Still it was not difficult to find reasons. The Turkomans, and especially the Yomuds, had never been obedient subjects of the Khan; on the contrary, they had exercised control over him. When the Russian troops retired they might again assume this control, and excite him to hostile acts against the Russians. It was said that peace would be impossible unless the Turkomans were made thoroughly to feel the Russian power, and that the Khan even would not be able to pay the money obligations which he was entering into with the Russians, unless he succeeded in collecting some tribute from the

Turkomans—a thing which before had been of very rare occurrence.

‘With these views General Kaufmann decided that, profiting by the presence of the Russian troops in the Khanate, it was necessary in some degree to change the order of things regarding the Turkomans, materially and morally, by subduing their pride and their license.’¹ It was, therefore, determined to lay upon the Turkomans a penalty of 300,000 rubles, which was to be their share of the indemnity to be paid by the Khan. General Kaufmann then invited to Khiva the elders of the Yomud Turkomans. Within a week, on July 17, seventeen of the twenty-five elders who had been invited presented themselves. ‘This delay served as a new proof how strange and unintelligible it was to the Turkomans to be obedient and to fulfil the orders or demands of anyone.’² When they were assembled General Kaufmann informed them that he had decided to place a contribution of 300,000 rubles (41,000*l.*) upon the Yomuds, of which one-third must be paid within ten days from July 19, and the remaining 200,000 rubles, within five days more, and that all must absolutely be paid by Sunday, August 3. The elders declared ‘after some hesitation,’ as the official report puts it, that the contribution would be paid. It was no wonder that they hesitated. The Yomuds were a nomad people, whose sole wealth consisted in their flocks and herds, and they had no ready cash. It was impossible even to raise it by the sale of their cattle or their corn, or even of the jewels and ornaments of their wives and daughters, for where were the purchasers to come from? And what was worse, it was obligatory to pay the contribution in money and not in kind.

Then followed an evident breach of faith. The next day, July 18, five of the elders were sent back to their families and tribes to declare the necessity of paying the contribution, while the remaining twelve were retained as hostages until the money should all be paid. As if to make it still more evident that his real meaning was war, on that very day General Kaufmann, by a written order to General Golovatchef,³ directed the forces to

¹ Official report. ‘Military Journal,’ December, 1873.

² *Ibid.*

³ No. 1167 dated at Khiva, July 6 (18), 1873.

march and attack the Turkomans without even waiting for the fifteen days to expire. After stating the fact that the contribution had been laid, General Kaufmann went on to say: 'To follow more closely the payment of the contribution by the Yomuds, I ask your Excellency to start with your detachment for Hazavat on July 7 (19), and to encamp in a suitable place. If your Excellency¹ sees that the Yomuds are not occupying themselves with getting together money, but are assembling for the purpose of opposing our troops, or perhaps even for leaving the country, I order you immediately to move upon the settlements of the Yomuds which are placed along the Hazavat canal and its branches, and *to give over the settlements of the Yomuds and their families to complete destruction, and their herds and property to confiscation.*'

The disposition of the troops was to be such as to cut off the Turkomans from the steppe and to surround them, so that in case of disobedience they should have no hope of escape. Orders were the same day sent to the Commander of the Orenburg detachment, directing him to go to Kyzyl-takyr and watch the Turkomans there, and if he saw the least sign of opposition to the troops, or a desire to migrate into the steppe,

¹ The style of the Russian orders is worthy of remark. The amount of orders, despatches, and reports written during a short campaign—for the rule seems to be that every order must be in writing—is astonishing, and every paper is written with the greatest formality, the appellation of Excellency and the full official rank being used in every possible place. As a consequence, each commander of a detachment is obliged to carry with him a large staff of clerks and writers, which seriously impede his movements. The present Minister of War, seeing the difficulties arising from this system, made an effort to change it, but of late the bureaucratic formalities seem to have become worse than ever. Unfortunately I have lost my note of the number of huge volumes filled with the correspondence of the different detachments which took part in the Khivan campaign, but I remember that the sight of them both astonished and amused me. As an example of this, in the official report published in the 'Military Journal,' November and December, 1873, the first report mentioned of General Kaufmann, dated March 21 (April 2), is No. 76. The last, of September 3 (15), is 2,309. To take other examples at random, the report of General Golovatchef, dated July 26 (August 7), 1873, is No. 1,376. That of Colonel Sarantchef, then commanding the Turkistan detachment, on July 28 (August 9), is No. 1,321. About eighteen days later, on August 15 (28), he had reached No. 1,495. Colonel Lomakin, the commander of the Mangyshlak detachment, on September 1 (13), issued No. 416; and on September 19 (October 1), No. 498. These, however, are nothing to what the commander-in-chief of a military district writes, for we find that on October 24 (November 5), 1873, the commander of the forces in the Orenburg military district had already reached No. 10,475 during that year.

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or assist their fellows at Hazavat canal, or make common cause with them, to proceed at once to the work of slaughter.

General Golovatchef set out on July 19, and matters went so fast, that on the 20th and 21st he was already able to report that the Turkomans showed yet no signs of collecting the money, but, on the contrary, were assembling together with the evident intention either of running away or of attacking the troops, and he had therefore, owing to the strict orders of the Commander-in-Chief, felt the necessity of punishing them, and had burned their villages along the road. These reports brought out another order from General Kaufmann, July 10 (22), No. 1,217, approving of his conduct, but advising him to preserve the grain rather than burn it, as it might be sold or used by the troops. He informed him also that he had allowed the hostages to go in order that they might influence their tribes and save them from ruin. He further added: 'If the Yomuds become submissive, stop ravaging them, but keep watch of what is being done among them, and at the least attempt to migrate, carry out my order for the *final extermination of the disobedient tribe.*'

General Golovatchef's campaign against the Turkomans lasted until July 30, when he returned to Ilyali, and met there the Orenburg detachment under Colonel Sarantchef. On the 25th, 27th, 28th, and 29th, there was some hard fighting with the enemy. On the 27th, at night, General Golovatchef had intended to make an attack upon the Turkoman camp, but just as he was about starting, his own camp was attacked by the Turkomans, and had it not been for the presence of mind of the commander of the sharpshooters, the Russians would probably have all been massacred.

In the meantime the Turkomans had cut off communication between General Golovatchef and Khiva, and for five days General Kaufmann received no reports. He therefore decided to advance to the assistance of Golovatchef, and left Khiva on July 27, reaching Ilyali on the 31st.

The butchery and the destruction by the troops had been so great that the Turkomans now showed signs of yielding, and on August 1 General Kaufmann received deputations asking for mercy, and promising to return to their former habitations. The next day he assembled the elders of several tribes, and

insisted on receiving in twelve days' time a contribution to the amount of 310,000 rubles. Finding out, however, that they had little ready money, he proposed to them to pay half the sum in camels. To help in raising this sum the Turkoman women had to strip themselves of all their ornaments, and bring them into the Russian camp for sale at whatever prices could be obtained. Every necklace and bracelet thus given up will leave a long legacy of hatred.¹

At the end of the appointed time, August 14, the Turkomans had succeeded in paying only one-third of the sum demanded, and as General Kaufmann thought it unwise to forgive the remainder, he retained twenty-seven influential Turkomans as hostages until the whole amount should be paid. The next day he returned from Ilyali with the Tashkent detachment to Khiva, and in passing through the lands of the Yomud tribe of Bairam-Shaly, he demanded of them a further contribution of 108,000 rubles, and took fourteen of their elders and influential chiefs as hostages.

It is impossible here to enter into the details, interesting as they may be, of the Turkoman campaign, which indeed were excellently set out by Mr. MacGahan, who accompanied the expedition.² In addition to his account, the report of another eye-witness may perhaps be interesting. It was taken down from his own lips:—

‘When we had gone about twenty-five miles from Khiva, General Golovatchef said before a large number of officers in my presence: “I have received an order from the Commander-in-Chief - I hope you will remember it and give it to your soldiers. This expedition does not spare either sex or age. Kill all of them.” After this the officers delivered this command to their several detachments. The detachment of the Caucasus army had not then arrived, but came that evening. Golovatchef called together the officers of the Caucasus and said: “I hope you will fulfil all these commands strictly in the Circassian style, without a question. You are not to spare either sex or age. Kill all of them.” The old Colonel of the Caucasus said, “Certainly, we will do exactly as you say.”

¹ These Turkoman ornaments were subsequently exhibited at St. Petersburg, and at the Geographical Congress at Paris in 1875.

² ‘Campaigning on the Oxus.’ London, 1874.

‘On the 7th, when we began to meet the Turkomans, these orders were again brought to mind, and nearly everyone whom we met was killed. The Cossacks seemed to get quite furious, and rushed on them with their sabres, cutting everybody down, whether a small child or an old man. I saw several such cases. I remember one case in particular which I could not look at for more than a moment, and rode hastily by. A mother, who had been riding on horseback with three children, was lying dead. The eldest child was dead also. The youngest had a sabre cut through its arm, and while crying was wiping off the blood. The other child, a little older, who was trying to wake up the dead mother, said to me “*Tiura—stop.*” The Turkomans were much enraged at these things, and cut one Cossack into pieces before our eyes.

‘On the 13th we were in camp, and the camp of the enemy was all about us. We saw them on every side. They seemed to be numberless. We had a picket of eight men with an officer stationed on a little mound in front of the camp. Of course on the attack of the enemy the pickets are at once withdrawn. This was three o’clock in the afternoon. Suddenly we saw all the soldiers raise their muskets to fire, and an officer raise his sabre. A *sotnia* of Cossacks was ready on horseback, but the General did not seem to understand, and did not order them to advance.

‘Suddenly we saw some Turkomans creeping up from the reeds on one side. A number of Cossacks, without order, at once started forth, but before they could ride 200 paces, the men in the picket were entirely cut to pieces without having had the chance to fire a shot, the Turkomans having stolen in the meantime sixty camels from different parts of the camp, where they were out of reach. The men were frightfully mutilated. We buried them the same day. The Cossacks were greatly enraged at this.

‘The next day we stayed in camp waiting for the Turkomans, but none came. On the 15th we were constantly on our guard. At midnight the General ordered a *wagenburg* to be constructed at once. My men aroused me and told me of this, but I went to sleep, and told them to go on and take my things there as fast as possible, but let me sleep. Everybody was working as hard as possible, for an attack on the enemy had been

ordered for early dawn, before they had made their morning prayers and ablutions. The *wagenburg* was only half done when the order was given to advance, and contrary to all rules the cavalry was sent out first. They went along a narrow road intersected with canals, not noticing that many Turkomans were lying hidden in the grass on each side. After going some distance they suddenly found themselves face to face with a large body of Turkoman cavalry across the road, whose intention was to take the camp. The Cossacks turned face and fled, followed by the Turkomans, and all hurried in one mass into the camp. The utmost confusion ensued, and for twenty minutes I did not hear a single command or see any order, and we thought that the whole affair was lost, until the commander of the rocket-battery brought his rockets into play. The rockets were damp, and for a time did not explode. At last two went off well, and the Turkomans who were coming on were much frightened, thinking it some new form of warfare. While the Turkomans were still in confusion, the commander of the sharpshooters brought his men up and put in line one company after another, who immediately opened fire on the enemy. The Turkomans made several charges, and each time were repulsed by the steady fire of the sharpshooters. Several hundred bodies were left on the ground. Golovatchef was not wounded until after the affair was quite over. When the enemy were retreating, and though still in sight, Golovatchef came up and rode along the line, thanking the soldiers for their valiant conduct. As he rode along the line of the sharpshooters near the end, a single Turkoman lay in ambush in the grass. He suddenly rushed out, and with a cry attacked Golovatchef with uplifted sabre and wounded him on the wrist. He again raised his sabre and would undoubtedly have killed him had not a soldier in the line pierced him with his bayonet. The soldier received the thanks of the General and a cross.

‘That same day and the next we began to pursue the Turkomans, who were very much disheartened by the result of their attack. We burned—as we had done before—grain, houses, and everything which we met, and the cavalry, which was in advance, cut down every person, man, woman, or child. Many of the men had gone, although a few of them got up and fired at us. They were generally women and children whom we met.

I saw much cruelty. The infantry came at a run behind, running fully eighteen miles, and continued the work of murder.

‘This continued on the 16th and 17th. On the night of the 16th we had a severe fright. We took care to be far enough off from the camp of the Turkomans, and we posted extra guards, besides throwing up a small fortification. As an extra precaution the soldiers were commanded to sleep with their rifles, and not to stack them, lest the Turkomans should make a sudden rush and carry them off. In the middle of the night nine Persians ran away from the Turkomans and came to us. Two soldiers on guard saw their tall caps in the dark, and taking them for Turkomans they fired at them, killing one. This caused instant alarm in the camp, and much worse confusion prevailed than on the 15th. The soldiers rushed for their muskets, and not finding them stacked—forgetting entirely that they had them on the ground with them—were in the wildest disorder, all exclaiming in one voice that the Turkomans had made an attack and carried off the muskets. It was some time before they recollected that they had slept with them instead of stacking them as usual. I saw Golovatchef in his shirt surrounded by a lot of soldiers with their bayonets presented. He asked me what I had seen, and I told him “Nothing,” that I found it was only a false alarm. He waited some little while, and soon everybody was laughing over the adventures of the night. Colonel N.—a very nervous man—went crying before the regiment, saying that the Turkomans had cut his throat, and continually spat, saying that it was blood, and it was some time before he got over the delusion.

‘The rest of the night passed quietly. The next day we continued burning carts and grain, and this was the time when the Duke of Leuchtenberg was nearly killed. He was commanding four *sotnias* of Cossacks, and imprudently went on in advance. Four Cossacks went ahead of him, and crossed a little bridge over a canal; a Turkoman rushed out, holding his pike by both hands, knocked over two of them at once, and wounded the other two. The Duke of Leuchtenberg went on apparently without noticing this. We were all on the roadside, I was close behind him. He pulled up to one side to allow the Cossacks to cross the bridge. Seeing the Turkoman, I thought that the Duke would certainly be killed; I rushed behind him, took out

my excellent American rifle with explosive bullets, and aiming from behind him I fired at the Turkoman at a distance of about thirty feet, and fortunately killed him. I thought at first I had shot the Duke, for he put up his hand to his head and came near falling from his horse. The ball must have passed within three inches of his ear. He immediately asked who it was, and the soldiers all called out "Gromof!" and then he jumped to the ground, kissed me, and thanked me.'

Notwithstanding the facts stated by Mr. Gromof, from all the information I have been able to collect, I quite agree with Mr. MacGahan, that General Golovatchef personally is innocent of the savagery which accompanied the Turkoman campaign. He did nothing but unwillingly obey imperative orders, and tried rather to mitigate than to increase their effect.

Before the departure of the troops from Ilyali, General Kaufmann sent Colonel Scobelef to investigate the road from Zmukshir to Ortakuya, the place which the detachment of Markozof had not been able to reach. Leaving Zmukshir on August 16, Colonel Scobelef went south-west as far as the wells of Nefes-guli, six miles from Ortakuya, and returned on August 23 to Khiva, having ridden 373 miles in seven days.

His reports and propositions having been approved by the Emperor, on August 24, the day after his return from the expedition, General Kaufmann signed a treaty of peace with the Khan of Khiva, the main provisions of which were as follows:—The Khan acknowledged himself as the faithful servant of the Emperor of Russia, and renounced all direct friendly communications with the neighbouring Sovereigns and Khans, and the closing of any treaties with them, engaging himself at the same time to undertake no military expedition without the knowledge and consent of the Russian authorities. The frontier between the two countries was to be the Amu Darya, following its westernmost branch to the Sea of Aral, thence along the shore of that sea to Cape Urgu, and thence along the southern slope of the Ust-urt to the supposed former old bed of the Amu Darya. All the right bank of the Amu Darya and the territory on that side previously belonging to Khiva was annexed to Russia. The navigation of the Amu Darya was exclusively reserved for Russian boats, but Khivan and Bukharan barges could have the right of navigating it by special

permission from the Russian authorities. The Russians gained the right to establish ports, factories, and depôts on the left bank wherever they wished, the safety of which was to be guaranteed by the Khan. The towns and villages of the Khanate were to be opened to Russian commerce, and Russian merchants and caravans could travel freely through the country. Russian merchants who carried on trade with the Khanate were to be exempt from *zekat*, or any trade duty, and were to enjoy the right of gratuitous transport for their merchandise from Khiva into the neighbouring countries. They could also have resident agents, could acquire landed property, and could be taxed only by agreement with the Russian authorities. Commercial engagements between Russians and Khivans were to be strictly respected, and all complaints of Russians against Khivans were to be at once examined and satisfied. Russians were to have priority over Khivans for the settlement of their accounts. Complaints of Khivans against Russian subjects were to be submitted to the nearest Russian authorities. No persons of any nationality coming from Russia were to be admitted without a proper Russian passport, and criminals were to be immediately returned. Slavery was to remain abolished. Finally, an indemnity of 2,200,000 rubles (274,000*l.*) was imposed on the Khanate to cover the expenses of the war, but as the revenues of the Amir were insufficient to cover this amount, it was to be paid by terms with interest at five per cent. These payments were fixed at 100,000 rubles for the first two years, and gradually increased until 1881, when they were to be 200,000 rubles a year, and were to be paid either in Russian paper money or in silver. The first payment was to be made on December 1 (13), 1873, and the last payment on November 1 (13), 1893.

By the strictness of these conditions, and especially by that which agreed to annual payments of large sums out of a very meagre revenue for twenty years, Russia secured the right of intervening in the Khanate at the slightest provocation. As if to render it impossible for the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg to reject the treaty, it was published in the 'Turkistan Gazette' at Tashkent before the authorities at St. Petersburg had had time to consider it. The annexation of the right bank of the Amu Darya called out many expressions of discontent in

the English newspapers, as it seemed in disaccord with the promise of Count Schouvalof when he was in London in 1873 previous to the Khivan expedition.¹ The reproaches of the English press had, perhaps, some foundation, and certainly touched a sore spot at St. Petersburg. The official journal, therefore, in printing the treaty, published an account of the reasons which had forced Russia to take this step.²

After speaking of the various attempts to bring the Khan to reason, the article goes on to say: 'After the want of success of these reiterated attempts, an expedition was decided upon. Its aim was first to chastise the Khan for the past, and then to create such a state of things as would protect our subjects from the Khivans and Turkomans, and render possible the development of pacific commercial relations. The special difficulty of this problem was that the fundamental bases of all the states of Central Asia are so precarious and so unstable, that it was to be feared that in inflicting a merited chastisement upon Khiva that country would cease to exist as an independent state. Such a result would have in no way coincided with the views of our Government, which hitherto has used its constant efforts to sustain and consolidate the autonomous existence of the other states bordering on us in Central Asia, as, for instance, Bukhara and Khokand. When Khiva had been occupied, and we were able to study the conditions of the life of the country, we became convinced that even with the best will on the part of the Khan and his counsellors to keep up good and neighbourly relations with us

¹ The Russians knew very well the English opinion about an expedition to Khiva from the questions which had been put to them before it was mooted. It was understood at the time in St. Petersburg that up to this point the English had been careful to say nothing about the expedition proposed at that time, in order not to complicate the question of the Afghan boundary. The statement of Count Schouvalof was consequently in a measure unasked for. It was believed, therefore, that he was unauthorised to make it in its fullest extent as a promise on the part of the Emperor, but merely as an expression of the Emperor's intentions at the time. It was seen that Khiva was an indefinite term, that could apply either to the city or to the Khanate. The city, indeed, was not by the treaty to be occupied by the Russians. Unfortunately, the intentions of the Emperor and of the Government at St. Petersburg in this, as in other cases, were overridden by the inexorable logic of facts. Circumstances arose which made it impossible to carry out these intentions. For a strong opinion on this subject see Sir H. Rawlinson's 'England and Russia in the East,' p. 381. London, 1875.

² 'Government Messenger,' November 30 (December 12), 1873.

he lacked the force necessary for the purpose, for his influence over the nomad and semi-nomad Turkomans was intermittent. Often it is null, and it sometimes happens that he, as well as his subjects, have to submit to the ascendancy of these brigands of the steppes.

‘ Thus after the departure of the troops of our expedition the same depredations and incursions would infallibly have begun again and would have demanded a new punishment, and then no effort of ours would have succeeded in preserving the autonomous existence of Khiva.

‘ It became, therefore, necessary to provide against a contingency so little to be desired, which would have exposed us to great sacrifices and to a grave deviation from the programme of our policy in Central Asia.

‘ For this reason it was judged indispensable to establish a fortified point provided with a sufficient garrison, in order to guard our frontier against the attacks of the brigands, to protect our caravans and those of the Khivans, and at the same time to support the Khan if he were threatened by the Turkomans. The best point to choose for the establishment of this fort would have been the southern coast of the Sea of Aral, which would have ensured us a communication by water with the mouths of the Syr Darya. Unfortunately this coast was covered with continuous marshes, presenting no locality favourable to the erection of a fortified station. It therefore became necessary to construct this fort on the right bank of the Amu Darya. Besides this, it was necessary to assure the communications of the fort and its garrison with the province of Turkistan. Without speaking of the difficulties of navigation of the Lower Amu Darya—in winter it becomes entirely impassable, and there is no other way than the Steppe—it was judged indispensable to annex to our possessions the arid desert which extends between this fort and the province of Turkistan. Certainly, if any other guarantee could have been found which would have effectually assured us for the future, the preference would have been given to it. But sterile and burdensome as such acquisition is to us, it was inevitable, seeing the Khan of Khiva had declared he would be able to fulfil his obligations towards us only upon the absolute condition of having a Russian fort near him as well as a body of Russian troops. His wishes

went even further. He asked again and again that Russian troops should in future be maintained in the very city of Khiva. Besides, as has been said above, this solution was the only one to guarantee our frontiers and commerce, and thus avoid in future the necessity of a new expedition with all the consequences that would follow, that is, the definitive destruction of the Khanate of Khiva, a consequence which would be entirely contrary to our political principles and our views upon Central Asia.'

Two months having elapsed since the capture of the city of Khiva, and arrangements having been made, as it was supposed, for the settled government of the Khanate, the troops took their departure. The Mangyshlak detachment left Khiva on August 21, arriving on the 30th at Kungrad, and pursuing a more favourable route than they had taken on the advance, they reached Kinderli on September 24, having marched in going and returning 1,120 miles. By October 18 the troops had returned to Petrofsk in the Caucasus.

The Orenburg detachment, after the Turkoman campaign, remained at Kyzyl-Takyr, and subsequently had been stationed for some days at Kunya Urgentch. Starting from there on August 13, they arrived at Emba on October 6, where they separated, returning to their old quarters at Uralsk, Orenburg, and Orsk. Without counting the moves made against the Turkomans at Sary Kamysh, this detachment had marched over 1,800 miles. The Turkistan detachment arrived at Hanki on August 24, and spent ten days in crossing the Amu Darya—a work of some difficulty, as the river there was divided into three branches, and it was necessary to cross two islands, changing the baggage each time from the boats to carts. Remaining some time on the other side of the river Shurakhana, where they were occupied in building the new fortress of Petro-Alexandrofsk, the troops finally started from that point on September 17, the cavalry being directed to go across the Kyzyl Kum to Perovsky, and the rest of the forces taking the former route by way of Khalata and Jizakh, and by October 25, the last *échelon* had arrived in Tashkent. The whole march, there and back, was 1,190 miles.

General Kaufmann's reward for the Khivan campaign consisted in the Cross of St. George of the second class, given for

the defeat in a pitched battle of the enemy's army, consisting of at least 50,000 men, or for the capture of an enemy's country. Although this was not exactly what he desired, as he had expected to be made Count of Khiva in the event of the successful termination of the campaign, yet it placed him in the first rank of Russian Generals, since there were only four or five others who had received similar decorations, and of the cavaliers of the first class there were none, except the Emperor of Germany, who had received it for the battle of Königgratz.

The other officers were suitably rewarded, and the men received each a medal to be worn in memory of their participation in the campaign and a ruble each extra pay.¹

The officials in Turkistan, however, took care that other honours should be in store for the troops on their return. Orders were issued that voluntary subscriptions should be made for a memorial to General Kaufmann and the Khivan campaign, which was to take the form of a scholarship at some university. As these orders were issued by their superiors, no officer felt at liberty to decline a subscription. In addition to this the inhabitants at Tashkent raised triumphal arches and spent a large sum of money for General Kaufmann's reception. The sum taken from the native population of Tashkent for this purpose, under the head of 'general expenditure,' was at one time 15,000 rubles, and at another time a sum of nearly an equal amount. Seeing what was being done in other places, Colonel Golof, the Prefect of Perovsky, had so far prevailed upon the Kirghiz that they in the same voluntary way subscribed 3,000 rubles for the Khivan memorial.

The cost of the expedition it is impossible to estimate with accuracy. When the campaign was decided upon General Kaufmann asked the ministry of finance for 300,000 rubles, but this sum was expended long before the troops had actually left Tashkent. The only data that have yet been published are those for the expenses of provisions and transport of the Orenburg detachment, which amount to 1,423,735 rubles (nearly 208,000*l.*). On this basis the expedition must have cost at least 7,000,000 rubles (nearly a million sterling). The expenses of the expedition were, however, in a slight degree

¹ The best paid private soldier in the Russian army receives, besides rations and uniform, only 3*r.* 60*k.* (or about ten shillings) per annum.

lessened by not paying for the camels which had been used, although unfortunately the loss fell upon the poor Kirghiz.

The Tashkent detachment, as I have already stated, took 8,800 camels from the various districts, for which they agreed to pay 50 rubles each in case the animals died. As the camels nearly all perished, it became necessary to pay 400,000 rubles. The Prefect of Perovsky, thinking this a good occasion for showing his zeal, and the good feeling of the Kirghiz population of his district, informed the people that the Russian Government would never pay for these camels, and that it would be much better to make a present of them to the Russians. By the use of threats and proper persuasions, he succeeded in getting them to sign an address to General Kaufmann to that effect. His example was followed in some of the other districts, and the result is that most of the inhabitants feel that they have been actually robbed of the camels by the Government. The action of the Kirghiz was reported to the authorities at St. Petersburg, and before the real explanation of the matter had become known there—although as late as June 4 (16), 1874—General Kaufmann succeeded in obtaining a rescript signed by the Emperor thanking the inhabitants of the province of Turkistan for their noble conduct, and their loyalty expressed by such a great sacrifice.

The newly annexed territory at the mouth of the Amu Darya, to which was given the name of Amu Darya Rayon, contained about 216,000 inhabitants, the majority of whom were nomad Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, and Turkomans—and five towns, the chief of which were Shura-khana and Tchimbai.

The region was not very productive, but it was thought that by putting a tax of 3 rubles 60 kopeks on each of the 6,000 settled population, and a tax of 3 rubles per head on the others, that, together with the bazaar and trade duties, a revenue of 200,000 rubles per annum could be obtained. To keep the province in order, a fort was built in the garden belonging to the Vizier Mat Niaz, six miles from the ferry at Hanki, and two from Shura-khana. This was garrisoned by nine companies of infantry and four *sotnias* of Cossacks, while the works themselves were defended by four guns, four mortars, and several cannon taken at Khiva. The chief command of

the troops, as well as of the district, was given to Colonel Ivanof.

It had been foreseen by many persons acquainted with affairs of Central Asia, that the campaign against the Turkomans would excite them against Russian rule, would cause them to take the first opportunity of attacking the Khan as well as the Russian troops, and would lead to serious results. The Governor-General of Orenburg stated with regard to this, that it would be necessary to repeat expeditions against the Turkomans for many years, that the region of Khiva would become a second Caucasus, and that in the end the Russians would probably be obliged to take Merv.

This prediction was not long in being partly realised. In October 1873, the Yomuds, out of revenge against the Khan and the Uzbeks and the Kirghiz who had favoured the Russians, began plundering the towns and villages, and compelled the Kirghiz to seek shelter on the Russian or right bank of the Amu Darya. A little before, a caravan of 100 camels, transporting stores to Petro-Alexandrofsk from Khalata, was attacked and pillaged by a band of Tekke Turkomans. Another caravan coming down the river from Bukhara to Khiva, was attacked by Turkomans, who fired upon it, and forced the men to abandon their boats.

The Russian troops were immediately ordered to descend the river as far as Utch-Utchak, where the Tekkes had crossed the Amu Darya. On October 8, after having proceeded 133 miles, they came upon them on the banks of the Amu Darya and completely routed them. Nearly all those who were not killed were drowned, as only eight succeeded in reaching the opposite shore, while five were made prisoners. The various bands of Tekke Turkomans then retreated to Merv. Colonel Ivanof next proceeded down the Amu Darya to the Kuvansh-Jarma branch and to Daukara. This movement had the effect of causing the Turkomans, who were ignorant of its object, to cease for a time from their depredations, so that the Russians would need no excuse for crossing to their side of the river.

As the result of his explorations, Colonel Ivanof thought it best to remove the greater portion of the garrison of Petro-Alexandrofsk to Nukus, a point of considerable strategical importance, situated at the beginning of the Delta. Here was the best passage over the river, and here also was the terminus

of a good road going to Kazala and the Syr Darya. Besides this, near Nukus there was abundance of *saksaul* and other shrubs suitable for fuel, and the proximity of the large town of Tchimbai assured the troops of a sufficiency of provisions. It was found that the fort of Petro-Alexandrofsk had been constructed in a very unhealthy locality, so that a large number of soldiers were constantly in the hospital.

About this time the Khan of Khiva sent a mission to Colonel Ivanof with 70,000 rubles as part of the tribute which he was to pay to Russia for that year. He also, at the suggestion of a Russian officer, assembled the Turkoman elders and made them promise to live in peace, to return all the property seized from the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks, and to send to Khiva all the Turkomans who had been guilty of pillage.

Although the Turkomans had been frightened into quiet by Colonel Ivanof's march, yet they immediately broke out again as soon as he returned to the fort. They again began to pillage, plundered the inhabitants all along the bank of the Amu Darya, and even crossed over to the right bank, with the intention of attacking the Kirghiz about Daukara, and burned forage and tents that had been prepared for the use of the Russians by the inhabitants. Colonel Ivanof was therefore obliged to set out with another expedition, which left the fort of Petro-Alexandrofsk on January 4, 1874.

He advanced to Nukus without meeting the enemy, and then hearing that they were collected in large numbers on the Laudan canal, called out the reserve troops from the fort, returned up the river to Kiptchak, and crossed it on the ice. The left bank of the river for several miles was lined with large bodies of Turkomans who followed the movements of the Russians, and occasionally fired at them.

After informing the Khan of the reasons of his presence on Khivan territory, and asking him to send a Khivan agent to him, he marched to Kazi Murad, a Turkoman encampment. The Cossacks were sent in front to ravage the country, and so well did they perform their duty, that when the main body arrived there was nothing to be seen but smoking ruins.

Colonel Ivanof had proceeded but a few miles further, when, to his great surprise, the country was found to be entirely under water, which was the more astonishing as in winter the

canals are all dry. It was found, however, that the Turkomans had cut the dykes of the canals. As the water was rising rapidly, it was necessary to recall the Cossacks who were burning houses and encampments in all directions, and to return to Kazi Murad. Thence the column marched south to the town of Mangyt, where was the only remaining bridge over the canal, and came upon the winter encampment of the Gultcha Turkomans, which they at once demolished, the Cossacks performing the work of destruction at a distance of a few versts off, while the infantry did it in an equally effective manner along the line of march.

At Mangyt Colonel Ivanof was informed by the Khan that the Yomuds of Hazavat had submitted. Although he did not fully believe this, he agreed to respect their lands and turned southward. The Tchaudurs, warned by the fate of the Gultchas, at once gave in their submission, and agreed to pay the contribution demanded of them and restore the booty they had taken. After reaching Old Porsu, where Prince Bekovitch and the Russians were murdered in 1717, the troops returned to Kiptchak and waited until the river was free from ice, when, on February 5, they crossed over to the right bank. The Bek of Kiptchak being suspected of complicity in the Turkoman raid, was removed by the Khan at Ivanof's request.

The raid of Colonel Ivanof had such an effect on the Turkomans that, during the summer of 1874, they remained tolerably quiet, and the Russians had leisure to occupy themselves with the construction of the fort at Nukus. But the site selected, which had been surveyed in winter, was no healthier than Petro-Alexandrofsk, and had the disadvantage of being sometimes overflowed. In addition to this, work had been commenced in a place where building material—*i.e.* clay for making bricks—was not to be found, and had to be brought some distance at considerable expense. It was therefore decided to leave the main body of troops at Petro-Alexandrofsk, and to erect only a small fortified post at Nukus, which would accommodate 350 men. This was ready by October.

During the summer new troops came from Kazala, and, at the same time, those soldiers whose term of service had expired were sent back. These movements were interpreted by the Turkomans to mean that the Russians were weak, and were

endeavouring to make a great display of their forces by sending out soldiers in boats to Kitchkine-ata, then across the Tchimbai, and back again in carts to Nukus. There were rumours, also, of a league being entered into with the Karakalpaks who up to this time had been comparatively peaceable. Colonel Ivanof, therefore, summoned the Biis of the Karakalpaks to meet him at Tchimbai. The Biis were so frightened at being called, that they assembled the next day, when they were told that they must furnish lists of the population. This, upon various pretexts, all but two declined to do, whereupon they were immediately surrounded with Cossacks and arrested. Being told they would not be freed until the lists had been presented, they agreed to furnish them, and, on the next day, handed them in. Colonel Ivanof informed them that the lists represented less than the actual population, and then the Biis—expecting death, as the Cossacks had their rifles pointed at them—immediately added more names. Unquestionably they would have made additions as long as the Russian officer desired. ‘By this arrest we not only did not attain our purpose, but we excited the ill-feeling of the population against us, as they greatly reverence their Biis.’¹

Notwithstanding the peaceful aspect of affairs, Colonel Ivanof did not consider it wise for the Amu Darya exploring expedition sent out by the Imperial Geographical Society to ascend the Amu Darya further than Petro-Alexandrofsk,² nor to cross to the left bank of the river, as the chief problems to be settled by the expedition were on the left bank of the river, *i.e.* the former channel of the Oxus, and the irrigation system. The expedition, therefore, did not accomplish as much as was expected. It was under the leadership of Colonel Stoletof, and consisted of Severtsof, the naturalist; Smirnof, the botanist; Sobolef, for ethnological and historical research; Karazin, the artist of the party; and of several topographers and lesser officers. It was also accompanied by Major Herbert Wood, an English officer of the Royal Engineers.³

¹ Golos No. 231, 1874. Letter from Tchimbai, July 25 (August 6).

² It had been the original intention to proceed to the Bukharan boundary and perhaps even further.

³ The book of Major Wood, ‘The Shores of Lake Aral,’ his articles in the ‘Geographical Magazine,’ and his papers read before the Royal Geographical

At about the same time with this expedition, another one, under the auspices of the Society of the Lovers of Natural History at Moscow, called the Aralo-Caspian expedition, was sent out to make surveys and explorations in the Ust-Urt, and to investigate the level of the Aral Sea, as well as to make geological and zoological researches.

In connection with the Amu Darya exploring expedition the steamer 'Perovsky,' a vessel drawing three and a half feet of water, succeeded in ascending the river as far as Nukus, which it reached on August 6, and subsequently went up as far as Petro-Alexandrofsk.¹ The trip to Nukus was accomplished by a new route. Vain efforts had been made to ascend the Ulkun and Kitchkine; finally, the steamer went to the Gulf of Tustche-bas, ascended the Yany-su, although with some difficulty on account of the shoals, to the Lake Daukara, and then went up the Kuvansh-Jarma to Nukus. It is considered, however, that the question as to the feasibility of steam navigation on the Amu Darya cannot be settled by the observations made during this one trip, and that further explorations of the channel are necessary.

In the autumn of 1874 the disorders of the Turkomans on the left bank of the Amu Darya again began. The Tekkes from Merv sent down a band and committed some depredations to the south of Pitniak. Merchants with caravans coming from Bukhara were also attacked and pillaged, and a party of Persians returning to their country from Bukharan territory were attacked. A troop of Cossacks with a rocket battery was therefore sent up the river as far as Meshekli, and produced for the moment good results.

During the course of December the Khan of Khiva sent the last payment of 100,000 rubles due from him for that year, and promised to collect if possible something from the Turkomans. He professed, however, his inability to do anything with these unruly subjects, feeling the necessity of Russian aid.

It was finally thought best by Colonel Ivanof to repeat the Society and Geographical Society of Geneva contain so far the best account that has been published of the expedition. Articles by Stoletof and Sobolef relating to special points of the expedition have appeared in the bulletin of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society.

¹ Several interesting papers on this expedition have appeared by Colonel Thilo, Mr. Barbotte de Marny, and Mr. Bogdanof.

lesson he had given the Turkomans the year before; and therefore starting from Petro-Alexandrofsk on January 19, and crossing the river near Hodjeili on the 28th, he made an excursion over the whole of the Turkoman territory, recrossing the river at Hanki on February 13. He visited in succession all the tribes of the Turkomans, except the Tchaudurs and Karajengeldi, who had been punished in 1874. The detachment met with no resistance and did not fire a single shot, although during its march through the encampments of the Kul Yomuds it destroyed everything within its reach. Every tribe was so frightened by this that they at once sent their elders to proffer their submission, asking for peace, and offering to pay the war indemnity which had previously been levied upon them. It was, therefore, necessary to punish only the few villages of the Imral tribe which sent no deputation. As to the punishment inflicted upon the Kul Yomuds I quote from an official report, 'Invalid,' No. 55, 1875:—

‘On January 29, after crossing to the right bank, the detachment marched upon Kunya Urgentch. From his place of crossing Colonel Ivanof sent Murtaza Bii, the Bek of Hodjeili, to all the Turkoman tribes with proclamations calling them to order and obedience. Giving out that from Kunya Urgentch he would move to Kyzyl Takyr, Colonel Ivanof on the 29th marched thirty-three versts and encamped at the canal of Esaul Bashi near Kunya Urgentch. On the 13th the column passing through Kunya Urgentch, instead of moving south, turned to the north-west and made for the Kul Yomud settlements, which began eight versts from the town and extended on both sides of the Khan-ab canal. The appearance of the column in these encampments was entirely unexpected; the settlements next to Kunya Urgentch were more especially taken by surprise, and no one had time to leave. The Kul Yomuds, numbering about 1,000 *kibitkas*, had taken an even more active part than the other tribes in the recent disorders; they had prevented compliance with our demands, had attacked the Persians on their way home in August 1874, had refused to obey the Khan, and had assaulted Mat Niaz and other dignitaries of the Khan who visited them in June 1874 to warn them of the consequences of their conduct. For these reasons Colonel Ivanof determined to punish the Kul Yomuds severely, so as to induce

the other tribes to submit and fulfil our demands. Stationing his troops in the grounds of Boyandur, he detached 150 Cossacks under Colonel Novotreshshenof with orders to fire all the villages within five versts of the camp. The troops were especially enjoined to confine themselves to the destruction of houses and movables and the seizure of cattle, without touching the inhabitants. The Cossacks rapidly carried out the task set them, and within two hours the country traversed was laid waste; fire and smoke rising in every direction indicated that the threatened punishment had overtaken the guilty. The first hut destroyed by the Cossacks belonged to Bakar, who led the Kul Yomud bands in their attack on the Persians; Bakar himself was taken prisoner and handed over to the Khivan authorities. To give the Kul Yomuds, who were said to be gathering for defence at a medressé fifteen versts further on, no time to recover, Colonel Ivanof, leaving the greater part of the detachment at Boyandur under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Komarof, put himself at the head of three companies, two sotnias, two guns, and a rocket division, and in the night of the 30th marched to the remoter settlements. The rumour of a hostile gathering proved unfounded; on the contrary, all the *auls* were found deserted, and there were signs that the inhabitants had left in a hurry and taken with them only their cattle and most valuable property. Successively traversing and destroying all the various settlements of the Kul Yomuds, the medressé and encampment of Ata Murad and Avas Turdi alone excepted, the column returned to Boyandur on the 31st. The Kul Yomuds migrated further west in the direction of Sary Kamish.

When near Khiva Colonel Ivanof received a visit from the Khan, which he subsequently returned in the capital himself, where he and his escort were well received by all the Uzbek population. In these interviews Colonel Ivanof gave the Khan to understand that the Russian troops could not always come to his assistance, and that it was time for him to take some means for keeping the Turkomans in check without Russian aid. He urged him immediately to send troops to arrest the originators of the disorders, and recommended him no longer to treat the Turkomans like a privileged part of the population but to place them on an equality with the rest of his subjects.

Not approving of the idea of the Khan to cut off the water supply from the Turkomans, he counselled him on the contrary to provide them with water on condition that any new canals they should require should be dug by themselves and not by the Uzbeks as before. Colonel Ivanof also insisted that the Khan should immediately impose some tax, even though a slight one, upon the Turkomans, for only on payment of a tax would they begin to consider themselves the Khan's subjects. He recommended the removal of the more troublesome elders, and said that it would be well not always to use harsh measures but sometimes to employ mildness and flattery, as the majority of the inhabitants now showed themselves to be really desirous of living in obedience.

The Khan then proposed to make a personal visit to the Turkomans, an idea which was warmly approved of by Colonel Ivanof, who thought that a personal visit would acquaint him with the real state of affairs, and procure for him the goodwill of the other inhabitants.

During the expedition the Turkomans paid 26,000 rubles of the penalties imposed upon them in 1873 and 1874, and soon after the return of the troops they sent 10,000 more.¹ Subsequently a further sum was received from the Khan on the part of the Turkomans, as well as 2,278 rubles as an indemnity from the Bukharans for the sheep stolen at Kabakli, and a further indemnity of 661 rubles to the merchant Dukof, whose caravan was robbed by the Turkomans in January 1874.

In accordance with the advice of Colonel Ivanof the Khan did make a tour through the Turkoman country, where he was very well received, and imposed upon them a tax amounting altogether to 40,770 *tillas*, *i.e.* about 73,000 rubles.

In November 1873 after the Khivan expedition, the Grand Duke Michael, the Lieutenant of the Caucasus, presented to the Emperor a project for forming all the Steppe region between the Caspian and the Sea of Aral into a military district subordinate to the Caucasus. General Lomakin was at once sent to Krasnovodsk to draw up a memorandum on the measures

¹ Up to the end of March, 1875, the Turkomans had paid 67,287 rubles. The whole sum imposed upon them in 1873 was 418,500 rubles, of which 261,837 rubles were paid, leaving a balance of 156,663 rubles still due from them.

which might develop the whole region and bring proper Russian influence to bear there. While there he had a conference with some of the elders of the Turkomans and engaged them as well as the leaders of the other tribes to come to Krasnovodsk in the spring of the next year, 1874.

By the regulations for the government of the new Trans-Caspian district which were signed by the Emperor on March 21, 1874,—although the project had just been rejected by an Imperial Commission, in consequence of the objections of the Foreign Office and of the Finance Ministry—the boundaries were stated to be from Mertvii Kultuk on the north to the river Attrek, the boundary between Russia and Persia, on the south, and from the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea to the western boundary of the Khanate of Khiva, including in it also the islands near the coast. The region was divided into two prefectures, that of Mangyshlak with the fort of Alexandrofsky, and that of Krasnovodsk, which was temporarily under the personal supervision of the Governor.

The regulations were in nearly all respects similar to those established for the Kirghiz in the provinces of Orenburg and Turkistan. Taxes were to be levied on the Kirghiz at the rate of three rubles a kubitka, but upon the Turkomans at half that rate. The regulations, however, contained an explanatory clause that this kubitka tax would be imposed proportionately to their degree of submission to the Russian protection and authority. Further taxes for the purpose of native administration were also to be imposed at rates to be decided upon by the inhabitants themselves, as in Turkistan.

General Lomakin was at once appointed Governor of this district. The chief reason for the formation of the Trans-Caspian district was probably not so much for the purpose of introducing order among the nomads as to give the large army stationed in the Caucasus something to do. With this view both the Grand Duke and General Lomakin occasionally make proposals for new expeditions, which sometimes even involve an increase of territory.

In 1874 a reconnaissance was made up the Attrek and a small fortification established there. In 1875 propositions were made for another and a much stronger reconnaissance in the same direction, with the idea of establishing a strong fortified post

about sixty miles from the mouth of the Attrek which would be of use as a sanitarium for the troops, and would, at the same time, be of service in keeping the Turkomans quiet, or 'for any ulterior movement.'

This plan, however, required a great expenditure of money, and when proposed to the Emperor was forbidden. Permission was given to send out the ordinary reconnaissance parties only as is customary at all frontier posts during the summer months.

In accordance with this permission General Lomakin started out with several companies of infantry, one sotnia of Cossacks, four guns and a rocket battery—in all about 1,000 men—for the exploration of the Uzboi, the old bed of the Oxus, as far as Sary Kamysh, which, it will be remembered, was the farthest point reached by Colonel Glukhovsky from the Khivan side, in the explorations during the summer of 1873. The pack-camels for the expedition, 574 in number, were brought to Krasnovodsk from Fort Alexandrovsky, Mangyshlak, under the convoy of one company of infantry, and a sotnia of Cossacks. The route followed was along the east coast of the Caspian to Kinderli, and thence along the narrow neck of the land separating Kara Bugaz bay from the sea. It was necessary for the camels to swim over a strait of 164 yards, and, in spite of the strong current, only two were lost. The whole march was of more than 400 miles, and was accomplished in twenty-three days, although in one part for fifty-seven miles no water was found, and the soldiers were mostly young men on their first campaign. From Krasnovodsk part of the troops were taken in boats over the Michailovsky Gulf and part marched round by land to the rendezvous at the wells at Mula Kari, which the whole expedition left on June 8, reaching the Uzboi on the 11th. The Uzboi presented the plainly marked bed of a vast river. The road along it was constantly cut up by great sandy hills sometimes seventy feet high, and it was besides frequently necessary to cross from one side of the Uzboi to the other, descending and climbing the steep and almost perpendicular banks. In the bed there were many lakes of salt and fresh water, and many wells, in which, however, the water was generally salt and bitter, or sulphurous. The march through the sand was very difficult, especially from the wells at Arvatu to Igdy where for forty miles there was

no water. Igdy was reached on June 20, the soldiers bearing the march well, having constantly a three days' supply of water, as well as pressed vegetables and extract of meat. They were obliged twice a day to drink tea. On June 22, a small party consisting of a topographer, a technician, and a commercial agent were sent out under an escort to Bala Ishem and thence to Sary Kamysh, where in accordance with a previous agreement they were met by an escort from the Khan of Khiva. The main body of the expedition meanwhile, remained for ten days at Igdy, waiting for news, and sending out every day eastward to cover the reconnaissance. This camp life was very painful as the heat sometimes rose to 110° Fahr. in the shade and to more than 122° in the sun, and the constant wind covered the men with sand and dust, while much suffering was caused by the bad water. On receiving news of the safe arrival of the topographical party at Sary Kamysh the expedition started back from Igdy on July 1, and on the 15th arrived at its starting place, Mula Kari, with thirteen men ill in consequence of the heat, two having died on the road.

The surveying party met at Tcharishli supplies of water sent by the Khivan authorities, made a complete survey of Sary Kamysh, and then returned by a more direct way and reached Krasnovodsk even before the main detachment of Lomakin.

The expedition was put to no trouble by the Turkomans; on the contrary General Lomakin several times received deputations from them. The first party, consisting of several Tekke Turkomans, came to him at Igdy, with declarations of submission and proffers of service. Others joined the detachment on the return journey, bringing for sale carpets, flour, and even sheep, with other provisions.

The impression produced by this expedition resulted in the whole steppe becoming quiet, and 500 Persian slaves freed at Khiva passed safely through the Turkoman steppe on their way home.

After giving his troops a short rest, General Lomakin set out again for Tchikishlar, and from there pursued the reconnaissance of the Attrek as far as Tchat. About 100 miles to the south of Mula Kari are the great fresh lakes of Tchairdy and Bugdaily. Here were found to be great encampments of the

Yomuds of the Attek and the Gurgan, who had come there for the second time that year, after having finished their harvests. There were as many as 2,000 kibitkas, and it was remarkable that these were belonging to two colonies formerly hostile, the Jafarbai and Ak Atabai. They had been reconciled by the Russians in 1874, and since that time had agreed to camp together, and to organise a mounted force of 500 men to watch the movements of the Tekkes.

On the Attek also General Lomakin met with many encampments of the Tcharva or nomad Yomuds of different tribes, having fully 4,000 kibitkas. These,—the most savage and rudest of all the Tcharva nomads acknowledging Russian authority, and the terror of the Persians at Astrabad,—were up to 1873 implacably hostile to the Russians. General Lomakin reported that all had now changed, for not only did they show no uneasiness at the presence of the Russians, but they even met them with the greatest good will.

Twenty-five miles south east of Bugdaili, the Russians found the ruined town of Mest-devran (Mestorian), which, from its size and from the remains of aqueducts, must have been at one time a very large and important town. Masjid, a few miles further on, appears to have been an ancient necropolis, being full of temples and mortuary mosques. All of this region was watered by means of aqueducts brought from the Attek, which crossed the river Sumbar in large brick pipes over two large bridges. The traces of these conduits were clearly seen on the banks of the Sumbar, and the direction of the aqueduct was traced for nearly its whole length. A range of mounds crowned with small forts, extends all the way from Tchat to Mest-devran, and from there on to Kara-tepé on the Caspian, south of the Green Mound. These forts were in all probability intended to protect the aqueducts and the tilled land from incursions of nomads.

The expeditions of Colonel Stebnitzky, Colonel Markozof, and General Lomakin, have acquainted us somewhat with the Turkomans inhabiting the steppe eastward of the Caspian. The three branches to be found there are the Yomuds, the Goklans, and the Tekkes. The Yomuds on the Caspian belong to the tribe Kara-tchuka, and are divided according to their kind of life—settled or nomad,—into Tchomura and Tcharva.

The Tcharva Yomuds live in the valley of the lower Attrek, fishing in the mouths of the rivers and planting the fertile lands. Pasture is easily found along the banks of the Gurgan for their cattle. They have but few camels. The Tcharva Yomuds remain between the Gurgan and the Attrek during the winter months. In March they migrate to the north of the Attrek, and encamp there on the right bank, or near lakes Tchairy and Bugdaily, along the Uzboi or even near the Balkan mountains, extending north as far as the Gulf of Kara Bugaz, and east as far as the wells of Igdy. The Tchomura and Tcharva are closely connected. Sometimes a father will be settled and his sons nomads; and sometimes a nomad will become settled or a settler will turn nomad. Altogether they are estimated to number 15,500 kibitkas, or about 80,000 souls. East of the Yomuds live the Goklans, of whom we have as yet but vague information. Nearly all that is known is that their encampments extend as far as the source of the Gurgan and the country of the Kurds. There are also some of them on the upper Sumbar and the Tchandyr. They number but 3,000 kibitkas, or about 15,000 souls. They were formerly much more numerous, but many of them were taken by force to Khiva, and others went there of their own accord to fight the Persians at the time of the campaign of Mahmud Shah on the Gurgan. Nearly all are agriculturists and some cultivate silkworms. As they are not nomads they have but few camels. The Tekke Turkomans occupy a long narrow oasis extending from north-west to south-east between the chain of the Kuren Dag and a series of sandy hills about 20 miles from the mountains. It is said that the constant northern winds are removing these hills further to the south and thus diminishing the area of the oasis. This valley, which is chiefly known by the name of Arkatch, is watered by numerous streams descending from the Kuren Dag, and is excellent for agriculture. A series of 43 small forts extends the whole length of this valley from Kyzyl-arvat, 45 miles south-east of Igdy, to the south-west of Merv.

The Tekkes can be considered as half sedentary. Their villages are large and they submit to a certain point to the authority of their elders, thus constituting a society in some measure organised. The result of this is that among the other

tribes who are scattered and have no internal organisation, the Tekkes are considered the strongest. With their excellent horses they have become the terror of their Persian neighbours on account of their raids or *alaman* which sometimes extend to Mashad and even to Herat.

In 1872 Colonel Markozof and Colonel Stoletof made a reconnaissance of a part of the Tekke oasis and visited some of the forts, which were abandoned by the inhabitants at their approach. These circumstances permitted the Russians to see a Tekke *aul* in its ordinary state. The kibitkas were arranged on the two sides of the fort. In the kibitkas were found bags of rice, wheat, and sorghum, carpets, felts, and household articles. In one was an apparatus for melting copper, and in others were agricultural tools of primitive forms, and looms for weaving carpets. Horses, cattle, pigs and fowls wandered about the kibitkas. Near the forts were small gardens planted with poplars and sown with cotton. Small water-mills were also established near each fort. The inhabitants of the Tekke oasis, as far as the fortress of Anev, called themselves Akhal to distinguish them from the other Tekkes further south near Merv. The Tekkes are nominally under the Khan of Khiva. Formerly they paid annually one camel for each fortress, which has now been replaced by about 12 rubles a year for each canal. About seven years ago the Akhal Tekkes were governed by an independent Khan named Nur Verdy Khan. He enjoyed absolute authority, but at last, tired of the constant quarrels of his tribe, he abdicated and retired to Merv. Since then there has been complete anarchy. The Akhal Tekkes are divided into two distinct families, the Tokhtamish and Utamish, who are always rivals. The Tokhtamish, who are three times more numerous than the Utamish, usually have the upper hand, but the others have always obeyed with bad grace. They all feel themselves menaced on one side by Russia, on another by the Persian Kurds, and on the third by the Khivan Yomuds. They felt the necessity of unity, and at the end of January 1875, a council was held, at which several thousands of persons were present from the fortresses and tribes, and after a long debate they elected Berdy Murad Khan, the son of the former Khan Nur Verdy. He refused the position unless they conferred upon him the right of life and death, and gave him the heads of four

brigands who had been guilty of many murders and robberies shortly before. This was refused by the assembly, and the fortresses in small groups elected separate chiefs for themselves, the five nearest the Russian frontier known as Besh Kala and peopled by Tokhtamish, being placed under the rule of Sofi Khan.

Most of these Turkomans have been brought into some kind of relations with the Russians since the formation of the Trans-Caspian district. The friendly intercourse was begun with the Jafarbai and Atabai Yomuds in 1873-4, and assistance was promised them against the Tekkes, and it was suggested that the Russians should undertake to obtain the release from the Tekkes of 500 prisoners in the hands of the Kurds. In 1874 also General Lomakin addressed letters to the Tekke Khans and Aksakals advising them to be at peace with Russia. A month later an answer was received from Sofi Khan and two others in the name of the Tekkes, declaring their readiness to obey orders of the Russian Government, and protect Russian and Khivan caravans passing between Krasnovodsk and Sary Kamysh. They also solicited Russian protection against the Persian Kurds and Goklans, desiring at the same time to enter into communication with the Khan of Khiva and the Russians on the Amu Darya, in order to restrain the Khivans from molesting them on their camping ground.

In answer General Lomakin demanded the release of the artillery soldier who was a prisoner at Merv, but neither he nor Colonel Ivanof has been able to obtain it, and the soldier is said to be still in the hands of the Turkomans.

This beginning of friendly relations with the Turkomans did not prevent a band of 500 strong of the Aral Turkomans in October 1874 from falling upon and pillaging the village of Dashly, 25 miles from Krasnovodsk, carrying off 150 prisoners and leaving 80 killed. Letters were sent to Sofi Khan demanding the return of the inhabitants and of the booty, but this apparently has been followed by no result.

This action of the Turkomans led some of the Russian newspapers to insist upon the necessity of bringing all the Turkomans under control, and for that purpose fortifying the line of the Attrek, which was now acknowledged as the boundary of Persia, although it was contended that the natural boundary was

the Kara-su, to the south of the Gurgan.¹ The Attrek was first officially recognised by Russia as its boundary with Persia in 1869. It appears that on receiving intelligence of the campaign of Krasnovodsk in that year the Shah, on December 16, asked the Russian Minister, Beger, to obtain assurance from the Emperor that the movement at Krasnovodsk had as its only aim the development of trade with Turkistan, and that it was not the intention of the Russians to mix in the affair of the Yomuds living on the banks of the Gurgan and the Attrek, and that they would not construct any fortifications on the banks of these rivers or at their mouths. Beger telegraphed about this to Prince Gortchakof, and received a reply saying that the Imperial Government admitted the sovereignty of Persia as far as the Attrek, and consequently had no intention of raising fortifications in that locality. This answer was communicated to the Shah on December 25, and produced such a pleasant impression that three days after the Persian Government permitted the Russian merchant-steamers to go to Murdab and Enzeli equally with sailing vessels, a right which Russian diplomats had for ten years vainly endeavoured to secure.²

The newspaper article to which I have just referred seems to have been written by a person acquainted with the course of events, for propositions have been made to the Central Government for occupation of territory beyond the Attrek, for the purpose of putting down the Turkomans, and there is reason to believe that the idea of the annexation of the whole Caspian coast now belonging to Persia has been brought up for consideration.

In spite of what happened in 1873, before the Khivan expedition, the Persian Government—owing perhaps to English suggestions—has strongly objected to any interference by General Lomakin in the affairs of the Turkomans on the southern side of the Attrek, and a sentence in one of his proclamations to the Turkomans called out a rather sharp correspondence. There can be little doubt that the relations with the Turkomans will compel Russia to advance as far as Merv,

¹ 'St. Petersburg Viedomosti,' January 14 (26), 1875.

² Terentief, *ib.* p. 98. See also the despatches of Mr. Ronald Thomson in the Parliamentary return of Correspondence respecting Central Asia, No. II., 1873, pp. 20, 25, 39.

and possibly permanently to occupy that town. It is very questionable, however, whether such a step would have the importance which has been attributed to it by influential organs of the English press. Merv is a half-ruined village in the Tekke oasis, and as a base of operations is in no way superior to the Amu Darya, except by being a short distance nearer the confines of India. Even in case of war it could never be more than a base of supplies.

Another consequence of the Khivan campaign has been the establishment of direct, though infrequent, commercial relations between the Khivan oasis and Krasnovodsk. Several caravans have been sent that way, most of which arrived in safety, although one was attacked and pillaged. Several of these caravans have belonged to Colonel Glukhovsky, who in 1874 had an idea of starting trade with Afghanistan, and sent a caravan as far as Mashad. A writer in the 'Allgemeine Zeitung' of March 3, 1875, on the subject of these caravans, accused the Russian Government of having an underhand policy in sending out military expeditions under the guise of trading caravans. In this, injustice has been done both to the Russian Government and to Colonel Glukhovsky. The Russian Government allows its officers to engage in commercial pursuits, when not incompatible with their official duties. Of this St. Petersburg is filled with examples. Colonel Glukhovsky is a young and ambitious officer, who has taken a distinguished part in the Central Asiatic campaigns. He has a large private fortune, and is, moreover, something of an enthusiast, and believes that the Khivan oasis is immensely rich, and that with proper effort its trade can be developed, as well as that the Amu Darya can be turned into its ancient channel in the Caspian Sea. It is true that valuable political information may be obtained by means of these caravans, but is not important information, geographical, political, &c., always obtained by commercial ventures in a new country?

CONCLUSION.

AN attempt has been made in the preceding pages to portray accurately and impartially the social and economical condition of the various countries of Central Asia and the present political relations of those countries, as well as to show the way in which those relations have been brought about. An impartial observer will, I think, be convinced that these relations are the natural consequence of many simple and unforeseen circumstances, and of accidents which possibly may not have been sufficiently guarded against, and that it is unnecessary to assume the theory of a settled plan of conquest, or to adopt extreme views on either one side or the other. Where there is a desire to find fault or always to see some hidden motive, simple reasons seem insufficient or may be overlooked, and there are few circumstances which are not capable of an abstruse and far-fetched explanation.¹

Central Asia has no stores of wealth and no economical

¹ As examples of what Machiavellian motives may be adduced to explain the circumstances—however small in themselves—take the following:—Prince Gortchakof, in November 1869, in a conversation with the British Ambassador about Kashgar, said that as the Russians had no diplomatic relations with Yakub Bek while the Government of India appeared to have dealings with him, Mr. Forsyth might assure the Atalyk Ghazi that the Russians had no hostile intentions against him. This request of Prince Gortchakof has been interpreted by English authorities to evince a desire on the part of the Russian Government to conceal the dealings which they actually had with Kashgar, for Mirza Shadi had come on an unsuccessful mission to St. Petersburg to General Kaufmann in 1868, and at the same time Captain Reinthal had been in Kashgar. Everybody knew that Mirza Shadi had been in St. Petersburg, for accounts of it had appeared in the newspapers and it could not be concealed, and it was also known that he had not been received by the Emperor, because the Emperor would not recognise Yakub Bek as a sovereign prince, but as the rebellious vassal of China. As far as concerns Reinthal, there is not the slightest reason to suppose that Prince Gortchakof knew of his visit to Kashgar, as General Kaufmann does not send a report of all his proceedings to the Foreign Office, and Reinthal besides was sent, not

resources; neither by its agricultural nor by its mineral wealth, nor by its commerce, nor by the revenue to be derived from it, can it ever repay the Russians for what it has already cost, and for the rapidly increasing expenditure bestowed upon it. Had Russia known fifteen years ago as much about the countries of Central Asia as she does now, there can be hardly a doubt that there would have been no movement in that direction. Even the steps taken in 1864 would not for a moment have been allowed.

Despite the drain upon the Imperial exchequer, it is practically impossible for Russia to withdraw from her position in Central Asia. Notwithstanding the many faults which may be found in the administration of the country, the Russian rule is on the whole beneficial to the natives, and it would be manifestly unjust to them to withdraw her protection and leave them to anarchy and to the unbridled rule of fanatical despots. Apart from this moral consideration, that of her *prestige* in Central Asia would be sufficient to keep Russia there even at a still greater loss.

On the contrary, as far as one can foresee Russia will be compelled in the future to advance still further. It seems now to be impossible for her to remain where she is. Kashgar, Bukhara, and the Turkoman country must either be annexed or they must be reduced to a position of real, and not nominal, vassalage.

This accomplished, Russia will have arrived at a true ethnical and political boundary. She will have under her rule in Central Asia all of the Mohammedan peoples of Turkish race. On the east her neighbour will be China; and as the

from Tashkent, but from Vierny. Even after the account of Reinthal's journey was finally published, it was believed in certain quarters in England that this was then done lest the English mission in Kashgar should find out for themselves the visit of Reinthal, and then accuse the Russians of duplicity. Now for an example on the other side, Captain Terentief, in his book 'Russia and England in Central Asia,' compares what was said about the roads from India to Kashgar by Shaw, and how easy and accessible they are in that direction, and what has been said by subsequent expeditions, by which accounts are given of the difficulties of the mountain passes, and draws the conclusion that at first the English travellers accidentally told the truth, but that since then there has been a persistent effort on the part of the English authorities to blind the Russians, by making them think that a natural barrier exists between Kashgar and India, when, in fact, there is an easy road!

Russians are not disposed to get into difficulties with that empire we may expect few boundary disputes. On the south the frontier will be the Oxus, separating the Russian domains from Afghanistan, as agreed upon by arrangement with England. Although the rulers are Afghans and of different stock, yet the inhabitants of Balkh and the province south, as far as the Hindu Kush, are of Turkish origin. This range would therefore form the true ethnical frontier of Russia on the south, and it must be remembered that mountains are always better barriers and boundaries than rivers. On the west the Russian frontier will join that of Persia, which is inhabited by men of a different race, and, although Mussulmans, yet of a sect violently hated by the inhabitants of Central Asia. If any difficulty with England ever arise, it will probably be in Persia,—where at present Russian influence is paramount—and not elsewhere.

How Russia is to repay herself for the money she spends in Central Asia it is difficult to say. The construction of a railway, while it may bind the country more strongly to Russia, in consequence of ease of communication and facilities for the transportation of troops, can hardly develop a region which, as long as it is inhabited by the races now living there, seems to have reached its highest point. It is hardly probable that an influx of Russian colonists with their shiftless ways will improve the position of affairs. But one issue seems possible—to introduce into Central Asia the patient and economical industry of the Chinese, notwithstanding the physical, moral, and political difficulties to be overcome. Under the Chinese Kuldja was a productive and a thickly settled country; under them Kashgar—which is now worthless—was flourishing; and with their help we might reasonably look for a great increase in the productiveness and the prosperity of Khokand, Bukhara, and Russian Turkistan.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX IV.

THE RUSSIAN POLICY REGARDING CENTRAL ASIA.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH.—BY PROFESSOR V. GRIGORIEF.

THERE was a time when orthodox Russia seemed thoroughly Tartar. Everything in it, except its religion, was permeated and impregnated with Tartardom. It was permeated and impregnated then by Tartardom in the same degree, if not more so, as it is now by the ideas of Western Europe; and as European ideas, which have already for a century and a half affected the higher and more influential classes of the Russian people, are the weaker as their influence extends to the lower and poorer classes, so especially the top and branches of the Russian tree were then affected by Tartardom, but the trunk and roots less. And not only in externals—in dress, manners, and habits of life—did the Russian princes and *boyars*, the Russian officials and merchants, imitate the Tartars, but everything, their feelings, their ideas, and their aspirations in the region of practical life, were in the strongest way influenced by Tartardom. Our ancestors received this Tartar influence during two hundred years—at first from an unwilling, but afterwards from an habitual conformity to the tone, the manners, and the morals that reigned at Sarai on the Volga, which in its time played in relation to us the same *rôle* that subsequently fell to the lot of Paris. Russia continued to seem Tartar even after the fall of the Golden Horde. During the continuance of the whole Moscow period, up to the very time of Peter the Great, the statecraft and the political management of the Russian Tsars and magnates continued to be in every respect Tartar; so that without an acquaintance with real Tartardom it is impossible correctly to understand and estimate many phases in Russian history from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century.

Thanks to having identified themselves in such a way with Tartardom, our ancestors succeeded in freeing themselves from the Tartar yoke. They had learned the weak sides of the Horde, and they succeeded in turning to their own profit whatever was really sensible in Tartar statecraft. It was in consequence of their complete acquaintance with Tartardom that the rulers of Moscow were able to carry on their affairs in relation to it as skilfully as they did after the fall of the Golden Horde. The Tsars and their counsellors understood at that time what they wanted, what they ought to aim at, what was possible and what was impossible, as well as the means and methods by which all this could be best accomplished. One of their most skilful and fruitful political methods was their habit of calling into their service those distinguished men of the Horde who for some reason or other did not get on well at home. By means of these immigrants, who appeared accompanied by a greater or smaller number of followers, the Muscovite Grand Princes and Tsars obtained first, an excellent military force, which they used against their enemies as well on the east as on the west of Russia; and secondly, an excellent support against their own selfish and disobediently disposed hereditary *boyars*. It would have been a great and a dangerous political mistake to have left these incomers in their Mussulman religion. Considering their importance and influence, there might have been formed in time out of these unchristian foreigners an element in the highest degree injurious to the State, on account of their not belonging to the orthodox religion, which then constituted and still constitutes the basis of the Russian nation. Fortunately this mistake was avoided, not because it was foreseen in time, but because it was impossible, considering the ideas of the whole Russian world at that time and its conditions of life. If not in the first, as usual, at least in the second generation the Tartar immigrants into Russia became orthodox, and entering thus into the flesh and blood of the Russian people, strengthened instead of weakened the Empire which was then in course of foundation. But as it was impossible to turn every useful and valuable Tartar at once into a Christian, and as the unavoidable perspective of becoming Christianised in Russia might have served as a preventive to their permanent or temporary immigration, a clever method was found of getting out of this dilemma. There was founded within the boundaries of Russia a special Khanate, where the useful immigrants from the Horde might remain Mussulmans without injury to their true and faithful services to our political interests—the Khanate, or as it was called, the Kingdom of Kasi-mof, which during two hundred years successfully performed the functions allotted to it.

Although during the existence of the Golden Horde the boundaries of Central Asia not only reached to the Volga, but were moved still further westward into Europe, still, according to the present geographical nomenclature, it is impossible to call, in any strict sense, Central Asiatic the policy of the Russian rulers with regard to the Tartar dominions which arose beyond the Volga on the ruins of the Golden Horde. Properly speaking, we came into contact with Central Asia, and were able to act with regard to its peoples in one way or another, only on the union with Russia of the kingdoms of Kazan and Astrakhan. If, after the downfall of these branches of the Golden Horde, no little time elapsed before Russia began to advance into the steppes of Central Asia, it is impossible to say that this was caused by the unskilfulness of the Muscovite rulers. Before penetrating so far into the East, the Muscovite Tsars had to attain much more important aims on the western and southern confines of Russia. They had to live through many troubles in its very heart, and it seemed necessary in any case to bind thoroughly to them the newly-conquered Trans-Volga country by turning it from a Tchudish and Tartar land into a Russian one. How well they understood the way to complete such a difficult transformation, is shown in the most brilliant manner by the part played by the Kazan region during the 'troubulous times' for Russia, some sixty years after the conquest of the north-eastern Trans-Volga country. We did not advance into Central Asia during the seventeenth century, for the very reason that we were then far better acquainted with it than in the following century, and because the character of its steppes and that of its nomad population were thoroughly known to us. Incontrovertible proofs of this acquaintance are presented to us not only by the 'Book of the Great Survey,' but by a remarkable work of the Dutch writer Witsen, who obtained, and could only obtain, in Russia that information about Central and Northern Asia, which astonished Europe at the end of the seventeenth century.

In consideration of the impossibility and the unprofitableness of schemes of aggrandisement in Central Asia in the circumstances in which Russia was placed during the seventeenth century, the Muscovite rulers in relation to this part of Asia had first, to keep up that *prestige* of Russian strength and Russian greatness, which, by the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, they had obtained in the most distant regions of the Mussulman East; second, as far as possible to prevent the nearest nomads from pillaging attacks on their borders; and third, to have a care for the commercial interests of their subjects, not forgetting even another interest of that time—which was common to us, with all the rest of Europe—the ransom

from Mussulman hands of orthodox Christians who had fallen by various fates into slavery.

'If you want others to respect you, first respect yourself.' The Muscovite Tsars and officials were impregnated to the marrow of their bones with this maxim, and therefore looked after the honour and dignity of Russia in relation to foreigners with a care which in later times has unfortunately been forgotten. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this care constituted a characteristic trait of our diplomacy. It is well known that when even in the time of Vassili III. an embassy arrived in Moscow from the Sultan Baber, who had just founded a most powerful and rich monarchy in Afghanistan—the news of this had not yet reached us—the Tsar, while receiving the ambassador politely, and agreeing to the mutual freedom of trade which Baber desired, did not order him to be called 'brother' in the document, as the chronicler observes, for he did not know for sure who Baber was, whether an autocrat, or only a sub-officer of the Indian realm.

The Nogais, whose encampments bordered all the eastern frontier of Russia, from the Caspian Sea to Siberia, were in the sixteenth century very dangerous neighbours for us. Nevertheless Ivan the Terrible did not allow Ismail, although he was our very good ally, and we prized his friendship, to name himself in documents (as Ismail wished to do by old habit) either his father or his brother, considering both designations derogatory to the dignity of the Autocrat of the Russian land. In 1589, when the famous Abdullah Khan of Bukhara sent to the Tsar Feodor Ivanovitch an ambassador with a letter, the letter was not received, because written without the Tsar's titles; and by command of the Tsar, the boyar Godunof answered Abdullah, that all sovereigns write to his Tsarish Majesty with due respect, and to him, the boyar, with love and compliment. He at the same time informed the Khan that if the T-sar had not placed his ambassador under ban, it was only through his intercession, together with that of the other boyars, and he proposed to the Khan to smooth over the insult which had been offered, promising to use all his efforts that relations might not be broken off. We know how little Russia in 1620 had succeeded in recovering from the disorders of the 'troublous times,' and yet the young Michael Feodorovitch, who sent in this year Khokhlof as Ambassador to Bukhara, strictly ordered him to give no presents if they should be demanded for his admission to the Khan; and if in dining with the Khan there should be ambassadors from other powers (there might happen to be among them an ambassador from Persia, or from the Indian realm of Baber, or from the Osmanli Sultans) to demand that he, the Russian Ambassador, should be

given a place higher than the rest, and, if this should not be accorded, not to dine. The first Russian Ambassador to China, the boyar's son, Baikof, who was sent thither in 1654, was not received by the Emperor, as is well known, because he did not consent to submit to the undignified reception and ceremonies, which, however, were considered obligatory on all foreign ambassadors from whatever place they came. In our turn, when we received embassies from the Central Asiatic rulers, we strictly observed in our negotiations with the ambassadors the relative political weight of their masters, and usually appointed for their reception officials of the lower grades. In order to inspire and keep up a high idea of ourselves abroad, it was not considered prejudicial even to be boastful. Thus, for example, in the instructions to Novosiltsof, who was sent in 1585 as ambassador from the Tsar Feodor Ivanovitch to the Emperor Rudolf, he was ordered to say with regard to our Asiatic relations that 'The sovereigns living along the confines of our country—the Khan of Kyzyl-bash, the Bukharan Tsar, the Turkistan Tsar, the Kazak Tsar, the Urgentch Tsar, and the Georgian, Izurian, Kalmuk, Shemakha, and Shenkal rulers—these now are all peaceable with the Kyzyl-bashes and with each other, according to the instructions and counsel of our sovereign, and in all great matters in which friendship or enmity to anyone arises, they write and report of that to our lord; and with regard to that our lord writes and orders them; and they are in everything obedient to our lord, and send frequent embassies to our lord with great respect and deference.' Four years after this, not much less than this was said to the ambassador of the German Empire at the Moscow Court—'that the Bukharan Abdula Tsar, and the Tsar of Urgentch, and the Prince of Izur are all in the power of our lord.' It is very possible that in his turn the famous Abdullah, the terrible and mighty ruler of the countries along the Syr and the Amu, who was called by us the 'Bukharan Abdula Tsar,' said very much the same thing to the ambassadors of the Great Mogul; that the Tsar of Moscow reported to him about everything, and was in his full power. All the cases, however, of the boasting of which we speak, that are known to us, relate exclusively to the reign of Feodor Ivanovitch, wherefore perhaps, we may ascribe this exaggeration not to the usual habit of our diplomacy in the seventeenth century, but to the influence on governmental matters of Godunof, a Tartar by extraction, and consequently a diplomat in the special Tartar sense.

As regards the second problem—the repression of attacks on the Russian settlements by the neighbouring nomads, we in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries knew very well that this task

was impossible for a central government, and for that reason the Moscow authorities did not interfere, but left the matter entirely to the frontier commanders. The only exception to this rule, as far as is known, was the construction for the defence of the settlement on the left bank of the Kama, against the incursions of the Bashkirs, Kirghiz, and Kalmuks, of a row of walls, ditches, and fortifications from Biely-yar on the Volga to the river Ik beyond Menzelinsk—a line of defence which received the appellation of the 'Trans-Kama line.' As concerning the frontier commanders, they in proper cases acted with the forces of the very people who had been pillaged, and paid off the nomads for the devastation they had wrought by a similar destruction of their settlements. Such a position of things naturally called the Cossacks into existence, and they developed on the Siberian frontier as well as on the Yaik and the Terek. Serving as a barrier against the brigandage of the nomads, the Cossacks at the same time took the offensive not only against them, but sometimes also against the settled states of Central Asia, as witness the bold attempts of the Cossacks of the Yaik to get possession of Khiva. Thanks to the Cossacks the Russian name continued to remain terrible in Central Asia without any special measures to that end on the part of the central government; and the government, prizing their services and deserts, had the good sense to look through its fingers at the fact that these profitable arms were not always obedient and submissive ones.

The natural productions of Russia being much demanded by Asia had from of old brought Asiatic traders thither. When Kazyan and Astrakhan fell, through which the Russian trade with the East had been carried on, ambassadors came to Ivan the Terrible from Samarkand, Bukhara, and other places, asking for a 'free road for guests.' The commercial relations with Central Asia were profitable for Russia, and therefore 'the road for guests' was willingly opened; but we understood even at that time that it would be still more advantageous if we could provide ourselves with the Asiatic wares that we needed by buying them at the place of production by means of our own merchants. For that reason the Moscow Tsars showed the greatest favour to those of their subjects who were bold enough to penetrate into the Central Asiatic markets through the hostile steppes full of marauders which separated them from us. The effort to obtain for the Russian merchants who went to Central Asia the same rights and conveniences which Central Asiatic traders had in Russia, was the chief reason which in the seventeenth century called out an embassy from Russia to the Central Asiatic sovereigns. The demand for

the liberation of the Russian prisoners who were in slavery there was put in merely from motives of humanity, and the prisoners who returned to Russia with our ambassadors were not received *gratis*, but were ransomed with money. Another aim of the embassies was to obtain correct information about the political condition of the countries to which they were sent, since the intelligence brought by the Asiatic traders could not always be depended upon.

If our affairs beyond the Volga did not advance, the *amour propre* of the government found abundant compensation in the constant success with which the Russian dominion extended over the wandering and pastoral natives of Siberia. About 1640 we had already begun to take firm hold on the Amur. This movement brought us into contact with the nomads of Central Asia on another side, the north instead of the west, and here apparently we met with great success. One after the other various little tribes of Turkish and Mongol race voluntarily gave their allegiance to us, and in 1636 Altyn Khan, the important ruler of Urunkhai had already become subject to Russia. But our late Chinese scholar, Hyacinth Bitchurin, was the first of European writers to remark 'that nomads consider allegiance a bargain with their conscience, in which they expected to win at least four to one, and for that reason when a favourable case arises they rival each other in their readiness to declare themselves subjects, but, if they be deceived in their hope of winning four to one, they are shrewd enough to repay themselves by pillage, rapine, and murder.' For that reason we said that our success in obtaining the submission of the nomads in the southern regions of Western Siberia was only apparent; in reality all declarations of submission on their part were tricks by which they hoped to get from us presents and other advantages. They understood this very well in Moscow, where even in 1623 there was an order not to allow Kalmuk and Urunkhai embassies to come there. Court vanity, however, which was pleased with the appearance of such embassies and their submission, got the better, and the comedy of bringing nomads to the oath of allegiance, in spite of the complete admission that it was no more than a comedy, continued to have constant success on the diplomatic stage during the rest of the seventeenth century, as well as up to the latest times.

Notwithstanding the rapid political growth of the Russian Empire, we could not arrange matters with the Crimean Horde in the seventeenth century, or even up till nearly the end of the eighteenth. This is known to everybody. Probably very few, however, know that in the seventeenth century Russia was exposed

to the danger of a new invasion of Mongols and of a new struggle with them. The fact is that the former strong, and afterwards much weakened, union of Jungarian Mongols, known to their western neighbours by the name of Kalmuks, but at home by the name of Oirat, began in the commencement of the seventeenth century to take new strength, and among the Jungarian rulers there arose the idea of establishing the old realm of Tchinghiz in its former extent and greatness. At least we see that while the head of the most powerful Kalmuk tribe of Tchoros, the renowned Bator Kuntaitsi, strove to weld the Oirat into a unity under his rule, the head of another tribe, Gushi-Khan, immigrated with a part of his subjects to the south-east to Khukhu-nor, and founded there an independent government, obtaining afterwards supreme power even over Thibet; and Ho-Urluk, the head of the tribe Torgout, moving from the Irtysh to the sources of the Tobol and of the Emba, crowded the Kirghiz to the south, then conquered the Nogais, whom we considered our subjects, overcame the Turkomans in Mangyshlak, and finally in about 1636 passed over the Yaik, went around Astrakhan, and settled with his Horde on both banks of the Lower Volga like a conqueror, not asking in the least the consent of the Russian Government for such an immigration into Russian dominions. In this way the Mongols in a very short space of time again made themselves the conquerors of the countries from Siberia to India, and from China to the Caucasus. The Horde had as many as 50,000 *kibitkas*, and could place in the field 30,000 well-armed horsemen, and after it came in the same direction to the Volga crowds of other Kalmuks. The Mongols of Baty invaded Russia with probably no greater number of soldiers, and if the situation of Russia at this time was not the same as it was in the thirteenth century, for there was a unified autocracy ruling, it was still in the highest degree difficult. The wounds of 'the troublous times' had hardly been healed; the population was exhausted physically and economically; the Imperial treasury was empty; the submission of the Cossacks was not to be trusted to; the military endurance of the *streltsi* and other soldiery was doubtful, and although peace had been concluded with Sweden and Poland, still if a trouble had arisen for Russia on the East, the Swedes and Poles would have again broken out. What aided us was that the Kalmuks and their leaders had neither the skill nor the discipline of the army of Tchinghiz Khan. They therefore contented themselves with the acquisitions they had made, and, settling on the Volga, limited themselves to pillage of the neighbourhood and to excursions to Astrakhan, where in a contest with its defenders Ho-Urluk was killed, according to one report in 1643. There were no means of expelling the Kalmuks

from the territory they had occupied. It only remained, therefore, to admit the accomplished fact, and try to cover the blot on our honour by turning the uninvited guests into subjects, if only in name, which, from the readiness of nomads for this bargain, was easily arranged. In 1655 the Ambassadors of Shukur Daitchin, the son and successor of Ho-Urluk, swore the eternal allegiance of the Kalmuk people to the Tsar Alexis. How little real meaning this allegiance had is evident from the fact that Shukur Daitchin and his successor several times after that entered into new treaties with the Russian government, did not pay them a kopek, but on the contrary received tribute from them in the guise of constant salary; continued to consider themselves as before as members of the Oirat league; were in constant relations with Jungaria, Thibet, and even China; entered on the government of their people without the Tsar's confirmation; received new immigrants from Jungaria; and sent back there whole thousands of people without the knowledge or consent of Moscow. In the year 1712 the Khan Ayuka, already with the knowledge and consent of our government, received an ambassador from the Chinese emperor, while the Russian Tsars themselves had not been honoured by a single Chinese embassy in their capital. In a word, living in the Russian dominions, the Kalmuk Khans acted not as subjects but as allies of Russia; and the Kalmuks really were our allies, as were other native tribes within the domains of the Empire up to about 1780, the time of the conquest of the Crimean Khanate.

At the end of the Moscow period we came into contact with China. We were brought into this contact by the successes of the Siberian Cossacks on the Amur, which disquieted the Chinese government. We had for a long time desired to trade with China through Mongolia. For the establishment of regular commercial relations with this great Empire our first embassy had been sent to Peking in the year 1654 by the Tsar Alexis. This was followed by other not more successful embassies. Our successes on the Amur ended, as is well known, in our yielding to the Chinese without the slightest need, by the Nertchinsk treaty of 1669, the left bank of the Amur, which had never belonged to them; and in this way we shut up for ourselves for more than a century and a half our most convenient way to the Pacific Ocean. It would have been well enough if we had been compelled to such a disadvantageous cession by the consideration of the great weakness of our defensive and offensive forces in Siberia, and by the danger of coming into armed conflict with the Mantchus, who had just conquered China, and, governed by the wisest politician of his time—the Emperor Kansi—were still in the full lust of conquest; although a danger of this kind

could have been hardly well founded in view of the comparatively enormous efforts which it cost the Manchus to subdue the insignificant fort of Albazin. The cause, however, of the conclusion of the Nertchinsk treaty must be considered to be our desire immediately to carry on a trade with China, just as if we could not live without this trade, and as if it had not been more advantageous and desirable to the Chinese than to us. The question why our affairs with the Chinese were so unsuccessfully carried on we generally like to explain by the interference of the Jesuits. It is much simpler to explain it by the general truth that knowledge is stronger than ignorance, and that we in Moscow and St. Petersburg never knew the weak sides of China, and were unable to prize those advantages which we have more than once had in relation to this power, in consequence of the positions of its affairs in Mongolia and Jungaria, and were therefore not in a condition to profit by them. The wily Chinese saw with whom they had to do, were obstinate, and obtained what they wanted.

That man alone can despise his people who recognises no worth in himself. If Peter the Great really succeeded in doing much that was great, it was because he believed in the Russian people, and measured their strength by the marrow of his own soul. This our reformer showed even in his designs with regard to Central Asia. He had no aspiration to conquer it, but was attracted by other ideas; first, to give to Russian trade a way through the steppe to the treasures of India, which he knew had given wealth to his friends the Dutch, and to other western European nations who had got there by sea; second, to bring into Russia the gold which, as report had told him, was to be found in masses in a river near the city of Irket (Yarkand)—a second Asiatic *El Dorado*—a country of which they said that it lay in the possessions of the Kalmuk prince, somewhere on the south of Siberia and on the east of Bukhara. Notwithstanding such indefinite knowledge of the position of Irket and of the road from Bukhara to India, Peter decided on making a road thither for his subjects by military force, without, however, conquering the countries through which the proposed road should go. This was the combination of a genius; and due justice has not yet been given to it by the biographers of the great Emperor, because they, being unacquainted with the history of the East, have never been in a position rightly to estimate its value. The realization of this combination was founded on a deep understanding of the political condition of the countries of Central Asia at that time, which, we are forced to say, Peter was the first and the last of our statesmen of the eighteenth century to possess. By means of an embassy from Khiva, which had appeared in Moscow at the very

beginning of the century (1703), with a proposal from the Khan to swear allegiance to Russia, and from other sources, Peter knew that the Khivan and Bukharan Khans were so little the actual rulers of their subjects, and were 'so much oppressed by them,' according to the just expression of Peter himself, that in order to put them down they would willingly accept any foreign aid. On these data he decided to send to Khiva and Bukhara a military force of considerable strength (5,000 men). A part of this force was to be left with the Khivan and Bukharan Khans as a guard, which would guarantee to them the obedience of their subjects, and at the same time their personal dependence on Russia, while with the rest measures were to be taken to open a road to India and Irket, and to send thither a Russian commercial caravan.

In the condition of affairs in Central Asia at that time this project was in no way subject to risk, and would have been crowned with full success, if the Emperor had not spoiled the whole affair by confiding it to Prince Bekovitch-Tcherkasski. Peter then naturally thought, as many do now, that in dealing with cunning Asiatics it was best to use an equally cunning but perfectly devoted 'Eastern man.' This was a great mistake. To succeed in dealings with Asiatics it is necessary to lay aside all cunning. Had the Emperor entrusted the undertaking to some capable and decisive Russian like Kotlyarefsky or Tchernaiief it would have been splendidly carried out. Tcherkasski, with his Asiatic cunning, was entrapped, and, as is well known, ruined both himself and his army without the slightest profit. The other expedition, too, from Tobolsk to Irket, under the command of Captain Buchholtz, did not attain its purpose, because the purpose was unattainable, but it led at least to the firm establishment of the Russians on the Irtysh. It is remarkable that with the peculiar sagacity and grandeur of his ideas, Peter was able also to see the value of the idea of turning the Amu-Darya into its old bed to the Caspian. The idea was not carried out by him on account of the ruin of Tcherkasski, and still remains only a project. With regard to China Peter followed the near-sighted policy of the old Moscow Court; but we may suppose that if he had lived longer he would have clearly seen the state of affairs there; for at the end of his reign, in 1722, he sent Captain Unkofsky as ambassador to the Kalmuk sovereign, Tsevan-Rabdan, in order to learn exactly the condition of Jungaria. It is evident that the importance of this subject to Russian interests had begun to be plain to his all-embracing mind.

Under the successors of Peter the Great the prominent men of Russia were imbued with such a deep contempt for their whole

past, and strove with such zeal to accept without choosing everything that came from Western Europe, that in a very short time they entirely forgot everything which they before knew, and among the rest lost all that knowledge and understanding of Asia which Muscovite Russia had possessed. Through their ignorance of everything that touched Asia, and especially Central Asia, they fully reached their aim—they made themselves real Europeans who had never had any idea of a nomad life or of the condition of the Steppes. Independently of that, a great number of foreigners from the West had entered the Russian service, and these immigrants were used without distinction not only for European and internal affairs but also for Asiatic matters. It is natural that under such conditions our policy with regard to Central Asia during the eighteenth century must have been far inferior to the policy not only of the sixteenth, but even of the seventeenth century, with no slight loss both to the interests of the Russian people and to the honour of their government.

Peter, I have just remarked, began to look into Jungarian affairs, from a true understanding of what enormous advantages might have been gained for us in regard to China. Had we been able to manœuvre skilfully during the struggle between the Manchus and the Kalmuks, we might have forced the Court of Pekin to very great concessions in favour of our trade, and to the fulfilment of all our wishes (such as the establishment of a Russian Consulate at Pekin). We could even have penetrated, according to Peter's idea, to Irket itself. Unfortunately, the significance of Jungarian affairs for our interests was, it seems, lost from sight at the death of the great Emperor, and we, in our negotiations with the Chinese, did not show ourselves in the part of threatening creditors, but in that of submissive debtors—a proceeding which nowhere and never has led to success. Instead of supporting the Kalmuks as far as was conformable to our national advantage, we with great equanimity allowed the Manchus to overwhelm this neighbouring people, and our deference to the conqueror of Jungaria, the arrogant Kien-long, was carried to such a degree that when the last warrior for the independence of his country, the indefatigable Amursana, was compelled to conceal himself in the limits of Siberia, and died there of the small-pox, the Siberian authorities, in order to assure the Court of Pekin of the reality of his death, twice carried the body of the unfortunate ruler to the boundaries of China. Once having allowed the fall of Jungaria we could not, even if we wished, obtain anything from China, and *nolens volens* we were compelled in our relations with the Chinese to yield to all their whims. The Dutch suffered still more in Nagasaki from the arrogance of the

Japanese, but they at least got some advantage from it. Our trade with the Chinese, while placing our national character in a shameful light, was at the same time disadvantageous from an economical point of view. Russian wares were almost constantly sold to the Chinese at prices which did not pay for their production, and for Chinese goods the Russian consumers were obliged to pay three times their value. The causes of this were, as is well known, the absence among the Russian traders with China of any feeling of common interest, while the Chinese merchants, on the contrary, were distinguished by the close relations which bound them together, and a common method of action. Let us admit that the removal of these causes lay outside of the power of our government, but in that case, why were all its efforts to keep up a trade which, by bringing loss to the Government and ruining the credit of the Russian name in Asia, served only for the reprehensible gain of a very small number of large and petty traders devoid of all feeling of patriotism? Let us remark also, that from ignorance of how to carry on our affairs we ourselves gave up the right which was accorded to us by the treaty of Nertchinsk and confirmed by that of Burinsk (1727), to send commercial caravans to Peking, and we ourselves lessened our trade with China by confining it to the frontier town of Kiakhta. One privilege remained to us which no other European government had—that of constantly keeping in Peking a Russian religious mission; but this mission, the only object of whose existence was to keep up orthodoxy among the descendants of the captive defenders of Albazin, who had already become Chinese, was, through its composition, and through the character of its members, unfit to cope with the learned and crafty Jesuits, and never had, and never could have, any influence on our commercial or other relations with China.

Our affairs on the trans-Volga boundary of Russia were carried on in the eighteenth century no better than on the southern Siberian frontier. The rule of the Empress Anne was remarkable, as we read in the school-books of Russian history, for the voluntary submission of the numerous Horde of Kirghiz who had formerly been hostile to us. This happened in 1734. In St. Petersburg there was a great rejoicing at this event, and it was recalled to mind that Peter the Great himself had been of the opinion, as it was said, that 'this Horde, though a nomad and light-thinking people, was yet the key and the gate of all the lands and countries of Asia,' for, according to European ideas, people supposed that because they had received the allegiance of one of the Kirghiz Khans they had gained possession of this key, had entered into and had passed through the wished-for gates beyond which the treasures of India

were open to us. In consequence of this we already set about establishing a flotilla on the Aral Sea, and sent caravans to Tashkent, Bukhara, and further. Affairs, however, did not turn out quite as was expected. A spectacle of another kind was shown to us, which before that had hardly been seen in history. In order to defend ourselves from our new subjects we were compelled to shut ourselves in by a line of fortresses with large garrisons, while up to this time the boundary had been entirely open. This happened because our rulers had forgotten the axiom we have mentioned, that 'swearing allegiance is regarded by nomads as a bargain which binds to nothing, but in which they expect to gain four to one, and that for a mistake in their calculations they revenge themselves by pillage and incursions.' We took words for facts, and of course we were obliged to experience the consequences of such short-sightedness. Our new subjects showed themselves to be most evilly-disposed enemies, so that during nearly a whole century all the efforts of the government to reduce them to obedience—efforts which cost no little money—seemed utterly fruitless. From beyond our lines on the Yaik (Ural) and the Irtysk during all this period we did not move one step further into the Kirghiz Steppes, and we considered it a great good fortune if their inhabitants did not break through these lines, ravage our villages, and carry off the people into slavery. The task of taming nomads strong in numbers, defended by the vastness and the barrenness of their steppes, cunning, eager for booty, and passionately fond of their wild liberty, was of course no light undertaking, but still it was possible, for it has at last been accomplished. So that if we fruitlessly wasted nearly a hundred years in performing this task, it is evident that we did not know how to set about it. In very truth the history of our efforts to turn the Kirghiz from nominal into real subjects is in the highest degree comic from the impracticable character of the measures used and their want of correspondence with the aim—an impracticableness and a want of correspondence which came from the most complete ignorance on the part of those who managed this matter, not only of the passions of the nomads and the springs which set them in action, but even of their language, their religion, their ideas, and their manners. It was natural that under such conditions almost every step of ours was a mistake.

How great were these mistakes may be judged from the few following examples. We imagined that the Kirghiz were the same ethnographically as our Volga Tartars, and therefore for one hundred and twenty years we carried on all our correspondence with them in the Tartar language in the full assurance that we were communicating with them in their native tongue which they fully understood, while,

in fact, it was exactly the same as writing to Spaniards in Italian, or to Italians in Spanish, or to Poles in Serbian. Still worse results followed; another misunderstanding of ours was, that the Kirghiz were Mohammedans, whereas in the last century they were almost all Shamanists, and a large number of them remain so to this time. At the epoch of their nominal union with Russia only a very few of the Khans and Sultans had a confused idea of the dogmas of Islam and performed some few of its rites. Not a single mosque then existed in the Kirghiz Steppes, not a single *mullah* performed there the rites of the Mussulman religion, and if since that time the Kirghiz have really become Mussulman to a considerable degree, it is only owing to our taking them for Mussulmans and to our treating them as such. An incontrovertible proof that the Mussulman propaganda in one or another form went into the Kirghiz Steppes from the side of Russia is the circumstance that especially those Kirghiz who live along our lines have become Mussulman, while the old genuine Shamanism is kept up, even at the present time, among those Kirghiz particularly who wander in the neighbourhood of Khiva, Bukhara, and what was formerly Khokand, that is, in really Mussulman countries. From a purely political point of view our greatest mistake was our considering the Kirghiz Khans as European rulers, and the Sultans as a kind of feudal aristocracy, in consequence of which we supposed that if the Khans and Sultans were on our side the people would be obedient to us, and for that reason we courted the Khans and Sultans, treated them well, gave them presents, and had to do only with them. Meanwhile nowhere in the world had the heads of the nation and the aristocracy by birth so little meaning, so little real strength, as the Kirghiz Khans and Sultans. If any one of them attained to any influence, so as to be able to draw a crowd after him, he reached this not because of his 'white bone,' but on account of his personal worth, and personal qualities have gained exactly the same influence for simple Kirghiz of the 'black bone.'

The most decisive of the efforts to change the relations between the Kirghiz and Russia which had existed, from the time of their being received into allegiance, were made in the reign of the Empress Catherine II. Her intentions were good, but they were not carried out, not only because the great Empress strove for what at that time and under those circumstances was impossible, but also because the measures which were taken for carrying them out were marked by an idyllic Europeanism and at the same time by the greatest bureaucracy. According to the ideas which prevailed for some time in St. Petersburg, the Kirghiz were simple-minded, rude shepherds, who did not eat bread because they did not know the taste of it, who did not till the fields because they did not know

how to set about it,¹ who allowed their cattle to perish in the storms because they did not know of the existence of sheds, who froze themselves in winter in their felt tents because they were unacquainted with the carpenter's art, and if they were sometimes given over to robbery it was only because they were forced into it by the injustice and oppression of all sorts which they endured from our Cossacks and in general from the Russian population on the Ural and Irtysh lines. In accordance with such notions orders were given to teach the Kirghiz the use of bread, to give them lessons in hay-cutting, to construct sheds in which they could winter their cattle, and houses where they could themselves live. It was forbidden to send out military expeditions into the steppe to punish marauders. Large sums were given for the construction of mosques, with schools and caravansarais attached; the Kirghiz scholars were to receive every day some money for their nourishment, and the fathers were to be induced to send their children to school by presents, certificates of good conduct, etc. It was finally decided to extend to the Kirghiz the action of the 'Institution for the Government of the Provinces,' and to prepare them for this by the foundation in Orenburg of a 'Boundary Court,' where Kirghiz would sit together with Russians, and in the Steppe of 'Judicial Tribunals' subordinate to this Court, composed only of Kirghiz (illiterate) with clerks taken from the mullahs (Tartars), whose duty it was to look after all the arrangements for carrying on justice as contemplated in the 'Institution for the Provinces.' They were to annotate all the papers which were presented, to write them out in the journals, to set forth extracts, to make protocols and registers, to write the hours of meeting, to put down the questions, and to compose reports, communications, orders, etc., etc., all in forms given by the Russian authorities. The persons chosen for such and other duties were obliged to take oath, and were confirmed in their positions by the Empress with a considerable salary in money and grain. The greater part of the proposed measures were put into execution, but as might be expected the Kirghiz could neither understand nor estimate rightly such anxious care in their behalf. They did not desire either to settle in the huts constructed for them, to learn in the schools

¹ Similar ideas seemed to have obtained even in the present century. When the Bashkirs were being converted from a nomad to a settled life, it was found necessary to instruct them how to till their fields. Many ploughs were therefore sent out from Moscow, and as they arrived in the beginning of winter, it was thought that no easier method of instruction could be employed than by compelling them to plough the snow which covered the steppes. The Bashkirs became expert in the use of this agricultural implement, but somehow or other they could never understand the object of their labours!

founded for them, to pray in the mosques built for them, or to judge or be judged in the tribunals established for them (the members of the last, however, went regularly to Orenburg to receive their pay) ; and they continued as before to quarrel among themselves, and to make pillaging excursions against their neighbours. It became necessary at last to give up the pleasing hope of introducing order into the steppes by means of such a panacea as the 'Institution for the Provinces,' to abandon all attempts to civilize a half-savage people by petting and playing with them, and not only to change the measures which forbade sending an armed force to punish marauders, but even to take stronger measures of just retribution by seizing the relatives or even the neighbours of the guilty parties.

But among the measures which were impracticable, either through their idyllic or their bureaucratic character, there was one which was perfectly just, and completely answered the aim of bringing all the order then possible among the Kirghiz. This was the removal of the great obstacle to it, which existed, as the government at last understood, in the power of the Khan over the Kirghiz, which, in consequence of their national character, did not in the slightest degree keep them down, but through personal ambition constantly excited the passions of the people and caused disorder. In 1786 the Khan of the Lesser Kirghiz Horde, Nurali, was driven out by his people, after a reign of thirty-seven years, injurious both to Russia and his subjects, and died at Ufa. Our government, profiting by this circumstance, thought it advantageous not to name his successor. Unfortunately this decision was soon changed. In 1791 Irali, the son of Nurali, was raised by the Empress to the rank of Khan, and there was again for very many years the same disagreeable confusion, as prejudicial to us as it was to the Kirghiz themselves.

The disobedience and the marauding of the Kirghiz made us angry so much the more that they prevented our trade with the settled countries of Central Asia. The development of this trade and its extension to India were the constant dreams of the statesmen of Russia of that time who paid any attention to Asia. It was especially with the hope of reaching these aims that we were rejoiced, as we have seen, at the submission of the Kirghiz. Their Khans constantly promised to convey commercial caravans to Central Asia, and from thence to Russia in perfect security, but their subjects as constantly took from these caravans a heavy contribution, or completely pillaged them. Under such circumstances our commercial relations with Central Asia could not flourish, and frequently were entirely stopped for a very long time. Besides this they were carried on from the Orenburg line almost exclusively with Bukhara

and Khiva. In order to keep up and strengthen these relations we coquetted even with Mahommedanism. It is well known that one of the best colleges in Bukhara was constructed at the instigation of the Empress Catherine, who gave 40,000 rubles for it,¹ and it was more than once proposed to establish a city at the mouth of the Syr-Darya, and to populate it at first, in consequence of the disagreeableness of the locality, with criminals condemned to exile, but this idea never passed from paper into reality. With Khiva we could still carry on trade from Astrakhan by way of the Caspian Sea and the Turkoman Steppe, but the Caspian Turkomans, although certain of their 'elders' had sworn allegiance to Russia even in the time of Peter the Great, did not fall behind the Kirghiz in their marauding disposition, and even the Khivans, remembering the destruction of Bekovitch, and constantly fearing revenge for their breach of faith at that time, avoided coming into close relations with us on that side where they thought they were the least protected from the Russian arms. Judging from their own feelings and ideas they could never understand that people in Russia might forget about the fate of some thousands of their compatriots who had been tortured to death or had lingered on in slavery. We, oppressed with other and more important cares, had not the slightest thought of the revenge which the Khivans feared, and were ready to hold out a friendly hand at any time. When the Khivan Inak (the ruler of the Khanate) became blind, and decided in 1792 to ask the Russian government to send him an oculist, his request was at once granted. In Asia such humanity cannot be prized at its worth. Our indulgence and long-suffering were considered nothing but weakness: and these, together with the want of capacity which we showed in arranging matters with the Kirghiz, over which Asiatics could not but laugh, and the superfluous politeness which was shown to the embassies of their insignificant rulers, greatly, if not entirely, destroyed the respect which from the time of Ivan the Terrible had surrounded the Russian name in the neighbouring East. They got accustomed to consider us as people who did not understand anything, who could be easily deceived, and who allowed themselves to be insulted with impunity, and it must be admitted we deservedly had such an unenviable reputation. At the end of the reign of Catharine the unsatisfactory character of our knowledge of Asia, and the ineffectual nature of our policy were apparently acknowledged by the government itself; at least we see that in order to acquaint ourselves with the countries in the basin of the Amu and the Syr, Russian officials were sent there in 1792 from

¹ See p. 93.

Siberia (Burnashof and Pospelof) who gave to us very curious information for that time about the Bukharan and Tashkent possessions.

Still less important was the trade which was carried on with the settled population of Central Asia from Semipalatinsk and Petropavlovsk on the Irtysh line, where merchants sometimes arrived from Tashkent, Khokand, and the cities of Eastern Turkistan; but it is necessary to mention that with the Kirghiz themselves a barter traffic arose on the lines which had been newly established against them, a trade very important in its amount and very profitable for us. This advantage was the only one which their nominal allegiance brought us.

At the same time with the Kirghiz another nation had sent a deputation to the Empress Anne, asking to be taken into allegiance—which was of course done—the Karakalpaks, half settled, half nomad people living at that time along the rivers Syr and Kuvan. After that, however, as neither people was necessary to the other, we entirely forgot about them and they about us. Let us notice also that in the year 1740 the Khivan Khanate was acknowledged as being in subjection to Russia even by the famous Nadir Shah of Persia, for the reason that our subject Abul Khair, Khan of the Kirghiz, had been chosen Khan in Khiva, and had reigned there for some days.

To the eighteenth century must be referred also our first attempts to begin relations with Japan, which from 1637, as is well known, had refused all intercourse with Christian nations except only the Dutch, who had declared themselves not to be Christians. The cause of this was the shipwreck of some Japanese about 1780 on the coast of Siberia. These efforts came to no result, except that the shipwrecked Japanese were obliged to teach their native language in the public schools at Irkutsk in order to form Russian interpreters to carry on our relations with Japan. Japanese was in this way the first of the Eastern languages which was officially taught in Russia.

A new attempt to establish relations with Japan was the first act of our Central Asiatic policy in the nineteenth century. It began in consequence of the first voyage of Russian ships around the world, on which they set out in 1803, but instead of the expected profit it brought us harm, for, on account of the prejudicial conduct of our ambassador, it ended in the just hostility of the Japanese towards us. Attempts at closer relations with Khiva and Bukhara were repeated by despatching embassies to these countries in 1819–20, but their only fruit was the enrichment of Russian and European literature by the excellent books of Muravief, Meyendorf, and Evers-

mann. In order to keep up the trade with Bukhara, which suffered from the Kirghiz marauders as well as from the Khivan robbers, we conceived the idea of sending caravans thither under a military convoy. The first attempt at such an armed caravan was made in 1824, but was very unfortunate notwithstanding the convoy, the outfit of which cost the government 230,000 rubles in assignats. The caravan was robbed, and an attempt of this kind was not repeated. The missions of Putimtsef to Jungaria in 1811, and of Nazarof in 1814 to Khokand, for obtaining information, were fruitless. Our relations to China were distinguished by Chinese immobility. In this way during the first quarter of the nineteenth century our policy with regard to Central Asia was in aims, methods, and results as unsuccessful and as unworthy of Russia as it was in the eighteenth century. We had no aims of aggrandisement; there were no efforts at subjection or conquest; all our care was limited to the modest object of obtaining equality in commercial relations with the petty settled countries of Uzbekistan; but even this, notwithstanding all our exertions, we were in no wise able to obtain. The Bukharan, Khivan, Tashkent, and Khokandian traders went about through the whole broad extent of Russia, as if at home, in perfect safety; bought Russian wares from the manufacturers at the place of production; and for their own goods which they had imported they were able, in the absence of competition, to fix most advantageous prices. Russian traders, on the contrary, in consequence of the vexation, oppression, and even danger to life to which they were exposed, as being Christians, in Bukhara and the other countries of Central Asia, were compelled entirely to give up their journeys thither, and if they sent caravans into those countries, it was only with the aid of Tartar clerks, on whose honesty they could not always depend. Even these agents, on account of their Russian citizenship, were obliged to pay double custom duties for their goods, were not allowed in any other places of the Khanate except the capitals or those towns which lay on their route, and were therefore obliged to make their purchases from the merchants of the capital at second or third hand. We do not even speak of the obligatory presents to the Khans, to the high officials, and even to the lesser ones. It frequently happened that all their goods were taken from them by the Khan at low and arbitrarily fixed prices. What government in the world could remain indifferent to such a state of affairs, to such unequal rights to the detriment of their subjects? The removal of this inequality was, as has been said, the chief object of all our diplomatic relations with the Central Asiatic rulers, but it was wrong for us to negotiate with them as with equals. We ought to have merely given orders, so

much the more because we had the power of compelling them to the fulfilment of our demands without recourse to military force. The Central Asiatics knew of this possibility, and nevertheless made no concessions to us, but were even very haughty. Why? Because from long experience they knew that our authorities did not take advantage of this possibility, not knowing of its existence, just as they did not know of many other modes of action which could be used on a closer acquaintance with the past and present of Eastern countries and nations. As a specimen of how slight was our acquaintance with them, we may state that even about 1850 the Siberian administration asked that of Orenburg to explain the meaning of the word *baranta*, although this term had been used in official papers almost every day from the time that the Kirghiz had been received into allegiance; that is, for a hundred and twenty years they had talked about what they did not clearly understand.

The reign of Alexander I. did not pass entirely without profit, at least with regard to the actual introduction of Russian power and the benefits of civil order into the Kirghiz steppes. In 1810 we moved further into the Ural steppes, cutting off from them on the Orenburg line a district with very rich salt mines, known by the name of the Iletsk district, and colonising it with Russians. Afterwards, having been convinced by a long and dear experience of the inutility to the Kirghiz and the injury to us of the rule of the Khans, we finally abolished the title of Khan, first in the Siberian, and then in the Orenburg steppes. The government of the people in both places was confided to Kirghiz chosen by the Russian government, with the participation, or under the surveillance only, of our officials. In consequence of this, in the parts of the Kirghiz steppes nearest to the Irtysh, Russian Kazak villages appeared as centres of the administrative districts as early as 1824. About the same time the topographical survey of the Kirghiz steppes was undertaken—a measure which apparently had nothing in common with politics or the Kirghiz administration, but which was important to both.

During the reign of the Emperor Nicholas I. measures for strengthening the union of the Kirghiz steppes with Russia brought a great part of its inhabitants into almost perfect submission. In 1834 a fort was built on the north-eastern coast of the Caspian Sea with the aim of preventing the marauding incursions of the Adäi Kirghiz, and in the following year a new military line was established between the river Ural and Uï, and all the region which was in this way cut off from the trans-Ural steppes was united to the territory of the Orenburg Cossack army. On the side of Siberia, in the trans-Irtysh steppes, there continued to be formed districts

with Russian colonies in their centres. Seeing the end of their disorderly independence, that part of the Siberian Kirghiz which was not willing to submit to this rebelled under the banner of the Sultan Kenisar Kasimcf, who also succeeded in raising a part of his fellow-countrymen—the Orenburg Kirghiz. Quickly moving with his followers from the Siberian steppes to those of Orenburg and back again, during six whole years he kept the Russian authorities in continual alarm. All our efforts to defeat and capture him proved vain, until in 1844, being pursued by the Russian forces, he was compelled to take refuge in the settlement of the Kara Kirghiz, and was killed in a fight with them.

The result of this rebellion was that in order to prevent as far as possible similar attempts, small fortifications were erected during the following years in the eastern parts of the trans-Ural steppes, on the rivers Turgai and Irghiz, after which the Russian fort Raim rose at the mouth of the Syr-Darya. By means of this we had the possibility of becoming better acquainted with the Aral Sea, which up to this time had been known only by name. In 1848-49 two ships which had been constructed in Orenburg, and had been brought in parts to Raim, made a survey of the Aral Sea, in the course of which a geographical discovery was made in this small mediterranean basin, just as might have been the case in some remote part of the ocean. A whole group of islands of considerable size was discovered, of the existence of which even the inhabitants of the coast had no suspicion. In this way what had been supposed possible in the reign of the Empress Anne was not actually carried out until 115 years after, under the Emperor Nicholas. At last we had really arrived from the side of Orenburg on that Syr-Darya which long before, in the first printed maps of Russia, had been marked as the Russian boundary against the settled countries of Central Asia. Meanwhile, in a parallel way from the side of Siberia there was also a further extension of Russian limits within Central Asia, and our power became established there. In 1845-7 the Great or Old Kirghiz Horde found it to its advantage to become submissive to Russia; for although it had once before sworn allegiance to us in the last century, it had depended more or less on the rulers of Tashkent and Khokand. This new acquisition compelled us, in order to defend it from its neighbours to erect the fortifications of Kopal at the foot of the Jungarian, and Viernoc at the foot of the Khokandian Ala-tan. An end was also found to the steppes on the extreme south-east, and the overflow of the Russian Sea began to beat then with its waves the rocks of the Tian Shan mountains.

When we had once received the Kirghiz steppes into our alle-

giance, we ought naturally to have attempted to turn this nominal into a real subjection, as without that it would be impossible not only to develop our trade with the settled countries which lie behind these steppes (a trade from which, although entirely without reason, great advantages were expected), but it would also be impossible to give security to the Russian settlements which bordered on the steppes. Once having succeeded in reducing the Kirghiz to obedience (the clearest proof of which was the revenue we began to get from them), and having introduced all the order and quiet we could into the steppe, it became our duty to preserve them from hostile attacks on the south by the Khokandians and Khivans. The pretensions of the Khivan Khans on the Kirghiz, which had grown much stronger since the beginning of the present century, were limited, however, to temporary imposts on the tribes which were nearest to them, and did not specially interfere with the quiet of the steppe in general. The Khokandians acted otherwise. Having established themselves about 1820 on the right border of the valley of the Syr and along the southern slopes of Kara-tau and Alatau by a line of mud forts, they not only regularly took tribute from the local and neighbouring Kirghiz, but from time to time penetrated with large bands into the trans-Ural and Tchu steppes, and wrought great devastation, accompanying it with the most frightful barbarity. After the construction of Viernoë and Raim, we stood face to face with these barbarians, and we were inevitably obliged to meet them with arms. As Asiatics do not practise political common sense, which would forbid them to begin a struggle that was disproportionate to their means, and as the Khokandians had not the slightest idea of the strength of Russia, and at the same time showed no desire to leave off their marauding expeditions, their hostile relations to our Kirghiz naturally ended to their great discomfiture. By the end of 1853 almost all the Khokandian forts in the valley of the Syr, including the strongest, Ak Masjid, had fallen in our hands. It was also necessary to punish the Khivans, not for their old faults, which had well-nigh been forgotten by us, but for their frequent attacks on our caravans going to Bukhara and on the Bukharan caravans coming to us, and for the protection which they gave to the still disobedient Kirghiz, who captured the Russian traders and fishermen on the Caspian Sea, in consequence of which Khiva became the chief market for the Russian slave trade, and thousands of Russians were there in torture. After long wavering as to how to set about this punishment, it was finally resolved in the year 1839 to undertake a military expedition against Khiva; but, as it is well known, through the severity of the winter, the Russian forces were obliged

to return when they were still far from reaching the bounds of the Khivan Khanate. It is true that, terrified by this movement, and still more by the detention of the Khivan traders in Russia—a measure which should have been applied long before—the Khivan Khan gave up a part of the Russians who were kept there as slaves; but immediately after affairs went on as before. The Khivans again robbed our caravans; again bought up the Russians who were captured by the Turkomans and the Kirghiz; so that the embassy which was sent in 1842 in order to arrange things peaceably, had little result except the collection of new knowledge about the Lower Amu Darya (published by Danilefsky and Basiner). In order to prevent the attack of the Caspian Turkomans we established a constant cruising service of armed vessels in the southern part of the Caspian Sea, from a station that had been agreed upon with Persia in the Gulf of Astrabad; but this fleet in general had little effect, and it defended from the attacks of the Turkomans rather the Caspian shores of Persia than the Russian commercial vessels in the northern part of that sea. During the period under consideration the commercial relations of Bukhara, which were so bad for Russia, did not change for the better. We profited by the request of the Bukharan Amir to send him people skilful in searching for gold (he had received information about our gold mines in Siberia and the Ural), only to send into Bukhara in 1842 several scientific officers and mining engineers, who on this occasion visited Samarkand and other places of the Khanate, which had hitherto been inaccessible to Europeans, and brought back to us precious scientific information (Khanikof, Lehmann, and Butenief).

As regards China we began to prize the trade of this empire, as it had been established at Kiakhta, still more than the trade with Bukhara, and although it was unprofitable to us we were ready to sacrifice everything in order that it might not in any way cease even for a short time. During the continuance of the war which the English declared against the Chinese in 1840, we could, if we had only wished, have obtained many advantages; for the Chinese authorities, then entirely unacquainted with Europe, turned of themselves to the members of our Pekin mission for counsel and explanation; but for some reason or other we thought it necessary not to meddle under any pretext in this dispute, and we considered it a great diplomatic victory that by the treaty of Kuldja in 1851 we legalized the trade with Western China through Kuldja and Tchugutchak, which had been very quietly carried on without any special permission from Bukhtarmy, Petropavlovsk, and Semipalatinsk from the very beginning of the present century. According to this treaty we obtained the right to construct factories in Tchug-

gatchak and Kuldja, and in the latter place to have our own consul. Towards the end of the period under consideration the fear of quarrelling with the Chinese began, however, to yield to other political views. We began to think about recovering the territory which had been lost by us without the slightest reason by the treaty of Nertchinsk, and about navigating the Amur to the Pacific. With this aim military operations along this river began against the Chinese in 1853; but it is necessary to say that even this matter, which had lain dormant for more than one hundred and sixty years, was begun too soon, for its advantages are still in the future, and mean while its has succeeded in acting in a very disadvantageous way on the prospects of Eastern Siberia.

At least, with regard to Japan we were not behind the other European nations in our success, having opened relations with it in the proper time and with energy. During the last days of the reign of the Emperor Nicholas a treaty was concluded with that country at Simoda, by which Russian vessels were allowed to enter the three ports of Simoda, Hakodati, and Nagasaki; Russia was allowed to have a consul in one of the first two ports; and a very important condition was made that all the rights and privileges which should be given in future in Japan to other nations should be at the same time extended to Russian subjects. In this way, to us, together with the Americans, belongs the honour of forcing a breach into this Great Britain of the Eastern Ocean, hitherto inaccessible.

In the castle of Gripsholm on Lake Mälär there lie two immense cannon of the time of Ivan the Terrible, brought from Novgorod during the 'troublous times' by General De La Gardie. The Swedes with pride point out these trophies to foreigners, and it is not even unpleasant for a Russian to look at them when he remembers the battle of Poltava and its consequences for Sweden. In the same way, without the slightest disagreeable feeling, we can admit the unsatisfactory character of our Asiatic policy since the time of Peter the Great, knowing that during the present reign almost all our former failures have been gloriously wiped out, and that the Russian name in Central Asia is now as terrible and enjoys the same respect as it did after the fall of Kazan and Astrakhan. But we do not undertake an estimate of our activity in this part of Asia during the last twenty years, because the view of a contemporary may be near-sighted and prejudiced, and also because we do not have at hand sufficiently full and truthful data.

APPENDIX V.

RUSSIA AND KHIVA.

THE following is the substance of an account of the relations with Khiva preceding the Khivan campaign of 1873, given by Terentief, in his 'Russia and England in Central Asia,' chapters v., vi. :—

'Immediately on his arrival in Tashkent, General Kaufmann wrote to the Khivan Khan, Mohammed Rahim, a letter of November 19 (December 1), 1867, in which he informed him of his appointment and arrival, of the full powers granted him by the Emperor, and of the movement of our detachment beyond the Syr Darya for the purpose of punishing the marauders who pillaged our caravans, &c. But this letter was evidently understood as a desire on the part of the Governor-General to curry favour, and the Khivans immediately took a lofty tone.

'The Khan did not even answer it himself, but committed the care of his correspondence to his attendants, who in their turn hastened so little that the answer was received only in February 1868. Knowing that Mohammed Rahim, who was only twenty years old, was more occupied in hunting with falcons than with business, which was carried on by his ministers, we did not expect from Khiva any special politeness. The tone of the answer surpassed our anticipations. The Khivan Kush-begi wrote: "Every lord rules his own lands and neither the people there, of old subject to him, nor his army ought to cross the boundary and in this way break the peace. Further, your statement that both sides of the Syr Darya belong to your rule is apparently an infringement of previous treaties, since the southern side of the Syr Darya belongs to us. If, on the southern side of the Syr Darya, rebels disturb caravans, we will put them down; but if they attack the caravans on the other side of the Syr Darya, that is your work."

'In view of his journey to St. Petersburg the Governor-General decided not to answer this letter until his return, and in the mean-

time to look up the question of the treaties to which the Khivans referred. It was decided also not to change the *de facto* occupation of the left bank of the Syr Darya, and of the whole course of the Kuvan and the Yany Darya to Lake Aktcha-kul, since the Kirghiz of the district of Kazala migrated along these rivers, passed the winter there, and left agriculturists there during the summer.

‘From the beginning of the winter of 1867, in order to protect these Kirghiz from the pillage of the Khivans, detachments had been sent out from Kazala and Perovsky to Irkibai, and even further, if the weather allowed. This measure up to 1873 continued to give satisfactory results. As concerns the juridical side of the question the researches made in St. Petersburg proved that there were no treaties regarding the boundaries; and although the Khivans had raised the question during the mission of General Ignatief, he had declined to decide the question, on the ground of the impossibility of exactly defining the boundary-line between countries the outlying provinces of which were inhabited by nomads only.

‘Khiva seemed to take no lessons from the capture of Samarkand, and even held her head high. All the robber-chiefs who had previously carried on their raids under the banner of the Amir, such as Sadyk, Nazar, &c., and all the Russian traitors, as the cornet Atankul and his brothers, as well as the rebellious son of the Amir, the Katta Tiura, found a refuge in Khiva. The Khan gave many of them money for their support, and proposed to the Katta Tiura the rank of Khan of the Turkomans subject to Khiva. The Amir, however, soon demanded the surrender of his son, and Khiva—thus placed between the laws of hospitality and the demands of a near and powerful neighbour—took the middle course and advised the Katta Tiura to leave the country. Atankul started to go with him, but was caught, put in chains, and incarcerated for four months in prison. . . .

‘During the troubles with the Kirghiz the proclamations of the Khan and his ministers filled the steppes, the Khivan emissaries were profuse in promises, and the small detachment sent out by the Khan grew in the imagination of the Kirghiz into great armies, and stimulated them to all sorts of depredations. How submissive were even those Kirghiz authorities supposed to be loyal can be judged from the reports of the Volost rulers. Iset Kutuy Barof very naïvely communicated on May 22 (June 3), that “having received information of the arrival of the Khivans on the borders, and an invitation from them to come, I and Niaz went. They asked us, ‘On whose side are you?’ We answered ‘On

both.' The Khivans took from us three merchants¹ and 1,000 sheep."

'In one of the proclamations issued, to which the seal of Mohammed Rahim Khan was affixed, it was said that according to the treaties with Russia the boundary was first the Ural and afterwards the Emba, and that the advance of the Russians beyond the Emba was an infringement of the treaties. "You and all the Kirghiz tribes," the Khan wrote, "unanimously agreed to separate yourselves from the infidels, and decided to smite them with the sword of Islam. This is known to him who rules on the threshold of the refuge of Islam, and therefore we send to you troops, with the Esaul Bashi Mahmud and Makhrum Khudai Nazar." By other proclamations in the name of the emissaries the Bii and elders were invited to come to Khiva for consultation about the intended movement. The Divan Begi also encouraged the rebels, and promised that the Khan's troops would soon come to their aid. It is possible, indeed, that these documents may have been forgeries, as forgeries are not uncommon in Central Asia. . . .

'Various Russians captured in the subsequent disturbances were sent on to Khiva.

'Not wishing at once to have recourse to harsh measures, the Governor-General tried to bring Khiva to its senses by diplomatic means. In a letter of August 12 (24), 1869, the Khan was told (1) That incendiary proclamations in his name had been sent to our Kirghiz and Turkomans. (2) That his officials, attended by troops, had come within our limits, for the purpose of exciting disorder among our subjects. (3) That some Russians had been carried off to Khiva, where they were kept with his knowledge. (4) That rebels and robbers, running away from the Russian dominions, find hospitality and protection with him.

'A demand was made at the same time that such offences should not be repeated, and that the guilty parties should be punished for their infringement of the frontier. "I do not wish to think that all this was done with your knowledge," added the Governor-General, "and would be glad to believe that you have no hand in these things. Similar acts were committed formerly by Khokand and Bukhara. You know the consequences."

'On receiving fresh information regarding the disturbances in the Bukan mountains another letter was written, dated September 20 (October 2), demanding the punishment of the marauders, the return of the men who had been taken, and the liberation of the Russian and Bukharan subjects that had been captured. No

¹ Ivan Burnashof and his companions.

answer, however, was received to either of these letters, and the messenger by whom they had been sent was kept under arrest in Khiva. This messenger was a Kirghiz from Perovsky, Sultan Danlet Bushaef. Leaving Perovsky on September 19, 1869, in fourteen days he arrived in Khiva, where the people met him with glad cries of *Eltchi, Eltchi!* (Ambassador). The Ministers, however, not content with his answer, did not receive him as such. To the question of the Kush-begi as to the opinion of the Russians about Sadyk, Bushaef replied that the Russians considered him one of their leaders; for wherever he appeared he always enticed the Russians, and gave up to them the cities that he defended; that the Khokandians were obliged to him for the loss of their cities; that the Bukharans had paid for his support by Samarkand; "and now he is with you," added Bushaef. Next day this messenger was disarmed and placed under guard, where he remained for three months.

'As the disturbances in the Orenburg steppes did not cease, a detachment was sent from Kazala to the Yany Darya and another from Jizakh to the Bukan mountains. The latter had also the purpose of marking out the new boundary-line with Bukhara.

'The Khan, hearing of the advance of the detachment to the Bukan mountains and of the establishment of a post at Krasnovodsk, gave up the Russian messenger, Bushaef. The landing at Krasnovodsk seems to have made a strong impression. The Khan immediately sent a force of cavalry to poison all the wells on the road to Krasnovodsk by throwing dead dogs into them. A new citadel was constructed in the city and armed with twenty guns. The chief branch of the Amu Darya, the Taldyk, was turned aside and various canals were cut, so as to render it shallow and impassable for Russian ships. A small fortification was constructed at Cape Urgu. The Russian Kirghiz migrating to Khiva were freed from all taxes on condition of giving troops in case of war. . . .

'As it would have been disadvantageous to have the Khivan Khan consider the expedition which occupied Krasnovodsk as an independent undertaking and not in conformity with the general direction of our policy in Central Asia, General Kaufmann, immediately on receiving information of it wrote to the Khan on January 18 (30), 1870, telling him of the purpose of the settlement—to construct a commercial depôt and protect the Kirghiz from the attacks of Turkomans. He, at the same time, reminded the Khan in very strong expressions of his previous demands in regard to permitting Russian merchants to come to Khiva, and adding that he had written already three times to him, but had received no

answer. "You have even allowed yourself, against all law, to detain my messengers. Such conduct can no longer be endured. One of two things—either we must be friends or enemies. There is no middle course between neighbours. There is an end to all this, and if I do not receive a satisfactory answer I shall take one."

'A month after this letter was sent, on March 9, Bushaef returned, having obtained an answer from the Divan Begi to the second letter and from the Kush-begi to the third.

'The first wrote that the Khivan tax collectors had always gone to the Bukan mountains and collected taxes from the Tcharu tribe and from the caravans. "This is no novelty," he wrote; "the Bukharan merchants are witness to it." As concerns the Hebrew who was taken prisoner there the Divan-begi explained that no one knew anything about him, and the robberies on the Bukan mountains were ascribed to Russian Kirghiz, since the Khivan tax collectors had only ten men, and not eighty, the number of the robbers.

'The Kush-begi wrote in much more detail. "Our master does not at all wish war; on the contrary, he desires quiet and the welfare of his people. We wish the same to you. However, some time back Russian troops have crossed our frontier and marched against us." Further, in defence of his proclamations and emissaries, the Kush-begi said: "Your Kirghiz complain to us that the Russians do not allow them to migrate within the Khivan borders, as was formerly the case, and that besides they oppress and kill them. To quiet these Kirghiz and to punish these marauders I sent them from five to ten officials." With regard to the prisoners he said: "The Kirghiz brought to us three Russians, and desired to obtain from them payment for their relatives who had been killed, and for property which had been stolen, but he who sits under the shadow of God cooled with the waters of prudence the flaming hearts of the Kirghiz, refused to allow the punishment, and took away the prisoners, who can be returned in case the Russian troops be forbidden to cross the frontier, and the Kirghiz be indemnified for the property which they had lost."

'On March 25 (April 6) General Kaufmann replied with a letter in which he said that the Russian troops had marched to a place occupied by Russian subjects who needed protection against robbers, and that wherever the subjects of the White Tsar lived they remained his subjects, and for that reason the lands along the Yany Darya as far as Lake Aktcha-kul had always been considered, and would always be considered Russian, as well as the Bukan mountains and all the road from the Kyzyl Kum to Irkibai, on the

Yany Darya, in accordance with the treaty made with Bukhara, and that no one else had the right to collect any taxes there.

‘On April 26 an answer was received from the Khan to General Kaufmann’s letter of January 30. With regard to Krasnovodsk the Kush-begi wrote: “The contents of your last letter show a great ill will. From the foundation of the world until this time there never was an example that one ruler, for the quiet of another, and for the welfare of foreign subjects, constructed fortresses beyond his own frontiers, and sent thither his troops. Our lord desires that the White Tsar, according to the example of his ancestors, should not be carried away by the immensity of the empire entrusted to him by God, and should not seek to obtain the lands of others. This is not the custom of great sovereigns. If, relying upon the strength of his armies, he wish to make war against us, then before the Creator of the heaven and earth, before the Great Judge of all earthly judges, all are equal, both the strong and the weak. To whom he wishes he gives the victory. Nothing can be accomplished against the will and the predestination of the Most High.”

‘Seeing how little importance the Khivans attached to the Russian demands when unsupported by force of arms, General Kaufmann reported to the Ministry of War the necessity of changing relations with Khiva, and suggested in case of war that one expedition be sent from Tashkent, and another from Krasnovodsk. By a letter dated March 25 (13), 1870, the Minister of War informed General Kaufmann that his views had met with the Emperor’s approval.

‘Meanwhile the Khan of Khiva sent an envoy to Krasnovodsk, but on the way he had interviews with Turkomans, and counselled them to unite against the Russians. Colonel Stoletof, the commander of Krasnovodsk, however, had received orders from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to have no negotiations with the ambassador except for a private agreement with regard to the protection of commercial caravans, but to refer him to the Governor-General of Turkistan as the person having the necessary full powers.

‘In the spring of 1870 there were new disturbances among the Kirghiz at Mangyshlak; and Colonel Rukin, with a detachment, having been surrounded by the enemy, is said to have shot himself, while the rest were taken prisoners.

‘The catastrophé of Rukin, the attack on Fort Alexandrofsky, the burning of the Nicolai station and of the neighbouring lightships, came one after the other; and if there had not been assistance rendered from the Caucasus, the fort, notwithstanding its fourteen guns, would have been taken by the rebels. Although all

this could not be directly ascribed to the Khivans, yet the evidence of the rebel prisoners plainly pointed to Khivan intrigues; some Cossacks taken prisoners by the Kirghiz were sent by them to the Khan, and soon after received into his service; while the rebels found in Khiva not only a refuge but protection.

‘As the Khan refused compliance with our demands General Kaufmann thought it unwise to have any further diplomatic relations with Khiva, and began to prepare for war, so as to put an end to this state of things. Preparations were rendered difficult because the bad harvests of 1870 had caused a great rise in the price of provisions. Still, by May 1871 we were ready, and the Bukharan Amir consented to allow our troops to pass through his dominions. Meanwhile Khiva also made preparations. It was decided to undertake the expedition of 1871 against Khiva from the Turkistan side, the other two detachments from Orenburg and the Caucasus taking a defensive position merely, and sending out small detachments in order to prevent the migration of the Kirghiz. The troops sent into the Barsuks and the Ursturt kept the Steppe from rebellion, and our Kirghiz forces did not allow the Khivans to penetrate within our frontiers. The Khan determined to seek an alliance with Bukhara, but his ambassador, Baba Bii, was arrested by the Amir on a hint from Tashkent.

‘At this time, however, the question of war had already been postponed on account of the final rupture with Kuldja. As General Kaufmann had decided to avoid immediate relations with Khiva, and as the Amir of Bukhara had proposed to act as mediator to remove the misunderstandings, the conditions were proposed, that Khiva should give up all Russian prisoners, should refuse further protection to marauders, and should send an embassy to Tashkent. The Amir released the Khivan envoy, and sent with him one of his own, Hadji Urak, who was treated with a certain contempt by the Khivans, who expressed surprise at the indifference of Bukhara. The Khan, in the final audience with the Bukharan envoy, said, “Let the Governor-General send me a polite letter with propositions of friendship and a promise not to cross with his troops the boundaries of my possessions, and I will then free the eleven soldiers whom I keep prisoners, and will stop pillage and robbery. If he will not do that I shall not give up the prisoners, and all will be as it was before; and it is known to God alone what will happen after that.” The reply of the Khan to the Amir,—which had no seal, and consequently showed a want of respect,—denied the justice of the Russian complaints against Khiva.

‘Murtaza Bii, the envoy sent back with the letter, was instructed to enter into communication with the Governor-General. Knowing


already by experience how little success could be expected from the negotiations with the Khivans, and especially in view of the categorical tone taken of late by the presumptuous Khan, the Governor-General decided not to receive the Khivan envoy in Tashkent, but to negotiate with him through the Amir of Bukhara. In case of the ill-success of these negotiations it was proposed once for all to finish with Khiva, but not sooner, however, than affairs had been arranged with Yakub Bek and with Kuldja.

‘Meanwhile Khiva, frightened by the simultaneous advance of two columns—that of General Golovatchef from Jizakh, through the Bukan mountains, and Colonel Markozof’s from Krasnovodsk—decided on coming to terms, and sent two embassies in the beginning of 1872 (Murtaza Bii and Baba Nazar Atalyk), one to Tiflis and the other to Orenburg. In spite of the order of the Emperor—which was well known to the Khivan Government—that relations should be carried on exclusively with the Governor-General at Turkistan, the Khivans, it is evident, doubted the solidarity of the relations with the adjoining Russian provinces, and hoped in Orenburg and Tiflis to find a support against the demands of Tashkent.

‘In a letter to the Grand Duke Michael the Khan wrote as follows:—“Be it known to your friendly heart that from the olden time alliance has existed between our high governments. Our relations have been sincere, and our friendship is strengthened from day to day, as though the two governments constituted one government and the two peoples one people. But last year your armies established themselves at Tcheleken, on the coast of the Kharesm Gulf, under the pretext of commercial aims. Not long ago a small detachment of these troops advanced as far as Sary Kamysh, which as from of old belongs to us, but returned thence. Besides this, from Tashkent and Ak Masjid Russian troops have advanced to the wells Ming Bulak, lying in our hereditary possessions. It is unknown to us whether the Grand Duke knows of this or not. Meanwhile, we have never done anything which could interfere with our friendly relations to you. Four or five of your people were captured by some Kirghiz, but we took them away and keep them with us. If you wish to keep up friendly relations with us, then conclude a treaty that each of us shall be contented within our lawful boundaries. Then we will return to you all your prisoners. But if these prisoners serve you only as a pretext for war against us, with the aim of extending your dominions, then the will of the Almighty be done.”

‘The envoys were stopped, one at Temur-khan-shura and the other at Orenburg, and were told that they would not be permitted to go either to the Imperial Court or to the Lieutenant of the

Caucasus, and that no letters could be received from them until the prisoners were released and an embassy sent to Tashkent. The Khivans saw the mistake, but no longer wished to rectify it. Instead of sending an embassy to Tashkent they sent one to India with a request for help against Russia. The Viceroy, as was to be expected, advised them to make peace with Russia, obey her demands, and give no cause for further dissatisfaction.'



MAP
OF THE KHANATES
OF BUKHARA KHIVA AND KHOKAND
AND PART OF RUSSIAN TURKISTAN

According to the latest topographical surveys
and astronomical determinations

1875



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